<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/security/capability.c, branch v3.10.2</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security</title>
<updated>2013-04-30T23:27:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-04-30T23:27:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=2e1deaad1e48453cea782854ab87df3f78c121c2'/>
<id>2e1deaad1e48453cea782854ab87df3f78c121c2</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull security subsystem update from James Morris:
 "Just some minor updates across the subsystem"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  ima: eliminate passing d_name.name to process_measurement()
  TPM: Retry SaveState command in suspend path
  tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon: Add small comment about return value of __i2c_transfer
  tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon.c: Add OF attributes type and name to the of_device_id table entries
  tpm_i2c_stm_st33: Remove duplicate inclusion of header files
  tpm: Add support for new Infineon I2C TPM (SLB 9645 TT 1.2 I2C)
  char/tpm: Convert struct i2c_msg initialization to C99 format
  drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ppi: use strlcpy instead of strncpy
  tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33: formatting and white space changes
  Smack: include magic.h in smackfs.c
  selinux: make security_sb_clone_mnt_opts return an error on context mismatch
  seccomp: allow BPF_XOR based ALU instructions.
  Fix NULL pointer dereference in smack_inode_unlink() and smack_inode_rmdir()
  Smack: add support for modification of existing rules
  smack: SMACK_MAGIC to include/uapi/linux/magic.h
  Smack: add missing support for transmute bit in smack_str_from_perm()
  Smack: prevent revoke-subject from failing when unseen label is written to it
  tomoyo: use DEFINE_SRCU() to define tomoyo_ss
  tomoyo: use DEFINE_SRCU() to define tomoyo_ss
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull security subsystem update from James Morris:
 "Just some minor updates across the subsystem"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  ima: eliminate passing d_name.name to process_measurement()
  TPM: Retry SaveState command in suspend path
  tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon: Add small comment about return value of __i2c_transfer
  tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon.c: Add OF attributes type and name to the of_device_id table entries
  tpm_i2c_stm_st33: Remove duplicate inclusion of header files
  tpm: Add support for new Infineon I2C TPM (SLB 9645 TT 1.2 I2C)
  char/tpm: Convert struct i2c_msg initialization to C99 format
  drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ppi: use strlcpy instead of strncpy
  tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33: formatting and white space changes
  Smack: include magic.h in smackfs.c
  selinux: make security_sb_clone_mnt_opts return an error on context mismatch
  seccomp: allow BPF_XOR based ALU instructions.
  Fix NULL pointer dereference in smack_inode_unlink() and smack_inode_rmdir()
  Smack: add support for modification of existing rules
  smack: SMACK_MAGIC to include/uapi/linux/magic.h
  Smack: add missing support for transmute bit in smack_str_from_perm()
  Smack: prevent revoke-subject from failing when unseen label is written to it
  tomoyo: use DEFINE_SRCU() to define tomoyo_ss
  tomoyo: use DEFINE_SRCU() to define tomoyo_ss
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: add a skb_owned_by() hook</title>
<updated>2013-04-09T17:23:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-04-08T17:58:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ca10b9e9a8ca7342ee07065289cbe74ac128c169'/>
<id>ca10b9e9a8ca7342ee07065289cbe74ac128c169</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit 90ba9b1986b5ac (tcp: tcp_make_synack() can use alloc_skb())
broke certain SELinux/NetLabel configurations by no longer correctly
assigning the sock to the outgoing SYNACK packet.

Cost of atomic operations on the LISTEN socket is quite big,
and we would like it to happen only if really needed.

This patch introduces a new security_ops-&gt;skb_owned_by() method,
that is a void operation unless selinux is active.

Reported-by: Miroslav Vadkerti &lt;mvadkert@redhat.com&gt;
Diagnosed-by: Paul Moore &lt;pmoore@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: "David S. Miller" &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Tested-by: Paul Moore &lt;pmoore@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul Moore &lt;pmoore@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Commit 90ba9b1986b5ac (tcp: tcp_make_synack() can use alloc_skb())
broke certain SELinux/NetLabel configurations by no longer correctly
assigning the sock to the outgoing SYNACK packet.

Cost of atomic operations on the LISTEN socket is quite big,
and we would like it to happen only if really needed.

This patch introduces a new security_ops-&gt;skb_owned_by() method,
that is a void operation unless selinux is active.

Reported-by: Miroslav Vadkerti &lt;mvadkert@redhat.com&gt;
Diagnosed-by: Paul Moore &lt;pmoore@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: "David S. Miller" &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Tested-by: Paul Moore &lt;pmoore@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul Moore &lt;pmoore@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: make security_sb_clone_mnt_opts return an error on context mismatch</title>
<updated>2013-04-02T00:30:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeff Layton</name>
<email>jlayton@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-04-01T12:14:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=094f7b69ea738d7d619cba449d2af97159949459'/>
<id>094f7b69ea738d7d619cba449d2af97159949459</id>
<content type='text'>
I had the following problem reported a while back. If you mount the
same filesystem twice using NFSv4 with different contexts, then the
second context= option is ignored. For instance:

    # mount server:/export /mnt/test1
    # mount server:/export /mnt/test2 -o context=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0
    # ls -dZ /mnt/test1
    drwxrwxrwt. root root system_u:object_r:nfs_t:s0       /mnt/test1
    # ls -dZ /mnt/test2
    drwxrwxrwt. root root system_u:object_r:nfs_t:s0       /mnt/test2

When we call into SELinux to set the context of a "cloned" superblock,
it will currently just bail out when it notices that we're reusing an
existing superblock. Since the existing superblock is already set up and
presumably in use, we can't go overwriting its context with the one from
the "original" sb. Because of this, the second context= option in this
case cannot take effect.

This patch fixes this by turning security_sb_clone_mnt_opts into an int
return operation. When it finds that the "new" superblock that it has
been handed is already set up, it checks to see whether the contexts on
the old superblock match it. If it does, then it will just return
success, otherwise it'll return -EBUSY and emit a printk to tell the
admin why the second mount failed.

Note that this patch may cause casualties. The NFSv4 code relies on
being able to walk down to an export from the pseudoroot. If you mount
filesystems that are nested within one another with different contexts,
then this patch will make those mounts fail in new and "exciting" ways.

For instance, suppose that /export is a separate filesystem on the
server:

    # mount server:/ /mnt/test1
    # mount salusa:/export /mnt/test2 -o context=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0
    mount.nfs: an incorrect mount option was specified

...with the printk in the ring buffer. Because we *might* eventually
walk down to /mnt/test1/export, the mount is denied due to this patch.
The second mount needs the pseudoroot superblock, but that's already
present with the wrong context.

OTOH, if we mount these in the reverse order, then both mounts work,
because the pseudoroot superblock created when mounting /export is
discarded once that mount is done. If we then however try to walk into
that directory, the automount fails for the similar reasons:

    # cd /mnt/test1/scratch/
    -bash: cd: /mnt/test1/scratch: Device or resource busy

The story I've gotten from the SELinux folks that I've talked to is that
this is desirable behavior. In SELinux-land, mounting the same data
under different contexts is wrong -- there can be only one.

Cc: Steve Dickson &lt;steved@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
I had the following problem reported a while back. If you mount the
same filesystem twice using NFSv4 with different contexts, then the
second context= option is ignored. For instance:

    # mount server:/export /mnt/test1
    # mount server:/export /mnt/test2 -o context=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0
    # ls -dZ /mnt/test1
    drwxrwxrwt. root root system_u:object_r:nfs_t:s0       /mnt/test1
    # ls -dZ /mnt/test2
    drwxrwxrwt. root root system_u:object_r:nfs_t:s0       /mnt/test2

When we call into SELinux to set the context of a "cloned" superblock,
it will currently just bail out when it notices that we're reusing an
existing superblock. Since the existing superblock is already set up and
presumably in use, we can't go overwriting its context with the one from
the "original" sb. Because of this, the second context= option in this
case cannot take effect.

This patch fixes this by turning security_sb_clone_mnt_opts into an int
return operation. When it finds that the "new" superblock that it has
been handed is already set up, it checks to see whether the contexts on
the old superblock match it. If it does, then it will just return
success, otherwise it'll return -EBUSY and emit a printk to tell the
admin why the second mount failed.

Note that this patch may cause casualties. The NFSv4 code relies on
being able to walk down to an export from the pseudoroot. If you mount
filesystems that are nested within one another with different contexts,
then this patch will make those mounts fail in new and "exciting" ways.

For instance, suppose that /export is a separate filesystem on the
server:

    # mount server:/ /mnt/test1
    # mount salusa:/export /mnt/test2 -o context=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0
    mount.nfs: an incorrect mount option was specified

...with the printk in the ring buffer. Because we *might* eventually
walk down to /mnt/test1/export, the mount is denied due to this patch.
The second mount needs the pseudoroot superblock, but that's already
present with the wrong context.

OTOH, if we mount these in the reverse order, then both mounts work,
because the pseudoroot superblock created when mounting /export is
discarded once that mount is done. If we then however try to walk into
that directory, the automount fails for the similar reasons:

    # cd /mnt/test1/scratch/
    -bash: cd: /mnt/test1/scratch: Device or resource busy

The story I've gotten from the SELinux folks that I've talked to is that
this is desirable behavior. In SELinux-land, mounting the same data
under different contexts is wrong -- there can be only one.

Cc: Steve Dickson &lt;steved@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tun: fix LSM/SELinux labeling of tun/tap devices</title>
<updated>2013-01-14T23:16:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Moore</name>
<email>pmoore@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-01-14T07:12:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=5dbbaf2de89613d19a9286d4db0a535ca2735d26'/>
<id>5dbbaf2de89613d19a9286d4db0a535ca2735d26</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch corrects some problems with LSM/SELinux that were introduced
with the multiqueue patchset.  The problem stems from the fact that the
multiqueue work changed the relationship between the tun device and its
associated socket; before the socket persisted for the life of the
device, however after the multiqueue changes the socket only persisted
for the life of the userspace connection (fd open).  For non-persistent
devices this is not an issue, but for persistent devices this can cause
the tun device to lose its SELinux label.

We correct this problem by adding an opaque LSM security blob to the
tun device struct which allows us to have the LSM security state, e.g.
SELinux labeling information, persist for the lifetime of the tun
device.  In the process we tweak the LSM hooks to work with this new
approach to TUN device/socket labeling and introduce a new LSM hook,
security_tun_dev_attach_queue(), to approve requests to attach to a
TUN queue via TUNSETQUEUE.

The SELinux code has been adjusted to match the new LSM hooks, the
other LSMs do not make use of the LSM TUN controls.  This patch makes
use of the recently added "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission to
restrict access to the TUNSETQUEUE operation.  On older SELinux
policies which do not define the "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission
the access control decision for TUNSETQUEUE will be handled according
to the SELinux policy's unknown permission setting.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;pmoore@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@parisplace.org&gt;
Tested-by: Jason Wang &lt;jasowang@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This patch corrects some problems with LSM/SELinux that were introduced
with the multiqueue patchset.  The problem stems from the fact that the
multiqueue work changed the relationship between the tun device and its
associated socket; before the socket persisted for the life of the
device, however after the multiqueue changes the socket only persisted
for the life of the userspace connection (fd open).  For non-persistent
devices this is not an issue, but for persistent devices this can cause
the tun device to lose its SELinux label.

We correct this problem by adding an opaque LSM security blob to the
tun device struct which allows us to have the LSM security state, e.g.
SELinux labeling information, persist for the lifetime of the tun
device.  In the process we tweak the LSM hooks to work with this new
approach to TUN device/socket labeling and introduce a new LSM hook,
security_tun_dev_attach_queue(), to approve requests to attach to a
TUN queue via TUNSETQUEUE.

The SELinux code has been adjusted to match the new LSM hooks, the
other LSMs do not make use of the LSM TUN controls.  This patch makes
use of the recently added "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission to
restrict access to the TUNSETQUEUE operation.  On older SELinux
policies which do not define the "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission
the access control decision for TUNSETQUEUE will be handled according
to the SELinux policy's unknown permission setting.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;pmoore@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@parisplace.org&gt;
Tested-by: Jason Wang &lt;jasowang@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: introduce kernel_module_from_file hook</title>
<updated>2012-12-14T02:35:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-15T21:02:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=2e72d51b4ac32989496870cd8171b3682fea1839'/>
<id>2e72d51b4ac32989496870cd8171b3682fea1839</id>
<content type='text'>
Now that kernel module origins can be reasoned about, provide a hook to
the LSMs to make policy decisions about the module file. This will let
Chrome OS enforce that loadable kernel modules can only come from its
read-only hash-verified root filesystem. Other LSMs can, for example,
read extended attributes for signatures, etc.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell &lt;rusty@rustcorp.com.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Now that kernel module origins can be reasoned about, provide a hook to
the LSMs to make policy decisions about the module file. This will let
Chrome OS enforce that loadable kernel modules can only come from its
read-only hash-verified root filesystem. Other LSMs can, for example,
read extended attributes for signatures, etc.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell &lt;rusty@rustcorp.com.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>consitify do_mount() arguments</title>
<updated>2012-10-12T00:02:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-11T15:42:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=808d4e3cfdcc52b19276175464f6dbca4df13b09'/>
<id>808d4e3cfdcc52b19276175464f6dbca4df13b09</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>userns: Teach security_path_chown to take kuids and kgids</title>
<updated>2012-09-21T10:13:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-06-01T22:14:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=d2b31ca644fdc8704de3367a6a56a5c958c77f53'/>
<id>d2b31ca644fdc8704de3367a6a56a5c958c77f53</id>
<content type='text'>
Don't make the security modules deal with raw user space uid and
gids instead pass in a kuid_t and a kgid_t so that security modules
only have to deal with internal kernel uids and gids.

Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Kentaro Takeda &lt;takedakn@nttdata.co.jp&gt;
Cc: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Don't make the security modules deal with raw user space uid and
gids instead pass in a kuid_t and a kgid_t so that security modules
only have to deal with internal kernel uids and gids.

Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Kentaro Takeda &lt;takedakn@nttdata.co.jp&gt;
Cc: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>split -&gt;file_mmap() into -&gt;mmap_addr()/-&gt;mmap_file()</title>
<updated>2012-05-31T17:11:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2012-05-30T17:30:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e5467859f7f79b69fc49004403009dfdba3bec53'/>
<id>e5467859f7f79b69fc49004403009dfdba3bec53</id>
<content type='text'>
... i.e. file-dependent and address-dependent checks.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
... i.e. file-dependent and address-dependent checks.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>SELinux: rename dentry_open to file_open</title>
<updated>2012-04-09T16:22:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Paris</name>
<email>eparis@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-04-04T17:45:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=83d498569e9a7a4b92c4c5d3566f2d6a604f28c9'/>
<id>83d498569e9a7a4b92c4c5d3566f2d6a604f28c9</id>
<content type='text'>
dentry_open takes a file, rename it to file_open

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
dentry_open takes a file, rename it to file_open

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: create task_free security callback</title>
<updated>2012-02-09T22:14:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2011-12-21T20:17:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=1a2a4d06e1e95260c470ebe3a945f61bbe8c1fd8'/>
<id>1a2a4d06e1e95260c470ebe3a945f61bbe8c1fd8</id>
<content type='text'>
The current LSM interface to cred_free is not sufficient for allowing
an LSM to track the life and death of a task. This patch adds the
task_free hook so that an LSM can clean up resources on task death.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The current LSM interface to cred_free is not sufficient for allowing
an LSM to track the life and death of a task. This patch adds the
task_free hook so that an LSM can clean up resources on task death.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
