<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig, branch toradex_5.3.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>docs: move gcc_plugins.txt to core-api and rename to .rst</title>
<updated>2019-07-15T12:20:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mauro Carvalho Chehab</name>
<email>mchehab+samsung@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-19T22:01:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=d5ccd65ab6272f21f442695b0022a4f553d818e5'/>
<id>d5ccd65ab6272f21f442695b0022a4f553d818e5</id>
<content type='text'>
The gcc_plugins.txt file is already a ReST file. Move it
to the core-api book while renaming it.

Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab &lt;mchehab+samsung@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The gcc_plugins.txt file is already a ReST file. Move it
to the core-api book while renaming it.

Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab &lt;mchehab+samsung@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>treewide: Add SPDX license identifier - Makefile/Kconfig</title>
<updated>2019-05-21T08:50:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-19T12:07:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ec8f24b7faaf3d4799a7c3f4c1b87f6b02778ad1'/>
<id>ec8f24b7faaf3d4799a7c3f4c1b87f6b02778ad1</id>
<content type='text'>
Add SPDX license identifiers to all Make/Kconfig files which:

 - Have no license information of any form

These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX
license identifier is:

  GPL-2.0-only

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add SPDX license identifiers to all Make/Kconfig files which:

 - Have no license information of any form

These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX
license identifier is:

  GPL-2.0-only

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: Move stackleak config to Kconfig.hardening</title>
<updated>2019-04-24T21:00:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-10T16:04:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=b6a6a3772d20b8552e703bb2a651760a22167cf6'/>
<id>b6a6a3772d20b8552e703bb2a651760a22167cf6</id>
<content type='text'>
This moves the stackleak plugin options to Kconfig.hardening's memory
initialization menu.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alexander Popov &lt;alex.popov@linux.com&gt;
Acked-by: Masahiro Yamada &lt;yamada.masahiro@socionext.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This moves the stackleak plugin options to Kconfig.hardening's memory
initialization menu.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alexander Popov &lt;alex.popov@linux.com&gt;
Acked-by: Masahiro Yamada &lt;yamada.masahiro@socionext.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: Create "kernel hardening" config area</title>
<updated>2019-04-24T20:45:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-10T15:23:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=9f671e58159adea641f76c56d1f0bbdcb3c524ff'/>
<id>9f671e58159adea641f76c56d1f0bbdcb3c524ff</id>
<content type='text'>
Right now kernel hardening options are scattered around various Kconfig
files. This can be a central place to collect these kinds of options
going forward. This is initially populated with the memory initialization
options from the gcc-plugins.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Masahiro Yamada &lt;yamada.masahiro@socionext.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Right now kernel hardening options are scattered around various Kconfig
files. This can be a central place to collect these kinds of options
going forward. This is initially populated with the memory initialization
options from the gcc-plugins.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Masahiro Yamada &lt;yamada.masahiro@socionext.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'gcc-plugins-v5.1-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux</title>
<updated>2019-03-09T17:06:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-09T17:06:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=2bb995405fe52dd893db57456556e8dc4fce35a7'/>
<id>2bb995405fe52dd893db57456556e8dc4fce35a7</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull gcc-plugins updates from Kees Cook:
 "This adds additional type coverage to the existing structleak plugin
  and adds a large set of selftests to help evaluate stack variable
  zero-initialization coverage.

  That can be used to test whatever instrumentation might be performing
  zero-initialization: either with the structleak plugin or with Clang's
  coming "-ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero" option.

  Summary:

   - Add scalar and array initialization coverage

   - Refactor Kconfig to make options more clear

   - Add self-test module for testing automatic initialization"

* tag 'gcc-plugins-v5.1-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
  lib: Introduce test_stackinit module
  gcc-plugins: structleak: Generalize to all variable types
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull gcc-plugins updates from Kees Cook:
 "This adds additional type coverage to the existing structleak plugin
  and adds a large set of selftests to help evaluate stack variable
  zero-initialization coverage.

  That can be used to test whatever instrumentation might be performing
  zero-initialization: either with the structleak plugin or with Clang's
  coming "-ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero" option.

  Summary:

   - Add scalar and array initialization coverage

   - Refactor Kconfig to make options more clear

   - Add self-test module for testing automatic initialization"

* tag 'gcc-plugins-v5.1-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
  lib: Introduce test_stackinit module
  gcc-plugins: structleak: Generalize to all variable types
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kasan: remove use after scope bugs detection.</title>
<updated>2019-03-06T05:07:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrey Ryabinin</name>
<email>aryabinin@virtuozzo.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-05T23:41:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=7771bdbbfd3d6f204631b6fd9e1bbc30cd15918e'/>
<id>7771bdbbfd3d6f204631b6fd9e1bbc30cd15918e</id>
<content type='text'>
Use after scope bugs detector seems to be almost entirely useless for
the linux kernel.  It exists over two years, but I've seen only one
valid bug so far [1].  And the bug was fixed before it has been
reported.  There were some other use-after-scope reports, but they were
false-positives due to different reasons like incompatibility with
structleak plugin.

