<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/net, branch v2.6.27.50</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: ip6t_REJECT: fix a dst leak in ipv6 REJECT</title>
<updated>2010-08-02T17:18:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>eric.dumazet@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-07-02T08:05:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=30b816a516ba96aa85ce0290aa63cebd3d258b72'/>
<id>30b816a516ba96aa85ce0290aa63cebd3d258b72</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 499031ac8a3df6738f6186ded9da853e8ea18253 upstream.

We should release dst if dst-&gt;error is set.

Bug introduced in 2.6.14 by commit e104411b82f5c
([XFRM]: Always release dst_entry on error in xfrm_lookup)

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy &lt;kaber@trash.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 499031ac8a3df6738f6186ded9da853e8ea18253 upstream.

We should release dst if dst-&gt;error is set.

Bug introduced in 2.6.14 by commit e104411b82f5c
([XFRM]: Always release dst_entry on error in xfrm_lookup)

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy &lt;kaber@trash.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: fix append error cause to ERROR chunk correctly</title>
<updated>2010-07-05T18:08:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Wei Yongjun</name>
<email>yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-05-18T05:51:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=7694247af71eb2a9067c07ee716ea2ead7bd8fe2'/>
<id>7694247af71eb2a9067c07ee716ea2ead7bd8fe2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2e3219b5c8a2e44e0b83ae6e04f52f20a82ac0f2 upstream.

commit 5fa782c2f5ef6c2e4f04d3e228412c9b4a4c8809
  sctp: Fix skb_over_panic resulting from multiple invalid \
    parameter errors (CVE-2010-1173) (v4)

cause 'error cause' never be add the the ERROR chunk due to
some typo when check valid length in sctp_init_cause_fixed().

Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun &lt;yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vladislav.yasevich@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 2e3219b5c8a2e44e0b83ae6e04f52f20a82ac0f2 upstream.

commit 5fa782c2f5ef6c2e4f04d3e228412c9b4a4c8809
  sctp: Fix skb_over_panic resulting from multiple invalid \
    parameter errors (CVE-2010-1173) (v4)

cause 'error cause' never be add the the ERROR chunk due to
some typo when check valid length in sctp_init_cause_fixed().

Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun &lt;yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vladislav.yasevich@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tipc: Fix oops on send prior to entering networked mode (v3)</title>
<updated>2010-07-05T18:08:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Neil Horman</name>
<email>nhorman@tuxdriver.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-03-03T08:31:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=670037a94e70b107a79fd9ac0f4f2c9e1d26f742'/>
<id>670037a94e70b107a79fd9ac0f4f2c9e1d26f742</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d0021b252eaf65ca07ed14f0d66425dd9ccab9a6 upstream.

Fix TIPC to disallow sending to remote addresses prior to entering NET_MODE

user programs can oops the kernel by sending datagrams via AF_TIPC prior to
entering networked mode.  The following backtrace has been observed:

ID: 13459  TASK: ffff810014640040  CPU: 0   COMMAND: "tipc-client"
[exception RIP: tipc_node_select_next_hop+90]
RIP: ffffffff8869d3c3  RSP: ffff81002d9a5ab8  RFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000001  RBX: 0000000000000001  RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 0000000000000000  RSI: 0000000000000001  RDI: 0000000001001001
RBP: 0000000001001001   R8: 0074736575716552   R9: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff81003fbd0680  R11: 00000000000000c8  R12: 0000000000000008
R13: 0000000000000001  R14: 0000000000000001  R15: ffff810015c6ca00
ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
RIP: 0000003cbd8d49a3  RSP: 00007fffc84e0be8  RFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 000000000000002c  RBX: ffffffff8005d116  RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000008  RSI: 00007fffc84e0c00  RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000000   R8: 00007fffc84e0c10   R9: 0000000000000010
R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000246  R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fffc84e0d10  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: 00007fffc84e0c30
ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c  CS: 0033  SS: 002b

What happens is that, when the tipc module in inserted it enters a standalone
node mode in which communication to its own address is allowed &lt;0.0.0&gt; but not
to other addresses, since the appropriate data structures have not been
allocated yet (specifically the tipc_net pointer).  There is nothing stopping a
client from trying to send such a message however, and if that happens, we
attempt to dereference tipc_net.zones while the pointer is still NULL, and
explode.  The fix is pretty straightforward.  Since these oopses all arise from
the dereference of global pointers prior to their assignment to allocated
values, and since these allocations are small (about 2k total), lets convert
these pointers to static arrays of the appropriate size.  All the accesses to
these bits consider 0/NULL to be a non match when searching, so all the lookups
still work properly, and there is no longer a chance of a bad dererence
anywhere.  As a bonus, this lets us eliminate the setup/teardown routines for
those pointers, and elimnates the need to preform any locking around them to
prevent access while their being allocated/freed.

