<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/net, branch v2.6.32.28</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>sctp: Fix a race between ICMP protocol unreachable and connect()</title>
<updated>2011-01-07T22:43:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vlad Yasevich</name>
<email>vladislav.yasevich@hp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-05-06T07:56:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=6552df6df2fcfc281c64dea191fef144d5a188c5'/>
<id>6552df6df2fcfc281c64dea191fef144d5a188c5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 50b5d6ad63821cea324a5a7a19854d4de1a0a819 upstream.

ICMP protocol unreachable handling completely disregarded
the fact that the user may have locked the socket.  It proceeded
to destroy the association, even though the user may have
held the lock and had a ref on the association.  This resulted
in the following:

Attempt to release alive inet socket f6afcc00

=========================
[ BUG: held lock freed! ]
-------------------------
somenu/2672 is freeing memory f6afcc00-f6afcfff, with a lock still held
there!
 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.+.}, at: [&lt;c122098a&gt;] sctp_connect+0x13/0x4c
1 lock held by somenu/2672:
 #0:  (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.+.}, at: [&lt;c122098a&gt;] sctp_connect+0x13/0x4c

stack backtrace:
Pid: 2672, comm: somenu Not tainted 2.6.32-telco #55
Call Trace:
 [&lt;c1232266&gt;] ? printk+0xf/0x11
 [&lt;c1038553&gt;] debug_check_no_locks_freed+0xce/0xff
 [&lt;c10620b4&gt;] kmem_cache_free+0x21/0x66
 [&lt;c1185f25&gt;] __sk_free+0x9d/0xab
 [&lt;c1185f9c&gt;] sk_free+0x1c/0x1e
 [&lt;c1216e38&gt;] sctp_association_put+0x32/0x89
 [&lt;c1220865&gt;] __sctp_connect+0x36d/0x3f4
 [&lt;c122098a&gt;] ? sctp_connect+0x13/0x4c
 [&lt;c102d073&gt;] ? autoremove_wake_function+0x0/0x33
 [&lt;c12209a8&gt;] sctp_connect+0x31/0x4c
 [&lt;c11d1e80&gt;] inet_dgram_connect+0x4b/0x55
 [&lt;c11834fa&gt;] sys_connect+0x54/0x71
 [&lt;c103a3a2&gt;] ? lock_release_non_nested+0x88/0x239
 [&lt;c1054026&gt;] ? might_fault+0x42/0x7c
 [&lt;c1054026&gt;] ? might_fault+0x42/0x7c
 [&lt;c11847ab&gt;] sys_socketcall+0x6d/0x178
 [&lt;c10da994&gt;] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0xc/0x10
 [&lt;c1002959&gt;] syscall_call+0x7/0xb

This was because the sctp_wait_for_connect() would aqcure the socket
lock and then proceed to release the last reference count on the
association, thus cause the fully destruction path to finish freeing
the socket.

The simplest solution is to start a very short timer in case the socket
is owned by user.  When the timer expires, we can do some verification
and be able to do the release properly.

Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vladislav.yasevich@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 50b5d6ad63821cea324a5a7a19854d4de1a0a819 upstream.

ICMP protocol unreachable handling completely disregarded
the fact that the user may have locked the socket.  It proceeded
to destroy the association, even though the user may have
held the lock and had a ref on the association.  This resulted
in the following:

Attempt to release alive inet socket f6afcc00

=========================
[ BUG: held lock freed! ]
-------------------------
somenu/2672 is freeing memory f6afcc00-f6afcfff, with a lock still held
there!
 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.+.}, at: [&lt;c122098a&gt;] sctp_connect+0x13/0x4c
1 lock held by somenu/2672:
 #0:  (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.+.}, at: [&lt;c122098a&gt;] sctp_connect+0x13/0x4c

stack backtrace:
Pid: 2672, comm: somenu Not tainted 2.6.32-telco #55
Call Trace:
 [&lt;c1232266&gt;] ? printk+0xf/0x11
 [&lt;c1038553&gt;] debug_check_no_locks_freed+0xce/0xff
 [&lt;c10620b4&gt;] kmem_cache_free+0x21/0x66
 [&lt;c1185f25&gt;] __sk_free+0x9d/0xab
 [&lt;c1185f9c&gt;] sk_free+0x1c/0x1e
 [&lt;c1216e38&gt;] sctp_association_put+0x32/0x89
 [&lt;c1220865&gt;] __sctp_connect+0x36d/0x3f4
 [&lt;c122098a&gt;] ? sctp_connect+0x13/0x4c
 [&lt;c102d073&gt;] ? autoremove_wake_function+0x0/0x33
 [&lt;c12209a8&gt;] sctp_connect+0x31/0x4c
 [&lt;c11d1e80&gt;] inet_dgram_connect+0x4b/0x55
 [&lt;c11834fa&gt;] sys_connect+0x54/0x71
 [&lt;c103a3a2&gt;] ? lock_release_non_nested+0x88/0x239
 [&lt;c1054026&gt;] ? might_fault+0x42/0x7c
 [&lt;c1054026&gt;] ? might_fault+0x42/0x7c
 [&lt;c11847ab&gt;] sys_socketcall+0x6d/0x178
 [&lt;c10da994&gt;] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0xc/0x10
 [&lt;c1002959&gt;] syscall_call+0x7/0xb

This was because the sctp_wait_for_connect() would aqcure the socket
lock and then proceed to release the last reference count on the
association, thus cause the fully destruction path to finish freeing
the socket.

The simplest solution is to start a very short timer in case the socket
is owned by user.  When the timer expires, we can do some verification
and be able to do the release properly.

Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vladislav.yasevich@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: release dst entry while cache-hot for GSO case too</title>
<updated>2011-01-07T22:43:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Krishna Kumar</name>
<email>krkumar2@in.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-12-09T20:59:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=60a517cab5e8885d8873bfa3acc2a138fbb7fb9c'/>
<id>60a517cab5e8885d8873bfa3acc2a138fbb7fb9c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 068a2de57ddf4f472e32e7af868613c574ad1d88 upstream.

Non-GSO code drops dst entry for performance reasons, but
the same is missing for GSO code. Drop dst while cache-hot
for GSO case too.

Signed-off-by: Krishna Kumar &lt;krkumar2@in.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrey Vagin &lt;avagin@openvz.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 068a2de57ddf4f472e32e7af868613c574ad1d88 upstream.

Non-GSO code drops dst entry for performance reasons, but
the same is missing for GSO code. Drop dst while cache-hot
for GSO case too.

Signed-off-by: Krishna Kumar &lt;krkumar2@in.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrey Vagin &lt;avagin@openvz.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sunrpc: prevent use-after-free on clearing XPT_BUSY</title>
<updated>2011-01-07T22:43:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>NeilBrown</name>
<email>neilb@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2010-11-16T05:55:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=7df3fe5e2fcac3f469c4a6d4c4a4c0f4c4020983'/>
<id>7df3fe5e2fcac3f469c4a6d4c4a4c0f4c4020983</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ed2849d3ecfa339435818eeff28f6c3424300cec upstream.

When an xprt is created, it has a refcount of 1, and XPT_BUSY is set.
The refcount is *not* owned by the thread that created the xprt
(as is clear from the fact that creators never put the reference).
Rather, it is owned by the absence of XPT_DEAD.  Once XPT_DEAD is set,
(And XPT_BUSY is clear) that initial reference is dropped and the xprt
can be freed.

So when a creator clears XPT_BUSY it is dropping its only reference and
so must not touch the xprt again.

However svc_recv, after calling -&gt;xpo_accept (and so getting an XPT_BUSY
reference on a new xprt), calls svc_xprt_recieved.  This clears
XPT_BUSY and then svc_xprt_enqueue - this last without owning a reference.
This is dangerous and has been seen to leave svc_xprt_enqueue working
with an xprt containing garbage.

So we need to hold an extra counted reference over that call to
svc_xprt_received.

For safety, any time we clear XPT_BUSY and then use the xprt again, we
first get a reference, and the put it again afterwards.

Note that svc_close_all does not need this extra protection as there are
no threads running, and the final free can only be called asynchronously
from such a thread.

Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit ed2849d3ecfa339435818eeff28f6c3424300cec upstream.

When an xprt is created, it has a refcount of 1, and XPT_BUSY is set.
The refcount is *not* owned by the thread that created the xprt
(as is clear from the fact that creators never put the reference).
Rather, it is owned by the absence of XPT_DEAD.  Once XPT_DEAD is set,
(And XPT_BUSY is clear) that initial reference is dropped and the xprt
can be freed.

So when a creator clears XPT_BUSY it is dropping its only reference and
so must not touch the xprt again.

However svc_recv, after calling -&gt;xpo_accept (and so getting an XPT_BUSY
reference on a new xprt), calls svc_xprt_recieved.  This clears
XPT_BUSY and then svc_xprt_enqueue - this last without owning a reference.
This is dangerous and has been seen to leave svc_xprt_enqueue working
with an xprt containing garbage.

So we need to hold an extra counted reference over that call to
svc_xprt_received.

For safety, any time we clear XPT_BUSY and then use the xprt again, we
first get a reference, and the put it again afterwards.

Note that svc_close_all does not need this extra protection as there are
no threads running, and the final free can only be called asynchronously
from such a thread.

Signed-off-by: NeilBrown &lt;neilb@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net sched: fix some kernel memory leaks</title>
<updated>2010-12-09T21:27:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>eric.dumazet@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-08-16T20:04:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=0bf178002ce72557fce63c7fda7f0906fa6a5541'/>
<id>0bf178002ce72557fce63c7fda7f0906fa6a5541</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1c40be12f7d8ca1d387510d39787b12e512a7ce8 upstream.

We leak at least 32bits of kernel memory to user land in tc dump,
because we dont init all fields (capab ?) of the dumped structure.

Use C99 initializers so that holes and non explicit fields are zeroed.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: dann frazier &lt;dannf@debian.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 1c40be12f7d8ca1d387510d39787b12e512a7ce8 upstream.

We leak at least 32bits of kernel memory to user land in tc dump,
because we dont init all fields (capab ?) of the dumped structure.

Use C99 initializers so that holes and non explicit fields are zeroed.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: dann frazier &lt;dannf@debian.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>act_nat: use stack variable</title>
<updated>2010-12-09T21:27:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Changli Gao</name>
<email>xiaosuo@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-06-29T23:07:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=4882e6cb833cb279dd52b004da5bcbe6a5560218'/>
<id>4882e6cb833cb279dd52b004da5bcbe6a5560218</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 504f85c9d05f7c605306e808f0d835fe11bfd18d upstream.

act_nat: use stack variable

structure tc_nat isn't too big for stack, so we can put it in stack.

Signed-off-by: Changli Gao &lt;xiaosuo@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: dann frazier &lt;dannf@debian.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 504f85c9d05f7c605306e808f0d835fe11bfd18d upstream.

act_nat: use stack variable

structure tc_nat isn't too big for stack, so we can put it in stack.

Signed-off-by: Changli Gao &lt;xiaosuo@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: dann frazier &lt;dannf@debian.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: Limit socket I/O iovec total length to INT_MAX.</title>
<updated>2010-12-09T21:27:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David S. Miller</name>
<email>davem@davemloft.net</email>
</author>
<published>2010-10-28T18:41:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=f342cb14f58813fe972a152b5034306a08c2de70'/>
<id>f342cb14f58813fe972a152b5034306a08c2de70</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8acfe468b0384e834a303f08ebc4953d72fb690a upstream.

This helps protect us from overflow issues down in the
individual protocol sendmsg/recvmsg handlers.  Once
we hit INT_MAX we truncate out the rest of the iovec
by setting the iov_len members to zero.

This works because:

1) For SOCK_STREAM and SOCK_SEQPACKET sockets, partial
   writes are allowed and the application will just continue
   with another write to send the rest of the data.

2) For datagram oriented sockets, where there must be a
   one-to-one correspondance between write() calls and
   packets on the wire, INT_MAX is going to be far larger
   than the packet size limit the protocol is going to
   check for and signal with -EMSGSIZE.

Based upon a patch by Linus Torvalds.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8acfe468b0384e834a303f08ebc4953d72fb690a upstream.

This helps protect us from overflow issues down in the
individual protocol sendmsg/recvmsg handlers.  Once
we hit INT_MAX we truncate out the rest of the iovec
by setting the iov_len members to zero.

This works because:

1) For SOCK_STREAM and SOCK_SEQPACKET sockets, partial
   writes are allowed and the application will just continue
   with another write to send the rest of the data.

2) For datagram oriented sockets, where there must be a
   one-to-one correspondance between write() calls and
   packets on the wire, INT_MAX is going to be far larger
   than the packet size limit the protocol is going to
   check for and signal with -EMSGSIZE.

Based upon a patch by Linus Torvalds.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: Truncate recvfrom and sendto length to INT_MAX.</title>
<updated>2010-12-09T21:27:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2010-10-30T23:43:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=3543e68e10bc6cacd30326e837a53147a1d33660'/>
<id>3543e68e10bc6cacd30326e837a53147a1d33660</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 253eacc070b114c2ec1f81b067d2fed7305467b0 upstream.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 253eacc070b114c2ec1f81b067d2fed7305467b0 upstream.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rds: Integer overflow in RDS cmsg handling</title>
<updated>2010-12-09T21:27:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Rosenberg</name>
<email>drosenberg@vsecurity.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-11-17T06:37:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=0dd472b3a508ae8ec0b7ff3396e1a17434b78a75'/>
<id>0dd472b3a508ae8ec0b7ff3396e1a17434b78a75</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 218854af84038d828a32f061858b1902ed2beec6 upstream.

In rds_cmsg_rdma_args(), the user-provided args-&gt;nr_local value is
restricted to less than UINT_MAX.  This seems to need a tighter upper
bound, since the calculation of total iov_size can overflow, resulting
in a small sock_kmalloc() allocation.  This would probably just result
in walking off the heap and crashing when calling rds_rdma_pages() with
a high count value.  If it somehow doesn't crash here, then memory
corruption could occur soon after.

Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg &lt;drosenberg@vsecurity.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 218854af84038d828a32f061858b1902ed2beec6 upstream.

In rds_cmsg_rdma_args(), the user-provided args-&gt;nr_local value is
restricted to less than UINT_MAX.  This seems to need a tighter upper
bound, since the calculation of total iov_size can overflow, resulting
in a small sock_kmalloc() allocation.  This would probably just result
in walking off the heap and crashing when calling rds_rdma_pages() with
a high count value.  If it somehow doesn't crash here, then memory
corruption could occur soon after.

Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg &lt;drosenberg@vsecurity.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>econet: fix CVE-2010-3850</title>
<updated>2010-12-09T21:27:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Phil Blundell</name>
<email>philb@gnu.org</email>
</author>
<published>2010-11-24T19:49:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=667b9703cf420799a25d816fdfd376a00e7ca0ae'/>
<id>667b9703cf420799a25d816fdfd376a00e7ca0ae</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 16c41745c7b92a243d0874f534c1655196c64b74 upstream.

Add missing check for capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) in SIOCSIFADDR operation.

Signed-off-by: Phil Blundell &lt;philb@gnu.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 16c41745c7b92a243d0874f534c1655196c64b74 upstream.

Add missing check for capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) in SIOCSIFADDR operation.

Signed-off-by: Phil Blundell &lt;philb@gnu.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>econet: disallow NULL remote addr for sendmsg(), fixes CVE-2010-3849</title>
<updated>2010-12-09T21:27:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Phil Blundell</name>
<email>philb@gnu.org</email>
</author>
<published>2010-11-24T19:49:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=72013721bd096ae0bb46cec1db71d4161db32eac'/>
<id>72013721bd096ae0bb46cec1db71d4161db32eac</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fa0e846494792e722d817b9d3d625a4ef4896c96 upstream.

Later parts of econet_sendmsg() rely on saddr != NULL, so return early
with EINVAL if NULL was passed otherwise an oops may occur.

Signed-off-by: Phil Blundell &lt;philb@gnu.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit fa0e846494792e722d817b9d3d625a4ef4896c96 upstream.

Later parts of econet_sendmsg() rely on saddr != NULL, so return early
with EINVAL if NULL was passed otherwise an oops may occur.

Signed-off-by: Phil Blundell &lt;philb@gnu.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
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