<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/net, branch v2.6.25.17</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>sch_prio: Fix nla_parse_nested_compat() regression</title>
<updated>2008-09-08T10:20:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Graf</name>
<email>tgraf@suug.ch</email>
</author>
<published>2008-09-03T08:00:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=01b140eb2108f7c30e01659a573a971bc8ca3dea'/>
<id>01b140eb2108f7c30e01659a573a971bc8ca3dea</id>
<content type='text'>
[ No upstream commit, this is fixing code no longer in 2.6.27 ]

nla_parse_nested_compat() was used to parse two different message
formats in the netem and prio qdisc, when it was "fixed" to work
with netem, it broke the multi queue support in the prio qdisc.
Since the prio qdisc code in question is already removed in the
development tree, this patch only fixes the regression in the
stable tree.

Based on original patch from Alexander H Duyck &lt;alexander.h.duyck@intel.com&gt;

Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf &lt;tgraf@suug.ch&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ No upstream commit, this is fixing code no longer in 2.6.27 ]

nla_parse_nested_compat() was used to parse two different message
formats in the netem and prio qdisc, when it was "fixed" to work
with netem, it broke the multi queue support in the prio qdisc.
Since the prio qdisc code in question is already removed in the
development tree, this patch only fixes the regression in the
stable tree.

Based on original patch from Alexander H Duyck &lt;alexander.h.duyck@intel.com&gt;

Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf &lt;tgraf@suug.ch&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: fix random memory dereference with SCTP_HMAC_IDENT option.</title>
<updated>2008-09-08T10:20:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vlad Yasevich</name>
<email>vladislav.yasevich@hp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-09-03T08:02:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=6d204e4fe042aafb1e443b08de56b4fa5cf012ca'/>
<id>6d204e4fe042aafb1e443b08de56b4fa5cf012ca</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d97240552cd98c4b07322f30f66fd9c3ba4171de ]

The number of identifiers needs to be checked against the option
length.  Also, the identifier index provided needs to be verified
to make sure that it doesn't exceed the bounds of the array.

Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vladislav.yasevich@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit d97240552cd98c4b07322f30f66fd9c3ba4171de ]

The number of identifiers needs to be checked against the option
length.  Also, the identifier index provided needs to be verified
to make sure that it doesn't exceed the bounds of the array.

Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vladislav.yasevich@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: correct bounds check in sctp_setsockopt_auth_key</title>
<updated>2008-09-08T10:20:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vlad Yasevich</name>
<email>vladislav.yasevich@hp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-09-03T08:02:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=113de4111795af1245a84368c233f25699999908'/>
<id>113de4111795af1245a84368c233f25699999908</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 328fc47ea0bcc27d9afa69c3ad6e52431cadd76c ]

The bonds check to prevent buffer overlflow was not exactly
right.  It still allowed overflow of up to 8 bytes which is
sizeof(struct sctp_authkey).

Since optlen is already checked against the size of that struct,
we are guaranteed not to cause interger overflow either.

Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vladislav.yasevich@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 328fc47ea0bcc27d9afa69c3ad6e52431cadd76c ]

The bonds check to prevent buffer overlflow was not exactly
right.  It still allowed overflow of up to 8 bytes which is
sizeof(struct sctp_authkey).

Since optlen is already checked against the size of that struct,
we are guaranteed not to cause interger overflow either.

Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vladislav.yasevich@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: add verification checks to SCTP_AUTH_KEY option</title>
<updated>2008-09-08T10:20:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vlad Yasevich</name>
<email>vladislav.yasevich@hp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-08-28T05:41:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=1c6f8e1945a2b8317e5dad8fb5cfc882bd35b2b8'/>
<id>1c6f8e1945a2b8317e5dad8fb5cfc882bd35b2b8</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 30c2235cbc477d4629983d440cdc4f496fec9246 ]

The structure used for SCTP_AUTH_KEY option contains a
length that needs to be verfied to prevent buffer overflow
conditions.  Spoted by Eugene Teo &lt;eteo@redhat.com&gt;.

Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vladislav.yasevich@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 30c2235cbc477d4629983d440cdc4f496fec9246 ]

The structure used for SCTP_AUTH_KEY option contains a
length that needs to be verfied to prevent buffer overflow
conditions.  Spoted by Eugene Teo &lt;eteo@redhat.com&gt;.

Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vladislav.yasevich@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: fix potential panics in the SCTP-AUTH API.</title>
<updated>2008-09-08T10:20:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vlad Yasevich</name>
<email>vladislav.yasevich@hp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-08-28T05:41:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=a1d348ddecaee92e74c27ccd69c325f4ce01d95f'/>
<id>a1d348ddecaee92e74c27ccd69c325f4ce01d95f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5e739d1752aca4e8f3e794d431503bfca3162df4 ]

All of the SCTP-AUTH socket options could cause a panic
if the extension is disabled and the API is envoked.

Additionally, there were some additional assumptions that
certain pointers would always be valid which may not
always be the case.

This patch hardens the API and address all of the crash
scenarios.

Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vladislav.yasevich@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 5e739d1752aca4e8f3e794d431503bfca3162df4 ]

All of the SCTP-AUTH socket options could cause a panic
if the extension is disabled and the API is envoked.

Additionally, there were some additional assumptions that
certain pointers would always be valid which may not
always be the case.

This patch hardens the API and address all of the crash
scenarios.

Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vladislav.yasevich@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sunrpc: fix possible overrun on read of /proc/sys/sunrpc/transports</title>
<updated>2008-09-08T10:20:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Cyrill Gorcunov</name>
<email>gorcunov@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-09-01T18:51:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=fde5378952ed3550b5e0eb2310be6687baeed143'/>
<id>fde5378952ed3550b5e0eb2310be6687baeed143</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 27df6f25ff218072e0e879a96beeb398a79cdbc8 upstream

Vegard Nossum reported
----------------------
&gt; I noticed that something weird is going on with /proc/sys/sunrpc/transports.
&gt; This file is generated in net/sunrpc/sysctl.c, function proc_do_xprt(). When
&gt; I "cat" this file, I get the expected output:
&gt;    $ cat /proc/sys/sunrpc/transports
&gt;    tcp 1048576
&gt;    udp 32768

&gt; But I think that it does not check the length of the buffer supplied by
&gt; userspace to read(). With my original program, I found that the stack was
&gt; being overwritten by the characters above, even when the length given to
&gt; read() was just 1.

David Wagner added (among other things) that copy_to_user could be
probably used here.

Ingo Oeser suggested to use simple_read_from_buffer() here.

The conclusion is that proc_do_xprt doesn't check for userside buffer
size indeed so fix this by using Ingo's suggestion.

Reported-by: Vegard Nossum &lt;vegard.nossum@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@gmail.com&gt;
CC: Ingo Oeser &lt;ioe-lkml@rameria.de&gt;
Cc: Neil Brown &lt;neilb@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Chuck Lever &lt;chuck.lever@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Greg Banks &lt;gnb@sgi.com&gt;
Cc: Tom Tucker &lt;tom@opengridcomputing.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@citi.umich.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 27df6f25ff218072e0e879a96beeb398a79cdbc8 upstream

Vegard Nossum reported
----------------------
&gt; I noticed that something weird is going on with /proc/sys/sunrpc/transports.
&gt; This file is generated in net/sunrpc/sysctl.c, function proc_do_xprt(). When
&gt; I "cat" this file, I get the expected output:
&gt;    $ cat /proc/sys/sunrpc/transports
&gt;    tcp 1048576
&gt;    udp 32768

&gt; But I think that it does not check the length of the buffer supplied by
&gt; userspace to read(). With my original program, I found that the stack was
&gt; being overwritten by the characters above, even when the length given to
&gt; read() was just 1.

David Wagner added (among other things) that copy_to_user could be
probably used here.

Ingo Oeser suggested to use simple_read_from_buffer() here.

The conclusion is that proc_do_xprt doesn't check for userside buffer
size indeed so fix this by using Ingo's suggestion.

Reported-by: Vegard Nossum &lt;vegard.nossum@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@gmail.com&gt;
CC: Ingo Oeser &lt;ioe-lkml@rameria.de&gt;
Cc: Neil Brown &lt;neilb@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Chuck Lever &lt;chuck.lever@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Greg Banks &lt;gnb@sgi.com&gt;
Cc: Tom Tucker &lt;tom@opengridcomputing.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@citi.umich.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: nf_nat_snmp_basic: fix a range check in NAT for SNMP</title>
<updated>2008-08-20T18:15:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-07-09T22:06:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c119d39883ca9a7016a37fc701f7cbe7c3d03956'/>
<id>c119d39883ca9a7016a37fc701f7cbe7c3d03956</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 252815b0cfe711001eff0327872209986b36d490 upstream

Fix a range check in netfilter IP NAT for SNMP to always use a big enough size
variable that the compiler won't moan about comparing it to ULONG_MAX/8 on a
64-bit platform.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy &lt;kaber@trash.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Eugene Teo &lt;eteo@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 252815b0cfe711001eff0327872209986b36d490 upstream

Fix a range check in netfilter IP NAT for SNMP to always use a big enough size
variable that the compiler won't moan about comparing it to ULONG_MAX/8 on a
64-bit platform.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy &lt;kaber@trash.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Eugene Teo &lt;eteo@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: Fix ip6_xmit to send fragments if ipfragok is true</title>
<updated>2008-08-20T18:15:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Wei Yongjun</name>
<email>yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-08-01T03:46:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=a250ca45baa1f3f36233727132d4d7728d5a0a63'/>
<id>a250ca45baa1f3f36233727132d4d7728d5a0a63</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 77e2f14f71d68d05945f1d30ca55b5194d6ab1ce ]

SCTP used ip6_xmit() to send fragments after received ICMP packet too
big message. But while send packet used ip6_xmit, the skb-&gt;local_df is
not initialized. So when skb if enter ip6_fragment(), the following
code will discard the skb.

ip6_fragment(...)
{
    if (!skb-&gt;local_df) {
        ...
        return -EMSGSIZE;
    }
    ...
}

SCTP do the following step:
1. send packet ip6_xmit(skb, ipfragok=0)
2. received ICMP packet too big message
3. if PMTUD_ENABLE: ip6_xmit(skb, ipfragok=1)

This patch fixed the problem by set local_df if ipfragok is true.

Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun &lt;yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Acked-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 77e2f14f71d68d05945f1d30ca55b5194d6ab1ce ]

SCTP used ip6_xmit() to send fragments after received ICMP packet too
big message. But while send packet used ip6_xmit, the skb-&gt;local_df is
not initialized. So when skb if enter ip6_fragment(), the following
code will discard the skb.

ip6_fragment(...)
{
    if (!skb-&gt;local_df) {
        ...
        return -EMSGSIZE;
    }
    ...
}

SCTP do the following step:
1. send packet ip6_xmit(skb, ipfragok=0)
2. received ICMP packet too big message
3. if PMTUD_ENABLE: ip6_xmit(skb, ipfragok=1)

This patch fixed the problem by set local_df if ipfragok is true.

Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun &lt;yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Acked-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dccp: change L/R must have at least one byte in the dccpsf_val field</title>
<updated>2008-08-20T18:15:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo</name>
<email>acme@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-08-13T20:48:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ab332c1c4bcdd94cb1d2eb6778e38b4b640f918a'/>
<id>ab332c1c4bcdd94cb1d2eb6778e38b4b640f918a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3e8a0a559c66ee9e7468195691a56fefc3589740 upstream

Thanks to Eugene Teo for reporting this problem.

Signed-off-by: Eugene Teo &lt;eugeneteo@kernel.sg&gt;
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Gerrit Renker &lt;gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3e8a0a559c66ee9e7468195691a56fefc3589740 upstream

Thanks to Eugene Teo for reporting this problem.

Signed-off-by: Eugene Teo &lt;eugeneteo@kernel.sg&gt;
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Gerrit Renker &lt;gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipvs: Fix possible deadlock in estimator code</title>
<updated>2008-08-20T18:15:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sven Wegener</name>
<email>sven.wegener@stealer.net</email>
</author>
<published>2008-08-14T03:55:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=1cc2f16f28ccfc4c0b477e3b0de7b89817876938'/>
<id>1cc2f16f28ccfc4c0b477e3b0de7b89817876938</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8ab19ea36c5c5340ff598e4d15fc084eb65671dc upstream

There is a slight chance for a deadlock in the estimator code. We can't call
del_timer_sync() while holding our lock, as the timer might be active and
spinning for the lock on another cpu. Work around this issue by using
try_to_del_timer_sync() and releasing the lock. We could actually delete the
timer outside of our lock, as the add and kill functions are only every called
from userspace via [gs]etsockopt() and are serialized by a mutex, but better
make this explicit.

Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener &lt;sven.wegener@stealer.net&gt;
Acked-by: Simon Horman &lt;horms@verge.net.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8ab19ea36c5c5340ff598e4d15fc084eb65671dc upstream

There is a slight chance for a deadlock in the estimator code. We can't call
del_timer_sync() while holding our lock, as the timer might be active and
spinning for the lock on another cpu. Work around this issue by using
try_to_del_timer_sync() and releasing the lock. We could actually delete the
timer outside of our lock, as the add and kill functions are only every called
from userspace via [gs]etsockopt() and are serialized by a mutex, but better
make this explicit.

Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener &lt;sven.wegener@stealer.net&gt;
Acked-by: Simon Horman &lt;horms@verge.net.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