I've updated the tipc_net structure to behave this way to fix the exact reported
problem, and also fixed up the tipc_bearers and media_list arrays to fix an
obvious simmilar problem that arises from issuing tipc-config commands to
manipulate bearers/links prior to entering networked mode

I've tested this for a few hours by running the sanity tests and stress test
with the tipcutils suite, and nothing has fallen over.  There have been a few
lockdep warnings, but those were there before, and can be addressed later, as
they didn't actually result in any deadlock.

Signed-off-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
CC: Allan Stephens &lt;allan.stephens@windriver.com&gt;
CC: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
CC: tipc-discussion@lists.sourceforge.net
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d0021b252eaf65ca07ed14f0d66425dd9ccab9a6 upstream.

Fix TIPC to disallow sending to remote addresses prior to entering NET_MODE

user programs can oops the kernel by sending datagrams via AF_TIPC prior to
entering networked mode.  The following backtrace has been observed:

ID: 13459  TASK: ffff810014640040  CPU: 0   COMMAND: "tipc-client"
[exception RIP: tipc_node_select_next_hop+90]
RIP: ffffffff8869d3c3  RSP: ffff81002d9a5ab8  RFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000001  RBX: 0000000000000001  RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 0000000000000000  RSI: 0000000000000001  RDI: 0000000001001001
RBP: 0000000001001001   R8: 0074736575716552   R9: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff81003fbd0680  R11: 00000000000000c8  R12: 0000000000000008
R13: 0000000000000001  R14: 0000000000000001  R15: ffff810015c6ca00
ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
RIP: 0000003cbd8d49a3  RSP: 00007fffc84e0be8  RFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 000000000000002c  RBX: ffffffff8005d116  RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000008  RSI: 00007fffc84e0c00  RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000000   R8: 00007fffc84e0c10   R9: 0000000000000010
R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000246  R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fffc84e0d10  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: 00007fffc84e0c30
ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c  CS: 0033  SS: 002b

What happens is that, when the tipc module in inserted it enters a standalone
node mode in which communication to its own address is allowed &lt;0.0.0&gt; but not
to other addresses, since the appropriate data structures have not been
allocated yet (specifically the tipc_net pointer).  There is nothing stopping a
client from trying to send such a message however, and if that happens, we
attempt to dereference tipc_net.zones while the pointer is still NULL, and
explode.  The fix is pretty straightforward.  Since these oopses all arise from
the dereference of global pointers prior to their assignment to allocated
values, and since these allocations are small (about 2k total), lets convert
these pointers to static arrays of the appropriate size.  All the accesses to
these bits consider 0/NULL to be a non match when searching, so all the lookups
still work properly, and there is no longer a chance of a bad dererence
anywhere.  As a bonus, this lets us eliminate the setup/teardown routines for
those pointers, and elimnates the need to preform any locking around them to
prevent access while their being allocated/freed.

I've updated the tipc_net structure to behave this way to fix the exact reported
problem, and also fixed up the tipc_bearers and media_list arrays to fix an
obvious simmilar problem that arises from issuing tipc-config commands to
manipulate bearers/links prior to entering networked mode

I've tested this for a few hours by running the sanity tests and stress test
with the tipcutils suite, and nothing has fallen over.  There have been a few
lockdep warnings, but those were there before, and can be addressed later, as
they didn't actually result in any deadlock.

Signed-off-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
CC: Allan Stephens &lt;allan.stephens@windriver.com&gt;
CC: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
CC: tipc-discussion@lists.sourceforge.net
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: Fix skb_over_panic resulting from multiple invalid parameter errors (CVE-2010-1173) (v4)</title>
<updated>2010-07-05T18:08:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Neil Horman</name>
<email>nhorman@tuxdriver.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-04-28T10:30:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=b1b7bf1eede2a2d954dc0e4e7db6bb94e7650f60'/>
<id>b1b7bf1eede2a2d954dc0e4e7db6bb94e7650f60</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5fa782c2f5ef6c2e4f04d3e228412c9b4a4c8809 upstream.

