<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/security/apparmor/include, branch master</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: fix race between freeing data and fs accessing it</title>
<updated>2026-03-09T23:05:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-02T00:10:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=8e135b8aee5a06c52a4347a5a6d51223c6f36ba3'/>
<id>8e135b8aee5a06c52a4347a5a6d51223c6f36ba3</id>
<content type='text'>
AppArmor was putting the reference to i_private data on its end after
removing the original entry from the file system. However the inode
can aand does live beyond that point and it is possible that some of
the fs call back functions will be invoked after the reference has
been put, which results in a race between freeing the data and
accessing it through the fs.

While the rawdata/loaddata is the most likely candidate to fail the
race, as it has the fewest references. If properly crafted it might be
possible to trigger a race for the other types stored in i_private.

Fix this by moving the put of i_private referenced data to the correct
place which is during inode eviction.

Fixes: c961ee5f21b20 ("apparmor: convert from securityfs to apparmorfs for policy ns files")
Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory &lt;qsa@qualys.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia &lt;georgia.garcia@canonical.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Maxime Bélair &lt;maxime.belair@canonical.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can &lt;cengiz.can@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
AppArmor was putting the reference to i_private data on its end after
removing the original entry from the file system. However the inode
can aand does live beyond that point and it is possible that some of
the fs call back functions will be invoked after the reference has
been put, which results in a race between freeing the data and
accessing it through the fs.

While the rawdata/loaddata is the most likely candidate to fail the
race, as it has the fewest references. If properly crafted it might be
possible to trigger a race for the other types stored in i_private.

Fix this by moving the put of i_private referenced data to the correct
place which is during inode eviction.

Fixes: c961ee5f21b20 ("apparmor: convert from securityfs to apparmorfs for policy ns files")
Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory &lt;qsa@qualys.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia &lt;georgia.garcia@canonical.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Maxime Bélair &lt;maxime.belair@canonical.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can &lt;cengiz.can@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: fix race on rawdata dereference</title>
<updated>2026-03-09T23:05:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-24T18:20:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=a0b7091c4de45a7325c8780e6934a894f92ac86b'/>
<id>a0b7091c4de45a7325c8780e6934a894f92ac86b</id>
<content type='text'>
There is a race condition that leads to a use-after-free situation:
because the rawdata inodes are not refcounted, an attacker can start
open()ing one of the rawdata files, and at the same time remove the
last reference to this rawdata (by removing the corresponding profile,
for example), which frees its struct aa_loaddata; as a result, when
seq_rawdata_open() is reached, i_private is a dangling pointer and
freed memory is accessed.

The rawdata inodes weren't refcounted to avoid a circular refcount and
were supposed to be held by the profile rawdata reference.  However
during profile removal there is a window where the vfs and profile
destruction race, resulting in the use after free.

Fix this by moving to a double refcount scheme. Where the profile
refcount on rawdata is used to break the circular dependency. Allowing
for freeing of the rawdata once all inode references to the rawdata
are put.

Fixes: 5d5182cae401 ("apparmor: move to per loaddata files, instead of replicating in profiles")
Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory &lt;qsa@qualys.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia &lt;georgia.garcia@canonical.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Maxime Bélair &lt;maxime.belair@canonical.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can &lt;cengiz.can@canonical.com&gt;
Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso &lt;carnil@debian.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
There is a race condition that leads to a use-after-free situation:
because the rawdata inodes are not refcounted, an attacker can start
open()ing one of the rawdata files, and at the same time remove the
last reference to this rawdata (by removing the corresponding profile,
for example), which frees its struct aa_loaddata; as a result, when
seq_rawdata_open() is reached, i_private is a dangling pointer and
freed memory is accessed.

The rawdata inodes weren't refcounted to avoid a circular refcount and
were supposed to be held by the profile rawdata reference.  However
during profile removal there is a window where the vfs and profile
destruction race, resulting in the use after free.

Fix this by moving to a double refcount scheme. Where the profile
refcount on rawdata is used to break the circular dependency. Allowing
for freeing of the rawdata once all inode references to the rawdata
are put.

Fixes: 5d5182cae401 ("apparmor: move to per loaddata files, instead of replicating in profiles")
Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory &lt;qsa@qualys.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia &lt;georgia.garcia@canonical.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Maxime Bélair &lt;maxime.belair@canonical.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can &lt;cengiz.can@canonical.com&gt;
Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso &lt;carnil@debian.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: fix differential encoding verification</title>
<updated>2026-03-09T23:05:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-10-17T08:53:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=39440b137546a3aa383cfdabc605fb73811b6093'/>
<id>39440b137546a3aa383cfdabc605fb73811b6093</id>
<content type='text'>
Differential encoding allows loops to be created if it is abused. To
prevent this the unpack should verify that a diff-encode chain
terminates.

Unfortunately the differential encode verification had two bugs.

1. it conflated states that had gone through check and already been
   marked, with states that were currently being checked and marked.
   This means that loops in the current chain being verified are treated
   as a chain that has already been verified.

2. the order bailout on already checked states compared current chain
   check iterators j,k instead of using the outer loop iterator i.
   Meaning a step backwards in states in the current chain verification
   was being mistaken for moving to an already verified state.

Move to a double mark scheme where already verified states get a
different mark, than the current chain being kept. This enables us
to also drop the backwards verification check that was the cause of
the second error as any already verified state is already marked.

Fixes: 031dcc8f4e84 ("apparmor: dfa add support for state differential encoding")
Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory &lt;qsa@qualys.com&gt;
Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso &lt;carnil@debian.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia &lt;georgia.garcia@canonical.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can &lt;cengiz.can@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Differential encoding allows loops to be created if it is abused. To
prevent this the unpack should verify that a diff-encode chain
terminates.

Unfortunately the differential encode verification had two bugs.

1. it conflated states that had gone through check and already been
   marked, with states that were currently being checked and marked.
   This means that loops in the current chain being verified are treated
   as a chain that has already been verified.

2. the order bailout on already checked states compared current chain
   check iterators j,k instead of using the outer loop iterator i.
   Meaning a step backwards in states in the current chain verification
   was being mistaken for moving to an already verified state.

Move to a double mark scheme where already verified states get a
different mark, than the current chain being kept. This enables us
to also drop the backwards verification check that was the cause of
the second error as any already verified state is already marked.

Fixes: 031dcc8f4e84 ("apparmor: dfa add support for state differential encoding")
Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory &lt;qsa@qualys.com&gt;
Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso &lt;carnil@debian.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia &lt;georgia.garcia@canonical.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can &lt;cengiz.can@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: fix unprivileged local user can do privileged policy management</title>
<updated>2026-03-09T23:05:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-11-07T16:36:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=6601e13e82841879406bf9f369032656f441a425'/>
<id>6601e13e82841879406bf9f369032656f441a425</id>
<content type='text'>
An unprivileged local user can load, replace, and remove profiles by
opening the apparmorfs interfaces, via a confused deputy attack, by
passing the opened fd to a privileged process, and getting the
privileged process to write to the interface.

This does require a privileged target that can be manipulated to do
the write for the unprivileged process, but once such access is
achieved full policy management is possible and all the possible
implications that implies: removing confinement, DoS of system or
target applications by denying all execution, by-passing the
unprivileged user namespace restriction, to exploiting kernel bugs for
a local privilege escalation.

The policy management interface can not have its permissions simply
changed from 0666 to 0600 because non-root processes need to be able
to load policy to different policy namespaces.

Instead ensure the task writing the interface has privileges that
are a subset of the task that opened the interface. This is already
done via policy for confined processes, but unconfined can delegate
access to the opened fd, by-passing the usual policy check.

Fixes: b7fd2c0340eac ("apparmor: add per policy ns .load, .replace, .remove interface files")
Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory &lt;qsa@qualys.com&gt;
Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso &lt;carnil@debian.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia &lt;georgia.garcia@canonical.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can &lt;cengiz.can@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
An unprivileged local user can load, replace, and remove profiles by
opening the apparmorfs interfaces, via a confused deputy attack, by
passing the opened fd to a privileged process, and getting the
privileged process to write to the interface.

This does require a privileged target that can be manipulated to do
the write for the unprivileged process, but once such access is
achieved full policy management is possible and all the possible
implications that implies: removing confinement, DoS of system or
target applications by denying all execution, by-passing the
unprivileged user namespace restriction, to exploiting kernel bugs for
a local privilege escalation.

The policy management interface can not have its permissions simply
changed from 0666 to 0600 because non-root processes need to be able
to load policy to different policy namespaces.

Instead ensure the task writing the interface has privileges that
are a subset of the task that opened the interface. This is already
done via policy for confined processes, but unconfined can delegate
access to the opened fd, by-passing the usual policy check.

Fixes: b7fd2c0340eac ("apparmor: add per policy ns .load, .replace, .remove interface files")
Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory &lt;qsa@qualys.com&gt;
Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso &lt;carnil@debian.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia &lt;georgia.garcia@canonical.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can &lt;cengiz.can@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: fix: limit the number of levels of policy namespaces</title>
<updated>2026-03-09T23:05:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-03T19:08:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=306039414932c80f8420695a24d4fe10c84ccfb2'/>
<id>306039414932c80f8420695a24d4fe10c84ccfb2</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently the number of policy namespaces is not bounded relying on
the user namespace limit. However policy namespaces aren't strictly
tied to user namespaces and it is possible to create them and nest
them arbitrarily deep which can be used to exhaust system resource.

Hard cap policy namespaces to the same depth as user namespaces.

Fixes: c88d4c7b049e8 ("AppArmor: core policy routines")
Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory &lt;qsa@qualys.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ryan Lee &lt;ryan.lee@canonical.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can &lt;cengiz.can@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Currently the number of policy namespaces is not bounded relying on
the user namespace limit. However policy namespaces aren't strictly
tied to user namespaces and it is possible to create them and nest
them arbitrarily deep which can be used to exhaust system resource.

Hard cap policy namespaces to the same depth as user namespaces.

Fixes: c88d4c7b049e8 ("AppArmor: core policy routines")
Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory &lt;qsa@qualys.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ryan Lee &lt;ryan.lee@canonical.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can &lt;cengiz.can@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: split xxx_in_ns into its two separate semantic use cases</title>
<updated>2026-01-29T09:27:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-12-25T09:21:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=796c146fa6c8289afc9e18004c21bfe05c75a487'/>
<id>796c146fa6c8289afc9e18004c21bfe05c75a487</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch doesn't change current functionality, it switches the two
uses of the in_ns fns and macros into the two semantically different
cases they are used for.

xxx_in_scope for checking mediation interaction between profiles
xxx_in_view to determine which profiles are visible.The scope will
always be a subset of the view as profiles that can not see each
other can not interact.

The split can not be completely done for label_match because it has to
distinct uses matching permission against label in scope, and checking
if a transition to a profile is allowed. The transition to a profile
can include profiles that are in view but not in scope, so retain this
distinction as a parameter.

While at the moment the two uses are very similar, in the future there
will be additional differences. So make sure the semantics differences
are present in the code.

Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia &lt;georgia.garcia@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This patch doesn't change current functionality, it switches the two
uses of the in_ns fns and macros into the two semantically different
cases they are used for.

xxx_in_scope for checking mediation interaction between profiles
xxx_in_view to determine which profiles are visible.The scope will
always be a subset of the view as profiles that can not see each
other can not interact.

The split can not be completely done for label_match because it has to
distinct uses matching permission against label in scope, and checking
if a transition to a profile is allowed. The transition to a profile
can include profiles that are in view but not in scope, so retain this
distinction as a parameter.

While at the moment the two uses are very similar, in the future there
will be additional differences. So make sure the semantics differences
are present in the code.

Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia &lt;georgia.garcia@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: refactor/cleanup cred helper fns.</title>
<updated>2026-01-29T09:27:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-11-08T11:00:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=acf2a94ac4734962742398bed0cde156baf48244'/>
<id>acf2a94ac4734962742398bed0cde156baf48244</id>
<content type='text'>
aa_cred_raw_label() and cred_label() now do the same things so
consolidate to cred_label()

Document the crit section use and constraints better and refactor
__begin_current_label_crit_section() into a base fn
__begin_cred_crit_section() and a wrapper that calls the base with
current cred.

Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia &lt;georgia.garcia@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
aa_cred_raw_label() and cred_label() now do the same things so
consolidate to cred_label()

Document the crit section use and constraints better and refactor
__begin_current_label_crit_section() into a base fn
__begin_cred_crit_section() and a wrapper that calls the base with
current cred.

Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia &lt;georgia.garcia@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: fix label and profile debug macros</title>
<updated>2026-01-29T09:27:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-11-02T09:36:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=1301b956190590ef7f64b321fd27c59907d9c271'/>
<id>1301b956190590ef7f64b321fd27c59907d9c271</id>
<content type='text'>
The label and profile debug macros were not correctly pasting their
var args.

Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia &lt;georgia.garcia@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The label and profile debug macros were not correctly pasting their
var args.

Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia &lt;georgia.garcia@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: add support loading per permission tagging</title>
<updated>2026-01-29T09:27:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-04-01T22:51:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=3d28e2397af7a89ac3de33c686ed404cda59b5d5'/>
<id>3d28e2397af7a89ac3de33c686ed404cda59b5d5</id>
<content type='text'>
Add support for the per permission tag index for a given permission
set. This will be used by both meta-data tagging, to allow annotating
accept states with context and debug information. As well as by rule
tainting and triggers to specify the taint or trigger to be applied.

Since these are low frequency ancillary data items they are stored
in a tighter packed format to that allows for sharing and reuse of the
strings between permissions and accept states. Reducing the amount of
kernel memory use at the cost of having to go through a couple if
index based indirections.

The tags are just strings that has no meaning with out context. When
used as meta-data for auditing and debugging its entirely information
for userspace, but triggers, and tainting can be used to affect the
domain. However they all exist in the same packed data set and can
be shared between different uses.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add support for the per permission tag index for a given permission
set. This will be used by both meta-data tagging, to allow annotating
accept states with context and debug information. As well as by rule
tainting and triggers to specify the taint or trigger to be applied.

Since these are low frequency ancillary data items they are stored
in a tighter packed format to that allows for sharing and reuse of the
strings between permissions and accept states. Reducing the amount of
kernel memory use at the cost of having to go through a couple if
index based indirections.

The tags are just strings that has no meaning with out context. When
used as meta-data for auditing and debugging its entirely information
for userspace, but triggers, and tainting can be used to affect the
domain. However they all exist in the same packed data set and can
be shared between different uses.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: make str table more generic and be able to have multiple entries</title>
<updated>2026-01-22T12:56:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-08-01T09:21:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c140dcd1246bfe705921ca881bbb247ff1ba2bca'/>
<id>c140dcd1246bfe705921ca881bbb247ff1ba2bca</id>
<content type='text'>
The strtable is currently limited to a single entry string on unpack
even though domain has the concept of multiple entries within it. Make
this a reality as it will be used for tags and more advanced domain
transitions.

Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia &lt;georgia.garcia@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The strtable is currently limited to a single entry string on unpack
even though domain has the concept of multiple entries within it. Make
this a reality as it will be used for tags and more advanced domain
transitions.

Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia &lt;georgia.garcia@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
