<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/net, branch v3.16.2</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>svcrdma: Select NFSv4.1 backchannel transport based on forward channel</title>
<updated>2014-09-05T23:36:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chuck Lever</name>
<email>chuck.lever@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-07-16T19:38:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c7650a012929bc8e1393423e7bb29a4a6a808f12'/>
<id>c7650a012929bc8e1393423e7bb29a4a6a808f12</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3c45ddf823d679a820adddd53b52c6699c9a05ac upstream.

The current code always selects XPRT_TRANSPORT_BC_TCP for the back
channel, even when the forward channel was not TCP (eg, RDMA). When
a 4.1 mount is attempted with RDMA, the server panics in the TCP BC
code when trying to send CB_NULL.

Instead, construct the transport protocol number from the forward
channel transport or'd with XPRT_TRANSPORT_BC. Transports that do
not support bi-directional RPC will not have registered a "BC"
transport, causing create_backchannel_client() to fail immediately.

Fixes: https://bugzilla.linux-nfs.org/show_bug.cgi?id=265
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever &lt;chuck.lever@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3c45ddf823d679a820adddd53b52c6699c9a05ac upstream.

The current code always selects XPRT_TRANSPORT_BC_TCP for the back
channel, even when the forward channel was not TCP (eg, RDMA). When
a 4.1 mount is attempted with RDMA, the server panics in the TCP BC
code when trying to send CB_NULL.

Instead, construct the transport protocol number from the forward
channel transport or'd with XPRT_TRANSPORT_BC. Transports that do
not support bi-directional RPC will not have registered a "BC"
transport, causing create_backchannel_client() to fail immediately.

Fixes: https://bugzilla.linux-nfs.org/show_bug.cgi?id=265
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever &lt;chuck.lever@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: fix possible seqlock seadlock in sctp_packet_transmit()</title>
<updated>2014-08-14T02:09:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-08-05T14:49:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c5d05276f7714c449c6ab427dc87957af067f83a'/>
<id>c5d05276f7714c449c6ab427dc87957af067f83a</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 757efd32d5ce31f67193cc0e6a56e4dffcc42fb1 ]

Dave reported following splat, caused by improper use of
IP_INC_STATS_BH() in process context.

BUG: using __this_cpu_add() in preemptible [00000000] code: trinity-c117/14551
caller is __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
CPU: 3 PID: 14551 Comm: trinity-c117 Not tainted 3.16.0+ #33
 ffffffff9ec898f0 0000000047ea7e23 ffff88022d32f7f0 ffffffff9e7ee207
 0000000000000003 ffff88022d32f818 ffffffff9e397eaa ffff88023ee70b40
 ffff88022d32f970 ffff8801c026d580 ffff88022d32f828 ffffffff9e397ee3
Call Trace:
 [&lt;ffffffff9e7ee207&gt;] dump_stack+0x4e/0x7a
 [&lt;ffffffff9e397eaa&gt;] check_preemption_disabled+0xfa/0x100
 [&lt;ffffffff9e397ee3&gt;] __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
 [&lt;ffffffffc0839872&gt;] sctp_packet_transmit+0x692/0x710 [sctp]
 [&lt;ffffffffc082a7f2&gt;] sctp_outq_flush+0x2a2/0xc30 [sctp]
 [&lt;ffffffff9e0d985c&gt;] ? mark_held_locks+0x7c/0xb0
 [&lt;ffffffff9e7f8c6d&gt;] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x5d/0x80
 [&lt;ffffffffc082b99a&gt;] sctp_outq_uncork+0x1a/0x20 [sctp]
 [&lt;ffffffffc081e112&gt;] sctp_cmd_interpreter.isra.23+0x1142/0x13f0 [sctp]
 [&lt;ffffffffc081c86b&gt;] sctp_do_sm+0xdb/0x330 [sctp]
 [&lt;ffffffff9e0b8f1b&gt;] ? preempt_count_sub+0xab/0x100
 [&lt;ffffffffc083b350&gt;] ? sctp_cname+0x70/0x70 [sctp]
 [&lt;ffffffffc08389ca&gt;] sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE+0x3a/0x50 [sctp]
 [&lt;ffffffffc083358f&gt;] sctp_sendmsg+0x88f/0xe30 [sctp]
 [&lt;ffffffff9e0d673a&gt;] ? lock_release_holdtime.part.28+0x9a/0x160
 [&lt;ffffffff9e0d62ce&gt;] ? put_lock_stats.isra.27+0xe/0x30
 [&lt;ffffffff9e73b624&gt;] inet_sendmsg+0x104/0x220
 [&lt;ffffffff9e73b525&gt;] ? inet_sendmsg+0x5/0x220
 [&lt;ffffffff9e68ac4e&gt;] sock_sendmsg+0x9e/0xe0
 [&lt;ffffffff9e1c0c09&gt;] ? might_fault+0xb9/0xc0
 [&lt;ffffffff9e1c0bae&gt;] ? might_fault+0x5e/0xc0
 [&lt;ffffffff9e68b234&gt;] SYSC_sendto+0x124/0x1c0
 [&lt;ffffffff9e0136b0&gt;] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x250/0x330
 [&lt;ffffffff9e68c3ce&gt;] SyS_sendto+0xe/0x10
 [&lt;ffffffff9e7f9be4&gt;] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2

This is a followup of commits f1d8cba61c3c4b ("inet: fix possible
seqlock deadlocks") and 7f88c6b23afbd315 ("ipv6: fix possible seqlock
deadlock in ip6_finish_output2")

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Reported-by: Dave Jones &lt;davej@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 757efd32d5ce31f67193cc0e6a56e4dffcc42fb1 ]

Dave reported following splat, caused by improper use of
IP_INC_STATS_BH() in process context.

BUG: using __this_cpu_add() in preemptible [00000000] code: trinity-c117/14551
caller is __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
CPU: 3 PID: 14551 Comm: trinity-c117 Not tainted 3.16.0+ #33
 ffffffff9ec898f0 0000000047ea7e23 ffff88022d32f7f0 ffffffff9e7ee207
 0000000000000003 ffff88022d32f818 ffffffff9e397eaa ffff88023ee70b40
 ffff88022d32f970 ffff8801c026d580 ffff88022d32f828 ffffffff9e397ee3
Call Trace:
 [&lt;ffffffff9e7ee207&gt;] dump_stack+0x4e/0x7a
 [&lt;ffffffff9e397eaa&gt;] check_preemption_disabled+0xfa/0x100
 [&lt;ffffffff9e397ee3&gt;] __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
 [&lt;ffffffffc0839872&gt;] sctp_packet_transmit+0x692/0x710 [sctp]
 [&lt;ffffffffc082a7f2&gt;] sctp_outq_flush+0x2a2/0xc30 [sctp]
 [&lt;ffffffff9e0d985c&gt;] ? mark_held_locks+0x7c/0xb0
 [&lt;ffffffff9e7f8c6d&gt;] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x5d/0x80
 [&lt;ffffffffc082b99a&gt;] sctp_outq_uncork+0x1a/0x20 [sctp]
 [&lt;ffffffffc081e112&gt;] sctp_cmd_interpreter.isra.23+0x1142/0x13f0 [sctp]
 [&lt;ffffffffc081c86b&gt;] sctp_do_sm+0xdb/0x330 [sctp]
 [&lt;ffffffff9e0b8f1b&gt;] ? preempt_count_sub+0xab/0x100
 [&lt;ffffffffc083b350&gt;] ? sctp_cname+0x70/0x70 [sctp]
 [&lt;ffffffffc08389ca&gt;] sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE+0x3a/0x50 [sctp]
 [&lt;ffffffffc083358f&gt;] sctp_sendmsg+0x88f/0xe30 [sctp]
 [&lt;ffffffff9e0d673a&gt;] ? lock_release_holdtime.part.28+0x9a/0x160
 [&lt;ffffffff9e0d62ce&gt;] ? put_lock_stats.isra.27+0xe/0x30
 [&lt;ffffffff9e73b624&gt;] inet_sendmsg+0x104/0x220
 [&lt;ffffffff9e73b525&gt;] ? inet_sendmsg+0x5/0x220
 [&lt;ffffffff9e68ac4e&gt;] sock_sendmsg+0x9e/0xe0
 [&lt;ffffffff9e1c0c09&gt;] ? might_fault+0xb9/0xc0
 [&lt;ffffffff9e1c0bae&gt;] ? might_fault+0x5e/0xc0
 [&lt;ffffffff9e68b234&gt;] SYSC_sendto+0x124/0x1c0
 [&lt;ffffffff9e0136b0&gt;] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x250/0x330
 [&lt;ffffffff9e68c3ce&gt;] SyS_sendto+0xe/0x10
 [&lt;ffffffff9e7f9be4&gt;] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2

This is a followup of commits f1d8cba61c3c4b ("inet: fix possible
seqlock deadlocks") and 7f88c6b23afbd315 ("ipv6: fix possible seqlock
deadlock in ip6_finish_output2")

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Reported-by: Dave Jones &lt;davej@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>batman-adv: Fix out-of-order fragmentation support</title>
<updated>2014-08-14T02:09:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sven Eckelmann</name>
<email>sven@narfation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-05-26T15:21:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=61a869b1c9f1b717e4e20e95555f1be03d32cffe'/>
<id>61a869b1c9f1b717e4e20e95555f1be03d32cffe</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d9124268d84a836f14a6ead54ff9d8eee4c43be5 ]

batadv_frag_insert_packet was unable to handle out-of-order packets because it
dropped them directly. This is caused by the way the fragmentation lists is
checked for the correct place to insert a fragmentation entry.

The fragmentation code keeps the fragments in lists. The fragmentation entries
are kept in descending order of sequence number. The list is traversed and each
entry is compared with the new fragment. If the current entry has a smaller
sequence number than the new fragment then the new one has to be inserted
before the current entry. This ensures that the list is still in descending
order.

An out-of-order packet with a smaller sequence number than all entries in the
list still has to be added to the end of the list. The used hlist has no
information about the last entry in the list inside hlist_head and thus the
last entry has to be calculated differently. Currently the code assumes that
the iterator variable of hlist_for_each_entry can be used for this purpose
after the hlist_for_each_entry finished. This is obviously wrong because the
iterator variable is always NULL when the list was completely traversed.

Instead the information about the last entry has to be stored in a different
variable.

This problem was introduced in 610bfc6bc99bc83680d190ebc69359a05fc7f605
("batman-adv: Receive fragmented packets and merge").

Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann &lt;sven@narfation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marek Lindner &lt;mareklindner@neomailbox.ch&gt;
Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli &lt;antonio@meshcoding.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit d9124268d84a836f14a6ead54ff9d8eee4c43be5 ]

batadv_frag_insert_packet was unable to handle out-of-order packets because it
dropped them directly. This is caused by the way the fragmentation lists is
checked for the correct place to insert a fragmentation entry.

The fragmentation code keeps the fragments in lists. The fragmentation entries
are kept in descending order of sequence number. The list is traversed and each
entry is compared with the new fragment. If the current entry has a smaller
sequence number than the new fragment then the new one has to be inserted
before the current entry. This ensures that the list is still in descending
order.

An out-of-order packet with a smaller sequence number than all entries in the
list still has to be added to the end of the list. The used hlist has no
information about the last entry in the list inside hlist_head and thus the
last entry has to be calculated differently. Currently the code assumes that
the iterator variable of hlist_for_each_entry can be used for this purpose
after the hlist_for_each_entry finished. This is obviously wrong because the
iterator variable is always NULL when the list was completely traversed.

Instead the information about the last entry has to be stored in a different
variable.

This problem was introduced in 610bfc6bc99bc83680d190ebc69359a05fc7f605
("batman-adv: Receive fragmented packets and merge").

Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann &lt;sven@narfation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marek Lindner &lt;mareklindner@neomailbox.ch&gt;
Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli &lt;antonio@meshcoding.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: Correctly set segment mac_len in skb_segment().</title>
<updated>2014-08-14T02:09:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vlad Yasevich</name>
<email>vyasevic@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-07-31T14:33:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=d2b999aca2407ed869df1b314bacce6253e01307'/>
<id>d2b999aca2407ed869df1b314bacce6253e01307</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit fcdfe3a7fa4cb74391d42b6a26dc07c20dab1d82 ]

When performing segmentation, the mac_len value is copied right
out of the original skb.  However, this value is not always set correctly
(like when the packet is VLAN-tagged) and we'll end up copying a bad
value.

One way to demonstrate this is to configure a VM which tags
packets internally and turn off VLAN acceleration on the forwarding
bridge port.  The packets show up corrupt like this:
16:18:24.985548 52:54:00:ab:be:25 &gt; 52:54:00:26:ce:a3, ethertype 802.1Q
(0x8100), length 1518: vlan 100, p 0, ethertype 0x05e0,
        0x0000:  8cdb 1c7c 8cdb 0064 4006 b59d 0a00 6402 ...|...d@.....d.
        0x0010:  0a00 6401 9e0d b441 0a5e 64ec 0330 14fa ..d....A.^d..0..
        0x0020:  29e3 01c9 f871 0000 0101 080a 000a e833)....q.........3
        0x0030:  000f 8c75 6e65 7470 6572 6600 6e65 7470 ...unetperf.netp
        0x0040:  6572 6600 6e65 7470 6572 6600 6e65 7470 erf.netperf.netp
        0x0050:  6572 6600 6e65 7470 6572 6600 6e65 7470 erf.netperf.netp
        0x0060:  6572 6600 6e65 7470 6572 6600 6e65 7470 erf.netperf.netp
        ...

This also leads to awful throughput as GSO packets are dropped and
cause retransmissions.

The solution is to set the mac_len using the values already available
in then new skb.  We've already adjusted all of the header offset, so we
might as well correctly figure out the mac_len using skb_reset_mac_len().
After this change, packets are segmented correctly and performance
is restored.

CC: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevic@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit fcdfe3a7fa4cb74391d42b6a26dc07c20dab1d82 ]

When performing segmentation, the mac_len value is copied right
out of the original skb.  However, this value is not always set correctly
(like when the packet is VLAN-tagged) and we'll end up copying a bad
value.

One way to demonstrate this is to configure a VM which tags
packets internally and turn off VLAN acceleration on the forwarding
bridge port.  The packets show up corrupt like this:
16:18:24.985548 52:54:00:ab:be:25 &gt; 52:54:00:26:ce:a3, ethertype 802.1Q
(0x8100), length 1518: vlan 100, p 0, ethertype 0x05e0,
        0x0000:  8cdb 1c7c 8cdb 0064 4006 b59d 0a00 6402 ...|...d@.....d.
        0x0010:  0a00 6401 9e0d b441 0a5e 64ec 0330 14fa ..d....A.^d..0..
        0x0020:  29e3 01c9 f871 0000 0101 080a 000a e833)....q.........3
        0x0030:  000f 8c75 6e65 7470 6572 6600 6e65 7470 ...unetperf.netp
        0x0040:  6572 6600 6e65 7470 6572 6600 6e65 7470 erf.netperf.netp
        0x0050:  6572 6600 6e65 7470 6572 6600 6e65 7470 erf.netperf.netp
        0x0060:  6572 6600 6e65 7470 6572 6600 6e65 7470 erf.netperf.netp
        ...

This also leads to awful throughput as GSO packets are dropped and
cause retransmissions.

The solution is to set the mac_len using the values already available
in then new skb.  We've already adjusted all of the header offset, so we
might as well correctly figure out the mac_len using skb_reset_mac_len().
After this change, packets are segmented correctly and performance
is restored.

CC: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevic@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: Fix integer-overflow in TCP vegas</title>
<updated>2014-08-14T02:09:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christoph Paasch</name>
<email>christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be</email>
</author>
<published>2014-07-29T11:40:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e5d3a2b85051d8ce40f00dd727993cca9a9fb80b'/>
<id>e5d3a2b85051d8ce40f00dd727993cca9a9fb80b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 1f74e613ded11517db90b2bd57e9464d9e0fb161 ]

In vegas we do a multiplication of the cwnd and the rtt. This
may overflow and thus their result is stored in a u64. However, we first
need to cast the cwnd so that actually 64-bit arithmetic is done.

Then, we need to do do_div to allow this to be used on 32-bit arches.

Cc: Stephen Hemminger &lt;stephen@networkplumber.org&gt;
Cc: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: David Laight &lt;David.Laight@ACULAB.COM&gt;
Cc: Doug Leith &lt;doug.leith@nuim.ie&gt;
Fixes: 8d3a564da34e (tcp: tcp_vegas cong avoid fix)
Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch &lt;christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 1f74e613ded11517db90b2bd57e9464d9e0fb161 ]

In vegas we do a multiplication of the cwnd and the rtt. This
may overflow and thus their result is stored in a u64. However, we first
need to cast the cwnd so that actually 64-bit arithmetic is done.

Then, we need to do do_div to allow this to be used on 32-bit arches.

Cc: Stephen Hemminger &lt;stephen@networkplumber.org&gt;
Cc: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: David Laight &lt;David.Laight@ACULAB.COM&gt;
Cc: Doug Leith &lt;doug.leith@nuim.ie&gt;
Fixes: 8d3a564da34e (tcp: tcp_vegas cong avoid fix)
Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch &lt;christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: Fix integer-overflows in TCP veno</title>
<updated>2014-08-14T02:09:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christoph Paasch</name>
<email>christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be</email>
</author>
<published>2014-07-29T10:07:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=5f8c2f96c5b0be542acd8ccd7f56edb930ebf25d'/>
<id>5f8c2f96c5b0be542acd8ccd7f56edb930ebf25d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 45a07695bc64b3ab5d6d2215f9677e5b8c05a7d0 ]

In veno we do a multiplication of the cwnd and the rtt. This
may overflow and thus their result is stored in a u64. However, we first
need to cast the cwnd so that actually 64-bit arithmetic is done.

A first attempt at fixing 76f1017757aa0 ([TCP]: TCP Veno congestion
control) was made by 159131149c2 (tcp: Overflow bug in Vegas), but it
failed to add the required cast in tcp_veno_cong_avoid().

Fixes: 76f1017757aa0 ([TCP]: TCP Veno congestion control)
Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch &lt;christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 45a07695bc64b3ab5d6d2215f9677e5b8c05a7d0 ]

In veno we do a multiplication of the cwnd and the rtt. This
may overflow and thus their result is stored in a u64. However, we first
need to cast the cwnd so that actually 64-bit arithmetic is done.

A first attempt at fixing 76f1017757aa0 ([TCP]: TCP Veno congestion
control) was made by 159131149c2 (tcp: Overflow bug in Vegas), but it
failed to add the required cast in tcp_veno_cong_avoid().

Fixes: 76f1017757aa0 ([TCP]: TCP Veno congestion control)
Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch &lt;christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ip_tunnel(ipv4): fix tunnels with "local any remote $remote_ip"</title>
<updated>2014-08-14T02:09:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Popov</name>
<email>ixaphire@qrator.net</email>
</author>
<published>2014-07-28T23:07:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=46daa0221b75076373d597fb7e274627dc4a1219'/>
<id>46daa0221b75076373d597fb7e274627dc4a1219</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 95cb5745983c222867cc9ac593aebb2ad67d72c0 ]

Ipv4 tunnels created with "local any remote $ip" didn't work properly since
7d442fab0 (ipv4: Cache dst in tunnels). 99% of packets sent via those tunnels
had src addr = 0.0.0.0. That was because only dst_entry was cached, although
fl4.saddr has to be cached too. Every time ip_tunnel_xmit used cached dst_entry
(tunnel_rtable_get returned non-NULL), fl4.saddr was initialized with
tnl_params-&gt;saddr (= 0 in our case), and wasn't changed until iptunnel_xmit().

This patch adds saddr to ip_tunnel-&gt;dst_cache, fixing this issue.

Reported-by: Sergey Popov &lt;pinkbyte@gentoo.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Popov &lt;ixaphire@qrator.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 95cb5745983c222867cc9ac593aebb2ad67d72c0 ]

Ipv4 tunnels created with "local any remote $ip" didn't work properly since
7d442fab0 (ipv4: Cache dst in tunnels). 99% of packets sent via those tunnels
had src addr = 0.0.0.0. That was because only dst_entry was cached, although
fl4.saddr has to be cached too. Every time ip_tunnel_xmit used cached dst_entry
(tunnel_rtable_get returned non-NULL), fl4.saddr was initialized with
tnl_params-&gt;saddr (= 0 in our case), and wasn't changed until iptunnel_xmit().

This patch adds saddr to ip_tunnel-&gt;dst_cache, fixing this issue.

