linux-toradex.git/net/packet, branch v5.18

net/packet: fix packet_sock xmit return value checking

2022-04-15T10:17:30+00:00

packet_sock xmit could be dev_queue_xmit, which also returns negative
errors. So only checking positive errors is not enough, or userspace
sendmsg may return success while packet is not send out.

Move the net_xmit_errno() assignment in the braces as checkpatch.pl said
do not use assignment in if condition.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Flavio Leitner 
Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net

2022-03-17T20:56:58+00:00

No conflicts.

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

net/packet: fix slab-out-of-bounds access in packet_recvmsg()

2022-03-15T05:08:34+00:00

syzbot found that when an AF_PACKET socket is using PACKET_COPY_THRESH
and mmap operations, tpacket_rcv() is queueing skbs with
garbage in skb->cb[], triggering a too big copy [1]

Presumably, users of af_packet using mmap() already gets correct
metadata from the mapped buffer, we can simply make sure
to clear 12 bytes that might be copied to user space later.

BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:225 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in packet_recvmsg+0x56c/0x1150 net/packet/af_packet.c:3489
Write of size 165 at addr ffffc9000385fb78 by task syz-executor233/3631

CPU: 0 PID: 3631 Comm: syz-executor233 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc7-syzkaller-02396-g0b3660695e80 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106
 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xf/0x336 mm/kasan/report.c:255
 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:442 [inline]
 kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf mm/kasan/report.c:459
 check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:183 [inline]
 kasan_check_range+0x13d/0x180 mm/kasan/generic.c:189
 memcpy+0x39/0x60 mm/kasan/shadow.c:66
 memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:225 [inline]
 packet_recvmsg+0x56c/0x1150 net/packet/af_packet.c:3489
 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:948 [inline]
 sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:966 [inline]
 sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:962 [inline]
 ____sys_recvmsg+0x2c4/0x600 net/socket.c:2632
 ___sys_recvmsg+0x127/0x200 net/socket.c:2674
 __sys_recvmsg+0xe2/0x1a0 net/socket.c:2704
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7fdfd5954c29
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 41 15 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffcf8e71e48 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002f
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007fdfd5954c29
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000500 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000000000000d R09: 000000000000000d
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffcf8e71e60
R13: 00000000000f4240 R14: 000000000000c1ff R15: 00007ffcf8e71e54
 

addr ffffc9000385fb78 is located in stack of task syz-executor233/3631 at offset 32 in frame:
 ____sys_recvmsg+0x0/0x600 include/linux/uio.h:246

this frame has 1 object:
 [32, 160) 'addr'

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffffc9000385fa80: 00 04 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffffc9000385fb00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00
>ffffc9000385fb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f3
                                                                ^
 ffffc9000385fc00: f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1
 ffffc9000385fc80: f1 f1 f1 00 f2 f2 f2 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00
==================================================================

Fixes: 0fb375fb9b93 ("[AF_PACKET]: Allow for > 8 byte hardware addresses.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Reported-by: syzbot 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220312232958.3535620-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

net: Handle delivery_time in skb->tstamp during network tapping with af_packet

2022-03-03T14:38:48+00:00

A latter patch will set the skb->mono_delivery_time to flag the skb->tstamp
is used as the mono delivery_time (EDT) instead of the (rcv) timestamp.
skb_clear_tstamp() will then keep this delivery_time during forwarding.

This patch is to make the network tapping (with af_packet) to handle
the delivery_time stored in skb->tstamp.

Regardless of tapping at the ingress or egress,  the tapped skb is
received by the af_packet socket, so it is ingress to the af_packet
socket and it expects the (rcv) timestamp.

When tapping at egress, dev_queue_xmit_nit() is used.  It has already
expected skb->tstamp may have delivery_time,  so it does
skb_clone()+net_timestamp_set() to ensure the cloned skb has
the (rcv) timestamp before passing to the af_packet sk.
This patch only adds to clear the skb->mono_delivery_time
bit in net_timestamp_set().

When tapping at ingress, it currently expects the skb->tstamp is either 0
or the (rcv) timestamp.  Meaning, the tapping at ingress path
has already expected the skb->tstamp could be 0 and it will get
the (rcv) timestamp by ktime_get_real() when needed.

There are two cases for tapping at ingress:

One case is af_packet queues the skb to its sk_receive_queue.
The skb is either not shared or new clone created.  The newly
added skb_clear_delivery_time() is called to clear the
delivery_time (if any) and set the (rcv) timestamp if
needed before the skb is queued to the sk_receive_queue.

Another case, the ingress skb is directly copied to the rx_ring
and tpacket_get_timestamp() is used to get the (rcv) timestamp.
The newly added skb_tstamp() is used in tpacket_get_timestamp()
to check the skb->mono_delivery_time bit before returning skb->tstamp.
As mentioned earlier, the tapping@ingress has already expected
the skb may not have the (rcv) timestamp (because no sk has asked
for it) and has handled this case by directly calling ktime_get_real().

Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

af_packet: fix data-race in packet_setsockopt / packet_setsockopt

2022-02-02T04:21:10+00:00

When packet_setsockopt( PACKET_FANOUT_DATA ) reads po->fanout,
no lock is held, meaning that another thread can change po->fanout.

Given that po->fanout can only be set once during the socket lifetime
(it is only cleared from fanout_release()), we can use
READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() to document the race.

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in packet_setsockopt / packet_setsockopt

write to 0xffff88813ae8e300 of 8 bytes by task 14653 on cpu 0:
 fanout_add net/packet/af_packet.c:1791 [inline]
 packet_setsockopt+0x22fe/0x24a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3931
 __sys_setsockopt+0x209/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2180
 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2191 [inline]
 __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2188 [inline]
 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x62/0x70 net/socket.c:2188
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

read to 0xffff88813ae8e300 of 8 bytes by task 14654 on cpu 1:
 packet_setsockopt+0x691/0x24a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3935
 __sys_setsockopt+0x209/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2180
 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2191 [inline]
 __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2188 [inline]
 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x62/0x70 net/socket.c:2188
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

value changed: 0x0000000000000000 -> 0xffff888106f8c000

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 14654 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.16.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011

Fixes: 47dceb8ecdc1 ("packet: add classic BPF fanout mode")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Cc: Willem de Bruijn 
Reported-by: syzbot 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220201022358.330621-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

net: fix information leakage in /proc/net/ptype

2022-01-20T10:12:53+00:00

In one net namespace, after creating a packet socket without binding
it to a device, users in other net namespaces can observe the new
`packet_type` added by this packet socket by reading `/proc/net/ptype`
file. This is minor information leakage as packet socket is
namespace aware.

Add a net pointer in `packet_type` to keep the net namespace of
of corresponding packet socket. In `ptype_seq_show`, this net pointer
must be checked when it is not NULL.

Fixes: 2feb27dbe00c ("[NETNS]: Minor information leak via /proc/net/ptype file.")
Signed-off-by: Congyu Liu 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

af_packet: fix tracking issues in packet_do_bind()

2022-01-08T03:11:55+00:00

It appears that my changes in packet_do_bind() were
slightly wrong.

syzbot found that calling bind() twice would trigger
a false positive.

Remove proto_curr/dev_curr variables and rewrite things
to be less confusing (like not having to use netdev_tracker_alloc(),
and instead use the standard dev_hold_track())

Fixes: f1d9268e0618 ("net: add net device refcount tracker to struct packet_type")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Reported-by: syzbot 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220107183953.3886647-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next

2021-12-31T14:35:40+00:00

Alexei Starovoitov says:

====================
pull-request: bpf-next 2021-12-30

The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net-next* tree.

We've added 72 non-merge commits during the last 20 day(s) which contain
a total of 223 files changed, 3510 insertions(+), 1591 deletions(-).

The main changes are:

1) Automatic setrlimit in libbpf when bpf is memcg's in the kernel, from Andrii.

2) Beautify and de-verbose verifier logs, from Christy.

3) Composable verifier types, from Hao.

4) bpf_strncmp helper, from Hou.

5) bpf.h header dependency cleanup, from Jakub.

6) get_func_[arg|ret|arg_cnt] helpers, from Jiri.

7) Sleepable local storage, from KP.

8) Extend kfunc with PTR_TO_CTX, PTR_TO_MEM argument support, from Kumar.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

net: Don't include filter.h from net/sock.h

2021-12-29T16:48:14+00:00

sock.h is pretty heavily used (5k objects rebuilt on x86 after
it's touched). We can drop the include of filter.h from it and
add a forward declaration of struct sk_filter instead.
This decreases the number of rebuilt objects when bpf.h
is touched from ~5k to ~1k.

There's a lot of missing includes this was masking. Primarily
in networking tho, this time.

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski 
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Acked-by: Marc Kleine-Budde 
Acked-by: Florian Fainelli 
Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov 
Acked-by: Stefano Garzarella 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211229004913.513372-1-kuba@kernel.org

Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net

2021-12-17T00:13:19+00:00

No conflicts.

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski