<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/net, branch v3.4.70</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: nf_ct_sip: don't drop packets with offsets pointing outside the packet</title>
<updated>2013-11-20T18:43:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Patrick McHardy</name>
<email>kaber@trash.net</email>
</author>
<published>2013-04-05T08:13:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=9736cb3f9aa9c620965d937f4ff0261f6ac32ee1'/>
<id>9736cb3f9aa9c620965d937f4ff0261f6ac32ee1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3a7b21eaf4fb3c971bdb47a98f570550ddfe4471 upstream.

Some Cisco phones create huge messages that are spread over multiple packets.
After calculating the offset of the SIP body, it is validated to be within
the packet and the packet is dropped otherwise. This breaks operation of
these phones. Since connection tracking is supposed to be passive, just let
those packets pass unmodified and untracked.

Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy &lt;kaber@trash.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Cc: William Roberts &lt;bill.c.roberts@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3a7b21eaf4fb3c971bdb47a98f570550ddfe4471 upstream.

Some Cisco phones create huge messages that are spread over multiple packets.
After calculating the offset of the SIP body, it is validated to be within
the packet and the packet is dropped otherwise. This breaks operation of
these phones. Since connection tracking is supposed to be passive, just let
those packets pass unmodified and untracked.

Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy &lt;kaber@trash.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Cc: William Roberts &lt;bill.c.roberts@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: flow_dissector: fail on evil iph-&gt;ihl</title>
<updated>2013-11-20T18:43:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason Wang</name>
<email>jasowang@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-11-01T07:01:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=161f4a458cd88dc6ab33078d64aa28315129fade'/>
<id>161f4a458cd88dc6ab33078d64aa28315129fade</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6f092343855a71e03b8d209815d8c45bf3a27fcd ]

We don't validate iph-&gt;ihl which may lead a dead loop if we meet a IPIP
skb whose iph-&gt;ihl is zero. Fix this by failing immediately when iph-&gt;ihl
is evil (less than 5).

This issue were introduced by commit ec5efe7946280d1e84603389a1030ccec0a767ae
(rps: support IPIP encapsulation).

Signed-off-by: Jason Wang &lt;jasowang@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Petr Matousek &lt;pmatouse@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin &lt;mst@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Daniel Borkmann &lt;dborkman@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 6f092343855a71e03b8d209815d8c45bf3a27fcd ]

We don't validate iph-&gt;ihl which may lead a dead loop if we meet a IPIP
skb whose iph-&gt;ihl is zero. Fix this by failing immediately when iph-&gt;ihl
is evil (less than 5).

This issue were introduced by commit ec5efe7946280d1e84603389a1030ccec0a767ae
(rps: support IPIP encapsulation).

Signed-off-by: Jason Wang &lt;jasowang@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Petr Matousek &lt;pmatouse@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin &lt;mst@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Daniel Borkmann &lt;dborkman@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mac80211: update sta-&gt;last_rx on acked tx frames</title>
<updated>2013-11-13T03:01:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Felix Fietkau</name>
<email>nbd@openwrt.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-09-29T19:39:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=48cca8f206801410760e7dc5abaa361c3fdba10a'/>
<id>48cca8f206801410760e7dc5abaa361c3fdba10a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0c5b93290b2f3c7a376567c03ae8d385b0e99851 upstream.

When clients are idle for too long, hostapd sends nullfunc frames for
probing. When those are acked by the client, the idle time needs to be
updated.

To make this work (and to avoid unnecessary probing), update sta-&gt;last_rx
whenever an ACK was received for a tx packet. Only do this if the flag
IEEE80211_HW_REPORTS_TX_ACK_STATUS is set.

Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau &lt;nbd@openwrt.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 0c5b93290b2f3c7a376567c03ae8d385b0e99851 upstream.

When clients are idle for too long, hostapd sends nullfunc frames for
probing. When those are acked by the client, the idle time needs to be
updated.

To make this work (and to avoid unnecessary probing), update sta-&gt;last_rx
whenever an ACK was received for a tx packet. Only do this if the flag
IEEE80211_HW_REPORTS_TX_ACK_STATUS is set.

Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau &lt;nbd@openwrt.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mac80211: correctly close cancelled scans</title>
<updated>2013-11-13T03:01:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Emmanuel Grumbach</name>
<email>emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-09-16T08:12:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=b9ef1eea8bc243c4435c85ea5a30c647ea19995a'/>
<id>b9ef1eea8bc243c4435c85ea5a30c647ea19995a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a754055a1296fcbe6f32de3a5eaca6efb2fd1865 upstream.

__ieee80211_scan_completed is called from a worker. This
means that the following flow is possible.

 * driver calls ieee80211_scan_completed
 * mac80211 cancels the scan (that is already complete)
 * __ieee80211_scan_completed runs

When scan_work will finally run, it will see that the scan
hasn't been aborted and might even trigger another scan on
another band. This leads to a situation where cfg80211's
scan is not done and no further scan can be issued.

Fix this by setting a new flag when a HW scan is being
cancelled so that no other scan will be triggered.

Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach &lt;emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a754055a1296fcbe6f32de3a5eaca6efb2fd1865 upstream.

__ieee80211_scan_completed is called from a worker. This
means that the following flow is possible.

 * driver calls ieee80211_scan_completed
 * mac80211 cancels the scan (that is already complete)
 * __ieee80211_scan_completed runs

When scan_work will finally run, it will see that the scan
hasn't been aborted and might even trigger another scan on
another band. This leads to a situation where cfg80211's
scan is not done and no further scan can be issued.

Fix this by setting a new flag when a HW scan is being
cancelled so that no other scan will be triggered.

Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach &lt;emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>wireless: radiotap: fix parsing buffer overrun</title>
<updated>2013-11-04T12:23:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Johannes Berg</name>
<email>johannes.berg@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-10-11T12:47:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=5b81d479d6b12a0c44e261de0e454ed740c7f81d'/>
<id>5b81d479d6b12a0c44e261de0e454ed740c7f81d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f5563318ff1bde15b10e736e97ffce13be08bc1a upstream.

When parsing an invalid radiotap header, the parser can overrun
the buffer that is passed in because it doesn't correctly check
 1) the minimum radiotap header size
 2) the space for extended bitmaps

The first issue doesn't affect any in-kernel user as they all
check the minimum size before calling the radiotap function.
The second issue could potentially affect the kernel if an skb
is passed in that consists only of the radiotap header with a
lot of extended bitmaps that extend past the SKB. In that case
a read-only buffer overrun by at most 4 bytes is possible.

Fix this by adding the appropriate checks to the parser.

Reported-by: Evan Huus &lt;eapache@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f5563318ff1bde15b10e736e97ffce13be08bc1a upstream.

When parsing an invalid radiotap header, the parser can overrun
the buffer that is passed in because it doesn't correctly check
 1) the minimum radiotap header size
 2) the space for extended bitmaps

The first issue doesn't affect any in-kernel user as they all
check the minimum size before calling the radiotap function.
The second issue could potentially affect the kernel if an skb
is passed in that consists only of the radiotap header with a
lot of extended bitmaps that extend past the SKB. In that case
a read-only buffer overrun by at most 4 bytes is possible.

Fix this by adding the appropriate checks to the parser.

Reported-by: Evan Huus &lt;eapache@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>inet: fix possible memory corruption with UDP_CORK and UFO</title>
<updated>2013-11-04T12:23:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hannes Frederic Sowa</name>
<email>hannes@stressinduktion.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-10-21T22:07:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=478e9a72b5e0cc9ecd8b787db90dec01d283123c'/>
<id>478e9a72b5e0cc9ecd8b787db90dec01d283123c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ This is a simplified -stable version of a set of upstream commits. ]

This is a replacement patch only for stable which does fix the problems
handled by the following two commits in -net:

"ip_output: do skb ufo init for peeked non ufo skb as well" (e93b7d748be887cd7639b113ba7d7ef792a7efb9)
"ip6_output: do skb ufo init for peeked non ufo skb as well" (c547dbf55d5f8cf615ccc0e7265e98db27d3fb8b)

Three frames are written on a corked udp socket for which the output
netdevice has UFO enabled.  If the first and third frame are smaller than
the mtu and the second one is bigger, we enqueue the second frame with
skb_append_datato_frags without initializing the gso fields. This leads
to the third frame appended regulary and thus constructing an invalid skb.

This fixes the problem by always using skb_append_datato_frags as soon
as the first frag got enqueued to the skb without marking the packet
as SKB_GSO_UDP.

The problem with only two frames for ipv6 was fixed by "ipv6: udp
packets following an UFO enqueued packet need also be handled by UFO"
(2811ebac2521ceac84f2bdae402455baa6a7fb47).

Cc: Jiri Pirko &lt;jiri@resnulli.us&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: David Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ This is a simplified -stable version of a set of upstream commits. ]

This is a replacement patch only for stable which does fix the problems
handled by the following two commits in -net:

"ip_output: do skb ufo init for peeked non ufo skb as well" (e93b7d748be887cd7639b113ba7d7ef792a7efb9)
"ip6_output: do skb ufo init for peeked non ufo skb as well" (c547dbf55d5f8cf615ccc0e7265e98db27d3fb8b)

Three frames are written on a corked udp socket for which the output
netdevice has UFO enabled.  If the first and third frame are smaller than
the mtu and the second one is bigger, we enqueue the second frame with
skb_append_datato_frags without initializing the gso fields. This leads
to the third frame appended regulary and thus constructing an invalid skb.

This fixes the problem by always using skb_append_datato_frags as soon
as the first frag got enqueued to the skb without marking the packet
as SKB_GSO_UDP.

The problem with only two frames for ipv6 was fixed by "ipv6: udp
packets following an UFO enqueued packet need also be handled by UFO"
(2811ebac2521ceac84f2bdae402455baa6a7fb47).

Cc: Jiri Pirko &lt;jiri@resnulli.us&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: David Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: unix: inherit SOCK_PASS{CRED, SEC} flags from socket to fix race</title>
<updated>2013-11-04T12:23:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>dborkman@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-10-17T20:51:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=4dde1cb060276e93a2ed22e4a167fc260a9d8c23'/>
<id>4dde1cb060276e93a2ed22e4a167fc260a9d8c23</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 90c6bd34f884cd9cee21f1d152baf6c18bcac949 ]

In the case of credentials passing in unix stream sockets (dgram
sockets seem not affected), we get a rather sparse race after
commit 16e5726 ("af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default").

We have a stream server on receiver side that requests credential
passing from senders (e.g. nc -U). Since we need to set SO_PASSCRED
on each spawned/accepted socket on server side to 1 first (as it's
not inherited), it can happen that in the time between accept() and
setsockopt() we get interrupted, the sender is being scheduled and
continues with passing data to our receiver. At that time SO_PASSCRED
is neither set on sender nor receiver side, hence in cmsg's
SCM_CREDENTIALS we get eventually pid:0, uid:65534, gid:65534
(== overflow{u,g}id) instead of what we actually would like to see.

On the sender side, here nc -U, the tests in maybe_add_creds()
invoked through unix_stream_sendmsg() would fail, as at that exact
time, as mentioned, the sender has neither SO_PASSCRED on his side
nor sees it on the server side, and we have a valid 'other' socket
in place. Thus, sender believes it would just look like a normal
connection, not needing/requesting SO_PASSCRED at that time.

As reverting 16e5726 would not be an option due to the significant
performance regression reported when having creds always passed,
one way/trade-off to prevent that would be to set SO_PASSCRED on
the listener socket and allow inheriting these flags to the spawned
socket on server side in accept(). It seems also logical to do so
if we'd tell the listener socket to pass those flags onwards, and
would fix the race.

Before, strace:

recvmsg(4, {msg_name(0)=NULL, msg_iov(1)=[{"blub\n", 4096}],
        msg_controllen=32, {cmsg_len=28, cmsg_level=SOL_SOCKET,
        cmsg_type=SCM_CREDENTIALS{pid=0, uid=65534, gid=65534}},
        msg_flags=0}, 0) = 5

After, strace:

recvmsg(4, {msg_name(0)=NULL, msg_iov(1)=[{"blub\n", 4096}],
        msg_controllen=32, {cmsg_len=28, cmsg_level=SOL_SOCKET,
        cmsg_type=SCM_CREDENTIALS{pid=11580, uid=1000, gid=1000}},
        msg_flags=0}, 0) = 5

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;dborkman@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 90c6bd34f884cd9cee21f1d152baf6c18bcac949 ]

In the case of credentials passing in unix stream sockets (dgram
sockets seem not affected), we get a rather sparse race after
commit 16e5726 ("af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default").

We have a stream server on receiver side that requests credential
passing from senders (e.g. nc -U). Since we need to set SO_PASSCRED
on each spawned/accepted socket on server side to 1 first (as it's
not inherited), it can happen that in the time between accept() and
setsockopt() we get interrupted, the sender is being scheduled and
continues with passing data to our receiver. At that time SO_PASSCRED
is neither set on sender nor receiver side, hence in cmsg's
SCM_CREDENTIALS we get eventually pid:0, uid:65534, gid:65534
(== overflow{u,g}id) instead of what we actually would like to see.

On the sender side, here nc -U, the tests in maybe_add_creds()
invoked through unix_stream_sendmsg() would fail, as at that exact
time, as mentioned, the sender has neither SO_PASSCRED on his side
nor sees it on the server side, and we have a valid 'other' socket
in place. Thus, sender believes it would just look like a normal
connection, not needing/requesting SO_PASSCRED at that time.

As reverting 16e5726 would not be an option due to the significant
performance regression reported when having creds always passed,
one way/trade-off to prevent that would be to set SO_PASSCRED on
the listener socket and allow inheriting these flags to the spawned
socket on server side in accept(). It seems also logical to do so
if we'd tell the listener socket to pass those flags onwards, and
would fix the race.

Before, strace:

recvmsg(4, {msg_name(0)=NULL, msg_iov(1)=[{"blub\n", 4096}],
        msg_controllen=32, {cmsg_len=28, cmsg_level=SOL_SOCKET,
        cmsg_type=SCM_CREDENTIALS{pid=0, uid=65534, gid=65534}},
        msg_flags=0}, 0) = 5

After, strace:

recvmsg(4, {msg_name(0)=NULL, msg_iov(1)=[{"blub\n", 4096}],
        msg_controllen=32, {cmsg_len=28, cmsg_level=SOL_SOCKET,
        cmsg_type=SCM_CREDENTIALS{pid=11580, uid=1000, gid=1000}},
        msg_flags=0}, 0) = 5

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;dborkman@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: Perform software checksum if packet has to be fragmented.</title>
<updated>2013-11-04T12:23:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vlad Yasevich</name>
<email>vyasevich@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-10-16T02:01:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=f3ce845cfe494296db847559b521706802f6eae0'/>
<id>f3ce845cfe494296db847559b521706802f6eae0</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d2dbbba77e95dff4b4f901fee236fef6d9552072 ]

IP/IPv6 fragmentation knows how to compute only TCP/UDP checksum.
This causes problems if SCTP packets has to be fragmented and
ipsummed has been set to PARTIAL due to checksum offload support.
This condition can happen when retransmitting after MTU discover,
or when INIT or other control chunks are larger then MTU.
Check for the rare fragmentation condition in SCTP and use software
checksum calculation in this case.

CC: Fan Du &lt;fan.du@windriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit d2dbbba77e95dff4b4f901fee236fef6d9552072 ]

IP/IPv6 fragmentation knows how to compute only TCP/UDP checksum.
This causes problems if SCTP packets has to be fragmented and
ipsummed has been set to PARTIAL due to checksum offload support.
This condition can happen when retransmitting after MTU discover,
or when INIT or other control chunks are larger then MTU.
Check for the rare fragmentation condition in SCTP and use software
checksum calculation in this case.

CC: Fan Du &lt;fan.du@windriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: Use software crc32 checksum when xfrm transform will happen.</title>
<updated>2013-11-04T12:23:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Fan Du</name>
<email>fan.du@windriver.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-10-16T02:01:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=80d20e7b6c4e467e16f7520df1abb461063720a0'/>
<id>80d20e7b6c4e467e16f7520df1abb461063720a0</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 27127a82561a2a3ed955ce207048e1b066a80a2a ]

igb/ixgbe have hardware sctp checksum support, when this feature is enabled
and also IPsec is armed to protect sctp traffic, ugly things happened as
xfrm_output checks CHECKSUM_PARTIAL to do checksum operation(sum every thing
up and pack the 16bits result in the checksum field). The result is fail
establishment of sctp communication.

Signed-off-by: Fan Du &lt;fan.du@windriver.com&gt;
Cc: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Cc: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 27127a82561a2a3ed955ce207048e1b066a80a2a ]

igb/ixgbe have hardware sctp checksum support, when this feature is enabled
and also IPsec is armed to protect sctp traffic, ugly things happened as
xfrm_output checks CHECKSUM_PARTIAL to do checksum operation(sum every thing
up and pack the 16bits result in the checksum field). The result is fail
establishment of sctp communication.

Signed-off-by: Fan Du &lt;fan.du@windriver.com&gt;
Cc: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Cc: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>unix_diag: fix info leak</title>
<updated>2013-11-04T12:23:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mathias Krause</name>
<email>minipli@googlemail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-09-30T20:05:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=f4358dfd80518a11e4386a15750ad2601d0cf539'/>
<id>f4358dfd80518a11e4386a15750ad2601d0cf539</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6865d1e834be84ddd5808d93d5035b492346c64a ]

When filling the netlink message we miss to wipe the pad field,
therefore leak one byte of heap memory to userland. Fix this by
setting pad to 0.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause &lt;minipli@googlemail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 6865d1e834be84ddd5808d93d5035b492346c64a ]

When filling the netlink message we miss to wipe the pad field,
therefore leak one byte of heap memory to userland. Fix this by
setting pad to 0.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause &lt;minipli@googlemail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