Reported-by: Sergey Popov &lt;pinkbyte@gentoo.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Popov &lt;ixaphire@qrator.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: sendmsg: fix NULL pointer dereference</title>
<updated>2014-07-29T19:20:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrey Ryabinin</name>
<email>ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-07-26T17:26:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=40eea803c6b2cfaab092f053248cbeab3f368412'/>
<id>40eea803c6b2cfaab092f053248cbeab3f368412</id>
<content type='text'>
Sasha's report:
	&gt; While fuzzing with trinity inside a KVM tools guest running the latest -next
	&gt; kernel with the KASAN patchset, I've stumbled on the following spew:
	&gt;
	&gt; [ 4448.949424] ==================================================================
	&gt; [ 4448.951737] AddressSanitizer: user-memory-access on address 0
	&gt; [ 4448.952988] Read of size 2 by thread T19638:
	&gt; [ 4448.954510] CPU: 28 PID: 19638 Comm: trinity-c76 Not tainted 3.16.0-rc4-next-20140711-sasha-00046-g07d3099-dirty #813
	&gt; [ 4448.956823]  ffff88046d86ca40 0000000000000000 ffff880082f37e78 ffff880082f37a40
	&gt; [ 4448.958233]  ffffffffb6e47068 ffff880082f37a68 ffff880082f37a58 ffffffffb242708d
	&gt; [ 4448.959552]  0000000000000000 ffff880082f37a88 ffffffffb24255b1 0000000000000000
	&gt; [ 4448.961266] Call Trace:
	&gt; [ 4448.963158] dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:52)
	&gt; [ 4448.964244] kasan_report_user_access (mm/kasan/report.c:184)
	&gt; [ 4448.965507] __asan_load2 (mm/kasan/kasan.c:352)
	&gt; [ 4448.966482] ? netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2339)
	&gt; [ 4448.967541] netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2339)
	&gt; [ 4448.968537] ? get_parent_ip (kernel/sched/core.c:2555)
	&gt; [ 4448.970103] sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:654)
	&gt; [ 4448.971584] ? might_fault (mm/memory.c:3741)
	&gt; [ 4448.972526] ? might_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:14 mm/memory.c:3740)
	&gt; [ 4448.973596] ? verify_iovec (net/core/iovec.c:64)
	&gt; [ 4448.974522] ___sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2096)
	&gt; [ 4448.975797] ? put_lock_stats.isra.13 (./arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:98 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:254)
	&gt; [ 4448.977030] ? lock_release_holdtime (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:273)
	&gt; [ 4448.978197] ? lock_release_non_nested (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3434 (discriminator 1))
	&gt; [ 4448.979346] ? check_chain_key (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2188)
	&gt; [ 4448.980535] __sys_sendmmsg (net/socket.c:2181)
	&gt; [ 4448.981592] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2600)
	&gt; [ 4448.982773] ? trace_hardirqs_on (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2607)
	&gt; [ 4448.984458] ? syscall_trace_enter (arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c:1500 (discriminator 2))
	&gt; [ 4448.985621] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2600)
	&gt; [ 4448.986754] SyS_sendmmsg (net/socket.c:2201)
	&gt; [ 4448.987708] tracesys (arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S:542)
	&gt; [ 4448.988929] ==================================================================

This reports means that we've come to netlink_sendmsg() with msg-&gt;msg_name == NULL and msg-&gt;msg_namelen &gt; 0.

After this report there was no usual "Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference"
and this gave me a clue that address 0 is mapped and contains valid socket address structure in it.

This bug was introduced in f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
(net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic).
Commit message states that:
	"Set msg-&gt;msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
	 non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
	 affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
	 address."
But in fact this affects sendto when address 0 is mapped and contains
socket address structure in it. In such case copy-in address will succeed,
verify_iovec() function will successfully exit with msg-&gt;msg_namelen &gt; 0
and msg-&gt;msg_name == NULL.

This patch fixes it by setting msg_namelen to 0 if msg_name == NULL.

Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Reported-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;a.ryabinin@samsung.com&gt;
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Sasha's report:
	&gt; While fuzzing with trinity inside a KVM tools guest running the latest -next
	&gt; kernel with the KASAN patchset, I've stumbled on the following spew:
	&gt;
	&gt; [ 4448.949424] ==================================================================
	&gt; [ 4448.951737] AddressSanitizer: user-memory-access on address 0
	&gt; [ 4448.952988] Read of size 2 by thread T19638:
	&gt; [ 4448.954510] CPU: 28 PID: 19638 Comm: trinity-c76 Not tainted 3.16.0-rc4-next-20140711-sasha-00046-g07d3099-dirty #813
	&gt; [ 4448.956823]  ffff88046d86ca40 0000000000000000 ffff880082f37e78 ffff880082f37a40
	&gt; [ 4448.958233]  ffffffffb6e47068 ffff880082f37a68 ffff880082f37a58 ffffffffb242708d
	&gt; [ 4448.959552]  0000000000000000 ffff880082f37a88 ffffffffb24255b1 0000000000000000
	&gt; [ 4448.961266] Call Trace:
	&gt; [ 4448.963158] dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:52)
	&gt; [ 4448.964244] kasan_report_user_access (mm/kasan/report.c:184)
	&gt; [ 4448.965507] __asan_load2 (mm/kasan/kasan.c:352)
	&gt; [ 4448.966482] ? netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2339)
	&gt; [ 4448.967541] netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2339)
	&gt; [ 4448.968537] ? get_parent_ip (kernel/sched/core.c:2555)
	&gt; [ 4448.970103] sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:654)
	&gt; [ 4448.971584] ? might_fault (mm/memory.c:3741)
	&gt; [ 4448.972526] ? might_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:14 mm/memory.c:3740)
	&gt; [ 4448.973596] ? verify_iovec (net/core/iovec.c:64)
	&gt; [ 4448.974522] ___sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2096)
	&gt; [ 4448.975797] ? put_lock_stats.isra.13 (./arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:98 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:254)
	&gt; [ 4448.977030] ? lock_release_holdtime (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:273)
	&gt; [ 4448.978197] ? lock_release_non_nested (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3434 (discriminator 1))
	&gt; [ 4448.979346] ? check_chain_key (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2188)
	&gt; [ 4448.980535] __sys_sendmmsg (net/socket.c:2181)
	&gt; [ 4448.981592] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2600)
	&gt; [ 4448.982773] ? trace_hardirqs_on (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2607)
	&gt; [ 4448.984458] ? syscall_trace_enter (arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c:1500 (discriminator 2))
	&gt; [ 4448.985621] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2600)
	&gt; [ 4448.986754] SyS_sendmmsg (net/socket.c:2201)
	&gt; [ 4448.987708] tracesys (arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S:542)
	&gt; [ 4448.988929] ==================================================================

This reports means that we've come to netlink_sendmsg() with msg-&gt;msg_name == NULL and msg-&gt;msg_namelen &gt; 0.

After this report there was no usual "Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference"
and this gave me a clue that address 0 is mapped and contains valid socket address structure in it.

This bug was introduced in f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
(net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic).
Commit message states that:
	"Set msg-&gt;msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
	 non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
	 affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
	 address."
But in fact this affects sendto when address 0 is mapped and contains
socket address structure in it. In such case copy-in address will succeed,
verify_iovec() function will successfully exit with msg-&gt;msg_namelen &gt; 0
and msg-&gt;msg_name == NULL.

This patch fixes it by setting msg_namelen to 0 if msg_name == NULL.

Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Reported-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;a.ryabinin@samsung.com&gt;
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ip: make IP identifiers less predictable</title>
<updated>2014-07-29T01:46:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-07-26T06:58:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=04ca6973f7c1a0d8537f2d9906a0cf8e69886d75'/>
<id>04ca6973f7c1a0d8537f2d9906a0cf8e69886d75</id>
<content type='text'>
In "Counting Packets Sent Between Arbitrary Internet Hosts", Jeffrey and
Jedidiah describe ways exploiting linux IP identifier generation to
infer whether two machines are exchanging packets.

With commit 73f156a6e8c1 ("inetpeer: get rid of ip_id_count"), we
changed IP id generation, but this does not really prevent this
side-channel technique.

This patch adds a random amount of perturbation so that IP identifiers
for a given destination [1] are no longer monotonically increasing after
an idle period.

