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<title>linux-toradex.git/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c, branch v4.16</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security</title>
<updated>2018-01-31T21:07:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-31T21:07:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=3c29548f87f9545f2f3c1cd1a784fae8ad2d53ba'/>
<id>3c29548f87f9545f2f3c1cd1a784fae8ad2d53ba</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
 "This contains a mixture of bug fixes, code cleanup, and new
  functionality. Of note is the integrity cache locking fix, file change
  detection, and support for a new EVM portable and immutable signature
  type.

  The re-introduction of the integrity cache lock (iint) fixes the
  problem of attempting to take the i_rwsem shared a second time, when
  it was previously taken exclusively. Defining atomic flags resolves
  the original iint/i_rwsem circular locking - accessing the file data
  vs. modifying the file metadata. Although it fixes the O_DIRECT
  problem as well, a subsequent patch is needed to remove the explicit
  O_DIRECT prevention.

  For performance reasons, detecting when a file has changed and needs
  to be re-measured, re-appraised, and/or re-audited, was limited to
  after the last writer has closed, and only if the file data has
  changed. Detecting file change is based on i_version. For filesystems
  that do not support i_version, remote filesystems, or userspace
  filesystems, the file was measured, appraised and/or audited once and
  never re-evaluated. Now local filesystems, which do not support
  i_version or are not mounted with the i_version option, assume the
  file has changed and are required to re-evaluate the file. This change
  does not address detecting file change on remote or userspace
  filesystems.

  Unlike file data signatures, which can be included and distributed in
  software packages (eg. rpm, deb), the existing EVM signature, which
  protects the file metadata, could not be included in software
  packages, as it includes file system specific information (eg. i_ino,
  possibly the UUID). This pull request defines a new EVM portable and
  immutable file metadata signature format, which can be included in
  software packages"

* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  ima/policy: fix parsing of fsuuid
  ima: Use i_version only when filesystem supports it
  integrity: remove unneeded initializations in integrity_iint_cache entries
  ima: log message to module appraisal error
  ima: pass filename to ima_rdwr_violation_check()
  ima: Fix line continuation format
  ima: support new "hash" and "dont_hash" policy actions
  ima: re-introduce own integrity cache lock
  EVM: Add support for portable signature format
  EVM: Allow userland to permit modification of EVM-protected metadata
  ima: relax requiring a file signature for new files with zero length
</content>
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<pre>
Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
 "This contains a mixture of bug fixes, code cleanup, and new
  functionality. Of note is the integrity cache locking fix, file change
  detection, and support for a new EVM portable and immutable signature
  type.

  The re-introduction of the integrity cache lock (iint) fixes the
  problem of attempting to take the i_rwsem shared a second time, when
  it was previously taken exclusively. Defining atomic flags resolves
  the original iint/i_rwsem circular locking - accessing the file data
  vs. modifying the file metadata. Although it fixes the O_DIRECT
  problem as well, a subsequent patch is needed to remove the explicit
  O_DIRECT prevention.

  For performance reasons, detecting when a file has changed and needs
  to be re-measured, re-appraised, and/or re-audited, was limited to
  after the last writer has closed, and only if the file data has
  changed. Detecting file change is based on i_version. For filesystems
  that do not support i_version, remote filesystems, or userspace
  filesystems, the file was measured, appraised and/or audited once and
  never re-evaluated. Now local filesystems, which do not support
  i_version or are not mounted with the i_version option, assume the
  file has changed and are required to re-evaluate the file. This change
  does not address detecting file change on remote or userspace
  filesystems.

  Unlike file data signatures, which can be included and distributed in
  software packages (eg. rpm, deb), the existing EVM signature, which
  protects the file metadata, could not be included in software
  packages, as it includes file system specific information (eg. i_ino,
  possibly the UUID). This pull request defines a new EVM portable and
  immutable file metadata signature format, which can be included in
  software packages"

* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  ima/policy: fix parsing of fsuuid
  ima: Use i_version only when filesystem supports it
  integrity: remove unneeded initializations in integrity_iint_cache entries
  ima: log message to module appraisal error
  ima: pass filename to ima_rdwr_violation_check()
  ima: Fix line continuation format
  ima: support new "hash" and "dont_hash" policy actions
  ima: re-introduce own integrity cache lock
  EVM: Add support for portable signature format
  EVM: Allow userland to permit modification of EVM-protected metadata
  ima: relax requiring a file signature for new files with zero length
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IMA: switch IMA over to new i_version API</title>
<updated>2018-01-29T11:42:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeff Layton</name>
<email>jlayton@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-12-11T11:35:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=3b370b215f4b45c0be87d7a15b0d0e2e8b238aee'/>
<id>3b370b215f4b45c0be87d7a15b0d0e2e8b238aee</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
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<pre>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: support new "hash" and "dont_hash" policy actions</title>
<updated>2017-12-18T14:43:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-09-29T14:04:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=da1b0029f527a9b4204e90ba6f14ee139fd76f9e'/>
<id>da1b0029f527a9b4204e90ba6f14ee139fd76f9e</id>
<content type='text'>
The builtin ima_appraise_tcb policy, which is specified on the boot
command line, can be replaced with a custom policy, normally early in
the boot process.  Custom policies can be more restrictive in some ways,
like requiring file signatures, but can be less restrictive in other
ways, like not appraising mutable files.  With a less restrictive policy
in place, files in the builtin policy might not be hashed and labeled
with a security.ima hash.  On reboot, files which should be labeled in
the ima_appraise_tcb are not labeled, possibly preventing the system
from booting properly.

To resolve this problem, this patch extends the existing IMA policy
actions "measure", "dont_measure", "appraise", "dont_appraise", and
"audit" with "hash" and "dont_hash".  The new "hash" action will write
the file hash as security.ima, but without requiring the file to be
appraised as well.

For example, the builtin ima_appraise_tcb policy includes the rule,
"appraise fowner=0".  Adding the "hash fowner=0" rule to a custom
policy, will cause the needed file hashes to be calculated and written
as security.ima xattrs.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The builtin ima_appraise_tcb policy, which is specified on the boot
command line, can be replaced with a custom policy, normally early in
the boot process.  Custom policies can be more restrictive in some ways,
like requiring file signatures, but can be less restrictive in other
ways, like not appraising mutable files.  With a less restrictive policy
in place, files in the builtin policy might not be hashed and labeled
with a security.ima hash.  On reboot, files which should be labeled in
the ima_appraise_tcb are not labeled, possibly preventing the system
from booting properly.

To resolve this problem, this patch extends the existing IMA policy
actions "measure", "dont_measure", "appraise", "dont_appraise", and
"audit" with "hash" and "dont_hash".  The new "hash" action will write
the file hash as security.ima, but without requiring the file to be
appraised as well.

For example, the builtin ima_appraise_tcb policy includes the rule,
"appraise fowner=0".  Adding the "hash fowner=0" rule to a custom
policy, will cause the needed file hashes to be calculated and written
as security.ima xattrs.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: always measure and audit files in policy</title>
<updated>2017-11-08T20:16:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-18T03:56:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=f3cc6b25dcc5616f0d5c720009b2ac66f97df2ff'/>
<id>f3cc6b25dcc5616f0d5c720009b2ac66f97df2ff</id>
<content type='text'>
All files matching a "measure" rule must be included in the IMA
measurement list, even when the file hash cannot be calculated.
Similarly, all files matching an "audit" rule must be audited, even when
the file hash can not be calculated.

The file data hash field contained in the IMA measurement list template
data will contain 0's instead of the actual file hash digest.

Note:
In general, adding, deleting or in anyway changing which files are
included in the IMA measurement list is not a good idea, as it might
result in not being able to unseal trusted keys sealed to a specific
TPM PCR value.  This patch not only adds file measurements that were
not previously measured, but specifies that the file hash value for
these files will be 0's.

As the IMA measurement list ordering is not consistent from one boot
to the next, it is unlikely that anyone is sealing keys based on the
IMA measurement list.  Remote attestation servers should be able to
process these new measurement records, but might complain about
these unknown records.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
All files matching a "measure" rule must be included in the IMA
measurement list, even when the file hash cannot be calculated.
Similarly, all files matching an "audit" rule must be audited, even when
the file hash can not be calculated.

The file data hash field contained in the IMA measurement list template
data will contain 0's instead of the actual file hash digest.

Note:
In general, adding, deleting or in anyway changing which files are
included in the IMA measurement list is not a good idea, as it might
result in not being able to unseal trusted keys sealed to a specific
TPM PCR value.  This patch not only adds file measurements that were
not previously measured, but specifies that the file hash value for
these files will be 0's.

As the IMA measurement list ordering is not consistent from one boot
to the next, it is unlikely that anyone is sealing keys based on the
IMA measurement list.  Remote attestation servers should be able to
process these new measurement records, but might complain about
these unknown records.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: allow to check MAY_APPEND</title>
<updated>2017-01-27T19:17:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Lans Zhang</name>
<email>jia.zhang@windriver.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-01-06T04:38:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=20f482ab9e0f800d1e01ce748ebd382d085abe56'/>
<id>20f482ab9e0f800d1e01ce748ebd382d085abe56</id>
<content type='text'>
Otherwise some mask and inmask tokens with MAY_APPEND flag may not work
as expected.

Signed-off-by: Lans Zhang &lt;jia.zhang@windriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Otherwise some mask and inmask tokens with MAY_APPEND flag may not work
as expected.

Signed-off-by: Lans Zhang &lt;jia.zhang@windriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: fix ima_d_path() possible race with rename</title>
<updated>2017-01-27T19:16:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-01-17T11:45:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=bc15ed663e7e53ee4dc3e60f8d09c93a0528c694'/>
<id>bc15ed663e7e53ee4dc3e60f8d09c93a0528c694</id>
<content type='text'>
On failure to return a pathname from ima_d_path(), a pointer to
dname is returned, which is subsequently used in the IMA measurement
list, the IMA audit records, and other audit logging.  Saving the
pointer to dname for later use has the potential to race with rename.

Intead of returning a pointer to dname on failure, this patch returns
a pointer to a copy of the filename.

Reported-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
</content>
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<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
On failure to return a pathname from ima_d_path(), a pointer to
dname is returned, which is subsequently used in the IMA measurement
list, the IMA audit records, and other audit logging.  Saving the
pointer to dname for later use has the potential to race with rename.

Intead of returning a pointer to dname on failure, this patch returns
a pointer to a copy of the filename.

Reported-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: change integrity cache to store measured pcr</title>
<updated>2016-06-30T05:14:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Richter</name>
<email>erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-06-01T18:14:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=a422638d492a35316e3fd9bb31bfc9769b249bca'/>
<id>a422638d492a35316e3fd9bb31bfc9769b249bca</id>
<content type='text'>
IMA avoids re-measuring files by storing the current state as a flag in
the integrity cache. It will then skip adding a new measurement log entry
if the cache reports the file as already measured.

If a policy measures an already measured file to a new PCR, the measurement
will not be added to the list. This patch implements a new bitfield for
specifying which PCR the file was measured into, rather than if it was
measured.

Signed-off-by: Eric Richter &lt;erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
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<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
IMA avoids re-measuring files by storing the current state as a flag in
the integrity cache. It will then skip adding a new measurement log entry
if the cache reports the file as already measured.

If a policy measures an already measured file to a new PCR, the measurement
will not be added to the list. This patch implements a new bitfield for
specifying which PCR the file was measured into, rather than if it was
measured.

Signed-off-by: Eric Richter &lt;erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: include pcr for each measurement log entry</title>
<updated>2016-06-30T05:14:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Richter</name>
<email>erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-06-01T18:14:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=14b1da85bbe9a59c5e01123a06dea4c4758a6db9'/>
<id>14b1da85bbe9a59c5e01123a06dea4c4758a6db9</id>
<content type='text'>
The IMA measurement list entries include the Kconfig defined PCR value.
This patch defines a new ima_template_entry field for including the PCR
as specified in the policy rule.

Signed-off-by: Eric Richter &lt;erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The IMA measurement list entries include the Kconfig defined PCR value.
This patch defines a new ima_template_entry field for including the PCR
as specified in the policy rule.

Signed-off-by: Eric Richter &lt;erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: extend ima_get_action() to return the policy pcr</title>
<updated>2016-06-30T05:14:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Richter</name>
<email>erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-06-01T18:14:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=725de7fabb9fe4ca388c780ad4644352f2f06ccc'/>
<id>725de7fabb9fe4ca388c780ad4644352f2f06ccc</id>
<content type='text'>
Different policy rules may extend different PCRs. This patch retrieves
the specific PCR for the matched rule.  Subsequent patches will include
the rule specific PCR in the measurement list and extend the appropriate
PCR.

Signed-off-by: Eric Richter &lt;erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Different policy rules may extend different PCRs. This patch retrieves
the specific PCR for the matched rule.  Subsequent patches will include
the rule specific PCR in the measurement list and extend the appropriate
PCR.

Signed-off-by: Eric Richter &lt;erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>constify ima_d_path()</title>
<updated>2016-03-28T04:47:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2016-03-25T19:33:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=81cd8896a64cc34bd59f097fa619b11ab40ca7a6'/>
<id>81cd8896a64cc34bd59f097fa619b11ab40ca7a6</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
