<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/security/integrity/iint.c, branch v5.0</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>security: audit and remove any unnecessary uses of module.h</title>
<updated>2018-12-12T22:58:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Gortmaker</name>
<email>paul.gortmaker@windriver.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-09T20:36:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=876979c9308b7228cdaf6785909c57eebc85d911'/>
<id>876979c9308b7228cdaf6785909c57eebc85d911</id>
<content type='text'>
Historically a lot of these existed because we did not have
a distinction between what was modular code and what was providing
support to modules via EXPORT_SYMBOL and friends.  That changed
when we forked out support for the latter into the export.h file.
This means we should be able to reduce the usage of module.h
in code that is obj-y Makefile or bool Kconfig.

The advantage in removing such instances is that module.h itself
sources about 15 other headers; adding significantly to what we feed
cpp, and it can obscure what headers we are effectively using.

Since module.h might have been the implicit source for init.h
(for __init) and for export.h (for EXPORT_SYMBOL) we consider each
instance for the presence of either and replace as needed.

Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Cc: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Historically a lot of these existed because we did not have
a distinction between what was modular code and what was providing
support to modules via EXPORT_SYMBOL and friends.  That changed
when we forked out support for the latter into the export.h file.
This means we should be able to reduce the usage of module.h
in code that is obj-y Makefile or bool Kconfig.

The advantage in removing such instances is that module.h itself
sources about 15 other headers; adding significantly to what we feed
cpp, and it can obscure what headers we are effectively using.

Since module.h might have been the implicit source for init.h
(for __init) and for export.h (for EXPORT_SYMBOL) we consider each
instance for the presence of either and replace as needed.

Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Cc: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info</title>
<updated>2018-10-11T03:40:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-11T00:18:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=07aed2f2af5a5892ced035dbcf3993f630825fc3'/>
<id>07aed2f2af5a5892ced035dbcf3993f630825fc3</id>
<content type='text'>
In preparation for making LSM selections outside of the LSMs, include
the name of LSMs in struct lsm_info.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
In preparation for making LSM selections outside of the LSMs, include
the name of LSMs in struct lsm_info.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM()</title>
<updated>2018-10-11T03:40:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-11T00:18:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=3d6e5f6dcf6561e57b6466e43e14029fb196028d'/>
<id>3d6e5f6dcf6561e57b6466e43e14029fb196028d</id>
<content type='text'>
Instead of using argument-based initializers, switch to defining the
contents of struct lsm_info on a per-LSM basis. This also drops
the final use of the now inaccurate "initcall" naming.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Instead of using argument-based initializers, switch to defining the
contents of struct lsm_info on a per-LSM basis. This also drops
the final use of the now inaccurate "initcall" naming.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info</title>
<updated>2018-10-11T03:40:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-11T00:18:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=5b89c1bd4c7e5c5ca8c5374fde35ecee6e16496c'/>
<id>5b89c1bd4c7e5c5ca8c5374fde35ecee6e16496c</id>
<content type='text'>
In preparation for doing more interesting LSM init probing, this converts
the existing initcall system into an explicit call into a function pointer
from a section-collected struct lsm_info array.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
In preparation for doing more interesting LSM init probing, this converts
the existing initcall system into an explicit call into a function pointer
from a section-collected struct lsm_info array.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>integrity: silence warning when CONFIG_SECURITYFS is not enabled</title>
<updated>2018-07-18T11:27:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sudeep Holla</name>
<email>sudeep.holla@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-05T10:25:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ac2409a521f7ec5978fd582567398d19f4a2fdbd'/>
<id>ac2409a521f7ec5978fd582567398d19f4a2fdbd</id>
<content type='text'>
When CONFIG_SECURITYFS is not enabled, securityfs_create_dir returns
-ENODEV which throws the following error:
	"Unable to create integrity sysfs dir: -19"

However, if the feature is disabled, it can't be warning and hence
we need to silence the error. This patch checks for the error -ENODEV
which is returned when CONFIG_SECURITYFS is disabled to stop the error
being thrown.

Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla &lt;sudeep.holla@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Matthew Garrett &lt;mjg59@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When CONFIG_SECURITYFS is not enabled, securityfs_create_dir returns
-ENODEV which throws the following error:
	"Unable to create integrity sysfs dir: -19"

However, if the feature is disabled, it can't be warning and hence
we need to silence the error. This patch checks for the error -ENODEV
which is returned when CONFIG_SECURITYFS is disabled to stop the error
being thrown.

Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla &lt;sudeep.holla@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Matthew Garrett &lt;mjg59@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>integrity: Add an integrity directory in securityfs</title>
<updated>2018-05-17T12:03:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Matthew Garrett</name>
<email>mjg59@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-11T23:12:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=0c343af8065be5ceb0c03a876af7c513e960e2ff'/>
<id>0c343af8065be5ceb0c03a876af7c513e960e2ff</id>
<content type='text'>
We want to add additional evm control nodes, and it'd be preferable not
to clutter up the securityfs root directory any further. Create a new
integrity directory, move the ima directory into it, create an evm
directory for the evm attribute and add compatibility symlinks.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett &lt;mjg59@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
We want to add additional evm control nodes, and it'd be preferable not
to clutter up the securityfs root directory any further. Create a new
integrity directory, move the ima directory into it, create an evm
directory for the evm attribute and add compatibility symlinks.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett &lt;mjg59@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IMA: Support using new creds in appraisal policy</title>
<updated>2018-03-23T10:31:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Matthew Garrett</name>
<email>mjg59@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-08T21:36:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=d906c10d8a31654cb9167c9a2ebc7d3e43820bad'/>
<id>d906c10d8a31654cb9167c9a2ebc7d3e43820bad</id>
<content type='text'>
The existing BPRM_CHECK functionality in IMA validates against the
credentials of the existing process, not any new credentials that the
child process may transition to. Add an additional CREDS_CHECK target
and refactor IMA to pass the appropriate creds structure. In
ima_bprm_check(), check with both the existing process credentials and
the credentials that will be committed when the new process is started.
This will not change behaviour unless the system policy is extended to
include CREDS_CHECK targets - BPRM_CHECK will continue to check the same
credentials that it did previously.

After this patch, an IMA policy rule along the lines of:

measure func=CREDS_CHECK subj_type=unconfined_t

will trigger if a process is executed and runs as unconfined_t, ignoring
the context of the parent process. This is in contrast to:

measure func=BPRM_CHECK subj_type=unconfined_t

which will trigger if the process that calls exec() is already executing
in unconfined_t, ignoring the context that the child process executes
into.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett &lt;mjg59@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;

Changelog:
- initialize ima_creds_status
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The existing BPRM_CHECK functionality in IMA validates against the
credentials of the existing process, not any new credentials that the
child process may transition to. Add an additional CREDS_CHECK target
and refactor IMA to pass the appropriate creds structure. In
ima_bprm_check(), check with both the existing process credentials and
the credentials that will be committed when the new process is started.
This will not change behaviour unless the system policy is extended to
include CREDS_CHECK targets - BPRM_CHECK will continue to check the same
credentials that it did previously.

After this patch, an IMA policy rule along the lines of:

measure func=CREDS_CHECK subj_type=unconfined_t

will trigger if a process is executed and runs as unconfined_t, ignoring
the context of the parent process. This is in contrast to:

measure func=BPRM_CHECK subj_type=unconfined_t

which will trigger if the process that calls exec() is already executing
in unconfined_t, ignoring the context that the child process executes
into.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett &lt;mjg59@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;

Changelog:
- initialize ima_creds_status
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: re-initialize iint-&gt;atomic_flags</title>
<updated>2018-02-02T10:03:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-23T15:00:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e2598077dc6a26c9644393e5c21f22a90dbdccdb'/>
<id>e2598077dc6a26c9644393e5c21f22a90dbdccdb</id>
<content type='text'>
Intermittently security.ima is not being written for new files.  This
patch re-initializes the new slab iint-&gt;atomic_flags field before
freeing it.

Fixes: commit 0d73a55208e9 ("ima: re-introduce own integrity cache lock")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Intermittently security.ima is not being written for new files.  This
patch re-initializes the new slab iint-&gt;atomic_flags field before
freeing it.

Fixes: commit 0d73a55208e9 ("ima: re-introduce own integrity cache lock")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>integrity: remove unneeded initializations in integrity_iint_cache entries</title>
<updated>2017-12-18T14:43:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeff Layton</name>
<email>jlayton@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-06T14:54:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=02c324a55ed9ee4d790eaa9ac8e7cdecbe3e0a22'/>
<id>02c324a55ed9ee4d790eaa9ac8e7cdecbe3e0a22</id>
<content type='text'>
The init_once routine memsets the whole object to 0, and then
explicitly sets some of the fields to 0 again. Just remove the explicit
initializations.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The init_once routine memsets the whole object to 0, and then
explicitly sets some of the fields to 0 again. Just remove the explicit
initializations.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: re-introduce own integrity cache lock</title>
<updated>2017-12-11T22:20:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-12-05T19:06:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=0d73a55208e94fc9fb6deaeea61438cd3280d4c0'/>
<id>0d73a55208e94fc9fb6deaeea61438cd3280d4c0</id>
<content type='text'>
Before IMA appraisal was introduced, IMA was using own integrity cache
lock along with i_mutex. process_measurement and ima_file_free took
the iint-&gt;mutex first and then the i_mutex, while setxattr, chmod and
chown took the locks in reverse order. To resolve the potential deadlock,
i_mutex was moved to protect entire IMA functionality and the redundant
iint-&gt;mutex was eliminated.

Solution was based on the assumption that filesystem code does not take
i_mutex further. But when file is opened with O_DIRECT flag, direct-io
implementation takes i_mutex and produces deadlock. Furthermore, certain
other filesystem operations, such as llseek, also take i_mutex.

More recently some filesystems have replaced their filesystem specific
lock with the global i_rwsem to read a file.  As a result, when IMA
attempts to calculate the file hash, reading the file attempts to take
the i_rwsem again.

To resolve O_DIRECT related deadlock problem, this patch re-introduces
iint-&gt;mutex. But to eliminate the original chmod() related deadlock
problem, this patch eliminates the requirement for chmod hooks to take
the iint-&gt;mutex by introducing additional atomic iint-&gt;attr_flags to
indicate calling of the hooks. The allowed locking order is to take
the iint-&gt;mutex first and then the i_rwsem.

Original flags were cleared in chmod(), setxattr() or removwxattr()
hooks and tested when file was closed or opened again. New atomic flags
are set or cleared in those hooks and tested to clear iint-&gt;flags on
close or on open.

Atomic flags are following:
* IMA_CHANGE_ATTR - indicates that chATTR() was called (chmod, chown,
  chgrp) and file attributes have changed. On file open, it causes IMA
  to clear iint-&gt;flags to re-evaluate policy and perform IMA functions
  again.
* IMA_CHANGE_XATTR - indicates that setxattr or removexattr was called
  and extended attributes have changed. On file open, it causes IMA to
  clear iint-&gt;flags IMA_DONE_MASK to re-appraise.
* IMA_UPDATE_XATTR - indicates that security.ima needs to be updated.
  It is cleared if file policy changes and no update is needed.
* IMA_DIGSIG - indicates that file security.ima has signature and file
  security.ima must not update to file has on file close.
* IMA_MUST_MEASURE - indicates the file is in the measurement policy.

Fixes: Commit 6552321831dc ("xfs: remove i_iolock and use i_rwsem in
the VFS inode instead")

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Before IMA appraisal was introduced, IMA was using own integrity cache
lock along with i_mutex. process_measurement and ima_file_free took
the iint-&gt;mutex first and then the i_mutex, while setxattr, chmod and
chown took the locks in reverse order. To resolve the potential deadlock,
i_mutex was moved to protect entire IMA functionality and the redundant
iint-&gt;mutex was eliminated.

Solution was based on the assumption that filesystem code does not take
i_mutex further. But when file is opened with O_DIRECT flag, direct-io
implementation takes i_mutex and produces deadlock. Furthermore, certain
other filesystem operations, such as llseek, also take i_mutex.

More recently some filesystems have replaced their filesystem specific
lock with the global i_rwsem to read a file.  As a result, when IMA
attempts to calculate the file hash, reading the file attempts to take
the i_rwsem again.

To resolve O_DIRECT related deadlock problem, this patch re-introduces
iint-&gt;mutex. But to eliminate the original chmod() related deadlock
problem, this patch eliminates the requirement for chmod hooks to take
the iint-&gt;mutex by introducing additional atomic iint-&gt;attr_flags to
indicate calling of the hooks. The allowed locking order is to take
the iint-&gt;mutex first and then the i_rwsem.

Original flags were cleared in chmod(), setxattr() or removwxattr()
hooks and tested when file was closed or opened again. New atomic flags
are set or cleared in those hooks and tested to clear iint-&gt;flags on
close or on open.

Atomic flags are following:
* IMA_CHANGE_ATTR - indicates that chATTR() was called (chmod, chown,
  chgrp) and file attributes have changed. On file open, it causes IMA
  to clear iint-&gt;flags to re-evaluate policy and perform IMA functions
  again.
* IMA_CHANGE_XATTR - indicates that setxattr or removexattr was called
  and extended attributes have changed. On file open, it causes IMA to
  clear iint-&gt;flags IMA_DONE_MASK to re-appraise.
* IMA_UPDATE_XATTR - indicates that security.ima needs to be updated.
  It is cleared if file policy changes and no update is needed.
* IMA_DIGSIG - indicates that file security.ima has signature and file
  security.ima must not update to file has on file close.
* IMA_MUST_MEASURE - indicates the file is in the measurement policy.

Fixes: Commit 6552321831dc ("xfs: remove i_iolock and use i_rwsem in
the VFS inode instead")

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
