linux-toradex.git/security/Kconfig, branch v4.9.16

Merge tag 'usercopy-v4.8-rc6-part2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux

2016-09-07T21:03:49+00:00

Pull more hardened usercopyfixes from Kees Cook:

 - force check_object_size() to be inline too

 - move page-spanning check behind a CONFIG since it's triggering false
   positives

[ Changed the page-spanning config option to depend on EXPERT in the
  merge.  That way it still gets build testing, and you can enable it if
  you want to, but is never enabled for "normal" configurations ]

* tag 'usercopy-v4.8-rc6-part2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
  usercopy: remove page-spanning test for now
  usercopy: force check_object_size() inline

usercopy: remove page-spanning test for now

2016-09-07T18:33:26+00:00

A custom allocator without __GFP_COMP that copies to userspace has been
found in vmw_execbuf_process[1], so this disables the page-span checker
by placing it behind a CONFIG for future work where such things can be
tracked down later.

[1] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1373326

Reported-by: Vinson Lee 
Fixes: f5509cc18daa ("mm: Hardened usercopy")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook

Make the hardened user-copy code depend on having a hardened allocator

2016-08-19T19:47:01+00:00

The kernel test robot reported a usercopy failure in the new hardened
sanity checks, due to a page-crossing copy of the FPU state into the
task structure.

This happened because the kernel test robot was testing with SLOB, which
doesn't actually do the required book-keeping for slab allocations, and
as a result the hardening code didn't realize that the task struct
allocation was one single allocation - and the sanity checks fail.

Since SLOB doesn't even claim to support hardening (and you really
shouldn't use it), the straightforward solution is to just make the
usercopy hardening code depend on the allocator supporting it.

Reported-by: kernel test robot 
Cc: Kees Cook 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

mm: Hardened usercopy

2016-07-26T21:41:47+00:00

This is the start of porting PAX_USERCOPY into the mainline kernel. This
is the first set of features, controlled by CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. The
work is based on code by PaX Team and Brad Spengler, and an earlier port
from Casey Schaufler. Additional non-slab page tests are from Rik van Riel.

This patch contains the logic for validating several conditions when
performing copy_to_user() and copy_from_user() on the kernel object
being copied to/from:
- address range doesn't wrap around
- address range isn't NULL or zero-allocated (with a non-zero copy size)
- if on the slab allocator:
  - object size must be less than or equal to copy size (when check is
    implemented in the allocator, which appear in subsequent patches)
- otherwise, object must not span page allocations (excepting Reserved
  and CMA ranges)
- if on the stack
  - object must not extend before/after the current process stack
  - object must be contained by a valid stack frame (when there is
    arch/build support for identifying stack frames)
- object must not overlap with kernel text

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Tested-by: Valdis Kletnieks 
Tested-by: Michael Ellerman

LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions

2016-04-21T00:47:27+00:00

This LSM enforces that kernel-loaded files (modules, firmware, etc)
must all come from the same filesystem, with the expectation that
such a filesystem is backed by a read-only device such as dm-verity
or CDROM. This allows systems that have a verified and/or unchangeable
filesystem to enforce module and firmware loading restrictions without
needing to sign the files individually.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn 
Signed-off-by: James Morris

Yama: remove needless CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED

2015-07-28T03:18:19+00:00

Now that minor LSMs can cleanly stack with major LSMs, remove the unneeded
config for Yama to be made to explicitly stack. Just selecting the main
Yama CONFIG will allow it to work, regardless of the major LSM. Since
distros using Yama are already forcing it to stack, this is effectively
a no-op change.

Additionally add MAINTAINERS entry.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Signed-off-by: James Morris

kernel: conditionally support non-root users, groups and capabilities

2015-04-15T23:35:22+00:00

There are a lot of embedded systems that run most or all of their
functionality in init, running as root:root.  For these systems,
supporting multiple users is not necessary.

This patch adds a new symbol, CONFIG_MULTIUSER, that makes support for
non-root users, non-root groups, and capabilities optional.  It is enabled
under CONFIG_EXPERT menu.

When this symbol is not defined, UID and GID are zero in any possible case
and processes always have all capabilities.

The following syscalls are compiled out: setuid, setregid, setgid,
setreuid, setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setgroups,
getgroups, setfsuid, setfsgid, capget, capset.

Also, groups.c is compiled out completely.

In kernel/capability.c, capable function was moved in order to avoid
adding two ifdef blocks.

This change saves about 25 KB on a defconfig build.  The most minimal
kernels have total text sizes in the high hundreds of kB rather than
low MB.  (The 25k goes down a bit with allnoconfig, but not that much.

The kernel was booted in Qemu.  All the common functionalities work.
Adding users/groups is not possible, failing with -ENOSYS.

Bloat-o-meter output:
add/remove: 7/87 grow/shrink: 19/397 up/down: 1675/-26325 (-24650)

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Iulia Manda 
Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett 
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven 
Tested-by: Paul E. McKenney 
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

security: select correct default LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR on arm on arm64

2014-02-05T14:59:14+00:00

Binaries compiled for arm may run on arm64 if CONFIG_COMPAT is
selected.  Set LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR to 32768 if ARM64 && COMPAT to
prevent selinux failures launching 32-bit static executables that
are mapped at 0x8000.

Signed-off-by: Colin Cross 
Acked-by: Will Deacon 
Acked-by: Eric Paris 
Acked-by: James Morris 
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas

KEYS: Move the key config into security/keys/Kconfig

2012-05-11T09:56:56+00:00

Move the key config into security/keys/Kconfig as there are going to be a lot
of key-related options.

Signed-off-by: David Howells 
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar

security: Yama LSM

2012-02-09T22:18:52+00:00

This adds the Yama Linux Security Module to collect DAC security
improvements (specifically just ptrace restrictions for now) that have
existed in various forms over the years and have been carried outside the
mainline kernel by other Linux distributions like Openwall and grsecurity.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Acked-by: John Johansen 
Signed-off-by: James Morris