Ok, version 4

Change Notes:
1) Minor cleanups, from Vlads notes

Summary:

Hey-
	Recently, it was reported to me that the kernel could oops in the
following way:

&lt;5&gt; kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:91!
&lt;5&gt; invalid operand: 0000 [#1]
&lt;5&gt; Modules linked in: sctp netconsole nls_utf8 autofs4 sunrpc iptable_filter
ip_tables cpufreq_powersave parport_pc lp parport vmblock(U) vsock(U) vmci(U)
vmxnet(U) vmmemctl(U) vmhgfs(U) acpiphp dm_mirror dm_mod button battery ac md5
ipv6 uhci_hcd ehci_hcd snd_ens1371 snd_rawmidi snd_seq_device snd_pcm_oss
snd_mixer_oss snd_pcm snd_timer snd_page_alloc snd_ac97_codec snd soundcore
pcnet32 mii floppy ext3 jbd ata_piix libata mptscsih mptsas mptspi mptscsi
mptbase sd_mod scsi_mod
&lt;5&gt; CPU:    0
&lt;5&gt; EIP:    0060:[&lt;c02bff27&gt;]    Not tainted VLI
&lt;5&gt; EFLAGS: 00010216   (2.6.9-89.0.25.EL)
&lt;5&gt; EIP is at skb_over_panic+0x1f/0x2d
&lt;5&gt; eax: 0000002c   ebx: c033f461   ecx: c0357d96   edx: c040fd44
&lt;5&gt; esi: c033f461   edi: df653280   ebp: 00000000   esp: c040fd40
&lt;5&gt; ds: 007b   es: 007b   ss: 0068
&lt;5&gt; Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo=c040f000 task=c0370be0)
&lt;5&gt; Stack: c0357d96 e0c29478 00000084 00000004 c033f461 df653280 d7883180
e0c2947d
&lt;5&gt;        00000000 00000080 df653490 00000004 de4f1ac0 de4f1ac0 00000004
df653490
&lt;5&gt;        00000001 e0c2877a 08000800 de4f1ac0 df653490 00000000 e0c29d2e
00000004
&lt;5&gt; Call Trace:
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;e0c29478&gt;] sctp_addto_chunk+0xb0/0x128 [sctp]
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;e0c2947d&gt;] sctp_addto_chunk+0xb5/0x128 [sctp]
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;e0c2877a&gt;] sctp_init_cause+0x3f/0x47 [sctp]
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;e0c29d2e&gt;] sctp_process_unk_param+0xac/0xb8 [sctp]
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;e0c29e90&gt;] sctp_verify_init+0xcc/0x134 [sctp]
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;e0c20322&gt;] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x83/0x28e [sctp]
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;e0c25333&gt;] sctp_do_sm+0x41/0x77 [sctp]
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;c01555a4&gt;] cache_grow+0x140/0x233
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;e0c26ba1&gt;] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0xc5/0x108 [sctp]
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;e0c2b863&gt;] sctp_inq_push+0xe/0x10 [sctp]
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;e0c34600&gt;] sctp_rcv+0x454/0x509 [sctp]
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;e084e017&gt;] ipt_hook+0x17/0x1c [iptable_filter]
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;c02d005e&gt;] nf_iterate+0x40/0x81
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;c02e0bb9&gt;] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x151
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;c02e0c7f&gt;] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xc6/0x151
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;c02d0362&gt;] nf_hook_slow+0x83/0xb5
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;c02e0bb2&gt;] ip_local_deliver+0x1a2/0x1a9
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;c02e0bb9&gt;] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x151
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;c02e103e&gt;] ip_rcv+0x334/0x3b4
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;c02c66fd&gt;] netif_receive_skb+0x320/0x35b
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;e0a0928b&gt;] init_stall_timer+0x67/0x6a [uhci_hcd]
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;c02c67a4&gt;] process_backlog+0x6c/0xd9
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;c02c690f&gt;] net_rx_action+0xfe/0x1f8
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;c012a7b1&gt;] __do_softirq+0x35/0x79
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;c0107efb&gt;] handle_IRQ_event+0x0/0x4f
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;c01094de&gt;] do_softirq+0x46/0x4d

Its an skb_over_panic BUG halt that results from processing an init chunk in
which too many of its variable length parameters are in some way malformed.

The problem is in sctp_process_unk_param:
if (NULL == *errp)
	*errp = sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk,
					 ntohs(chunk-&gt;chunk_hdr-&gt;length));

	if (*errp) {
		sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_PARAM,
				 WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p-&gt;length)));
		sctp_addto_chunk(*errp,
			WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p-&gt;length)),
				  param.v);

When we allocate an error chunk, we assume that the worst case scenario requires
that we have chunk_hdr-&gt;length data allocated, which would be correct nominally,
given that we call sctp_addto_chunk for the violating parameter.  Unfortunately,
we also, in sctp_init_cause insert a sctp_errhdr_t structure into the error
chunk, so the worst case situation in which all parameters are in violation
requires chunk_hdr-&gt;length+(sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t)*param_count) bytes of data.

The result of this error is that a deliberately malformed packet sent to a
listening host can cause a remote DOS, described in CVE-2010-1173:
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2010-1173

I've tested the below fix and confirmed that it fixes the issue.  We move to a
strategy whereby we allocate a fixed size error chunk and ignore errors we don't
have space to report.  Tested by me successfully

Signed-off-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vladislav.yasevich@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 5fa782c2f5ef6c2e4f04d3e228412c9b4a4c8809 upstream.

Ok, version 4

Change Notes:
1) Minor cleanups, from Vlads notes

Summary:

Hey-
	Recently, it was reported to me that the kernel could oops in the
following way:

&lt;5&gt; kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:91!
&lt;5&gt; invalid operand: 0000 [#1]
&lt;5&gt; Modules linked in: sctp netconsole nls_utf8 autofs4 sunrpc iptable_filter
ip_tables cpufreq_powersave parport_pc lp parport vmblock(U) vsock(U) vmci(U)
vmxnet(U) vmmemctl(U) vmhgfs(U) acpiphp dm_mirror dm_mod button battery ac md5
ipv6 uhci_hcd ehci_hcd snd_ens1371 snd_rawmidi snd_seq_device snd_pcm_oss
snd_mixer_oss snd_pcm snd_timer snd_page_alloc snd_ac97_codec snd soundcore
pcnet32 mii floppy ext3 jbd ata_piix libata mptscsih mptsas mptspi mptscsi
mptbase sd_mod scsi_mod
&lt;5&gt; CPU:    0
&lt;5&gt; EIP:    0060:[&lt;c02bff27&gt;]    Not tainted VLI
&lt;5&gt; EFLAGS: 00010216   (2.6.9-89.0.25.EL)
&lt;5&gt; EIP is at skb_over_panic+0x1f/0x2d
&lt;5&gt; eax: 0000002c   ebx: c033f461   ecx: c0357d96   edx: c040fd44
&lt;5&gt; esi: c033f461   edi: df653280   ebp: 00000000   esp: c040fd40
&lt;5&gt; ds: 007b   es: 007b   ss: 0068
&lt;5&gt; Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo=c040f000 task=c0370be0)
&lt;5&gt; Stack: c0357d96 e0c29478 00000084 00000004 c033f461 df653280 d7883180
e0c2947d
&lt;5&gt;        00000000 00000080 df653490 00000004 de4f1ac0 de4f1ac0 00000004
df653490
&lt;5&gt;        00000001 e0c2877a 08000800 de4f1ac0 df653490 00000000 e0c29d2e
00000004
&lt;5&gt; Call Trace:
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;e0c29478&gt;] sctp_addto_chunk+0xb0/0x128 [sctp]
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;e0c2947d&gt;] sctp_addto_chunk+0xb5/0x128 [sctp]
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;e0c2877a&gt;] sctp_init_cause+0x3f/0x47 [sctp]
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;e0c29d2e&gt;] sctp_process_unk_param+0xac/0xb8 [sctp]
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;e0c29e90&gt;] sctp_verify_init+0xcc/0x134 [sctp]
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;e0c20322&gt;] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x83/0x28e [sctp]
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;e0c25333&gt;] sctp_do_sm+0x41/0x77 [sctp]
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;c01555a4&gt;] cache_grow+0x140/0x233
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;e0c26ba1&gt;] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0xc5/0x108 [sctp]
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;e0c2b863&gt;] sctp_inq_push+0xe/0x10 [sctp]
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;e0c34600&gt;] sctp_rcv+0x454/0x509 [sctp]
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;e084e017&gt;] ipt_hook+0x17/0x1c [iptable_filter]
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;c02d005e&gt;] nf_iterate+0x40/0x81
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;c02e0bb9&gt;] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x151
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;c02e0c7f&gt;] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xc6/0x151
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;c02d0362&gt;] nf_hook_slow+0x83/0xb5
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;c02e0bb2&gt;] ip_local_deliver+0x1a2/0x1a9
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;c02e0bb9&gt;] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x151
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;c02e103e&gt;] ip_rcv+0x334/0x3b4
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;c02c66fd&gt;] netif_receive_skb+0x320/0x35b
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;e0a0928b&gt;] init_stall_timer+0x67/0x6a [uhci_hcd]
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;c02c67a4&gt;] process_backlog+0x6c/0xd9
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;c02c690f&gt;] net_rx_action+0xfe/0x1f8
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;c012a7b1&gt;] __do_softirq+0x35/0x79
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;c0107efb&gt;] handle_IRQ_event+0x0/0x4f
&lt;5&gt;  [&lt;c01094de&gt;] do_softirq+0x46/0x4d

Its an skb_over_panic BUG halt that results from processing an init chunk in
which too many of its variable length parameters are in some way malformed.

The problem is in sctp_process_unk_param:
if (NULL == *errp)
	*errp = sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk,
					 ntohs(chunk-&gt;chunk_hdr-&gt;length));

	if (*errp) {
		sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_PARAM,
				 WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p-&gt;length)));
		sctp_addto_chunk(*errp,
			WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p-&gt;length)),
				  param.v);

When we allocate an error chunk, we assume that the worst case scenario requires
that we have chunk_hdr-&gt;length data allocated, which would be correct nominally,
given that we call sctp_addto_chunk for the violating parameter.  Unfortunately,
we also, in sctp_init_cause insert a sctp_errhdr_t structure into the error
chunk, so the worst case situation in which all parameters are in violation
requires chunk_hdr-&gt;length+(sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t)*param_count) bytes of data.

The result of this error is that a deliberately malformed packet sent to a
listening host can cause a remote DOS, described in CVE-2010-1173:
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2010-1173

I've tested the below fix and confirmed that it fixes the issue.  We move to a
strategy whereby we allocate a fixed size error chunk and ignore errors we don't
have space to report.  Tested by me successfully

Signed-off-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vladislav.yasevich@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>svc: Clean up deferred requests on transport destruction</title>
<updated>2010-05-26T21:27:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tom Tucker</name>
<email>tom@opengridcomputing.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-01-05T21:21:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=60f30297ff9403dec857f23292bc82ecdc5b4a57'/>
<id>60f30297ff9403dec857f23292bc82ecdc5b4a57</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 22945e4a1c7454c97f5d8aee1ef526c83fef3223 upstream.

A race between svc_revisit and svc_delete_xprt can result in
deferred requests holding references on a transport that can never be
recovered because dead transports are not enqueued for subsequent
processing.

Check for XPT_DEAD in revisit to clean up completing deferrals on a dead
transport and sweep a transport's deferred queue to do the same for queued
but unprocessed deferrals.

Signed-off-by: Tom Tucker &lt;tom@opengridcomputing.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@citi.umich.edu&gt;
Cc: roma1390 &lt;roma1390@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 22945e4a1c7454c97f5d8aee1ef526c83fef3223 upstream.

A race between svc_revisit and svc_delete_xprt can result in
deferred requests holding references on a transport that can never be
recovered because dead transports are not enqueued for subsequent
processing.

Check for XPT_DEAD in revisit to clean up completing deferrals on a dead
transport and sweep a transport's deferred queue to do the same for queued
but unprocessed deferrals.

Signed-off-by: Tom Tucker &lt;tom@opengridcomputing.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@citi.umich.edu&gt;
Cc: roma1390 &lt;roma1390@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tc: Fix unitialized kernel memory leak</title>
<updated>2010-04-01T22:52:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>eric.dumazet@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-09-02T02:40:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=910e88a0698da1f483603c603b04c780cb87dd08'/>
<id>910e88a0698da1f483603c603b04c780cb87dd08</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 16ebb5e0b36ceadc8186f71d68b0c4fa4b6e781b upstream.

Three bytes of uninitialized kernel memory are currently leaked to user

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko &lt;jpirko@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 16ebb5e0b36ceadc8186f71d68b0c4fa4b6e781b upstream.

Three bytes of uninitialized kernel memory are currently leaked to user

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko &lt;jpirko@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: fix CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG + CONFIG_PREEMPT timer BUG()</title>
<updated>2010-04-01T22:52:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Robert Varga</name>
<email>nite@hq.alert.sk</email>
</author>
<published>2009-09-16T06:49:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=7224283df47b5ff9f309371b60030f07037cd51e'/>
<id>7224283df47b5ff9f309371b60030f07037cd51e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 657e9649e745b06675aa5063c84430986cdc3afa upstream.

I have recently came across a preemption imbalance detected by:

&lt;4&gt;huh, entered ffffffff80644630 with preempt_count 00000102, exited with 00000101?
&lt;0&gt;------------[ cut here ]------------
&lt;2&gt;kernel BUG at /usr/src/linux/kernel/timer.c:664!
&lt;0&gt;invalid opcode: 0000 [1] PREEMPT SMP

with ffffffff80644630 being inet_twdr_hangman().

This appeared after I enabled CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG and played with it a
bit, so I looked at what might have caused it.

One thing that struck me as strange is tcp_twsk_destructor(), as it
calls tcp_put_md5sig_pool() -- which entails a put_cpu(), causing the
detected imbalance. Found on 2.6.23.9, but 2.6.31 is affected as well,
as far as I can tell.

Signed-off-by: Robert Varga &lt;nite@hq.alert.sk&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 657e9649e745b06675aa5063c84430986cdc3afa upstream.

I have recently came across a preemption imbalance detected by:

&lt;4&gt;huh, entered ffffffff80644630 with preempt_count 00000102, exited with 00000101?
&lt;0&gt;------------[ cut here ]------------
&lt;2&gt;kernel BUG at /usr/src/linux/kernel/timer.c:664!
&lt;0&gt;invalid opcode: 0000 [1] PREEMPT SMP

with ffffffff80644630 being inet_twdr_hangman().

This appeared after I enabled CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG and played with it a
bit, so I looked at what might have caused it.

One thing that struck me as strange is tcp_twsk_destructor(), as it
calls tcp_put_md5sig_pool() -- which entails a put_cpu(), causing the
detected imbalance. Found on 2.6.23.9, but 2.6.31 is affected as well,
as far as I can tell.

Signed-off-by: Robert Varga &lt;nite@hq.alert.sk&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sit: fix off-by-one in ipip6_tunnel_get_prl</title>
<updated>2010-04-01T22:52:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sascha Hlusiak</name>
<email>contact@saschahlusiak.de</email>
</author>
<published>2009-09-29T11:27:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=f02363178930a9fb73c88f88c3c347d27d62a082'/>
<id>f02363178930a9fb73c88f88c3c347d27d62a082</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 298bf12ddb25841804f26234a43b89da1b1c0e21 upstream.

When requesting all prl entries (kprl.addr == INADDR_ANY) and there are
more prl entries than there is space passed from userspace, the existing
code would always copy cmax+1 entries, which is more than can be handled.

This patch makes the kernel copy only exactly cmax entries.

Signed-off-by: Sascha Hlusiak &lt;contact@saschahlusiak.de&gt;
Acked-By: Fred L. Templin &lt;Fred.L.Templin@boeing.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 298bf12ddb25841804f26234a43b89da1b1c0e21 upstream.

When requesting all prl entries (kprl.addr == INADDR_ANY) and there are
more prl entries than there is space passed from userspace, the existing
code would always copy cmax+1 entries, which is more than can be handled.

This patch makes the kernel copy only exactly cmax entries.

Signed-off-by: Sascha Hlusiak &lt;contact@saschahlusiak.de&gt;
Acked-By: Fred L. Templin &lt;Fred.L.Templin@boeing.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: unix: fix sending fds in multiple buffers</title>
<updated>2010-04-01T22:52:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Miklos Szeredi</name>
<email>mszeredi@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2009-09-11T18:31:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=140d894f72c42b58de16c7587241fdd369fc81da'/>
<id>140d894f72c42b58de16c7587241fdd369fc81da</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8ba69ba6a324b13e1190fc31e41954d190fd4f1d upstream.

Kalle Olavi Niemitalo reported that:

  "..., when one process calls sendmsg once to send 43804 bytes of
  data and one file descriptor, and another process then calls recvmsg
  three times to receive the 16032+16032+11740 bytes, each of those
  recvmsg calls returns the file descriptor in the ancillary data.  I
  confirmed this with strace.  The behaviour differs from Linux
  2.6.26, where reportedly only one of those recvmsg calls (I think
  the first one) returned the file descriptor."

This bug was introduced by a patch from me titled "net: unix: fix inflight
counting bug in garbage collector", commit 6209344f5.

And the reason is, quoting Kalle:

  "Before your patch, unix_attach_fds() would set scm-&gt;fp = NULL, so
  that if the loop in unix_stream_sendmsg() ran multiple iterations,
  it could not call unix_attach_fds() again.  But now,
  unix_attach_fds() leaves scm-&gt;fp unchanged, and I think this causes
  it to be called multiple times and duplicate the same file
  descriptors to each struct sk_buff."

Fix this by introducing a flag that is cleared at the start and set
when the fds attached to the first buffer.  The resulting code should
work equivalently to the one on 2.6.26.

Reported-by: Kalle Olavi Niemitalo &lt;kon@iki.fi&gt;
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8ba69ba6a324b13e1190fc31e41954d190fd4f1d upstream.

Kalle Olavi Niemitalo reported that:

  "..., when one process calls sendmsg once to send 43804 bytes of
  data and one file descriptor, and another process then calls recvmsg
  three times to receive the 16032+16032+11740 bytes, each of those
  recvmsg calls returns the file descriptor in the ancillary data.  I
  confirmed this with strace.  The behaviour differs from Linux
  2.6.26, where reportedly only one of those recvmsg calls (I think
  the first one) returned the file descriptor."

This bug was introduced by a patch from me titled "net: unix: fix inflight
counting bug in garbage collector", commit 6209344f5.

And the reason is, quoting Kalle:

  "Before your patch, unix_attach_fds() would set scm-&gt;fp = NULL, so
  that if the loop in unix_stream_sendmsg() ran multiple iterations,
  it could not call unix_attach_fds() again.  But now,
  unix_attach_fds() leaves scm-&gt;fp unchanged, and I think this causes
  it to be called multiple times and duplicate the same file
  descriptors to each struct sk_buff."

Fix this by introducing a flag that is cleared at the start and set
when the fds attached to the first buffer.  The resulting code should
work equivalently to the one on 2.6.26.

Reported-by: Kalle Olavi Niemitalo &lt;kon@iki.fi&gt;
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ax25: Fix possible oops in ax25_make_new</title>
<updated>2010-04-01T22:52:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jarek Poplawski</name>
<email>jarkao2@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-09-27T10:57:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=d59e55cb2c8bc73f885de7242223849b3d051cd5'/>
<id>d59e55cb2c8bc73f885de7242223849b3d051cd5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8c185ab6185bf5e67766edb000ce428269364c86 upstream.

In ax25_make_new, if kmemdup of digipeat returns an error, there would
be an oops in sk_free while calling sk_destruct, because sk_protinfo
is NULL at the moment; move sk-&gt;sk_destruct initialization after this.

BTW of reported-by: Bernard Pidoux F6BVP &lt;f6bvp@free.fr&gt;

Signed-off-by: Jarek Poplawski &lt;jarkao2@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8c185ab6185bf5e67766edb000ce428269364c86 upstream.

In ax25_make_new, if kmemdup of digipeat returns an error, there would
be an oops in sk_free while calling sk_destruct, because sk_protinfo
is NULL at the moment; move sk-&gt;sk_destruct initialization after this.

BTW of reported-by: Bernard Pidoux F6BVP &lt;f6bvp@free.fr&gt;

Signed-off-by: Jarek Poplawski &lt;jarkao2@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