This feature significantly increases stack usage, especially with GCC &lt;
9 version, and causes a 32K stack overflow.  It probably adds
performance penalty too.

Given all that, let's remove use-after-scope detector entirely.

While preparing this patch I've noticed that we mistakenly enable
use-after-scope detection for clang compiler regardless of
CONFIG_KASAN_EXTRA setting.  This is also fixed now.

[1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/&lt;20171129052106.rhgbjhhis53hkgfn@wfg-t540p.sh.intel.com&gt;

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190111185842.13978-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Acked-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;		[arm64]
Cc: Qian Cai &lt;cai@lca.pw&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Use after scope bugs detector seems to be almost entirely useless for
the linux kernel.  It exists over two years, but I've seen only one
valid bug so far [1].  And the bug was fixed before it has been
reported.  There were some other use-after-scope reports, but they were
false-positives due to different reasons like incompatibility with
structleak plugin.

This feature significantly increases stack usage, especially with GCC &lt;
9 version, and causes a 32K stack overflow.  It probably adds
performance penalty too.

Given all that, let's remove use-after-scope detector entirely.

While preparing this patch I've noticed that we mistakenly enable
use-after-scope detection for clang compiler regardless of
CONFIG_KASAN_EXTRA setting.  This is also fixed now.

[1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/&lt;20171129052106.rhgbjhhis53hkgfn@wfg-t540p.sh.intel.com&gt;

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190111185842.13978-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Acked-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;		[arm64]
Cc: Qian Cai &lt;cai@lca.pw&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>gcc-plugins: structleak: Generalize to all variable types</title>
<updated>2019-03-04T17:29:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-01-23T23:19:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=81a56f6dcd20325607d6008f4bb560c96f4c821a'/>
<id>81a56f6dcd20325607d6008f4bb560c96f4c821a</id>
<content type='text'>
This adjusts structleak to also work with non-struct types when they
are passed by reference, since those variables may leak just like
anything else. This is exposed via an improved set of Kconfig options.
(This does mean structleak is slightly misnamed now.)

Building with CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL should give the
kernel complete initialization coverage of all stack variables passed
by reference, including padding (see lib/test_stackinit.c).

Using CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE to count added initializations
under defconfig:

	..._BYREF:      5945 added initializations
	..._BYREF_ALL: 16606 added initializations

There is virtually no change to text+data size (both have less than 0.05%
growth):

   text    data     bss     dec     hex filename
19502103        5051456 1917000 26470559        193e89f vmlinux.stock
19513412        5051456 1908808 26473676        193f4cc vmlinux.byref
19516974        5047360 1900616 26464950        193d2b6 vmlinux.byref_all

The measured performance difference is in the noise for hackbench and
kernel build benchmarks:

Stock:

	5x hackbench -g 20 -l 1000
	Mean:   10.649s
	Std Dev: 0.339

	5x kernel build (4-way parallel)
	Mean:  261.98s
	Std Dev: 1.53

CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF:

	5x hackbench -g 20 -l 1000
	Mean:   10.540s
	Std Dev: 0.233

	5x kernel build (4-way parallel)
	Mean:  260.52s
	Std Dev: 1.31

CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL:

	5x hackbench -g 20 -l 1000
	Mean:   10.320
	Std Dev: 0.413

	5x kernel build (4-way parallel)
	Mean:  260.10
	Std Dev: 0.86

This does not yet solve missing padding initialization for structures
on the stack that are never passed by reference (which should be a tiny
minority). Hopefully this will be more easily addressed by upstream
compiler fixes after clarifying the C11 padding initialization
specification.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This adjusts structleak to also work with non-struct types when they
are passed by reference, since those variables may leak just like
anything else. This is exposed via an improved set of Kconfig options.
(This does mean structleak is slightly misnamed now.)

Building with CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL should give the
kernel complete initialization coverage of all stack variables passed
by reference, including padding (see lib/test_stackinit.c).

Using CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE to count added initializations
under defconfig:

	..._BYREF:      5945 added initializations
	..._BYREF_ALL: 16606 added initializations

There is virtually no change to text+data size (both have less than 0.05%
growth):

   text    data     bss     dec     hex filename
19502103        5051456 1917000 26470559        193e89f vmlinux.stock
19513412        5051456 1908808 26473676        193f4cc vmlinux.byref
19516974        5047360 1900616 26464950        193d2b6 vmlinux.byref_all

The measured performance difference is in the noise for hackbench and
kernel build benchmarks:

Stock:

	5x hackbench -g 20 -l 1000
	Mean:   10.649s
	Std Dev: 0.339

	5x kernel build (4-way parallel)
	Mean:  261.98s
	Std Dev: 1.53

CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF:

	5x hackbench -g 20 -l 1000
	Mean:   10.540s
	Std Dev: 0.233

	5x kernel build (4-way parallel)
	Mean:  260.52s
	Std Dev: 1.31

CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL:

	5x hackbench -g 20 -l 1000
	Mean:   10.320
	Std Dev: 0.413

	5x kernel build (4-way parallel)
	Mean:  260.10
	Std Dev: 0.86

This does not yet solve missing padding initialization for structures
on the stack that are never passed by reference (which should be a tiny
minority). Hopefully this will be more easily addressed by upstream
compiler fixes after clarifying the C11 padding initialization
specification.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ARM: smp: add support for per-task stack canaries</title>
<updated>2018-12-12T21:20:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ard Biesheuvel</name>
<email>ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-06T08:32:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=189af4657186da08a2e79fb8e906cfd82b2ccddc'/>
<id>189af4657186da08a2e79fb8e906cfd82b2ccddc</id>
<content type='text'>
On ARM, we currently only change the value of the stack canary when
switching tasks if the kernel was built for UP. On SMP kernels, this
is impossible since the stack canary value is obtained via a global
symbol reference, which means
a) all running tasks on all CPUs must use the same value
b) we can only modify the value when no kernel stack frames are live
   on any CPU, which is effectively never.

So instead, use a GCC plugin to add a RTL pass that replaces each
reference to the address of the __stack_chk_guard symbol with an
expression that produces the address of the 'stack_canary' field
that is added to struct thread_info. This way, each task will use
its own randomized value.

Cc: Russell King &lt;linux@armlinux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Emese Revfy &lt;re.emese@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Laura Abbott &lt;labbott@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre &lt;nico@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
On ARM, we currently only change the value of the stack canary when
switching tasks if the kernel was built for UP. On SMP kernels, this
is impossible since the stack canary value is obtained via a global
symbol reference, which means
a) all running tasks on all CPUs must use the same value
b) we can only modify the value when no kernel stack frames are live
   on any CPU, which is effectively never.

So instead, use a GCC plugin to add a RTL pass that replaces each
reference to the address of the __stack_chk_guard symbol with an
expression that produces the address of the 'stack_canary' field
that is added to struct thread_info. This way, each task will use
its own randomized value.

Cc: Russell King &lt;linux@armlinux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Emese Revfy &lt;re.emese@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Laura Abbott &lt;labbott@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre &lt;nico@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>stackleak: Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing</title>
<updated>2018-09-04T17:35:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexander Popov</name>
<email>alex.popov@linux.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-16T22:17:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=964c9dff0091893a9a74a88edf984c6da0b779f7'/>
<id>964c9dff0091893a9a74a88edf984c6da0b779f7</id>
<content type='text'>
Introduce CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE option, which provides
'stack_erasing' sysctl. It can be used in runtime to control kernel
stack erasing for kernels built with CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK.

Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov &lt;alex.popov@linux.com&gt;
Tested-by: Laura Abbott &lt;labbott@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Introduce CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE option, which provides
'stack_erasing' sysctl. It can be used in runtime to control kernel
stack erasing for kernels built with CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK.

Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov &lt;alex.popov@linux.com&gt;
Tested-by: Laura Abbott &lt;labbott@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs/proc: Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system</title>
<updated>2018-09-04T17:35:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexander Popov</name>
<email>alex.popov@linux.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-16T22:17:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c8d126275a5fa59394fe17109bdb9812fed296b8'/>
<id>c8d126275a5fa59394fe17109bdb9812fed296b8</id>
<content type='text'>
Introduce CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS providing STACKLEAK information about
tasks via the /proc file system. In particular, /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/stack_depth
shows the maximum kernel stack consumption for the current and previous
syscalls. Although this information is not precise, it can be useful for
estimating the STACKLEAK performance impact for your workloads.

Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov &lt;alex.popov@linux.com&gt;
Tested-by: Laura Abbott &lt;labbott@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Introduce CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS providing STACKLEAK information about
tasks via the /proc file system. In particular, /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/stack_depth
shows the maximum kernel stack consumption for the current and previous
syscalls. Although this information is not precise, it can be useful for
estimating the STACKLEAK performance impact for your workloads.

Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov &lt;alex.popov@linux.com&gt;
Tested-by: Laura Abbott &lt;labbott@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
