linux-toradex.git/net, branch v4.9.121

Bluetooth: hidp: buffer overflow in hidp_process_report

2018-08-17T18:59:29+00:00

commit 7992c18810e568b95c869b227137a2215702a805 upstream.

CVE-2018-9363

The buffer length is unsigned at all layers, but gets cast to int and
checked in hidp_process_report and can lead to a buffer overflow.
Switch len parameter to unsigned int to resolve issue.

This affects 3.18 and newer kernels.

Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn 
Fixes: a4b1b5877b514b276f0f31efe02388a9c2836728 ("HID: Bluetooth: hidp: make sure input buffers are big enough")
Cc: Marcel Holtmann 
Cc: Johan Hedberg 
Cc: "David S. Miller" 
Cc: Kees Cook 
Cc: Benjamin Tissoires 
Cc: linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: kernel-team@android.com
Acked-by: Kees Cook 
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tcp: add tcp_ooo_try_coalesce() helper

2018-08-09T10:18:00+00:00

commit 58152ecbbcc6a0ce7fddd5bf5f6ee535834ece0c upstream.

In case skb in out_or_order_queue is the result of
multiple skbs coalescing, we would like to get a proper gso_segs
counter tracking, so that future tcp_drop() can report an accurate
number.

I chose to not implement this tracking for skbs in receive queue,
since they are not dropped, unless socket is disconnected.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh 
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

netlink: Don't shift on 64 for ngroups

2018-08-09T10:17:59+00:00

commit 91874ecf32e41b5d86a4cb9d60e0bee50d828058 upstream.

It's legal to have 64 groups for netlink_sock.

As user-supplied nladdr->nl_groups is __u32, it's possible to subscribe
only to first 32 groups.

The check for correctness of .bind() userspace supplied parameter
is done by applying mask made from ngroups shift. Which broke Android
as they have 64 groups and the shift for mask resulted in an overflow.

Fixes: 61f4b23769f0 ("netlink: Don't shift with UB on nlk->ngroups")
Cc: "David S. Miller" 
Cc: Herbert Xu 
Cc: Steffen Klassert 
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-and-Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor 
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

netlink: Don't shift with UB on nlk->ngroups

2018-08-09T10:17:59+00:00

[ Upstream commit 61f4b23769f0cc72ae62c9a81cf08f0397d40da8 ]

On i386 nlk->ngroups might be 32 or 0. Which leads to UB, resulting in
hang during boot.
Check for 0 ngroups and use (unsigned long long) as a type to shift.

Fixes: 7acf9d4237c4 ("netlink: Do not subscribe to non-existent groups").
Reported-by: kernel test robot 
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

netlink: Do not subscribe to non-existent groups

2018-08-09T10:17:58+00:00

[ Upstream commit 7acf9d4237c46894e0fa0492dd96314a41742e84 ]

Make ABI more strict about subscribing to group > ngroups.
Code doesn't check for that and it looks bogus.
(one can subscribe to non-existing group)
Still, it's possible to bind() to all possible groups with (-1)

Cc: "David S. Miller" 
Cc: Herbert Xu 
Cc: Steffen Klassert 
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: socket: fix potential spectre v1 gadget in socketcall

2018-08-06T14:23:04+00:00

commit c8e8cd579bb4265651df8223730105341e61a2d1 upstream.

'call' is a user-controlled value, so sanitize the array index after the
bounds check to avoid speculating past the bounds of the 'nargs' array.

Found with the help of Smatch:

net/socket.c:2508 __do_sys_socketcall() warn: potential spectre issue
'nargs' [r] (local cap)

Cc: Josh Poimboeuf 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Cline 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

netlink: Fix spectre v1 gadget in netlink_create()

2018-08-06T14:23:03+00:00

[ Upstream commit bc5b6c0b62b932626a135f516a41838c510c6eba ]

'protocol' is a user-controlled value, so sanitize it after the bounds
check to avoid using it for speculative out-of-bounds access to arrays
indexed by it.

This addresses the following accesses detected with the help of smatch:

* net/netlink/af_netlink.c:654 __netlink_create() warn: potential
  spectre issue 'nlk_cb_mutex_keys' [w]

* net/netlink/af_netlink.c:654 __netlink_create() warn: potential
  spectre issue 'nlk_cb_mutex_key_strings' [w]

* net/netlink/af_netlink.c:685 netlink_create() warn: potential spectre
  issue 'nl_table' [w] (local cap)

Cc: Josh Poimboeuf 
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Cline 
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: dsa: Do not suspend/resume closed slave_dev

2018-08-06T14:23:03+00:00

[ Upstream commit a94c689e6c9e72e722f28339e12dff191ee5a265 ]

If a DSA slave network device was previously disabled, there is no need
to suspend or resume it.

Fixes: 2446254915a7 ("net: dsa: allow switch drivers to implement suspend/resume hooks")
Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli 
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ipv4: frags: handle possible skb truesize change

2018-08-06T14:23:03+00:00

[ Upstream commit 4672694bd4f1aebdab0ad763ae4716e89cb15221 ]

ip_frag_queue() might call pskb_pull() on one skb that
is already in the fragment queue.

We need to take care of possible truesize change, or we
might have an imbalance of the netns frags memory usage.

IPv6 is immune to this bug, because RFC5722, Section 4,
amended by Errata ID 3089 states :

  When reassembling an IPv6 datagram, if
  one or more its constituent fragments is determined to be an
  overlapping fragment, the entire datagram (and any constituent
  fragments) MUST be silently discarded.

Fixes: 158f323b9868 ("net: adjust skb->truesize in pskb_expand_head()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

inet: frag: enforce memory limits earlier

2018-08-06T14:23:03+00:00

[ Upstream commit 56e2c94f055d328f5f6b0a5c1721cca2f2d4e0a1 ]

We currently check current frags memory usage only when
a new frag queue is created. This allows attackers to first
consume the memory budget (default : 4 MB) creating thousands
of frag queues, then sending tiny skbs to exceed high_thresh
limit by 2 to 3 order of magnitude.

Note that before commit 648700f76b03 ("inet: frags: use rhashtables
for reassembly units"), work queue could be starved under DOS,
getting no cpu cycles.
After commit 648700f76b03, only the per frag queue timer can eventually
remove an incomplete frag queue and its skbs.

Fixes: b13d3cbfb8e8 ("inet: frag: move eviction of queues to work queue")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Reported-by: Jann Horn 
Cc: Florian Westphal 
Cc: Peter Oskolkov 
Cc: Paolo Abeni 
Acked-by: Florian Westphal 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman