<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/net, branch v3.12.49</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>fib_rules: fix fib rule dumps across multiple skbs</title>
<updated>2015-10-05T20:01:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Wilson Kok</name>
<email>wkok@cumulusnetworks.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-09-23T04:40:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=737ea8025dfb9e762e019163b8c8db45bacc7e56'/>
<id>737ea8025dfb9e762e019163b8c8db45bacc7e56</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 41fc014332d91ee90c32840bf161f9685b7fbf2b ]

dump_rules returns skb length and not error.
But when family == AF_UNSPEC, the caller of dump_rules
assumes that it returns an error. Hence, when family == AF_UNSPEC,
we continue trying to dump on -EMSGSIZE errors resulting in
incorrect dump idx carried between skbs belonging to the same dump.
This results in fib rule dump always only dumping rules that fit
into the first skb.

This patch fixes dump_rules to return error so that we exit correctly
and idx is correctly maintained between skbs that are part of the
same dump.

[rd] fix for &lt;= 3.19: fib_nl_fill_rule() returns skb-&gt;len, make the
     check 'err &lt; 0'

Signed-off-by: Wilson Kok &lt;wkok@cumulusnetworks.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Roopa Prabhu &lt;roopa@cumulusnetworks.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier &lt;roland@purestorage.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 41fc014332d91ee90c32840bf161f9685b7fbf2b ]

dump_rules returns skb length and not error.
But when family == AF_UNSPEC, the caller of dump_rules
assumes that it returns an error. Hence, when family == AF_UNSPEC,
we continue trying to dump on -EMSGSIZE errors resulting in
incorrect dump idx carried between skbs belonging to the same dump.
This results in fib rule dump always only dumping rules that fit
into the first skb.

This patch fixes dump_rules to return error so that we exit correctly
and idx is correctly maintained between skbs that are part of the
same dump.

[rd] fix for &lt;= 3.19: fib_nl_fill_rule() returns skb-&gt;len, make the
     check 'err &lt; 0'

Signed-off-by: Wilson Kok &lt;wkok@cumulusnetworks.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Roopa Prabhu &lt;roopa@cumulusnetworks.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier &lt;roland@purestorage.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>openvswitch: Zero flows on allocation.</title>
<updated>2015-09-30T11:47:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jesse Gross</name>
<email>jesse@nicira.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-09-22T03:21:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=3b27550cd346974eb3086a3932ea7bdf3c1a566b'/>
<id>3b27550cd346974eb3086a3932ea7bdf3c1a566b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ae5f2fb1d51fa128a460bcfbe3c56d7ab8bf6a43 ]

When support for megaflows was introduced, OVS needed to start
installing flows with a mask applied to them. Since masking is an
expensive operation, OVS also had an optimization that would only
take the parts of the flow keys that were covered by a non-zero
mask. The values stored in the remaining pieces should not matter
because they are masked out.

While this works fine for the purposes of matching (which must always
look at the mask), serialization to netlink can be problematic. Since
the flow and the mask are serialized separately, the uninitialized
portions of the flow can be encoded with whatever values happen to be
present.

In terms of functionality, this has little effect since these fields
will be masked out by definition. However, it leaks kernel memory to
userspace, which is a potential security vulnerability. It is also
possible that other code paths could look at the masked key and get
uninitialized data, although this does not currently appear to be an
issue in practice.

This removes the mask optimization for flows that are being installed.
This was always intended to be the case as the mask optimizations were
really targetting per-packet flow operations.

Fixes: 03f0d916 ("openvswitch: Mega flow implementation")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross &lt;jesse@nicira.com&gt;
Acked-by: Pravin B Shelar &lt;pshelar@nicira.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit ae5f2fb1d51fa128a460bcfbe3c56d7ab8bf6a43 ]

When support for megaflows was introduced, OVS needed to start
installing flows with a mask applied to them. Since masking is an
expensive operation, OVS also had an optimization that would only
take the parts of the flow keys that were covered by a non-zero
mask. The values stored in the remaining pieces should not matter
because they are masked out.

While this works fine for the purposes of matching (which must always
look at the mask), serialization to netlink can be problematic. Since
the flow and the mask are serialized separately, the uninitialized
portions of the flow can be encoded with whatever values happen to be
present.

In terms of functionality, this has little effect since these fields
will be masked out by definition. However, it leaks kernel memory to
userspace, which is a potential security vulnerability. It is also
possible that other code paths could look at the masked key and get
uninitialized data, although this does not currently appear to be an
issue in practice.

This removes the mask optimization for flows that are being installed.
This was always intended to be the case as the mask optimizations were
really targetting per-packet flow operations.

Fixes: 03f0d916 ("openvswitch: Mega flow implementation")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross &lt;jesse@nicira.com&gt;
Acked-by: Pravin B Shelar &lt;pshelar@nicira.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: fix race on protocol/netns initialization</title>
<updated>2015-09-30T11:47:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Marcelo Ricardo Leitner</name>
<email>marcelo.leitner@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-09-10T20:31:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=540a0bd97d4e790b9526e266c22f4c12cf732a1f'/>
<id>540a0bd97d4e790b9526e266c22f4c12cf732a1f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 8e2d61e0aed2b7c4ecb35844fe07e0b2b762dee4 ]

Consider sctp module is unloaded and is being requested because an user
is creating a sctp socket.

During initialization, sctp will add the new protocol type and then
initialize pernet subsys:

        status = sctp_v4_protosw_init();
        if (status)
                goto err_protosw_init;

        status = sctp_v6_protosw_init();
        if (status)
                goto err_v6_protosw_init;

        status = register_pernet_subsys(&amp;sctp_net_ops);

The problem is that after those calls to sctp_v{4,6}_protosw_init(), it
is possible for userspace to create SCTP sockets like if the module is
already fully loaded. If that happens, one of the possible effects is
that we will have readers for net-&gt;sctp.local_addr_list list earlier
than expected and sctp_net_init() does not take precautions while
dealing with that list, leading to a potential panic but not limited to
that, as sctp_sock_init() will copy a bunch of blank/partially
initialized values from net-&gt;sctp.

The race happens like this:

     CPU 0                           |  CPU 1
  socket()                           |
   __sock_create                     | socket()
    inet_create                      |  __sock_create
     list_for_each_entry_rcu(        |
        answer, &amp;inetsw[sock-&gt;type], |
        list) {                      |   inet_create
      /* no hits */                  |
     if (unlikely(err)) {            |
      ...                            |
      request_module()               |
      /* socket creation is blocked  |
       * the module is fully loaded  |
       */                            |
       sctp_init                     |
        sctp_v4_protosw_init         |
         inet_register_protosw       |
          list_add_rcu(&amp;p-&gt;list,     |
                       last_perm);   |
                                     |  list_for_each_entry_rcu(
                                     |     answer, &amp;inetsw[sock-&gt;type],
        sctp_v6_protosw_init         |     list) {
                                     |     /* hit, so assumes protocol
                                     |      * is already loaded
                                     |      */
                                     |  /* socket creation continues
                                     |   * before netns is initialized
                                     |   */
        register_pernet_subsys       |

Simply inverting the initialization order between
register_pernet_subsys() and sctp_v4_protosw_init() is not possible
because register_pernet_subsys() will create a control sctp socket, so
the protocol must be already visible by then. Deferring the socket
creation to a work-queue is not good specially because we loose the
ability to handle its errors.

So, as suggested by Vlad, the fix is to split netns initialization in
two moments: defaults and control socket, so that the defaults are
already loaded by when we register the protocol, while control socket
initialization is kept at the same moment it is today.

Fixes: 4db67e808640 ("sctp: Make the address lists per network namespace")
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner &lt;marcelo.leitner@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 8e2d61e0aed2b7c4ecb35844fe07e0b2b762dee4 ]

Consider sctp module is unloaded and is being requested because an user
is creating a sctp socket.

During initialization, sctp will add the new protocol type and then
initialize pernet subsys:

        status = sctp_v4_protosw_init();
        if (status)
                goto err_protosw_init;

        status = sctp_v6_protosw_init();
        if (status)
                goto err_v6_protosw_init;

        status = register_pernet_subsys(&amp;sctp_net_ops);

The problem is that after those calls to sctp_v{4,6}_protosw_init(), it
is possible for userspace to create SCTP sockets like if the module is
already fully loaded. If that happens, one of the possible effects is
that we will have readers for net-&gt;sctp.local_addr_list list earlier
than expected and sctp_net_init() does not take precautions while
dealing with that list, leading to a potential panic but not limited to
that, as sctp_sock_init() will copy a bunch of blank/partially
initialized values from net-&gt;sctp.

The race happens like this:

     CPU 0                           |  CPU 1
  socket()                           |
   __sock_create                     | socket()
    inet_create                      |  __sock_create
     list_for_each_entry_rcu(        |
        answer, &amp;inetsw[sock-&gt;type], |
        list) {                      |   inet_create
      /* no hits */                  |
     if (unlikely(err)) {            |
      ...                            |
      request_module()               |
      /* socket creation is blocked  |
       * the module is fully loaded  |
       */                            |
       sctp_init                     |
        sctp_v4_protosw_init         |
         inet_register_protosw       |
          list_add_rcu(&amp;p-&gt;list,     |
                       last_perm);   |
                                     |  list_for_each_entry_rcu(
                                     |     answer, &amp;inetsw[sock-&gt;type],
        sctp_v6_protosw_init         |     list) {
                                     |     /* hit, so assumes protocol
                                     |      * is already loaded
                                     |      */
                                     |  /* socket creation continues
                                     |   * before netns is initialized
                                     |   */
        register_pernet_subsys       |

Simply inverting the initialization order between
register_pernet_subsys() and sctp_v4_protosw_init() is not possible
because register_pernet_subsys() will create a control sctp socket, so
the protocol must be already visible by then. Deferring the socket
creation to a work-queue is not good specially because we loose the
ability to handle its errors.

So, as suggested by Vlad, the fix is to split netns initialization in
two moments: defaults and control socket, so that the defaults are
already loaded by when we register the protocol, while control socket
initialization is kept at the same moment it is today.

Fixes: 4db67e808640 ("sctp: Make the address lists per network namespace")
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner &lt;marcelo.leitner@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netlink, mmap: transform mmap skb into full skb on taps</title>
<updated>2015-09-30T11:47:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2015-09-10T18:05:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=92994a5f49d0a81c8643452d5c0a6e8b31d85a61'/>
<id>92994a5f49d0a81c8643452d5c0a6e8b31d85a61</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 1853c949646005b5959c483becde86608f548f24 ]

Ken-ichirou reported that running netlink in mmap mode for receive in
combination with nlmon will throw a NULL pointer dereference in
__kfree_skb() on nlmon_xmit(), in my case I can also trigger an "unable
to handle kernel paging request". The problem is the skb_clone() in
__netlink_deliver_tap_skb() for skbs that are mmaped.

I.e. the cloned skb doesn't have a destructor, whereas the mmap netlink
skb has it pointed to netlink_skb_destructor(), set in the handler
netlink_ring_setup_skb(). There, skb-&gt;head is being set to NULL, so
that in such cases, __kfree_skb() doesn't perform a skb_release_data()
via skb_release_all(), where skb-&gt;head is possibly being freed through
kfree(head) into slab allocator, although netlink mmap skb-&gt;head points
to the mmap buffer. Similarly, the same has to be done also for large
netlink skbs where the data area is vmalloced. Therefore, as discussed,
make a copy for these rather rare cases for now. This fixes the issue
on my and Ken-ichirou's test-cases.

Reference: http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/371129
Fixes: bcbde0d449ed ("net: netlink: virtual tap device management")
Reported-by: Ken-ichirou MATSUZAWA &lt;chamaken@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Tested-by: Ken-ichirou MATSUZAWA &lt;chamaken@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 1853c949646005b5959c483becde86608f548f24 ]

Ken-ichirou reported that running netlink in mmap mode for receive in
combination with nlmon will throw a NULL pointer dereference in
__kfree_skb() on nlmon_xmit(), in my case I can also trigger an "unable
to handle kernel paging request". The problem is the skb_clone() in
__netlink_deliver_tap_skb() for skbs that are mmaped.

I.e. the cloned skb doesn't have a destructor, whereas the mmap netlink
skb has it pointed to netlink_skb_destructor(), set in the handler
netlink_ring_setup_skb(). There, skb-&gt;head is being set to NULL, so
that in such cases, __kfree_skb() doesn't perform a skb_release_data()
via skb_release_all(), where skb-&gt;head is possibly being freed through
kfree(head) into slab allocator, although netlink mmap skb-&gt;head points
to the mmap buffer. Similarly, the same has to be done also for large
netlink skbs where the data area is vmalloced. Therefore, as discussed,
make a copy for these rather rare cases for now. This fixes the issue
on my and Ken-ichirou's test-cases.

Reference: http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/371129
Fixes: bcbde0d449ed ("net: netlink: virtual tap device management")
Reported-by: Ken-ichirou MATSUZAWA &lt;chamaken@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Tested-by: Ken-ichirou MATSUZAWA &lt;chamaken@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net/ipv6: Correct PIM6 mrt_lock handling</title>
<updated>2015-09-30T11:47:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Laing</name>
<email>richard.laing@alliedtelesis.co.nz</email>
</author>
<published>2015-09-03T01:52:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=2b80121a026fa8d2189120fb3b39e0eb14ef0635'/>
<id>2b80121a026fa8d2189120fb3b39e0eb14ef0635</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 25b4a44c19c83d98e8c0807a7ede07c1f28eab8b ]

In the IPv6 multicast routing code the mrt_lock was not being released
correctly in the MFC iterator, as a result adding or deleting a MIF would
cause a hang because the mrt_lock could not be acquired.

This fix is a copy of the code for the IPv4 case and ensures that the lock
is released correctly.

Signed-off-by: Richard Laing &lt;richard.laing@alliedtelesis.co.nz&gt;
Acked-by: Cong Wang &lt;cwang@twopensource.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 25b4a44c19c83d98e8c0807a7ede07c1f28eab8b ]

In the IPv6 multicast routing code the mrt_lock was not being released
correctly in the MFC iterator, as a result adding or deleting a MIF would
cause a hang because the mrt_lock could not be acquired.

This fix is a copy of the code for the IPv4 case and ensures that the lock
is released correctly.

Signed-off-by: Richard Laing &lt;richard.laing@alliedtelesis.co.nz&gt;
Acked-by: Cong Wang &lt;cwang@twopensource.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: fix exthdrs offload registration in out_rt path</title>
<updated>2015-09-30T11:47:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2015-09-02T22:29:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=d3c40560a5ea3b6ef5707ce35d645c2c0b19a4f8'/>
<id>d3c40560a5ea3b6ef5707ce35d645c2c0b19a4f8</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e41b0bedba0293b9e1e8d1e8ed553104b9693656 ]

We previously register IPPROTO_ROUTING offload under inet6_add_offload(),
but in error path, we try to unregister it with inet_del_offload(). This
doesn't seem correct, it should actually be inet6_del_offload(), also
ipv6_exthdrs_offload_exit() from that commit seems rather incorrect (it
also uses rthdr_offload twice), but it got removed entirely later on.

Fixes: 3336288a9fea ("ipv6: Switch to using new offload infrastructure.")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit e41b0bedba0293b9e1e8d1e8ed553104b9693656 ]

We previously register IPPROTO_ROUTING offload under inet6_add_offload(),
but in error path, we try to unregister it with inet_del_offload(). This
doesn't seem correct, it should actually be inet6_del_offload(), also
ipv6_exthdrs_offload_exit() from that commit seems rather incorrect (it
also uses rthdr_offload twice), but it got removed entirely later on.

Fixes: 3336288a9fea ("ipv6: Switch to using new offload infrastructure.")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ip6_gre: release cached dst on tunnel removal</title>
<updated>2015-09-30T11:47:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>huaibin Wang</name>
<email>huaibin.wang@6wind.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-08-25T14:20:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=48b478e1cabce50f545b71ef0229fa45d1cf1a28'/>
<id>48b478e1cabce50f545b71ef0229fa45d1cf1a28</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d4257295ba1b389c693b79de857a96e4b7cd8ac0 ]

When a tunnel is deleted, the cached dst entry should be released.

This problem may prevent the removal of a netns (seen with a x-netns IPv6
gre tunnel):
  unregister_netdevice: waiting for lo to become free. Usage count = 3

CC: Dmitry Kozlov &lt;xeb@mail.ru&gt;
Fixes: c12b395a4664 ("gre: Support GRE over IPv6")
Signed-off-by: huaibin Wang &lt;huaibin.wang@6wind.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel &lt;nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit d4257295ba1b389c693b79de857a96e4b7cd8ac0 ]

When a tunnel is deleted, the cached dst entry should be released.

This problem may prevent the removal of a netns (seen with a x-netns IPv6
gre tunnel):
  unregister_netdevice: waiting for lo to become free. Usage count = 3

CC: Dmitry Kozlov &lt;xeb@mail.ru&gt;
Fixes: c12b395a4664 ("gre: Support GRE over IPv6")
Signed-off-by: huaibin Wang &lt;huaibin.wang@6wind.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel &lt;nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mac80211: enable assoc check for mesh interfaces</title>
<updated>2015-09-30T09:00:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Bob Copeland</name>
<email>me@bobcopeland.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-06-13T14:16:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=aa21b9a683aee430dd378e82e36ddd4aab0cce4e'/>
<id>aa21b9a683aee430dd378e82e36ddd4aab0cce4e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3633ebebab2bbe88124388b7620442315c968e8f upstream.

We already set a station to be associated when peering completes, both
in user space and in the kernel.  Thus we should always have an
associated sta before sending data frames to that station.

Failure to check assoc state can cause crashes in the lower-level driver
due to transmitting unicast data frames before driver sta structures
(e.g. ampdu state in ath9k) are initialized.  This occurred when
forwarding in the presence of fixed mesh paths: frames were transmitted
to stations with whom we hadn't yet completed peering.

Reported-by: Alexis Green &lt;agreen@cococorp.com&gt;
Tested-by: Jesse Jones &lt;jjones@cococorp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Bob Copeland &lt;me@bobcopeland.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3633ebebab2bbe88124388b7620442315c968e8f upstream.

We already set a station to be associated when peering completes, both
in user space and in the kernel.  Thus we should always have an
associated sta before sending data frames to that station.

Failure to check assoc state can cause crashes in the lower-level driver
due to transmitting unicast data frames before driver sta structures
(e.g. ampdu state in ath9k) are initialized.  This occurred when
forwarding in the presence of fixed mesh paths: frames were transmitted
to stations with whom we hadn't yet completed peering.

Reported-by: Alexis Green &lt;agreen@cococorp.com&gt;
Tested-by: Jesse Jones &lt;jjones@cococorp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Bob Copeland &lt;me@bobcopeland.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: nf_conntrack: don't release a conntrack with non-zero refcnt</title>
<updated>2015-09-14T14:28:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pablo Neira Ayuso</name>
<email>pablo@netfilter.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-09-11T12:26:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=a7775d15b11a277f8af0dc4df69ae420b266e3dd'/>
<id>a7775d15b11a277f8af0dc4df69ae420b266e3dd</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e53376bef2cd97d3e3f61fdc677fb8da7d03d0da ]

With this patch, the conntrack refcount is initially set to zero and
it is bumped once it is added to any of the list, so we fulfill
Eric's golden rule which is that all released objects always have a
refcount that equals zero.

Andrey Vagin reports that nf_conntrack_free can't be called for a
conntrack with non-zero ref-counter, because it can race with
nf_conntrack_find_get().

A conntrack slab is created with SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU. Non-zero
ref-counter says that this conntrack is used. So when we release
a conntrack with non-zero counter, we break this assumption.

CPU1                                    CPU2
____nf_conntrack_find()
                                        nf_ct_put()
                                         destroy_conntrack()
                                        ...
                                        init_conntrack
                                         __nf_conntrack_alloc (set use = 1)
atomic_inc_not_zero(&amp;ct-&gt;use) (use = 2)
                                         if (!l4proto-&gt;new(ct, skb, dataoff, timeouts))
                                          nf_conntrack_free(ct); (use = 2 !!!)
                                        ...
                                        __nf_conntrack_alloc (set use = 1)
 if (!nf_ct_key_equal(h, tuple, zone))
  nf_ct_put(ct); (use = 0)
   destroy_conntrack()
                                        /* continue to work with CT */

After applying the path "[PATCH] netfilter: nf_conntrack: fix RCU
race in nf_conntrack_find_get" another bug was triggered in
destroy_conntrack():

