linux-toradex.git/net/socket.c, branch v3.12.33

net/compat: Fix minor information leak in siocdevprivate_ioctl()

2014-06-27T08:25:17+00:00

commit 417c3522b3202dacce4873cfb0190459fbce95c5 upstream.

We don't need to check that ifr_data itself is a valid user pointer,
but we should check &ifr_data is.  Thankfully the copy of ifr_name is
checked, so this can only leak a few bytes from immediately above the
user address limit.

Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings 
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby

net: socket: error on a negative msg_namelen

2014-04-18T09:07:03+00:00

[ Upstream commit dbb490b96584d4e958533fb637f08b557f505657 ]

When copying in a struct msghdr from the user, if the user has set the
msg_namelen parameter to a negative value it gets clamped to a valid
size due to a comparison between signed and unsigned values.

Ensure the syscall errors when the user passes in a negative value.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Leach 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby

net: clamp ->msg_namelen instead of returning an error

2013-12-08T15:29:13+00:00

[ Upstream commit db31c55a6fb245fdbb752a2ca4aefec89afabb06 ]

If kmsg->msg_namelen > sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage) then in the
original code that would lead to memory corruption in the kernel if you
had audit configured.  If you didn't have audit configured it was
harmless.

There are some programs such as beta versions of Ruby which use too
large of a buffer and returning an error code breaks them.  We should
clamp the ->msg_namelen value instead.

Fixes: 1661bf364ae9 ("net: heap overflow in __audit_sockaddr()")
Reported-by: Eric Wong 
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter 
Tested-by: Eric Wong 
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: add BUG_ON if kernel advertises msg_namelen > sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)

2013-12-08T15:29:13+00:00

[ Upstream commit 68c6beb373955da0886d8f4f5995b3922ceda4be ]

In that case it is probable that kernel code overwrote part of the
stack. So we should bail out loudly here.

The BUG_ON may be removed in future if we are sure all protocols are
conformant.

Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet 
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic

2013-12-08T15:29:13+00:00

[ Upstream commit f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c ]

This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.

This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.

Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.

Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.

Changes since RFC:

Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.

With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
	msg->msg_name = NULL
".

This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.

Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.

Cc: David Miller 
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet 
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: heap overflow in __audit_sockaddr()

2013-10-03T20:05:14+00:00

We need to cap ->msg_namelen or it leads to a buffer overflow when we
to the memcpy() in __audit_sockaddr().  It requires CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL to
exploit this bug.

The call tree is:
___sys_recvmsg()
  move_addr_to_user()
    audit_sockaddr()
      __audit_sockaddr()

Reported-by: Jüri Aedla 
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

Merge git://git.kvack.org/~bcrl/aio-next

2013-09-13T17:55:58+00:00

Pull aio changes from Ben LaHaise:
 "First off, sorry for this pull request being late in the merge window.
  Al had raised a couple of concerns about 2 items in the series below.
  I addressed the first issue (the race introduced by Gu's use of
  mm_populate()), but he has not provided any further details on how he
  wants to rework the anon_inode.c changes (which were sent out months
  ago but have yet to be commented on).

  The bulk of the changes have been sitting in the -next tree for a few
  months, with all the issues raised being addressed"

* git://git.kvack.org/~bcrl/aio-next: (22 commits)
  aio: rcu_read_lock protection for new rcu_dereference calls
  aio: fix race in ring buffer page lookup introduced by page migration support
  aio: fix rcu sparse warnings introduced by ioctx table lookup patch
  aio: remove unnecessary debugging from aio_free_ring()
  aio: table lookup: verify ctx pointer
  staging/lustre: kiocb->ki_left is removed
  aio: fix error handling and rcu usage in "convert the ioctx list to table lookup v3"
  aio: be defensive to ensure request batching is non-zero instead of BUG_ON()
  aio: convert the ioctx list to table lookup v3
  aio: double aio_max_nr in calculations
  aio: Kill ki_dtor
  aio: Kill ki_users
  aio: Kill unneeded kiocb members
  aio: Kill aio_rw_vect_retry()
  aio: Don't use ctx->tail unnecessarily
  aio: io_cancel() no longer returns the io_event
  aio: percpu ioctx refcount
  aio: percpu reqs_available
  aio: reqs_active -> reqs_available
  aio: fix build when migration is disabled
  ...

kernel-wide: fix missing validations on get/put/__copy_to/__copy_from_user()

2013-09-11T22:58:18+00:00

I found the following pattern that leads in to interesting findings:

  grep -r "ret.*|=.*__put_user" *
  grep -r "ret.*|=.*__get_user" *
  grep -r "ret.*|=.*__copy" *

The __put_user() calls in compat_ioctl.c, ptrace compat, signal compat,
since those appear in compat code, we could probably expect the kernel
addresses not to be reachable in the lower 32-bit range, so I think they
might not be exploitable.

For the "__get_user" cases, I don't think those are exploitable: the worse
that can happen is that the kernel will copy kernel memory into in-kernel
buffers, and will fail immediately afterward.

The alpha csum_partial_copy_from_user() seems to be missing the
access_ok() check entirely.  The fix is inspired from x86.  This could
lead to information leak on alpha.  I also noticed that many architectures
map csum_partial_copy_from_user() to csum_partial_copy_generic(), but I
wonder if the latter is performing the access checks on every
architectures.

Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers 
Cc: Richard Henderson 
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky 
Cc: Matt Turner 
Cc: Jens Axboe 
Cc: Oleg Nesterov 
Cc: David Miller 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

net: rename CONFIG_NET_LL_RX_POLL to CONFIG_NET_RX_BUSY_POLL

2013-08-01T22:11:17+00:00

Eliezer renames several *ll_poll to *busy_poll, but forgets
CONFIG_NET_LL_RX_POLL, so in case of confusion, rename it too.

Cc: Eliezer Tamir 
Cc: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

aio: Kill ki_dtor

2013-07-30T15:53:12+00:00

sock_aio_dtor() is dead code - and stuff that does need to do cleanup
can simply do it before calling aio_complete().

Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet 
Cc: Zach Brown 
Cc: Felipe Balbi 
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Cc: Mark Fasheh 
Cc: Joel Becker 
Cc: Rusty Russell 
Cc: Jens Axboe 
Cc: Asai Thambi S P 
Cc: Selvan Mani 
Cc: Sam Bradshaw 
Cc: Jeff Moyer 
Cc: Al Viro 
Cc: Benjamin LaHaise 
Cc: Theodore Ts'o 
Signed-off-by: Benjamin LaHaise

linux-toradex.git/net/socket.c, branch v3.12.33

net/compat: Fix minor information leak in siocdevprivate_ioctl()

net: socket: error on a negative msg_namelen

net: clamp ->msg_namelen instead of returning an error

net: add BUG_ON if kernel advertises msg_namelen > sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)

net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic

net: heap overflow in __audit_sockaddr()

Merge git://git.kvack.org/~bcrl/aio-next

kernel-wide: fix missing validations on __get/__put/__copy_to/__copy_from_user()

net: rename CONFIG_NET_LL_RX_POLL to CONFIG_NET_RX_BUSY_POLL

aio: Kill ki_dtor

kernel-wide: fix missing validations on get/put/__copy_to/__copy_from_user()