<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/samples/landlock, branch master</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>samples/landlock: Add capability and namespace restriction support</title>
<updated>2026-10-20T14:47:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mickaël Salaün</name>
<email>mic@digikod.net</email>
</author>
<published>2026-10-14T08:27:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=b3dafbe7ed23c280564e390d9ad3023a46d77f89'/>
<id>b3dafbe7ed23c280564e390d9ad3023a46d77f89</id>
<content type='text'>
Extend the sandboxer sample to demonstrate the new Landlock capability
and namespace restriction features.  LL_CAP takes a colon-delimited list
of allowed capabilities.  Numeric values are always accepted; when
libcap development files are available, use cap_from_name(3) to accept
names too.  Builds without libcap warn when capability settings are
used.  This keeps the sample buildable without optional development
files.  LL_NS takes a colon-delimited list of allowed namespace types by
short name.  Add best-effort degradation for older kernels that predate
the LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_* features.

Allow creating user and UTS namespaces but deny network namespaces, as
an unprivileged user.  The first command succeeds and sets the hostname
inside the new UTS namespace; the second is denied because the network
namespace type is not allowed:

  LL_FS_RO=/ LL_FS_RW=/proc LL_NS="user:uts" \
    ./sandboxer /bin/sh -c \
    "unshare --user --uts --map-root-user hostname sandbox \
    &amp;&amp; ! unshare --user --net true"

Allow only user namespace creation and CAP_SYS_CHROOT, denying all other
capabilities and namespace types.  An unprivileged process creates a
user namespace, which requires no capability, and calls chroot inside it
using the CAP_SYS_CHROOT granted within that namespace:

  LL_FS_RO=/ LL_FS_RW="" LL_NS="user" LL_CAP="cap_sys_chroot" \
    ./sandboxer /bin/sh -c \
    "unshare --user --keep-caps chroot / true"

Allow user namespace creation but deny network namespaces, and quiet the
network-namespace denials with LL_NS_QUIET so the denied creation is not
audit logged.  The negated second command makes the whole line succeed:

  LL_FS_RO=/ LL_FS_RW=/proc LL_NS="user" LL_NS_QUIET="net" \
    ./sandboxer /bin/sh -c \
    "unshare --user --map-root-user true &amp;&amp; ! unshare --user --net true"

Cc: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Günther Noack &lt;gnoack@google.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Cc: Tingmao Wang &lt;m@maowtm.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261014082718.1435842-8-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@digikod.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Extend the sandboxer sample to demonstrate the new Landlock capability
and namespace restriction features.  LL_CAP takes a colon-delimited list
of allowed capabilities.  Numeric values are always accepted; when
libcap development files are available, use cap_from_name(3) to accept
names too.  Builds without libcap warn when capability settings are
used.  This keeps the sample buildable without optional development
files.  LL_NS takes a colon-delimited list of allowed namespace types by
short name.  Add best-effort degradation for older kernels that predate
the LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_* features.

Allow creating user and UTS namespaces but deny network namespaces, as
an unprivileged user.  The first command succeeds and sets the hostname
inside the new UTS namespace; the second is denied because the network
namespace type is not allowed:

  LL_FS_RO=/ LL_FS_RW=/proc LL_NS="user:uts" \
    ./sandboxer /bin/sh -c \
    "unshare --user --uts --map-root-user hostname sandbox \
    &amp;&amp; ! unshare --user --net true"

Allow only user namespace creation and CAP_SYS_CHROOT, denying all other
capabilities and namespace types.  An unprivileged process creates a
user namespace, which requires no capability, and calls chroot inside it
using the CAP_SYS_CHROOT granted within that namespace:

  LL_FS_RO=/ LL_FS_RW="" LL_NS="user" LL_CAP="cap_sys_chroot" \
    ./sandboxer /bin/sh -c \
    "unshare --user --keep-caps chroot / true"

Allow user namespace creation but deny network namespaces, and quiet the
network-namespace denials with LL_NS_QUIET so the denied creation is not
audit logged.  The negated second command makes the whole line succeed:

  LL_FS_RO=/ LL_FS_RW=/proc LL_NS="user" LL_NS_QUIET="net" \
    ./sandboxer /bin/sh -c \
    "unshare --user --map-root-user true &amp;&amp; ! unshare --user --net true"

Cc: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Günther Noack &lt;gnoack@google.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Cc: Tingmao Wang &lt;m@maowtm.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261014082718.1435842-8-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@digikod.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>samples/landlock: Add LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS to sampler</title>
<updated>2026-08-15T07:14:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Justin Suess</name>
<email>utilityemal77@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-09T15:45:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=6b3fac7fc1d6fd6f3ece67a32c48497a241a9832'/>
<id>6b3fac7fc1d6fd6f3ece67a32c48497a241a9832</id>
<content type='text'>
Add LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS to the default flag setting.
Gate the flag on the ABI version, but do not expose any userspace
control over this flag as it has no practical effect on the resulting
sandbox.

Signed-off-by: Justin Suess &lt;utilityemal77@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260809154544.1253100-6-utilityemal77@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@digikod.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS to the default flag setting.
Gate the flag on the ABI version, but do not expose any userspace
control over this flag as it has no practical effect on the resulting
sandbox.

Signed-off-by: Justin Suess &lt;utilityemal77@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260809154544.1253100-6-utilityemal77@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@digikod.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>samples/landlock: Add quiet flag support to sandboxer</title>
<updated>2026-06-14T18:17:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tingmao Wang</name>
<email>m@maowtm.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-12T01:48:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=8faab14922b75c3c0bbc0769eedef85d4609a85a'/>
<id>8faab14922b75c3c0bbc0769eedef85d4609a85a</id>
<content type='text'>
Adds ability to set which access bits to quiet via LL_*_QUIET_ACCESS
(FS, NET or SCOPED), and attach quiet flags to individual objects via
LL_*_QUIET for FS and NET.

Assisted-by: GitHub-Copilot:claude-opus-4.8 copilot-reviepickw
Signed-off-by: Tingmao Wang &lt;m@maowtm.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/59b94997565032bc9870044f021214a2ed6df213.1781228815.git.m@maowtm.org
[mic: Fix comment formatting]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@digikod.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Adds ability to set which access bits to quiet via LL_*_QUIET_ACCESS
(FS, NET or SCOPED), and attach quiet flags to individual objects via
LL_*_QUIET for FS and NET.

Assisted-by: GitHub-Copilot:claude-opus-4.8 copilot-reviepickw
Signed-off-by: Tingmao Wang &lt;m@maowtm.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/59b94997565032bc9870044f021214a2ed6df213.1781228815.git.m@maowtm.org
[mic: Fix comment formatting]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@digikod.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>samples/landlock: Add sandboxer UDP access control</title>
<updated>2026-06-13T21:15:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Matthieu Buffet</name>
<email>matthieu@buffet.re</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-11T16:21:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=a1b0b278455a70e2567bdf77e6fda23438280987'/>
<id>a1b0b278455a70e2567bdf77e6fda23438280987</id>
<content type='text'>
Add environment variables to control associated access rights:
- LL_UDP_BIND
- LL_UDP_CONNECT_SEND

Each one takes a list of ports separated by colons, like other list
options.

Signed-off-by: Matthieu Buffet &lt;matthieu@buffet.re&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260611162107.49278-6-matthieu@buffet.re
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@digikod.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add environment variables to control associated access rights:
- LL_UDP_BIND
- LL_UDP_CONNECT_SEND

Each one takes a list of ports separated by colons, like other list
options.

Signed-off-by: Matthieu Buffet &lt;matthieu@buffet.re&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260611162107.49278-6-matthieu@buffet.re
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@digikod.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>samples/landlock: Add support for named UNIX domain socket restrictions</title>
<updated>2026-04-07T16:51:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Günther Noack</name>
<email>gnoack3000@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-27T16:48:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=a92cb5d7c6c988f304df355f4b5afcc379428f07'/>
<id>a92cb5d7c6c988f304df355f4b5afcc379428f07</id>
<content type='text'>
The access right for UNIX domain socket lookups is grouped with the
read-write rights in the sample tool.  Rationale: In the general case,
any operations are possible through a UNIX domain socket, including
data-mutating operations.

Cc: Justin Suess &lt;utilityemal77@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@digikod.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack &lt;gnoack3000@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260327164838.38231-7-gnoack3000@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@digikod.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The access right for UNIX domain socket lookups is grouped with the
read-write rights in the sample tool.  Rationale: In the general case,
any operations are possible through a UNIX domain socket, including
data-mutating operations.

Cc: Justin Suess &lt;utilityemal77@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@digikod.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack &lt;gnoack3000@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260327164838.38231-7-gnoack3000@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@digikod.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>samples/landlock: Bump ABI version to 8</title>
<updated>2026-03-04T17:28:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Günther Noack</name>
<email>gnoack3000@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-20T16:06:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=f8e2019c3bd1ea73ca25cd69a8141555243c9a11'/>
<id>f8e2019c3bd1ea73ca25cd69a8141555243c9a11</id>
<content type='text'>
The sample tool should print a warning if it is not running on a
kernel that provides the newest Landlock ABI version.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260218.ufao5Vaefa2u@digikod.net/
Suggested-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@digikod.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack &lt;gnoack3000@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260220160627.53913-1-gnoack3000@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@digikod.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The sample tool should print a warning if it is not running on a
kernel that provides the newest Landlock ABI version.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260218.ufao5Vaefa2u@digikod.net/
Suggested-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@digikod.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack &lt;gnoack3000@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260220160627.53913-1-gnoack3000@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@digikod.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>samples/landlock: Fix building on musl libc</title>
<updated>2025-07-01T19:42:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Brahmajit Das</name>
<email>listout@listout.xyz</email>
</author>
<published>2025-06-30T20:32:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=970f8a17c9c86eff390252e13bb9a08a3fb5a098'/>
<id>970f8a17c9c86eff390252e13bb9a08a3fb5a098</id>
<content type='text'>
Building with make allyesconfig on musl results in the following

In file included from samples/landlock/sandboxer.c:22:
/usr/include/sys/prctl.h:88:8: error: redefinition of 'struct prctl_mm_map'
   88 | struct prctl_mm_map {
      |        ^~~~~~~~~~~~
In file included from samples/landlock/sandboxer.c:16:
usr/include/linux/prctl.h:134:8: note: originally defined here
  134 | struct prctl_mm_map {
      |        ^~~~~~~~~~~~

This is mainly due to difference in the sys/prctl.h between glibc and
musl. The struct prctl_mm_map is defined in sys/prctl.h in musl.

Signed-off-by: Brahmajit Das &lt;listout@listout.xyz&gt;
[mic: Move down the if/include/endif block]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250630203248.16273-1-listout@listout.xyz
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@digikod.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Building with make allyesconfig on musl results in the following

In file included from samples/landlock/sandboxer.c:22:
/usr/include/sys/prctl.h:88:8: error: redefinition of 'struct prctl_mm_map'
   88 | struct prctl_mm_map {
      |        ^~~~~~~~~~~~
In file included from samples/landlock/sandboxer.c:16:
usr/include/linux/prctl.h:134:8: note: originally defined here
  134 | struct prctl_mm_map {
      |        ^~~~~~~~~~~~

This is mainly due to difference in the sys/prctl.h between glibc and
musl. The struct prctl_mm_map is defined in sys/prctl.h in musl.

Signed-off-by: Brahmajit Das &lt;listout@listout.xyz&gt;
[mic: Move down the if/include/endif block]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250630203248.16273-1-listout@listout.xyz
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@digikod.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>samples/landlock: Enable users to log sandbox denials</title>
<updated>2025-03-26T12:59:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mickaël Salaün</name>
<email>mic@digikod.net</email>
</author>
<published>2025-03-20T19:07:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ec2798d85b1c29f4549849f1332555a0fd09686f'/>
<id>ec2798d85b1c29f4549849f1332555a0fd09686f</id>
<content type='text'>
By default, denials from within the sandbox are not logged.  Indeed, the
sandboxer's security policy might not be fitted to the set of sandboxed
processes that could be spawned (e.g. from a shell).

For test purpose, parse the LL_FORCE_LOG environment variable to log
every sandbox denials, including after launching the initial sandboxed
program thanks to LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON.

Cc: Günther Noack &lt;gnoack@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-20-mic@digikod.net
[mic: Remove inappropriate hunk]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@digikod.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
By default, denials from within the sandbox are not logged.  Indeed, the
sandboxer's security policy might not be fitted to the set of sandboxed
processes that could be spawned (e.g. from a shell).

For test purpose, parse the LL_FORCE_LOG environment variable to log
every sandbox denials, including after launching the initial sandboxed
program thanks to LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON.

Cc: Günther Noack &lt;gnoack@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-20-mic@digikod.net
[mic: Remove inappropriate hunk]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@digikod.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>samples/landlock: Fix possible NULL dereference in parse_path()</title>
<updated>2025-01-10T11:12:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Zichen Xie</name>
<email>zichenxie0106@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-11-28T03:29:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=078bf9438a31567e2c0587159ccefde835fb1ced'/>
<id>078bf9438a31567e2c0587159ccefde835fb1ced</id>
<content type='text'>
malloc() may return NULL, leading to NULL dereference.  Add a NULL
check.

Fixes: ba84b0bf5a16 ("samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example")
Signed-off-by: Zichen Xie &lt;zichenxie0106@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241128032955.11711-1-zichenxie0106@gmail.com
[mic: Simplify fix]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@digikod.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
malloc() may return NULL, leading to NULL dereference.  Add a NULL
check.

Fixes: ba84b0bf5a16 ("samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example")
Signed-off-by: Zichen Xie &lt;zichenxie0106@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241128032955.11711-1-zichenxie0106@gmail.com
[mic: Simplify fix]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@digikod.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>samples/landlock: Clarify option parsing behaviour</title>
<updated>2024-10-22T18:43:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Matthieu Buffet</name>
<email>matthieu@buffet.re</email>
</author>
<published>2024-10-19T15:15:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=53b9d789df983790015ef04b0283ac5a33917cad'/>
<id>53b9d789df983790015ef04b0283ac5a33917cad</id>
<content type='text'>
Clarify the distinction between filesystem variables (mandatory)
and all others (optional).

For optional variables, explain the difference between unset variables
(no access check performed) and empty variables (nothing allowed for
lists of allowed paths/ports, or no effect for lists of scopes).

List the known LL_SCOPED values and their effect.

Signed-off-by: Matthieu Buffet &lt;matthieu@buffet.re&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241019151534.1400605-4-matthieu@buffet.re
[mic: Add a missing colon]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@digikod.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Clarify the distinction between filesystem variables (mandatory)
and all others (optional).

For optional variables, explain the difference between unset variables
(no access check performed) and empty variables (nothing allowed for
lists of allowed paths/ports, or no effect for lists of scopes).

List the known LL_SCOPED values and their effect.

Signed-off-by: Matthieu Buffet &lt;matthieu@buffet.re&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241019151534.1400605-4-matthieu@buffet.re
[mic: Add a missing colon]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@digikod.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
