linux-toradex.git/net/tipc, branch v4.2.6

tipc: move fragment importance field to new header position

2015-10-27T00:53:37+00:00

[ Upstream commit dde4b5ae65de659b9ec64bafdde0430459fcb495 ]

In commit e3eea1eb47a ("tipc: clean up handling of message priorities")
we introduced a field in the packet header for keeping track of the
priority of fragments, since this value is not present in the specified
protocol header. Since the value so far only is used at the transmitting
end of the link, we have not yet officially defined it as part of the
protocol.

Unfortunately, the field we use for keeping this value, bits 13-15 in
in word 5, has turned out to be a poor choice; it is already used by the
broadcast protocol for carrying the 'network id' field of the sending
node. Since packet fragments also need to be transported across the
broadcast protocol, the risk of conflict is obvious, and we see this
happen when we use network identities larger than 2^13-1. This has
escaped our testing because we have so far only been using small network
id values.

We now move this field to bits 0-2 in word 9, a field that is guaranteed
to be unused by all involved protocols.

Fixes: e3eea1eb47a ("tipc: clean up handling of message priorities")
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy 
Acked-by: Ying Xue 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net/tipc: initialize security state for new connection socket

2015-07-08T23:08:23+00:00

Calling connect() with an AF_TIPC socket would trigger a series
of error messages from SELinux along the lines of:
SELinux: Invalid class 0
type=AVC msg=audit(1434126658.487:34500): avc:  denied  {  }
  for pid=292 comm="kworker/u16:5" scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0
  tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 tclass=
  permissive=0

This was due to a failure to initialize the security state of the new
connection sock by the tipc code, leaving it with junk in the security
class field and an unlabeled secid.  Add a call to security_sk_clone()
to inherit the security state from the parent socket.

Reported-by: Tim Shearer 
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley 
Acked-by: Paul Moore 
Acked-by: Ying Xue 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

tipc: purge backlog queue counters when broadcast link is reset

2015-06-28T23:43:02+00:00

In commit 1f66d161ab3d8b518903fa6c3f9c1f48d6919e74
("tipc: introduce starvation free send algorithm")
we introduced a counter per priority level for buffers
in the link backlog queue. We also introduced a new
function tipc_link_purge_backlog(), to reset these
counters to zero when the link is reset.

Unfortunately, we missed to call this function when
the broadcast link is reset, with the result that the
values of these counters might be permanently skewed
when new nodes are attached. This may in the worst case
lead to permananent, but spurious, broadcast link
congestion, where no broadcast packets can be sent at
all.

We fix this bug with this commit.

Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net

2015-06-14T06:56:52+00:00

tipc: disconnect socket directly after probe failure

2015-06-11T05:05:20+00:00

If the TIPC connection timer expires in a probing state, a
self abort message is supposed to be generated and delivered
to the local socket. This is currently broken, and the abort
message is actually sent out to the peer node with invalid
addressing information. This will cause the link to enter
a constant retransmission state and eventually reset.
We fix this by removing the self-abort message creation and
tear down connection immediately instead.

Signed-off-by: Erik Hugne 
Reviewed-by: Ying Xue 
Reviewed-by: Jon Maloy 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

tipc: unconditionally put sock refcnt when sock timer to be deleted is pending

2015-05-31T01:08:37+00:00

As sock refcnt is taken when sock timer is started in
sk_reset_timer(), the sock refcnt should be put when sock timer
to be deleted is in pending state no matter what "probing_state"
value of tipc sock is.

Reviewed-by: Erik Hugne 
Reviewed-by: Jon Maloy 
Signed-off-by: Ying Xue 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

tipc: fix bug in link protocol message create function

2015-05-26T23:43:03+00:00

In commit dd3f9e70f59f43a5712eba9cf3ee4f1e6999540c
("tipc: add packet sequence number at instant of transmission") we
made a change with the consequence that packets in the link backlog
queue don't contain valid sequence numbers.

However, when we create a link protocol message, we still use the
sequence number of the first packet in the backlog, if there is any,
as "next_sent" indicator in the message. This may entail unnecessary
retransissions or stale packet transmission when there is very low
traffic on the link.

This commit fixes this issue by only using the current value of
tipc_link::snd_nxt as indicator.

Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

tipc: use sock_create_kern interface to create kernel socket

2015-05-14T17:39:33+00:00

After commit eeb1bd5c40ed ("net: Add a struct net parameter to
sock_create_kern"), we should use sock_create_kern() to create kernel
socket as the interface doesn't reference count struct net any more.

Signed-off-by: Ying Xue 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

tipc: add packet sequence number at instant of transmission

2015-05-14T16:24:46+00:00

Currently, the packet sequence number is updated and added to each
packet at the moment a packet is added to the link backlog queue.
This is wasteful, since it forces the code to traverse the send
packet list packet by packet when adding them to the backlog queue.
It would be better to just splice the whole packet list into the
backlog queue when that is the right action to do.

In this commit, we do this change. Also, since the sequence numbers
cannot now be assigned to the packets at the moment they are added
the backlog queue, we do instead calculate and add them at the moment
of transmission, when the backlog queue has to be traversed anyway.
We do this in the function tipc_link_push_packet().

Reviewed-by: Erik Hugne 
Reviewed-by: Ying Xue 
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

tipc: improve link congestion algorithm

2015-05-14T16:24:46+00:00

The link congestion algorithm used until now implies two problems.

- It is too generous towards lower-level messages in situations of high
  load by giving "absolute" bandwidth guarantees to the different
  priority levels. LOW traffic is guaranteed 10%, MEDIUM is guaranted
  20%, HIGH is guaranteed 30%, and CRITICAL is guaranteed 40% of the
  available bandwidth. But, in the absence of higher level traffic, the
  ratio between two distinct levels becomes unreasonable. E.g. if there
  is only LOW and MEDIUM traffic on a system, the former is guaranteed
  1/3 of the bandwidth, and the latter 2/3. This again means that if
  there is e.g. one LOW user and 10 MEDIUM users, the  former will have
  33.3% of the bandwidth, and the others will have to compete for the
  remainder, i.e. each will end up with 6.7% of the capacity.

- Packets of type MSG_BUNDLER are created at SYSTEM importance level,
  but only after the packets bundled into it have passed the congestion
  test for their own respective levels. Since bundled packets don't
  result in incrementing the level counter for their own importance,
  only occasionally for the SYSTEM level counter, they do in practice
  obtain SYSTEM level importance. Hence, the current implementation
  provides a gap in the congestion algorithm that in the worst case
  may lead to a link reset.

We now refine the congestion algorithm as follows:

- A message is accepted to the link backlog only if its own level
  counter, and all superior level counters, permit it.

- The importance of a created bundle packet is set according to its
  contents. A bundle packet created from messges at levels LOW to
  CRITICAL is given importance level CRITICAL, while a bundle created
  from a SYSTEM level message is given importance SYSTEM. In the latter
  case only subsequent SYSTEM level messages are allowed to be bundled
  into it.

This solves the first problem described above, by making the bandwidth
guarantee relative to the total number of users at all levels; only
the upper limit for each level remains absolute. In the example
described above, the single LOW user would use 1/11th of the bandwidth,
the same as each of the ten MEDIUM users, but he still has the same
guarantee against starvation as the latter ones.

The fix also solves the second problem. If the CRITICAL level is filled
up by bundle packets of that level, no lower level packets will be
accepted any more.

Suggested-by: Gergely Kiss 
Reviewed-by: Ying Xue 
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller