linux-toradex.git/net, branch v3.4.67

Bluetooth: Fix encryption key size for peripheral role

2013-10-13T22:42:48+00:00

commit 89cbb4da0abee2f39d75f67f9fd57f7410c8b65c upstream.

This patch fixes the connection encryption key size information when
the host is playing the peripheral role. We should set conn->enc_key_
size in hci_le_ltk_request_evt, otherwise it is left uninitialized.

Signed-off-by: Andre Guedes 
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Bluetooth: Fix security level for peripheral role

2013-10-13T22:42:48+00:00

commit f8776218e8546397be64ad2bc0ebf4748522d6e3 upstream.

While playing the peripheral role, the host gets a LE Long Term Key
Request Event from the controller when a connection is established
with a bonded device. The host then informs the LTK which should be
used for the connection. Once the link is encrypted, the host gets
an Encryption Change Event.

Therefore we should set conn->pending_sec_level instead of conn->
sec_level in hci_le_ltk_request_evt. This way, conn->sec_level is
properly updated in hci_encrypt_change_evt.

Moreover, since we have a LTK associated to the device, we have at
least BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM security level.

Signed-off-by: Andre Guedes 
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ipv6 mcast: use in6_dev_put in timer handlers instead of __in6_dev_put

2013-10-13T22:42:48+00:00

[ Upstream commit 9260d3e1013701aa814d10c8fc6a9f92bd17d643 ]

It is possible for the timer handlers to run after the call to
ipv6_mc_down so use in6_dev_put instead of __in6_dev_put in the
handler function in order to do proper cleanup when the refcnt
reaches 0. Otherwise, the refcnt can reach zero without the
inet6_dev being destroyed and we end up leaking a reference to
the net_device and see messages like the following,

unregister_netdevice: waiting for eth0 to become free. Usage count = 1

Tested on linux-3.4.43.

Signed-off-by: Salam Noureddine 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ipv4 igmp: use in_dev_put in timer handlers instead of __in_dev_put

2013-10-13T22:42:48+00:00

[ Upstream commit e2401654dd0f5f3fb7a8d80dad9554d73d7ca394 ]

It is possible for the timer handlers to run after the call to
ip_mc_down so use in_dev_put instead of __in_dev_put in the handler
function in order to do proper cleanup when the refcnt reaches 0.
Otherwise, the refcnt can reach zero without the in_device being
destroyed and we end up leaking a reference to the net_device and
see messages like the following,

unregister_netdevice: waiting for eth0 to become free. Usage count = 1

Tested on linux-3.4.43.

Signed-off-by: Salam Noureddine 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ipv6: udp packets following an UFO enqueued packet need also be handled by UFO

2013-10-13T22:42:48+00:00

[ Upstream commit 2811ebac2521ceac84f2bdae402455baa6a7fb47 ]

In the following scenario the socket is corked:
If the first UDP packet is larger then the mtu we try to append it to the
write queue via ip6_ufo_append_data. A following packet, which is smaller
than the mtu would be appended to the already queued up gso-skb via
plain ip6_append_data. This causes random memory corruptions.

In ip6_ufo_append_data we also have to be careful to not queue up the
same skb multiple times. So setup the gso frame only when no first skb
is available.

This also fixes a shortcoming where we add the current packet's length to
cork->length but return early because of a packet > mtu with dontfrag set
(instead of sutracting it again).

Found with trinity.

Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki 
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa 
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ip: generate unique IP identificator if local fragmentation is allowed

2013-10-13T22:42:48+00:00

[ Upstream commit 703133de331a7a7df47f31fb9de51dc6f68a9de8 ]

If local fragmentation is allowed, then ip_select_ident() and
ip_select_ident_more() need to generate unique IDs to ensure
correct defragmentation on the peer.

For example, if IPsec (tunnel mode) has to encrypt large skbs
that have local_df bit set, then all IP fragments that belonged
to different ESP datagrams would have used the same identificator.
If one of these IP fragments would get lost or reordered, then
peer could possibly stitch together wrong IP fragments that did
not belong to the same datagram. This would lead to a packet loss
or data corruption.

Signed-off-by: Ansis Atteka 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ip: use ip_hdr() in __ip_make_skb() to retrieve IP header

2013-10-13T22:42:47+00:00

[ Upstream commit 749154aa56b57652a282cbde57a57abc278d1205 ]

skb->data already points to IP header, but for the sake of
consistency we can also use ip_hdr() to retrieve it.

Signed-off-by: Ansis Atteka 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bridge: Clamp forward_delay when enabling STP

2013-10-13T22:42:47+00:00

[ Upstream commit be4f154d5ef0ca147ab6bcd38857a774133f5450 ]

At some point limits were added to forward_delay.  However, the
limits are only enforced when STP is enabled.  This created a
scenario where you could have a value outside the allowed range
while STP is disabled, which then stuck around even after STP
is enabled.

This patch fixes this by clamping the value when we enable STP.

I had to move the locking around a bit to ensure that there is
no window where someone could insert a value outside the range
while we're in the middle of enabling STP.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

resubmit bridge: fix message_age_timer calculation

2013-10-13T22:42:47+00:00

[ Upstream commit 9a0620133ccce9dd35c00a96405c8d80938c2cc0 ]

This changes the message_age_timer calculation to use the BPDU's max age as
opposed to the local bridge's max age.  This is in accordance with section
8.6.2.3.2 Step 2 of the 802.1D-1998 sprecification.

With the current implementation, when running with very large bridge
diameters, convergance will not always occur even if a root bridge is
configured to have a longer max age.

Tested successfully on bridge diameters of ~200.

Signed-off-by: Chris Healy 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: sctp: fix ipv6 ipsec encryption bug in sctp_v6_xmit

2013-10-13T22:42:47+00:00

[ Upstream commit 95ee62083cb6453e056562d91f597552021e6ae7 ]

Alan Chester reported an issue with IPv6 on SCTP that IPsec traffic is not
being encrypted, whereas on IPv4 it is. Setting up an AH + ESP transport
does not seem to have the desired effect:

SCTP + IPv4:

  22:14:20.809645 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 116)
    192.168.0.2 > 192.168.0.5: AH(spi=0x00000042,sumlen=16,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00000044,seq=0x1), length 72
  22:14:20.813270 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 340)
    192.168.0.5 > 192.168.0.2: AH(spi=0x00000043,sumlen=16,seq=0x1):

SCTP + IPv6:

  22:31:19.215029 IP6 (class 0x02, hlim 64, next-header SCTP (132) payload length: 364)
    fe80::222:15ff:fe87:7fc.3333 > fe80::92e6:baff:fe0d:5a54.36767: sctp
    1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 747759530] [rwnd: 62464] [OS: 10] [MIS: 10]

Moreover, Alan says:

  This problem was seen with both Racoon and Racoon2. Other people have seen
  this with OpenSwan. When IPsec is configured to encrypt all upper layer
  protocols the SCTP connection does not initialize. After using Wireshark to
  follow packets, this is because the SCTP packet leaves Box A unencrypted and
  Box B believes all upper layer protocols are to be encrypted so it drops
  this packet, causing the SCTP connection to fail to initialize. When IPsec
  is configured to encrypt just SCTP, the SCTP packets are observed unencrypted.

In fact, using `socat sctp6-listen:3333 -` on one end and transferring "plaintext"
string on the other end, results in cleartext on the wire where SCTP eventually
does not report any errors, thus in the latter case that Alan reports, the
non-paranoid user might think he's communicating over an encrypted transport on
SCTP although he's not (tcpdump ... -X):

  ...
  0x0030: 5d70 8e1a 0003 001a 177d eb6c 0000 0000  ]p.......}.l....
  0x0040: 0000 0000 706c 6169 6e74 6578 740a 0000  ....plaintext...

Only in /proc/net/xfrm_stat we can see XfrmInTmplMismatch increasing on the
receiver side. Initial follow-up analysis from Alan's bug report was done by
Alexey Dobriyan. Also thanks to Vlad Yasevich for feedback on this.

SCTP has its own implementation of sctp_v6_xmit() not calling inet6_csk_xmit().
This has the implication that it probably never really got updated along with
changes in inet6_csk_xmit() and therefore does not seem to invoke xfrm handlers.

SCTP's IPv4 xmit however, properly calls ip_queue_xmit() to do the work. Since
a call to inet6_csk_xmit() would solve this problem, but result in unecessary
route lookups, let us just use the cached flowi6 instead that we got through
sctp_v6_get_dst(). Since all SCTP packets are being sent through sctp_packet_transmit(),
we do the route lookup / flow caching in sctp_transport_route(), hold it in
tp->dst and skb_dst_set() right after that. If we would alter fl6->daddr in
sctp_v6_xmit() to np->opt->srcrt, we possibly could run into the same effect
of not having xfrm layer pick it up, hence, use fl6_update_dst() in sctp_v6_get_dst()
instead to get the correct source routed dst entry, which we assign to the skb.

Also source address routing example from 625034113 ("sctp: fix sctp to work with
ipv6 source address routing") still works with this patch! Nevertheless, in RFC5095
it is actually 'recommended' to not use that anyway due to traffic amplification [1].
So it seems we're not supposed to do that anyway in sctp_v6_xmit(). Moreover, if
we overwrite the flow destination here, the lower IPv6 layer will be unable to
put the correct destination address into IP header, as routing header is added in
ipv6_push_nfrag_opts() but then probably with wrong final destination. Things aside,
result of this patch is that we do not have any XfrmInTmplMismatch increase plus on
the wire with this patch it now looks like:

SCTP + IPv6:

  08:17:47.074080 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a > 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba:
    AH(spi=0x00005fb4,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00005fb5,seq=0x1), length 72
  08:17:47.074264 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba > 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a:
    AH(spi=0x00003d54,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00003d55,seq=0x1), length 296

This fixes Kernel Bugzilla 24412. This security issue seems to be present since
2.6.18 kernels. Lets just hope some big passive adversary in the wild didn't have
its fun with that. lksctp-tools IPv6 regression test suite passes as well with
this patch.

 [1] http://www.secdev.org/conf/IPv6_RH_security-csw07.pdf

Reported-by: Alan Chester 
Reported-by: Alexey Dobriyan 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Cc: Steffen Klassert 
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa 
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman