linux-toradex.git/net, branch v2.6.27.24

netfilter: {ip, ip6, arp}_tables: fix incorrect loop detection

2009-05-02T17:24:08+00:00

upstream commit: 1f9352ae2253a97b07b34dcf16ffa3b4ca12c558

Commit e1b4b9f ([NETFILTER]: {ip,ip6,arp}_tables: fix exponential worst-case
search for loops) introduced a regression in the loop detection algorithm,
causing sporadic incorrectly detected loops.

When a chain has already been visited during the check, it is treated as
having a standard target containing a RETURN verdict directly at the
beginning in order to not check it again. The real target of the first
rule is then incorrectly treated as STANDARD target and checked not to
contain invalid verdicts.

Fix by making sure the rule does actually contain a standard target.

Based on patch by Francis Dupont 
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy 
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net/netrom: Fix socket locking

2009-05-02T17:24:05+00:00

upstream commit: cc29c70dd581f85ee7a3e7980fb031f90b90a2ab

Patch "af_rose/x25: Sanity check the maximum user frame size"
(commit 83e0bbcbe2145f160fbaa109b0439dae7f4a38a9) from Alan Cox got
locking wrong. If we bail out due to user frame size being too large,
we must unlock the socket beforehand.

Signed-off-by: Jean Delvare 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

af_rose/x25: Sanity check the maximum user frame size

2009-05-02T17:24:04+00:00

upstream commit: 83e0bbcbe2145f160fbaa109b0439dae7f4a38a9

CVE-2009-0795.

Otherwise we can wrap the sizes and end up sending garbage.

Closes #10423

Signed-off-by: Alan Cox 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: fix sctp breakage

2009-05-02T17:23:54+00:00

[ Upstream commit cb0dc77de0d23615a845e45844a2e22fc224d7fe ]

broken by commit 5e739d1752aca4e8f3e794d431503bfca3162df4; AFAICS should
be -stable fodder as well...

Signed-off-by: Al Viro 
Aced-by: Vlad Yasevich 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

netfilter: nf_conntrack_tcp: fix unaligned memory access in tcp_sack

2009-05-02T17:23:53+00:00

[ Upstream commit 534f81a5068799799e264fd162e9488a129f98d4 ]

This patch fixes an unaligned memory access in tcp_sack while reading
sequence numbers from TCP selective acknowledgement options.  Prior to
applying this patch, upstream linux-2.6.27.20 was occasionally
generating messages like this on my sparc64 system:

  [54678.532071] Kernel unaligned access at TPC[6b17d4] tcp_packet+0xcd4/0xd00

Acked-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ipv6: Plug sk_buff leak in ipv6_rcv (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c)

2009-05-02T17:23:51+00:00

[ Upstream commit 71f6f6dfdf7c7a67462386d9ea05c1095a89c555 ]

Commit 778d80be52699596bf70e0eb0761cf5e1e46088d
(ipv6: Add disable_ipv6 sysctl to disable IPv6 operaion on specific interface)
seems to have introduced a leak of sk_buff's for ipv6 traffic,
at least in some configurations where idev is NULL, or when ipv6
is disabled via sysctl.

The problem is that if the first condition of the if-statement
returns non-NULL, it returns an skb with only one reference,
and when the other conditions apply, execution jumps to the "out"
label, which does not call kfree_skb for it.

To plug this leak, change to use the "drop" label instead.
(this relies on it being ok to call kfree_skb on NULL)
This also allows us to avoid calling rcu_read_unlock here,
and removes the only user of the "out" label.

Signed-off-by: Jesper Nilsson 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ipv6: don't use tw net when accounting for recycled tw

2009-05-02T17:23:49+00:00

[ Upstream commit 3f53a38131a4e7a053c0aa060aba0411242fb6b9 ]

We already have a valid net in that place, but this is not just a
cleanup - the tw pointer can be NULL there sometimes, thus causing
an oops in NET_NS=y case.

The same place in ipv4 code already works correctly using existing
net, rather than tw's one.

The bug exists since 2.6.27.

Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bridge: bad error handling when adding invalid ether address

2009-05-02T17:23:47+00:00

[ Upstream commit cda6d377ec6b2ee2e58d563d0bd7eb313e0165df ]

This fixes an crash when empty bond device is added to a bridge.
If an interface with invalid ethernet address (all zero) is added
to a bridge, then bridge code detects it when setting up the forward
databas entry. But the error unwind is broken, the bridge port object
can get freed twice: once when ref count went to zeo, and once by kfree.
Since object is never really accessible, just free it.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: Kill skb_truesize_check(), it only catches false-positives.

2009-03-17T00:52:42+00:00

[ Upstream commit 92a0acce186cde8ead56c6915d9479773673ea1a ]

A long time ago we had bugs, primarily in TCP, where we would modify
skb->truesize (for TSO queue collapsing) in ways which would corrupt
the socket memory accounting.

skb_truesize_check() was added in order to try and catch this error
more systematically.

However this debugging check has morphed into a Frankenstein of sorts
and these days it does nothing other than catch false-positives.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: amend the fix for SO_BSDCOMPAT gsopt infoleak

2009-03-17T00:52:41+00:00

[ Upstream commit 50fee1dec5d71b8a14c1b82f2f42e16adc227f8b ]

The fix for CVE-2009-0676 (upstream commit df0bca04) is incomplete. Note
that the same problem of leaking kernel memory will reappear if someone
on some architecture uses struct timeval with some internal padding (for
example tv_sec 64-bit and tv_usec 32-bit) --- then, you are going to
leak the padded bytes to userspace.

Signed-off-by: Eugene Teo 
Reported-by: Mikulas Patocka 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman