<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/security/integrity/evm, branch v4.4.106</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>EVM: Use crypto_memneq() for digest comparisons</title>
<updated>2016-02-17T20:31:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ryan Ware</name>
<email>ware@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-02-11T23:58:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=8592536bcfcbc717a3bf7cec57d7c1b38f4eec1d'/>
<id>8592536bcfcbc717a3bf7cec57d7c1b38f4eec1d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 613317bd212c585c20796c10afe5daaa95d4b0a1 upstream.

This patch fixes vulnerability CVE-2016-2085.  The problem exists
because the vm_verify_hmac() function includes a use of memcmp().
Unfortunately, this allows timing side channel attacks; specifically
a MAC forgery complexity drop from 2^128 to 2^12.  This patch changes
the memcmp() to the cryptographically safe crypto_memneq().

Reported-by: Xiaofei Rex Guo &lt;xiaofei.rex.guo@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ryan Ware &lt;ware@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 613317bd212c585c20796c10afe5daaa95d4b0a1 upstream.

This patch fixes vulnerability CVE-2016-2085.  The problem exists
because the vm_verify_hmac() function includes a use of memcmp().
Unfortunately, this allows timing side channel attacks; specifically
a MAC forgery complexity drop from 2^128 to 2^12.  This patch changes
the memcmp() to the cryptographically safe crypto_memneq().

Reported-by: Xiaofei Rex Guo &lt;xiaofei.rex.guo@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ryan Ware &lt;ware@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data</title>
<updated>2015-10-21T14:18:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-21T13:04:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=146aa8b1453bd8f1ff2304ffb71b4ee0eb9acdcc'/>
<id>146aa8b1453bd8f1ff2304ffb71b4ee0eb9acdcc</id>
<content type='text'>
Merge the type-specific data with the payload data into one four-word chunk
as it seems pointless to keep them separate.

Use user_key_payload() for accessing the payloads of overloaded
user-defined keys.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Merge the type-specific data with the payload data into one four-word chunk
as it seems pointless to keep them separate.

Use user_key_payload() for accessing the payloads of overloaded
user-defined keys.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: fix potential race when removing xattrs</title>
<updated>2015-05-21T17:28:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>d.kasatkin@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-11-20T14:31:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=7c51bb00c40e5608fb2cdac5230f51aeb56a28df'/>
<id>7c51bb00c40e5608fb2cdac5230f51aeb56a28df</id>
<content type='text'>
EVM needs to be atomically updated when removing xattrs.
Otherwise concurrent EVM verification may fail in between.
This patch fixes by moving i_mutex unlocking after calling
EVM hook. fsnotify_xattr() is also now called while locked
the same way as it is done in __vfs_setxattr_noperm.

Changelog:
- remove unused 'inode' variable.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
EVM needs to be atomically updated when removing xattrs.
Otherwise concurrent EVM verification may fail in between.
This patch fixes by moving i_mutex unlocking after calling
EVM hook. fsnotify_xattr() is also now called while locked
the same way as it is done in __vfs_setxattr_noperm.

Changelog:
- remove unused 'inode' variable.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: labeling pseudo filesystems exception</title>
<updated>2015-05-21T17:28:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-04-21T17:59:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=5101a1850bb7ccbf107929dee9af0cd2f400940f'/>
<id>5101a1850bb7ccbf107929dee9af0cd2f400940f</id>
<content type='text'>
To prevent offline stripping of existing file xattrs and relabeling of
them at runtime, EVM allows only newly created files to be labeled.  As
pseudo filesystems are not persistent, stripping of xattrs is not a
concern.

Some LSMs defer file labeling on pseudo filesystems.  This patch
permits the labeling of existing files on pseudo files systems.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
To prevent offline stripping of existing file xattrs and relabeling of
them at runtime, EVM allows only newly created files to be labeled.  As
pseudo filesystems are not persistent, stripping of xattrs is not a
concern.

Some LSMs defer file labeling on pseudo filesystems.  This patch
permits the labeling of existing files on pseudo files systems.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotations</title>
<updated>2015-04-15T19:06:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-03-17T22:26:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c6f493d631c4d40cea5c36055f9148f547b200af'/>
<id>c6f493d631c4d40cea5c36055f9148f547b200af</id>
<content type='text'>
most of the -&gt;d_inode uses there refer to the same inode IO would
go to, i.e. d_backing_inode()

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
most of the -&gt;d_inode uses there refer to the same inode IO would
go to, i.e. d_backing_inode()

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kconfig: use bool instead of boolean for type definition attributes</title>
<updated>2015-01-07T12:08:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christoph Jaeger</name>
<email>cj@linux.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-20T20:41:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=6341e62b212a2541efb0160c470e90bd226d5496'/>
<id>6341e62b212a2541efb0160c470e90bd226d5496</id>
<content type='text'>
Support for keyword 'boolean' will be dropped later on.

No functional change.

Reference: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1418003065.git.cj@linux.com
Signed-off-by: Christoph Jaeger &lt;cj@linux.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michal Marek &lt;mmarek@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Support for keyword 'boolean' will be dropped later on.

No functional change.

Reference: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1418003065.git.cj@linux.com
Signed-off-by: Christoph Jaeger &lt;cj@linux.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michal Marek &lt;mmarek@suse.cz&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security</title>
<updated>2014-12-15T04:36:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-15T04:36:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=67e2c3883828b39548cee2091b36656787775d95'/>
<id>67e2c3883828b39548cee2091b36656787775d95</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull security layer updates from James Morris:
 "In terms of changes, there's general maintenance to the Smack,
  SELinux, and integrity code.

  The IMA code adds a new kconfig option, IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT,
  which allows IMA appraisal to require signatures.  Support for reading
  keys from rootfs before init is call is also added"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (23 commits)
  selinux: Remove security_ops extern
  security: smack: fix out-of-bounds access in smk_parse_smack()
  VFS: refactor vfs_read()
  ima: require signature based appraisal
  integrity: provide a hook to load keys when rootfs is ready
  ima: load x509 certificate from the kernel
  integrity: provide a function to load x509 certificate from the kernel
  integrity: define a new function integrity_read_file()
  Security: smack: replace kzalloc with kmem_cache for inode_smack
  Smack: Lock mode for the floor and hat labels
  ima: added support for new kernel cmdline parameter ima_template_fmt
  ima: allocate field pointers array on demand in template_desc_init_fields()
  ima: don't allocate a copy of template_fmt in template_desc_init_fields()
  ima: display template format in meas. list if template name length is zero
  ima: added error messages to template-related functions
  ima: use atomic bit operations to protect policy update interface
  ima: ignore empty and with whitespaces policy lines
  ima: no need to allocate entry for comment
  ima: report policy load status
  ima: use path names cache
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull security layer updates from James Morris:
 "In terms of changes, there's general maintenance to the Smack,
  SELinux, and integrity code.

  The IMA code adds a new kconfig option, IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT,
  which allows IMA appraisal to require signatures.  Support for reading
  keys from rootfs before init is call is also added"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (23 commits)
  selinux: Remove security_ops extern
  security: smack: fix out-of-bounds access in smk_parse_smack()
  VFS: refactor vfs_read()
  ima: require signature based appraisal
  integrity: provide a hook to load keys when rootfs is ready
  ima: load x509 certificate from the kernel
  integrity: provide a function to load x509 certificate from the kernel
  integrity: define a new function integrity_read_file()
  Security: smack: replace kzalloc with kmem_cache for inode_smack
  Smack: Lock mode for the floor and hat labels
  ima: added support for new kernel cmdline parameter ima_template_fmt
  ima: allocate field pointers array on demand in template_desc_init_fields()
  ima: don't allocate a copy of template_fmt in template_desc_init_fields()
  ima: display template format in meas. list if template name length is zero
  ima: added error messages to template-related functions
  ima: use atomic bit operations to protect policy update interface
  ima: ignore empty and with whitespaces policy lines
  ima: no need to allocate entry for comment
  ima: report policy load status
  ima: use path names cache
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: check xattr value length and type in evm_inode_setxattr()</title>
<updated>2014-10-28T14:06:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>d.kasatkin@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-10-28T12:28:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=3b1deef6b1289a99505858a3b212c5b50adf0c2f'/>
<id>3b1deef6b1289a99505858a3b212c5b50adf0c2f</id>
<content type='text'>
evm_inode_setxattr() can be called with no value. The function does not
check the length so that following command can be used to produce the
kernel oops: setfattr -n security.evm FOO. This patch fixes it.

Changes in v3:
* there is no reason to return different error codes for EVM_XATTR_HMAC
  and non EVM_XATTR_HMAC. Remove unnecessary test then.

Changes in v2:
* testing for validity of xattr type

[ 1106.396921] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)
[ 1106.398192] IP: [&lt;ffffffff812af7b8&gt;] evm_inode_setxattr+0x2a/0x48
[ 1106.399244] PGD 29048067 PUD 290d7067 PMD 0
[ 1106.399953] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 1106.400020] Modules linked in: bridge stp llc evdev serio_raw i2c_piix4 button fuse
[ 1106.400020] CPU: 0 PID: 3635 Comm: setxattr Not tainted 3.16.0-kds+ #2936
[ 1106.400020] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[ 1106.400020] task: ffff8800291a0000 ti: ffff88002917c000 task.ti: ffff88002917c000
[ 1106.400020] RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff812af7b8&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffff812af7b8&gt;] evm_inode_setxattr+0x2a/0x48
[ 1106.400020] RSP: 0018:ffff88002917fd50  EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 1106.400020] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88002917fdf8 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 1106.400020] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff818136d3 RDI: ffff88002917fdf8
[ 1106.400020] RBP: ffff88002917fd68 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000003ec1df
[ 1106.400020] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8800438a0a00
[ 1106.400020] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 1106.400020] FS:  00007f7dfa7d7740(0000) GS:ffff88005da00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 1106.400020] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 1106.400020] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000003763e000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 1106.400020] Stack:
[ 1106.400020]  ffff8800438a0a00 ffff88002917fdf8 0000000000000000 ffff88002917fd98
[ 1106.400020]  ffffffff812a1030 ffff8800438a0a00 ffff88002917fdf8 0000000000000000
[ 1106.400020]  0000000000000000 ffff88002917fde0 ffffffff8116d08a ffff88002917fdc8
[ 1106.400020] Call Trace:
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff812a1030&gt;] security_inode_setxattr+0x5d/0x6a
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff8116d08a&gt;] vfs_setxattr+0x6b/0x9f
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff8116d1e0&gt;] setxattr+0x122/0x16c
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff811687e8&gt;] ? mnt_want_write+0x21/0x45
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff8114d011&gt;] ? __sb_start_write+0x10f/0x143
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff811687e8&gt;] ? mnt_want_write+0x21/0x45
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff811687c0&gt;] ? __mnt_want_write+0x48/0x4f
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff8116d3e6&gt;] SyS_setxattr+0x6e/0xb0
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff81529da9&gt;] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 1106.400020] Code: c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 55 49 89 d5 41 54 49 89 fc 53 48 89 f3 48 c7 c6 d3 36 81 81 48 89 df e8 18 22 04 00 85 c0 75 07 &lt;41&gt; 80 7d 00 02 74 0d 48 89 de 4c 89 e7 e8 5a fe ff ff eb 03 83
[ 1106.400020] RIP  [&lt;ffffffff812af7b8&gt;] evm_inode_setxattr+0x2a/0x48
[ 1106.400020]  RSP &lt;ffff88002917fd50&gt;
[ 1106.400020] CR2: 0000000000000000
[ 1106.428061] ---[ end trace ae08331628ba3050 ]---

Reported-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
evm_inode_setxattr() can be called with no value. The function does not
check the length so that following command can be used to produce the
kernel oops: setfattr -n security.evm FOO. This patch fixes it.

Changes in v3:
* there is no reason to return different error codes for EVM_XATTR_HMAC
  and non EVM_XATTR_HMAC. Remove unnecessary test then.

Changes in v2:
* testing for validity of xattr type

[ 1106.396921] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)
[ 1106.398192] IP: [&lt;ffffffff812af7b8&gt;] evm_inode_setxattr+0x2a/0x48
[ 1106.399244] PGD 29048067 PUD 290d7067 PMD 0
[ 1106.399953] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 1106.400020] Modules linked in: bridge stp llc evdev serio_raw i2c_piix4 button fuse
[ 1106.400020] CPU: 0 PID: 3635 Comm: setxattr Not tainted 3.16.0-kds+ #2936
[ 1106.400020] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[ 1106.400020] task: ffff8800291a0000 ti: ffff88002917c000 task.ti: ffff88002917c000
[ 1106.400020] RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff812af7b8&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffff812af7b8&gt;] evm_inode_setxattr+0x2a/0x48
[ 1106.400020] RSP: 0018:ffff88002917fd50  EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 1106.400020] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88002917fdf8 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 1106.400020] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff818136d3 RDI: ffff88002917fdf8
[ 1106.400020] RBP: ffff88002917fd68 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000003ec1df
[ 1106.400020] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8800438a0a00
[ 1106.400020] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 1106.400020] FS:  00007f7dfa7d7740(0000) GS:ffff88005da00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 1106.400020] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 1106.400020] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000003763e000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 1106.400020] Stack:
[ 1106.400020]  ffff8800438a0a00 ffff88002917fdf8 0000000000000000 ffff88002917fd98
[ 1106.400020]  ffffffff812a1030 ffff8800438a0a00 ffff88002917fdf8 0000000000000000
[ 1106.400020]  0000000000000000 ffff88002917fde0 ffffffff8116d08a ffff88002917fdc8
[ 1106.400020] Call Trace:
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff812a1030&gt;] security_inode_setxattr+0x5d/0x6a
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff8116d08a&gt;] vfs_setxattr+0x6b/0x9f
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff8116d1e0&gt;] setxattr+0x122/0x16c
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff811687e8&gt;] ? mnt_want_write+0x21/0x45
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff8114d011&gt;] ? __sb_start_write+0x10f/0x143
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff811687e8&gt;] ? mnt_want_write+0x21/0x45
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff811687c0&gt;] ? __mnt_want_write+0x48/0x4f
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff8116d3e6&gt;] SyS_setxattr+0x6e/0xb0
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff81529da9&gt;] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 1106.400020] Code: c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 55 49 89 d5 41 54 49 89 fc 53 48 89 f3 48 c7 c6 d3 36 81 81 48 89 df e8 18 22 04 00 85 c0 75 07 &lt;41&gt; 80 7d 00 02 74 0d 48 89 de 4c 89 e7 e8 5a fe ff ff eb 03 83
[ 1106.400020] RIP  [&lt;ffffffff812af7b8&gt;] evm_inode_setxattr+0x2a/0x48
[ 1106.400020]  RSP &lt;ffff88002917fd50&gt;
[ 1106.400020] CR2: 0000000000000000
[ 1106.428061] ---[ end trace ae08331628ba3050 ]---

Reported-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: skip replacing EVM signature with HMAC on read-only filesystem</title>
<updated>2014-10-07T18:32:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-10-01T18:43:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c2baec7ffaf6a2c15e03028ed9ef82a92cc49a94'/>
<id>c2baec7ffaf6a2c15e03028ed9ef82a92cc49a94</id>
<content type='text'>
If filesystem is mounted read-only or file is immutable, updating
xattr will fail. This is a usual case during early boot until
filesystem is remount read-write. This patch verifies conditions
to skip unnecessary attempt to calculate HMAC and set xattr.

Changes in v2:
* indention changed according to Lindent (requested by Mimi)

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
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<pre>
If filesystem is mounted read-only or file is immutable, updating
xattr will fail. This is a usual case during early boot until
filesystem is remount read-write. This patch verifies conditions
to skip unnecessary attempt to calculate HMAC and set xattr.

Changes in v2:
* indention changed according to Lindent (requested by Mimi)

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>integrity: base integrity subsystem kconfig options on integrity</title>
<updated>2014-09-09T14:28:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>d.kasatkin@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-04-17T12:07:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=7ef84e65ecc60289281e8e7e83a8bb6a97d7df5c'/>
<id>7ef84e65ecc60289281e8e7e83a8bb6a97d7df5c</id>
<content type='text'>
The integrity subsystem has lots of options and takes more than
half of the security menu.  This patch consolidates the options
under "integrity", which are hidden if not enabled.  This change
does not affect existing configurations.  Re-configuration is not
needed.

Changes v4:
- no need to change "integrity subsystem" to menuconfig as
options are hidden, when not enabled. (Mimi)
- add INTEGRITY Kconfig help description

Changes v3:
- dependency to INTEGRITY removed when behind 'if INTEGRITY'

Changes v2:
- previous patch moved integrity out of the 'security' menu.
  This version keeps integrity as a security option (Mimi).

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The integrity subsystem has lots of options and takes more than
half of the security menu.  This patch consolidates the options
under "integrity", which are hidden if not enabled.  This change
does not affect existing configurations.  Re-configuration is not
needed.

Changes v4:
- no need to change "integrity subsystem" to menuconfig as
options are hidden, when not enabled. (Mimi)
- add INTEGRITY Kconfig help description

Changes v3:
- dependency to INTEGRITY removed when behind 'if INTEGRITY'

Changes v2:
- previous patch moved integrity out of the 'security' menu.
  This version keeps integrity as a security option (Mimi).

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