&lt;4&gt;[67096.759334] ------------[ cut here ]------------
&lt;2&gt;[67096.759353] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:211!
...
&lt;4&gt;[67096.759837] Pid: 498649, comm: atdd veid: 666 Tainted: G         C ---------------    2.6.32-042stab084.18 #1 042stab084_18 /DQ45CB
&lt;4&gt;[67096.759932] RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffffa03d99ac&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffffa03d99ac&gt;] destroy_conntrack+0x15c/0x190 [nf_conntrack]
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255] Call Trace:
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff814844a7&gt;] nf_conntrack_destroy+0x17/0x30
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffffa03d9bb5&gt;] nf_conntrack_find_get+0x85/0x130 [nf_conntrack]
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffffa03d9fb2&gt;] nf_conntrack_in+0x352/0xb60 [nf_conntrack]
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffffa048c771&gt;] ipv4_conntrack_local+0x51/0x60 [nf_conntrack_ipv4]
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff81484419&gt;] nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff814b5b00&gt;] ? dst_output+0x0/0x20
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff814845d4&gt;] nf_hook_slow+0x74/0x110
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff814b5b00&gt;] ? dst_output+0x0/0x20
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff814b66d5&gt;] raw_sendmsg+0x775/0x910
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff8104c5a8&gt;] ? flush_tlb_others_ipi+0x128/0x130
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff8100bc4e&gt;] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0xe/0x20
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff8100bc4e&gt;] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0xe/0x20
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff814c136a&gt;] inet_sendmsg+0x4a/0xb0
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff81444e93&gt;] ? sock_sendmsg+0x13/0x140
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff81444f97&gt;] sock_sendmsg+0x117/0x140
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff8102e299&gt;] ? native_smp_send_reschedule+0x49/0x60
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff81519beb&gt;] ? _spin_unlock_bh+0x1b/0x20
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff8109d930&gt;] ? autoremove_wake_function+0x0/0x40
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff814960f0&gt;] ? do_ip_setsockopt+0x90/0xd80
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff8100bc4e&gt;] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0xe/0x20
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff8100bc4e&gt;] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0xe/0x20
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff814457c9&gt;] sys_sendto+0x139/0x190
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff810efa77&gt;] ? audit_syscall_entry+0x1d7/0x200
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff810ef7c5&gt;] ? __audit_syscall_exit+0x265/0x290
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff81474daf&gt;] compat_sys_socketcall+0x13f/0x210
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff8104dea3&gt;] ia32_sysret+0x0/0x5

I have reused the original title for the RFC patch that Andrey posted and
most of the original patch description.

Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Vagin &lt;avagin@parallels.com&gt;
Cc: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Reported-by: Andrew Vagin &lt;avagin@parallels.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Andrew Vagin &lt;avagin@parallels.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit e53376bef2cd97d3e3f61fdc677fb8da7d03d0da ]

With this patch, the conntrack refcount is initially set to zero and
it is bumped once it is added to any of the list, so we fulfill
Eric's golden rule which is that all released objects always have a
refcount that equals zero.

Andrey Vagin reports that nf_conntrack_free can't be called for a
conntrack with non-zero ref-counter, because it can race with
nf_conntrack_find_get().

A conntrack slab is created with SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU. Non-zero
ref-counter says that this conntrack is used. So when we release
a conntrack with non-zero counter, we break this assumption.

CPU1                                    CPU2
____nf_conntrack_find()
                                        nf_ct_put()
                                         destroy_conntrack()
                                        ...
                                        init_conntrack
                                         __nf_conntrack_alloc (set use = 1)
atomic_inc_not_zero(&amp;ct-&gt;use) (use = 2)
                                         if (!l4proto-&gt;new(ct, skb, dataoff, timeouts))
                                          nf_conntrack_free(ct); (use = 2 !!!)
                                        ...
                                        __nf_conntrack_alloc (set use = 1)
 if (!nf_ct_key_equal(h, tuple, zone))
  nf_ct_put(ct); (use = 0)
   destroy_conntrack()
                                        /* continue to work with CT */

After applying the path "[PATCH] netfilter: nf_conntrack: fix RCU
race in nf_conntrack_find_get" another bug was triggered in
destroy_conntrack():

&lt;4&gt;[67096.759334] ------------[ cut here ]------------
&lt;2&gt;[67096.759353] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:211!
...
&lt;4&gt;[67096.759837] Pid: 498649, comm: atdd veid: 666 Tainted: G         C ---------------    2.6.32-042stab084.18 #1 042stab084_18 /DQ45CB
&lt;4&gt;[67096.759932] RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffffa03d99ac&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffffa03d99ac&gt;] destroy_conntrack+0x15c/0x190 [nf_conntrack]
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255] Call Trace:
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff814844a7&gt;] nf_conntrack_destroy+0x17/0x30
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffffa03d9bb5&gt;] nf_conntrack_find_get+0x85/0x130 [nf_conntrack]
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffffa03d9fb2&gt;] nf_conntrack_in+0x352/0xb60 [nf_conntrack]
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffffa048c771&gt;] ipv4_conntrack_local+0x51/0x60 [nf_conntrack_ipv4]
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff81484419&gt;] nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff814b5b00&gt;] ? dst_output+0x0/0x20
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff814845d4&gt;] nf_hook_slow+0x74/0x110
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff814b5b00&gt;] ? dst_output+0x0/0x20
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff814b66d5&gt;] raw_sendmsg+0x775/0x910
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff8104c5a8&gt;] ? flush_tlb_others_ipi+0x128/0x130
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff8100bc4e&gt;] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0xe/0x20
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff8100bc4e&gt;] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0xe/0x20
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff814c136a&gt;] inet_sendmsg+0x4a/0xb0
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff81444e93&gt;] ? sock_sendmsg+0x13/0x140
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff81444f97&gt;] sock_sendmsg+0x117/0x140
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff8102e299&gt;] ? native_smp_send_reschedule+0x49/0x60
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff81519beb&gt;] ? _spin_unlock_bh+0x1b/0x20
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff8109d930&gt;] ? autoremove_wake_function+0x0/0x40
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff814960f0&gt;] ? do_ip_setsockopt+0x90/0xd80
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff8100bc4e&gt;] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0xe/0x20
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff8100bc4e&gt;] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0xe/0x20
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff814457c9&gt;] sys_sendto+0x139/0x190
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff810efa77&gt;] ? audit_syscall_entry+0x1d7/0x200
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff810ef7c5&gt;] ? __audit_syscall_exit+0x265/0x290
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff81474daf&gt;] compat_sys_socketcall+0x13f/0x210
&lt;4&gt;[67096.760255]  [&lt;ffffffff8104dea3&gt;] ia32_sysret+0x0/0x5

I have reused the original title for the RFC patch that Andrey posted and
most of the original patch description.

Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Vagin &lt;avagin@parallels.com&gt;
Cc: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Reported-by: Andrew Vagin &lt;avagin@parallels.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Andrew Vagin &lt;avagin@parallels.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: nf_conntrack: fix RCU race in nf_conntrack_find_get</title>
<updated>2015-09-14T14:28:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrey Vagin</name>
<email>avagin@openvz.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-09-11T12:26:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=336323b7bd2cd60417a56703666d4b05c85e148a'/>
<id>336323b7bd2cd60417a56703666d4b05c85e148a</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c6825c0976fa7893692e0e43b09740b419b23c09 ]

Lets look at destroy_conntrack:

hlist_nulls_del_rcu(&amp;ct-&gt;tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL].hnnode);
...
nf_conntrack_free(ct)
	kmem_cache_free(net-&gt;ct.nf_conntrack_cachep, ct);

net-&gt;ct.nf_conntrack_cachep is created with SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU.

The hash is protected by rcu, so readers look up conntracks without
locks.
A conntrack is removed from the hash, but in this moment a few readers
still can use the conntrack. Then this conntrack is released and another
thread creates conntrack with the same address and the equal tuple.
After this a reader starts to validate the conntrack:
* It's not dying, because a new conntrack was created
* nf_ct_tuple_equal() returns true.

But this conntrack is not initialized yet, so it can not be used by two
threads concurrently. In this case BUG_ON may be triggered from
nf_nat_setup_info().

Florian Westphal suggested to check the confirm bit too. I think it's
right.

task 1			task 2			task 3
			nf_conntrack_find_get
			 ____nf_conntrack_find
destroy_conntrack
 hlist_nulls_del_rcu
 nf_conntrack_free
 kmem_cache_free
						__nf_conntrack_alloc
						 kmem_cache_alloc
						 memset(&amp;ct-&gt;tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_MAX],
			 if (nf_ct_is_dying(ct))
			 if (!nf_ct_tuple_equal()

I'm not sure, that I have ever seen this race condition in a real life.
Currently we are investigating a bug, which is reproduced on a few nodes.
In our case one conntrack is initialized from a few tasks concurrently,
we don't have any other explanation for this.

&lt;2&gt;[46267.083061] kernel BUG at net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c:322!
...
&lt;4&gt;[46267.083951] RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffffa01e00a4&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffffa01e00a4&gt;] nf_nat_setup_info+0x564/0x590 [nf_nat]
...
&lt;4&gt;[46267.085549] Call Trace:
&lt;4&gt;[46267.085622]  [&lt;ffffffffa023421b&gt;] alloc_null_binding+0x5b/0xa0 [iptable_nat]
&lt;4&gt;[46267.085697]  [&lt;ffffffffa02342bc&gt;] nf_nat_rule_find+0x5c/0x80 [iptable_nat]
&lt;4&gt;[46267.085770]  [&lt;ffffffffa0234521&gt;] nf_nat_fn+0x111/0x260 [iptable_nat]
&lt;4&gt;[46267.085843]  [&lt;ffffffffa0234798&gt;] nf_nat_out+0x48/0xd0 [iptable_nat]
&lt;4&gt;[46267.085919]  [&lt;ffffffff814841b9&gt;] nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
&lt;4&gt;[46267.085991]  [&lt;ffffffff81494e70&gt;] ? ip_finish_output+0x0/0x2f0
&lt;4&gt;[46267.086063]  [&lt;ffffffff81484374&gt;] nf_hook_slow+0x74/0x110
&lt;4&gt;[46267.086133]  [&lt;ffffffff81494e70&gt;] ? ip_finish_output+0x0/0x2f0
&lt;4&gt;[46267.086207]  [&lt;ffffffff814b5890&gt;] ? dst_output+0x0/0x20
&lt;4&gt;[46267.086277]  [&lt;ffffffff81495204&gt;] ip_output+0xa4/0xc0
&lt;4&gt;[46267.086346]  [&lt;ffffffff814b65a4&gt;] raw_sendmsg+0x8b4/0x910
&lt;4&gt;[46267.086419]  [&lt;ffffffff814c10fa&gt;] inet_sendmsg+0x4a/0xb0
&lt;4&gt;[46267.086491]  [&lt;ffffffff814459aa&gt;] ? sock_update_classid+0x3a/0x50
&lt;4&gt;[46267.086562]  [&lt;ffffffff81444d67&gt;] sock_sendmsg+0x117/0x140
&lt;4&gt;[46267.086638]  [&lt;ffffffff8151997b&gt;] ? _spin_unlock_bh+0x1b/0x20
&lt;4&gt;[46267.086712]  [&lt;ffffffff8109d370&gt;] ? autoremove_wake_function+0x0/0x40
&lt;4&gt;[46267.086785]  [&lt;ffffffff81495e80&gt;] ? do_ip_setsockopt+0x90/0xd80
&lt;4&gt;[46267.086858]  [&lt;ffffffff8100be0e&gt;] ? call_function_interrupt+0xe/0x20
&lt;4&gt;[46267.086936]  [&lt;ffffffff8118cb10&gt;] ? ub_slab_ptr+0x20/0x90
&lt;4&gt;[46267.087006]  [&lt;ffffffff8118cb10&gt;] ? ub_slab_ptr+0x20/0x90
&lt;4&gt;[46267.087081]  [&lt;ffffffff8118f2e8&gt;] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0xd8/0x1e0
&lt;4&gt;[46267.087151]  [&lt;ffffffff81445599&gt;] sys_sendto+0x139/0x190
&lt;4&gt;[46267.087229]  [&lt;ffffffff81448c0d&gt;] ? sock_setsockopt+0x16d/0x6f0
&lt;4&gt;[46267.087303]  [&lt;ffffffff810efa47&gt;] ? audit_syscall_entry+0x1d7/0x200
&lt;4&gt;[46267.087378]  [&lt;ffffffff810ef795&gt;] ? __audit_syscall_exit+0x265/0x290
&lt;4&gt;[46267.087454]  [&lt;ffffffff81474885&gt;] ? compat_sys_setsockopt+0x75/0x210
&lt;4&gt;[46267.087531]  [&lt;ffffffff81474b5f&gt;] compat_sys_socketcall+0x13f/0x210
&lt;4&gt;[46267.087607]  [&lt;ffffffff8104dea3&gt;] ia32_sysret+0x0/0x5
&lt;4&gt;[46267.087676] Code: 91 20 e2 01 75 29 48 89 de 4c 89 f7 e8 56 fa ff ff 85 c0 0f 84 68 fc ff ff 0f b6 4d c6 41 8b 45 00 e9 4d fb ff ff e8 7c 19 e9 e0 &lt;0f&gt; 0b eb fe f6 05 17 91 20 e2 80 74 ce 80 3d 5f 2e 00 00 00 74
&lt;1&gt;[46267.088023] RIP  [&lt;ffffffffa01e00a4&gt;] nf_nat_setup_info+0x564/0x590

Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Cc: Patrick McHardy &lt;kaber@trash.net&gt;
Cc: Jozsef Kadlecsik &lt;kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu&gt;
Cc: "David S. Miller" &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@openvz.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrey Vagin &lt;avagin@openvz.org&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit c6825c0976fa7893692e0e43b09740b419b23c09 ]

Lets look at destroy_conntrack:

hlist_nulls_del_rcu(&amp;ct-&gt;tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL].hnnode);
...
nf_conntrack_free(ct)
	kmem_cache_free(net-&gt;ct.nf_conntrack_cachep, ct);

net-&gt;ct.nf_conntrack_cachep is created with SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU.

The hash is protected by rcu, so readers look up conntracks without
locks.
A conntrack is removed from the hash, but in this moment a few readers
still can use the conntrack. Then this conntrack is released and another
thread creates conntrack with the same address and the equal tuple.
After this a reader starts to validate the conntrack:
* It's not dying, because a new conntrack was created
* nf_ct_tuple_equal() returns true.

But this conntrack is not initialized yet, so it can not be used by two
threads concurrently. In this case BUG_ON may be triggered from
nf_nat_setup_info().

Florian Westphal suggested to check the confirm bit too. I think it's
right.

task 1			task 2			task 3
			nf_conntrack_find_get
			 ____nf_conntrack_find
destroy_conntrack
 hlist_nulls_del_rcu
 nf_conntrack_free
 kmem_cache_free
						__nf_conntrack_alloc
						 kmem_cache_alloc
						 memset(&amp;ct-&gt;tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_MAX],
			 if (nf_ct_is_dying(ct))
			 if (!nf_ct_tuple_equal()

I'm not sure, that I have ever seen this race condition in a real life.
Currently we are investigating a bug, which is reproduced on a few nodes.
In our case one conntrack is initialized from a few tasks concurrently,
we don't have any other explanation for this.

&lt;2&gt;[46267.083061] kernel BUG at net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c:322!
...
&lt;4&gt;[46267.083951] RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffffa01e00a4&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffffa01e00a4&gt;] nf_nat_setup_info+0x564/0x590 [nf_nat]
...
&lt;4&gt;[46267.085549] Call Trace:
&lt;4&gt;[46267.085622]  [&lt;ffffffffa023421b&gt;] alloc_null_binding+0x5b/0xa0 [iptable_nat]
&lt;4&gt;[46267.085697]  [&lt;ffffffffa02342bc&gt;] nf_nat_rule_find+0x5c/0x80 [iptable_nat]
&lt;4&gt;[46267.085770]  [&lt;ffffffffa0234521&gt;] nf_nat_fn+0x111/0x260 [iptable_nat]
&lt;4&gt;[46267.085843]  [&lt;ffffffffa0234798&gt;] nf_nat_out+0x48/0xd0 [iptable_nat]
&lt;4&gt;[46267.085919]  [&lt;ffffffff814841b9&gt;] nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
&lt;4&gt;[46267.085991]  [&lt;ffffffff81494e70&gt;] ? ip_finish_output+0x0/0x2f0
&lt;4&gt;[46267.086063]  [&lt;ffffffff81484374&gt;] nf_hook_slow+0x74/0x110
&lt;4&gt;[46267.086133]  [&lt;ffffffff81494e70&gt;] ? ip_finish_output+0x0/0x2f0
&lt;4&gt;[46267.086207]  [&lt;ffffffff814b5890&gt;] ? dst_output+0x0/0x20
&lt;4&gt;[46267.086277]  [&lt;ffffffff81495204&gt;] ip_output+0xa4/0xc0
&lt;4&gt;[46267.086346]  [&lt;ffffffff814b65a4&gt;] raw_sendmsg+0x8b4/0x910
&lt;4&gt;[46267.086419]  [&lt;ffffffff814c10fa&gt;] inet_sendmsg+0x4a/0xb0
&lt;4&gt;[46267.086491]  [&lt;ffffffff814459aa&gt;] ? sock_update_classid+0x3a/0x50
&lt;4&gt;[46267.086562]  [&lt;ffffffff81444d67&gt;] sock_sendmsg+0x117/0x140
&lt;4&gt;[46267.086638]  [&lt;ffffffff8151997b&gt;] ? _spin_unlock_bh+0x1b/0x20
&lt;4&gt;[46267.086712]  [&lt;ffffffff8109d370&gt;] ? autoremove_wake_function+0x0/0x40
&lt;4&gt;[46267.086785]  [&lt;ffffffff81495e80&gt;] ? do_ip_setsockopt+0x90/0xd80
&lt;4&gt;[46267.086858]  [&lt;ffffffff8100be0e&gt;] ? call_function_interrupt+0xe/0x20
&lt;4&gt;[46267.086936]  [&lt;ffffffff8118cb10&gt;] ? ub_slab_ptr+0x20/0x90
&lt;4&gt;[46267.087006]  [&lt;ffffffff8118cb10&gt;] ? ub_slab_ptr+0x20/0x90
&lt;4&gt;[46267.087081]  [&lt;ffffffff8118f2e8&gt;] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0xd8/0x1e0
&lt;4&gt;[46267.087151]  [&lt;ffffffff81445599&gt;] sys_sendto+0x139/0x190
&lt;4&gt;[46267.087229]  [&lt;ffffffff81448c0d&gt;] ? sock_setsockopt+0x16d/0x6f0
&lt;4&gt;[46267.087303]  [&lt;ffffffff810efa47&gt;] ? audit_syscall_entry+0x1d7/0x200
&lt;4&gt;[46267.087378]  [&lt;ffffffff810ef795&gt;] ? __audit_syscall_exit+0x265/0x290
&lt;4&gt;[46267.087454]  [&lt;ffffffff81474885&gt;] ? compat_sys_setsockopt+0x75/0x210
&lt;4&gt;[46267.087531]  [&lt;ffffffff81474b5f&gt;] compat_sys_socketcall+0x13f/0x210
&lt;4&gt;[46267.087607]  [&lt;ffffffff8104dea3&gt;] ia32_sysret+0x0/0x5
&lt;4&gt;[46267.087676] Code: 91 20 e2 01 75 29 48 89 de 4c 89 f7 e8 56 fa ff ff 85 c0 0f 84 68 fc ff ff 0f b6 4d c6 41 8b 45 00 e9 4d fb ff ff e8 7c 19 e9 e0 &lt;0f&gt; 0b eb fe f6 05 17 91 20 e2 80 74 ce 80 3d 5f 2e 00 00 00 74
&lt;1&gt;[46267.088023] RIP  [&lt;ffffffffa01e00a4&gt;] nf_nat_setup_info+0x564/0x590

Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Cc: Patrick McHardy &lt;kaber@trash.net&gt;
Cc: Jozsef Kadlecsik &lt;kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu&gt;
Cc: "David S. Miller" &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@openvz.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrey Vagin &lt;avagin@openvz.org&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
