<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/net/sctp/socket.c, branch v3.4.46</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>net: sctp: sctp_setsockopt_auth_key: use kzfree instead of kfree</title>
<updated>2013-02-14T18:49:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>dborkman@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-02-08T03:04:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=8a501d87edf7190e8fe1741d9312dfcb6361c538'/>
<id>8a501d87edf7190e8fe1741d9312dfcb6361c538</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6ba542a291a5e558603ac51cda9bded347ce7627 ]

In sctp_setsockopt_auth_key, we create a temporary copy of the user
passed shared auth key for the endpoint or association and after
internal setup, we free it right away. Since it's sensitive data, we
should zero out the key before returning the memory back to the
allocator. Thus, use kzfree instead of kfree, just as we do in
sctp_auth_key_put().

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;dborkman@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 6ba542a291a5e558603ac51cda9bded347ce7627 ]

In sctp_setsockopt_auth_key, we create a temporary copy of the user
passed shared auth key for the endpoint or association and after
internal setup, we free it right away. Since it's sensitive data, we
should zero out the key before returning the memory back to the
allocator. Thus, use kzfree instead of kfree, just as we do in
sctp_auth_key_put().

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;dborkman@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: fix -ENOMEM result with invalid user space pointer in sendto() syscall</title>
<updated>2013-01-11T17:06:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tommi Rantala</name>
<email>tt.rantala@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-11-22T03:23:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=dff343c7f4dfa5650d5d3a78f58f080ec9f14a25'/>
<id>dff343c7f4dfa5650d5d3a78f58f080ec9f14a25</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6e51fe7572590d8d86e93b547fab6693d305fd0d ]

Consider the following program, that sets the second argument to the
sendto() syscall incorrectly:

 #include &lt;string.h&gt;
 #include &lt;arpa/inet.h&gt;
 #include &lt;sys/socket.h&gt;

 int main(void)
 {
         int fd;
         struct sockaddr_in sa;

         fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 132 /*IPPROTO_SCTP*/);
         if (fd &lt; 0)
                 return 1;

         memset(&amp;sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
         sa.sin_family = AF_INET;
         sa.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
         sa.sin_port = htons(11111);

         sendto(fd, NULL, 1, 0, (struct sockaddr *)&amp;sa, sizeof(sa));

         return 0;
 }

We get -ENOMEM:

 $ strace -e sendto ./demo
 sendto(3, NULL, 1, 0, {sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(11111), sin_addr=inet_addr("127.0.0.1")}, 16) = -1 ENOMEM (Cannot allocate memory)

Propagate the error code from sctp_user_addto_chunk(), so that we will
tell user space what actually went wrong:

 $ strace -e sendto ./demo
 sendto(3, NULL, 1, 0, {sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(11111), sin_addr=inet_addr("127.0.0.1")}, 16) = -1 EFAULT (Bad address)

Noticed while running Trinity (the syscall fuzzer).

Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala &lt;tt.rantala@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 6e51fe7572590d8d86e93b547fab6693d305fd0d ]

Consider the following program, that sets the second argument to the
sendto() syscall incorrectly:

 #include &lt;string.h&gt;
 #include &lt;arpa/inet.h&gt;
 #include &lt;sys/socket.h&gt;

 int main(void)
 {
         int fd;
         struct sockaddr_in sa;

         fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 132 /*IPPROTO_SCTP*/);
         if (fd &lt; 0)
                 return 1;

         memset(&amp;sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
         sa.sin_family = AF_INET;
         sa.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
         sa.sin_port = htons(11111);

         sendto(fd, NULL, 1, 0, (struct sockaddr *)&amp;sa, sizeof(sa));

         return 0;
 }

We get -ENOMEM:

 $ strace -e sendto ./demo
 sendto(3, NULL, 1, 0, {sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(11111), sin_addr=inet_addr("127.0.0.1")}, 16) = -1 ENOMEM (Cannot allocate memory)

Propagate the error code from sctp_user_addto_chunk(), so that we will
tell user space what actually went wrong:

 $ strace -e sendto ./demo
 sendto(3, NULL, 1, 0, {sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(11111), sin_addr=inet_addr("127.0.0.1")}, 16) = -1 EFAULT (Bad address)

Noticed while running Trinity (the syscall fuzzer).

Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala &lt;tt.rantala@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: Fix list corruption resulting from freeing an association on a list</title>
<updated>2012-08-09T15:31:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Neil Horman</name>
<email>nhorman@tuxdriver.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-07-16T09:13:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=2936d35db07cc3c9e3f2d60ed90f9a72f2031130'/>
<id>2936d35db07cc3c9e3f2d60ed90f9a72f2031130</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2eebc1e188e9e45886ee00662519849339884d6d ]

A few days ago Dave Jones reported this oops:

[22766.294255] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[22766.295376] CPU 0
[22766.295384] Modules linked in:
[22766.387137]  ffffffffa169f292 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b ffff880147c03a90
ffff880147c03a74
[22766.387135] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000000000
[22766.387136] Process trinity-watchdo (pid: 10896, threadinfo ffff88013e7d2000,
[22766.387137] Stack:
[22766.387140]  ffff880147c03a10
[22766.387140]  ffffffffa169f2b6
[22766.387140]  ffff88013ed95728
[22766.387143]  0000000000000002
[22766.387143]  0000000000000000
[22766.387143]  ffff880003fad062
[22766.387144]  ffff88013c120000
[22766.387144]
[22766.387145] Call Trace:
[22766.387145]  &lt;IRQ&gt;
[22766.387150]  [&lt;ffffffffa169f292&gt;] ? __sctp_lookup_association+0x62/0xd0
[sctp]
[22766.387154]  [&lt;ffffffffa169f2b6&gt;] __sctp_lookup_association+0x86/0xd0 [sctp]
[22766.387157]  [&lt;ffffffffa169f597&gt;] sctp_rcv+0x207/0xbb0 [sctp]
[22766.387161]  [&lt;ffffffff810d4da8&gt;] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x28/0xd0
[22766.387163]  [&lt;ffffffff815827e3&gt;] ? nf_hook_slow+0x133/0x210
[22766.387166]  [&lt;ffffffff815902fc&gt;] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x4c/0x4c0
[22766.387168]  [&lt;ffffffff8159043d&gt;] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x18d/0x4c0
[22766.387169]  [&lt;ffffffff815902fc&gt;] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x4c/0x4c0
[22766.387171]  [&lt;ffffffff81590a07&gt;] ip_local_deliver+0x47/0x80
[22766.387172]  [&lt;ffffffff8158fd80&gt;] ip_rcv_finish+0x150/0x680
[22766.387174]  [&lt;ffffffff81590c54&gt;] ip_rcv+0x214/0x320
[22766.387176]  [&lt;ffffffff81558c07&gt;] __netif_receive_skb+0x7b7/0x910
[22766.387178]  [&lt;ffffffff8155856c&gt;] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x11c/0x910
[22766.387180]  [&lt;ffffffff810d423e&gt;] ? put_lock_stats.isra.25+0xe/0x40
[22766.387182]  [&lt;ffffffff81558f83&gt;] netif_receive_skb+0x23/0x1f0
[22766.387183]  [&lt;ffffffff815596a9&gt;] ? dev_gro_receive+0x139/0x440
[22766.387185]  [&lt;ffffffff81559280&gt;] napi_skb_finish+0x70/0xa0
[22766.387187]  [&lt;ffffffff81559cb5&gt;] napi_gro_receive+0xf5/0x130
[22766.387218]  [&lt;ffffffffa01c4679&gt;] e1000_receive_skb+0x59/0x70 [e1000e]
[22766.387242]  [&lt;ffffffffa01c5aab&gt;] e1000_clean_rx_irq+0x28b/0x460 [e1000e]
[22766.387266]  [&lt;ffffffffa01c9c18&gt;] e1000e_poll+0x78/0x430 [e1000e]
[22766.387268]  [&lt;ffffffff81559fea&gt;] net_rx_action+0x1aa/0x3d0
[22766.387270]  [&lt;ffffffff810a495f&gt;] ? account_system_vtime+0x10f/0x130
[22766.387273]  [&lt;ffffffff810734d0&gt;] __do_softirq+0xe0/0x420
[22766.387275]  [&lt;ffffffff8169826c&gt;] call_softirq+0x1c/0x30
[22766.387278]  [&lt;ffffffff8101db15&gt;] do_softirq+0xd5/0x110
[22766.387279]  [&lt;ffffffff81073bc5&gt;] irq_exit+0xd5/0xe0
[22766.387281]  [&lt;ffffffff81698b03&gt;] do_IRQ+0x63/0xd0
[22766.387283]  [&lt;ffffffff8168ee2f&gt;] common_interrupt+0x6f/0x6f
[22766.387283]  &lt;EOI&gt;
[22766.387284]
[22766.387285]  [&lt;ffffffff8168eed9&gt;] ? retint_swapgs+0x13/0x1b
[22766.387285] Code: c0 90 5d c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 4c 89 c8 5d c3 0f 1f 00 55 48
89 e5 48 83
ec 20 48 89 5d e8 4c 89 65 f0 4c 89 6d f8 66 66 66 66 90 &lt;0f&gt; b7 87 98 00 00 00
48 89 fb
49 89 f5 66 c1 c0 08 66 39 46 02
[22766.387307]
[22766.387307] RIP
[22766.387311]  [&lt;ffffffffa168a2c9&gt;] sctp_assoc_is_match+0x19/0x90 [sctp]
[22766.387311]  RSP &lt;ffff880147c039b0&gt;
[22766.387142]  ffffffffa16ab120
[22766.599537] ---[ end trace 3f6dae82e37b17f5 ]---
[22766.601221] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt

It appears from his analysis and some staring at the code that this is likely
occuring because an association is getting freed while still on the
sctp_assoc_hashtable.  As a result, we get a gpf when traversing the hashtable
while a freed node corrupts part of the list.

Nominally I would think that an mibalanced refcount was responsible for this,
but I can't seem to find any obvious imbalance.  What I did note however was
that the two places where we create an association using
sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE (__sctp_connect and sctp_sendmsg), have failure paths
which free a newly created association after calling sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE.
sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE brings us into the sctp_sf_do_prm_asoc path, which
issues a SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC side effect, which in turn adds a new association to
the aforementioned hash table.  the sctp command interpreter that process side
effects has not way to unwind previously processed commands, so freeing the
association from the __sctp_connect or sctp_sendmsg error path would lead to a
freed association remaining on this hash table.

I've fixed this but modifying sctp_[un]hash_established to use hlist_del_init,
which allows us to proerly use hlist_unhashed to check if the node is on a
hashlist safely during a delete.  That in turn alows us to safely call
sctp_unhash_established in the __sctp_connect and sctp_sendmsg error paths
before freeing them, regardles of what the associations state is on the hash
list.

I noted, while I was doing this, that the __sctp_unhash_endpoint was using
hlist_unhsashed in a simmilar fashion, but never nullified any removed nodes
pointers to make that function work properly, so I fixed that up in a simmilar
fashion.

I attempted to test this using a virtual guest running the SCTP_RR test from
netperf in a loop while running the trinity fuzzer, both in a loop.  I wasn't
able to recreate the problem prior to this fix, nor was I able to trigger the
failure after (neither of which I suppose is suprising).  Given the trace above
however, I think its likely that this is what we hit.

Signed-off-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Reported-by: davej@redhat.com
CC: davej@redhat.com
CC: "David S. Miller" &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
CC: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
CC: Sridhar Samudrala &lt;sri@us.ibm.com&gt;
CC: linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 2eebc1e188e9e45886ee00662519849339884d6d ]

A few days ago Dave Jones reported this oops:

[22766.294255] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[22766.295376] CPU 0
[22766.295384] Modules linked in:
[22766.387137]  ffffffffa169f292 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b ffff880147c03a90
ffff880147c03a74
[22766.387135] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000000000
[22766.387136] Process trinity-watchdo (pid: 10896, threadinfo ffff88013e7d2000,
[22766.387137] Stack:
[22766.387140]  ffff880147c03a10
[22766.387140]  ffffffffa169f2b6
[22766.387140]  ffff88013ed95728
[22766.387143]  0000000000000002
[22766.387143]  0000000000000000
[22766.387143]  ffff880003fad062
[22766.387144]  ffff88013c120000
[22766.387144]
[22766.387145] Call Trace:
[22766.387145]  &lt;IRQ&gt;
[22766.387150]  [&lt;ffffffffa169f292&gt;] ? __sctp_lookup_association+0x62/0xd0
[sctp]
[22766.387154]  [&lt;ffffffffa169f2b6&gt;] __sctp_lookup_association+0x86/0xd0 [sctp]
[22766.387157]  [&lt;ffffffffa169f597&gt;] sctp_rcv+0x207/0xbb0 [sctp]
[22766.387161]  [&lt;ffffffff810d4da8&gt;] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x28/0xd0
[22766.387163]  [&lt;ffffffff815827e3&gt;] ? nf_hook_slow+0x133/0x210
[22766.387166]  [&lt;ffffffff815902fc&gt;] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x4c/0x4c0
[22766.387168]  [&lt;ffffffff8159043d&gt;] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x18d/0x4c0
[22766.387169]  [&lt;ffffffff815902fc&gt;] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x4c/0x4c0
[22766.387171]  [&lt;ffffffff81590a07&gt;] ip_local_deliver+0x47/0x80
[22766.387172]  [&lt;ffffffff8158fd80&gt;] ip_rcv_finish+0x150/0x680
[22766.387174]  [&lt;ffffffff81590c54&gt;] ip_rcv+0x214/0x320
[22766.387176]  [&lt;ffffffff81558c07&gt;] __netif_receive_skb+0x7b7/0x910
[22766.387178]  [&lt;ffffffff8155856c&gt;] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x11c/0x910
[22766.387180]  [&lt;ffffffff810d423e&gt;] ? put_lock_stats.isra.25+0xe/0x40
[22766.387182]  [&lt;ffffffff81558f83&gt;] netif_receive_skb+0x23/0x1f0
[22766.387183]  [&lt;ffffffff815596a9&gt;] ? dev_gro_receive+0x139/0x440
[22766.387185]  [&lt;ffffffff81559280&gt;] napi_skb_finish+0x70/0xa0
[22766.387187]  [&lt;ffffffff81559cb5&gt;] napi_gro_receive+0xf5/0x130
[22766.387218]  [&lt;ffffffffa01c4679&gt;] e1000_receive_skb+0x59/0x70 [e1000e]
[22766.387242]  [&lt;ffffffffa01c5aab&gt;] e1000_clean_rx_irq+0x28b/0x460 [e1000e]
[22766.387266]  [&lt;ffffffffa01c9c18&gt;] e1000e_poll+0x78/0x430 [e1000e]
[22766.387268]  [&lt;ffffffff81559fea&gt;] net_rx_action+0x1aa/0x3d0
[22766.387270]  [&lt;ffffffff810a495f&gt;] ? account_system_vtime+0x10f/0x130
[22766.387273]  [&lt;ffffffff810734d0&gt;] __do_softirq+0xe0/0x420
[22766.387275]  [&lt;ffffffff8169826c&gt;] call_softirq+0x1c/0x30
[22766.387278]  [&lt;ffffffff8101db15&gt;] do_softirq+0xd5/0x110
[22766.387279]  [&lt;ffffffff81073bc5&gt;] irq_exit+0xd5/0xe0
[22766.387281]  [&lt;ffffffff81698b03&gt;] do_IRQ+0x63/0xd0
[22766.387283]  [&lt;ffffffff8168ee2f&gt;] common_interrupt+0x6f/0x6f
[22766.387283]  &lt;EOI&gt;
[22766.387284]
[22766.387285]  [&lt;ffffffff8168eed9&gt;] ? retint_swapgs+0x13/0x1b
[22766.387285] Code: c0 90 5d c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 4c 89 c8 5d c3 0f 1f 00 55 48
89 e5 48 83
ec 20 48 89 5d e8 4c 89 65 f0 4c 89 6d f8 66 66 66 66 90 &lt;0f&gt; b7 87 98 00 00 00
48 89 fb
49 89 f5 66 c1 c0 08 66 39 46 02
[22766.387307]
[22766.387307] RIP
[22766.387311]  [&lt;ffffffffa168a2c9&gt;] sctp_assoc_is_match+0x19/0x90 [sctp]
[22766.387311]  RSP &lt;ffff880147c039b0&gt;
[22766.387142]  ffffffffa16ab120
[22766.599537] ---[ end trace 3f6dae82e37b17f5 ]---
[22766.601221] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt

It appears from his analysis and some staring at the code that this is likely
occuring because an association is getting freed while still on the
sctp_assoc_hashtable.  As a result, we get a gpf when traversing the hashtable
while a freed node corrupts part of the list.

Nominally I would think that an mibalanced refcount was responsible for this,
but I can't seem to find any obvious imbalance.  What I did note however was
that the two places where we create an association using
sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE (__sctp_connect and sctp_sendmsg), have failure paths
which free a newly created association after calling sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE.
sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE brings us into the sctp_sf_do_prm_asoc path, which
issues a SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC side effect, which in turn adds a new association to
the aforementioned hash table.  the sctp command interpreter that process side
effects has not way to unwind previously processed commands, so freeing the
association from the __sctp_connect or sctp_sendmsg error path would lead to a
freed association remaining on this hash table.

I've fixed this but modifying sctp_[un]hash_established to use hlist_del_init,
which allows us to proerly use hlist_unhashed to check if the node is on a
hashlist safely during a delete.  That in turn alows us to safely call
sctp_unhash_established in the __sctp_connect and sctp_sendmsg error paths
before freeing them, regardles of what the associations state is on the hash
list.

I noted, while I was doing this, that the __sctp_unhash_endpoint was using
hlist_unhsashed in a simmilar fashion, but never nullified any removed nodes
pointers to make that function work properly, so I fixed that up in a simmilar
fashion.

I attempted to test this using a virtual guest running the SCTP_RR test from
netperf in a loop while running the trinity fuzzer, both in a loop.  I wasn't
able to recreate the problem prior to this fix, nor was I able to trigger the
failure after (neither of which I suppose is suprising).  Given the trace above
however, I think its likely that this is what we hit.

Signed-off-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Reported-by: davej@redhat.com
CC: davej@redhat.com
CC: "David S. Miller" &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
CC: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
CC: Sridhar Samudrala &lt;sri@us.ibm.com&gt;
CC: linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: Allow struct sctp_event_subscribe to grow without breaking binaries</title>
<updated>2012-04-04T22:05:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Graf</name>
<email>tgraf@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-04-03T22:17:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=acdd5985364f8dc511a0762fab2e683f29d9d692'/>
<id>acdd5985364f8dc511a0762fab2e683f29d9d692</id>
<content type='text'>
getsockopt(..., SCTP_EVENTS, ...) performs a length check and returns
an error if the user provides less bytes than the size of struct
sctp_event_subscribe.

Struct sctp_event_subscribe needs to be extended by an u8 for every
new event or notification type that is added.

This obviously makes getsockopt fail for binaries that are compiled
against an older versions of &lt;net/sctp/user.h&gt; which do not contain
all event types.

This patch changes getsockopt behaviour to no longer return an error
if not enough bytes are being provided by the user. Instead, it
returns as much of sctp_event_subscribe as fits into the provided buffer.

This leads to the new behavior that users see what they have been aware
of at compile time.

The setsockopt(..., SCTP_EVENTS, ...) API is already behaving like this.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf &lt;tgraf@suug.ch&gt;
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vladislav.yasevich@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
getsockopt(..., SCTP_EVENTS, ...) performs a length check and returns
an error if the user provides less bytes than the size of struct
sctp_event_subscribe.

Struct sctp_event_subscribe needs to be extended by an u8 for every
new event or notification type that is added.

This obviously makes getsockopt fail for binaries that are compiled
against an older versions of &lt;net/sctp/user.h&gt; which do not contain
all event types.

This patch changes getsockopt behaviour to no longer return an error
if not enough bytes are being provided by the user. Instead, it
returns as much of sctp_event_subscribe as fits into the provided buffer.

This leads to the new behavior that users see what they have been aware
of at compile time.

The setsockopt(..., SCTP_EVENTS, ...) API is already behaving like this.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf &lt;tgraf@suug.ch&gt;
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vladislav.yasevich@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: Export sctp_do_peeloff</title>
<updated>2012-03-08T21:52:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Benjamin Poirier</name>
<email>bpoirier@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2012-03-08T05:55:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=0343c5543b1d3ffa08e6716d82afb62648b80eba'/>
<id>0343c5543b1d3ffa08e6716d82afb62648b80eba</id>
<content type='text'>
lookup sctp_association within sctp_do_peeloff() to enable its use outside of
the sctp code with minimal knowledge of the former.

Signed-off-by: Benjamin Poirier &lt;bpoirier@suse.de&gt;
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vladislav.yasevich@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
lookup sctp_association within sctp_do_peeloff() to enable its use outside of
the sctp code with minimal knowledge of the former.

Signed-off-by: Benjamin Poirier &lt;bpoirier@suse.de&gt;
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vladislav.yasevich@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net</title>
<updated>2011-12-23T22:13:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David S. Miller</name>
<email>davem@davemloft.net</email>
</author>
<published>2011-12-23T22:13:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=abb434cb0539fb355c1c921f8fd761efbbac3462'/>
<id>abb434cb0539fb355c1c921f8fd761efbbac3462</id>
<content type='text'>
Conflicts:
	net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c

Just two overlapping changes, one added an initialization of
a local variable, and another change added a new local variable.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Conflicts:
	net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c

Just two overlapping changes, one added an initialization of
a local variable, and another change added a new local variable.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: fix incorrect overflow check on autoclose</title>
<updated>2011-12-19T21:25:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Xi Wang</name>
<email>xi.wang@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-12-16T12:44:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=2692ba61a82203404abd7dd2a027bda962861f74'/>
<id>2692ba61a82203404abd7dd2a027bda962861f74</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit 8ffd3208 voids the previous patches f6778aab and 810c0719 for
limiting the autoclose value.  If userspace passes in -1 on 32-bit
platform, the overflow check didn't work and autoclose would be set
to 0xffffffff.

This patch defines a max_autoclose (in seconds) for limiting the value
and exposes it through sysctl, with the following intentions.

1) Avoid overflowing autoclose * HZ.

2) Keep the default autoclose bound consistent across 32- and 64-bit
   platforms (INT_MAX / HZ in this patch).

3) Keep the autoclose value consistent between setsockopt() and
   getsockopt() calls.

Suggested-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vladislav.yasevich@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang &lt;xi.wang@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Commit 8ffd3208 voids the previous patches f6778aab and 810c0719 for
limiting the autoclose value.  If userspace passes in -1 on 32-bit
platform, the overflow check didn't work and autoclose would be set
to 0xffffffff.

This patch defines a max_autoclose (in seconds) for limiting the value
and exposes it through sysctl, with the following intentions.

1) Avoid overflowing autoclose * HZ.

2) Keep the default autoclose bound consistent across 32- and 64-bit
   platforms (INT_MAX / HZ in this patch).

3) Keep the autoclose value consistent between setsockopt() and
   getsockopt() calls.

Suggested-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vladislav.yasevich@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang &lt;xi.wang@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: use IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)</title>
<updated>2011-12-11T23:25:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>eric.dumazet@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-12-10T09:48:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=dfd56b8b38fff3586f36232db58e1e9f7885a605'/>
<id>dfd56b8b38fff3586f36232db58e1e9f7885a605</id>
<content type='text'>
Instead of testing defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Instead of testing defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: remove ipv6_addr_copy()</title>
<updated>2011-11-22T21:43:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexey Dobriyan</name>
<email>adobriyan@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-11-21T03:39:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=4e3fd7a06dc20b2d8ec6892233ad2012968fe7b6'/>
<id>4e3fd7a06dc20b2d8ec6892233ad2012968fe7b6</id>
<content type='text'>
C assignment can handle struct in6_addr copying.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
C assignment can handle struct in6_addr copying.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: Add export.h for EXPORT_SYMBOL/THIS_MODULE to non-modules</title>
<updated>2011-10-31T23:30:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Gortmaker</name>
<email>paul.gortmaker@windriver.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-07-15T15:47:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=bc3b2d7fb9b014d75ebb79ba371a763dbab5e8cf'/>
<id>bc3b2d7fb9b014d75ebb79ba371a763dbab5e8cf</id>
<content type='text'>
These files are non modular, but need to export symbols using
the macros now living in export.h -- call out the include so
that things won't break when we remove the implicit presence
of module.h from everywhere.

Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
These files are non modular, but need to export symbols using
the macros now living in export.h -- call out the include so
that things won't break when we remove the implicit presence
of module.h from everywhere.

Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