Note that prandom_u32_max(1) returns 0, so if generator is used at most
once per jiffy, this patch inserts no hole in the ID suite and do not
increase collision probability.

This is jiffies based, so in the worst case (HZ=1000), the id can
rollover after ~65 seconds of idle time, which should be fine.

We also change the hash used in __ip_select_ident() to not only hash
on daddr, but also saddr and protocol, so that ICMP probes can not be
used to infer information for other protocols.

For IPv6, adds saddr into the hash as well, but not nexthdr.

If I ping the patched target, we can see ID are now hard to predict.

21:57:11.008086 IP (...)
    A &gt; target: ICMP echo request, seq 1, length 64
21:57:11.010752 IP (... id 2081 ...)
    target &gt; A: ICMP echo reply, seq 1, length 64

21:57:12.013133 IP (...)
    A &gt; target: ICMP echo request, seq 2, length 64
21:57:12.015737 IP (... id 3039 ...)
    target &gt; A: ICMP echo reply, seq 2, length 64

21:57:13.016580 IP (...)
    A &gt; target: ICMP echo request, seq 3, length 64
21:57:13.019251 IP (... id 3437 ...)
    target &gt; A: ICMP echo reply, seq 3, length 64

[1] TCP sessions uses a per flow ID generator not changed by this patch.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Jeffrey Knockel &lt;jeffk@cs.unm.edu&gt;
Reported-by: Jedidiah R. Crandall &lt;crandall@cs.unm.edu&gt;
Cc: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
In "Counting Packets Sent Between Arbitrary Internet Hosts", Jeffrey and
Jedidiah describe ways exploiting linux IP identifier generation to
infer whether two machines are exchanging packets.

With commit 73f156a6e8c1 ("inetpeer: get rid of ip_id_count"), we
changed IP id generation, but this does not really prevent this
side-channel technique.

This patch adds a random amount of perturbation so that IP identifiers
for a given destination [1] are no longer monotonically increasing after
an idle period.

Note that prandom_u32_max(1) returns 0, so if generator is used at most
once per jiffy, this patch inserts no hole in the ID suite and do not
increase collision probability.

This is jiffies based, so in the worst case (HZ=1000), the id can
rollover after ~65 seconds of idle time, which should be fine.

We also change the hash used in __ip_select_ident() to not only hash
on daddr, but also saddr and protocol, so that ICMP probes can not be
used to infer information for other protocols.

For IPv6, adds saddr into the hash as well, but not nexthdr.

If I ping the patched target, we can see ID are now hard to predict.

21:57:11.008086 IP (...)
    A &gt; target: ICMP echo request, seq 1, length 64
21:57:11.010752 IP (... id 2081 ...)
    target &gt; A: ICMP echo reply, seq 1, length 64

21:57:12.013133 IP (...)
    A &gt; target: ICMP echo request, seq 2, length 64
21:57:12.015737 IP (... id 3039 ...)
    target &gt; A: ICMP echo reply, seq 2, length 64

21:57:13.016580 IP (...)
    A &gt; target: ICMP echo request, seq 3, length 64
21:57:13.019251 IP (... id 3437 ...)
    target &gt; A: ICMP echo reply, seq 3, length 64

[1] TCP sessions uses a per flow ID generator not changed by this patch.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Jeffrey Knockel &lt;jeffk@cs.unm.edu&gt;
Reported-by: Jedidiah R. Crandall &lt;crandall@cs.unm.edu&gt;
Cc: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>neighbour : fix ndm_type type error issue</title>
<updated>2014-07-29T00:52:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jun Zhao</name>
<email>mypopydev@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-07-25T16:38:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=545469f7a5d7f7b2a17b74da0a1bd0c1aea2f545'/>
<id>545469f7a5d7f7b2a17b74da0a1bd0c1aea2f545</id>
<content type='text'>
ndm_type means L3 address type, in neighbour proxy and vxlan, it's RTN_UNICAST.
NDA_DST is for netlink TLV type, hence it's not right value in this context.

Signed-off-by: Jun Zhao &lt;mypopydev@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
ndm_type means L3 address type, in neighbour proxy and vxlan, it's RTN_UNICAST.
NDA_DST is for netlink TLV type, hence it's not right value in this context.

Signed-off-by: Jun Zhao &lt;mypopydev@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
