<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/security/integrity, branch v5.19</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>lockdown: Fix kexec lockdown bypass with ima policy</title>
<updated>2022-07-20T16:56:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Snowberg</name>
<email>eric.snowberg@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-07-20T16:40:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=543ce63b664e2c2f9533d089a4664b559c3e6b5b'/>
<id>543ce63b664e2c2f9533d089a4664b559c3e6b5b</id>
<content type='text'>
The lockdown LSM is primarily used in conjunction with UEFI Secure Boot.
This LSM may also be used on machines without UEFI.  It can also be
enabled when UEFI Secure Boot is disabled.  One of lockdown's features
is to prevent kexec from loading untrusted kernels.  Lockdown can be
enabled through a bootparam or after the kernel has booted through
securityfs.

If IMA appraisal is used with the "ima_appraise=log" boot param,
lockdown can be defeated with kexec on any machine when Secure Boot is
disabled or unavailable.  IMA prevents setting "ima_appraise=log" from
the boot param when Secure Boot is enabled, but this does not cover
cases where lockdown is used without Secure Boot.

To defeat lockdown, boot without Secure Boot and add ima_appraise=log to
the kernel command line; then:

  $ echo "integrity" &gt; /sys/kernel/security/lockdown
  $ echo "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig" &gt; \
    /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
  $ kexec -ls unsigned-kernel

Add a call to verify ima appraisal is set to "enforce" whenever lockdown
is enabled.  This fixes CVE-2022-21505.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 29d3c1c8dfe7 ("kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down")
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg &lt;eric.snowberg@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: John Haxby &lt;john.haxby@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The lockdown LSM is primarily used in conjunction with UEFI Secure Boot.
This LSM may also be used on machines without UEFI.  It can also be
enabled when UEFI Secure Boot is disabled.  One of lockdown's features
is to prevent kexec from loading untrusted kernels.  Lockdown can be
enabled through a bootparam or after the kernel has booted through
securityfs.

If IMA appraisal is used with the "ima_appraise=log" boot param,
lockdown can be defeated with kexec on any machine when Secure Boot is
disabled or unavailable.  IMA prevents setting "ima_appraise=log" from
the boot param when Secure Boot is enabled, but this does not cover
cases where lockdown is used without Secure Boot.

To defeat lockdown, boot without Secure Boot and add ima_appraise=log to
the kernel command line; then:

  $ echo "integrity" &gt; /sys/kernel/security/lockdown
  $ echo "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig" &gt; \
    /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
  $ kexec -ls unsigned-kernel

Add a call to verify ima appraisal is set to "enforce" whenever lockdown
is enabled.  This fixes CVE-2022-21505.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 29d3c1c8dfe7 ("kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down")
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg &lt;eric.snowberg@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: John Haxby &lt;john.haxby@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: Fix potential memory leak in ima_init_crypto()</title>
<updated>2022-07-13T14:13:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jianglei Nie</name>
<email>niejianglei2021@163.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-07-12T01:10:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=067d2521874135267e681c19d42761c601d503d6'/>
<id>067d2521874135267e681c19d42761c601d503d6</id>
<content type='text'>
On failure to allocate the SHA1 tfm, IMA fails to initialize and exits
without freeing the ima_algo_array. Add the missing kfree() for
ima_algo_array to avoid the potential memory leak.

Signed-off-by: Jianglei Nie &lt;niejianglei2021@163.com&gt;
Fixes: 6d94809af6b0 ("ima: Allocate and initialize tfm for each PCR bank")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
On failure to allocate the SHA1 tfm, IMA fails to initialize and exits
without freeing the ima_algo_array. Add the missing kfree() for
ima_algo_array to avoid the potential memory leak.

Signed-off-by: Jianglei Nie &lt;niejianglei2021@163.com&gt;
Fixes: 6d94809af6b0 ("ima: Allocate and initialize tfm for each PCR bank")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: force signature verification when CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG is configured</title>
<updated>2022-07-13T14:13:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Coiby Xu</name>
<email>coxu@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-07-13T07:21:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=af16df54b89dee72df253abc5e7b5e8a6d16c11c'/>
<id>af16df54b89dee72df253abc5e7b5e8a6d16c11c</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently, an unsigned kernel could be kexec'ed when IMA arch specific
policy is configured unless lockdown is enabled. Enforce kernel
signature verification check in the kexec_file_load syscall when IMA
arch specific policy is configured.

Fixes: 99d5cadfde2b ("kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE")
Reported-and-suggested-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu &lt;coxu@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Currently, an unsigned kernel could be kexec'ed when IMA arch specific
policy is configured unless lockdown is enabled. Enforce kernel
signature verification check in the kexec_file_load syscall when IMA
arch specific policy is configured.

Fixes: 99d5cadfde2b ("kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE")
Reported-and-suggested-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu &lt;coxu@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: Fix a potential integer overflow in ima_appraise_measurement</title>
<updated>2022-07-07T15:50:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Huaxin Lu</name>
<email>luhuaxin1@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-07-05T05:14:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=d2ee2cfc4aa85ff6a2a3b198a3a524ec54e3d999'/>
<id>d2ee2cfc4aa85ff6a2a3b198a3a524ec54e3d999</id>
<content type='text'>
When the ima-modsig is enabled, the rc passed to evm_verifyxattr() may be
negative, which may cause the integer overflow problem.

Fixes: 39b07096364a ("ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures")
Signed-off-by: Huaxin Lu &lt;luhuaxin1@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When the ima-modsig is enabled, the rc passed to evm_verifyxattr() may be
negative, which may cause the integer overflow problem.

Fixes: 39b07096364a ("ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures")
Signed-off-by: Huaxin Lu &lt;luhuaxin1@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: fix violation measurement list record</title>
<updated>2022-07-07T02:31:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-06-30T15:23:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=9fab303a2cb3d323ca3a32a8b4ab60b451141901'/>
<id>9fab303a2cb3d323ca3a32a8b4ab60b451141901</id>
<content type='text'>
Although the violation digest in the IMA measurement list is always
zeroes, the size of the digest should be based on the hash algorithm.
Until recently the hash algorithm was hard coded to sha1.  Fix the
violation digest size included in the IMA measurement list.

This is just a cosmetic change which should not affect attestation.

Reported-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Fixes: 09091c44cb73 ("ima: use IMA default hash algorithm for integrity violations")
Tested-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Although the violation digest in the IMA measurement list is always
zeroes, the size of the digest should be based on the hash algorithm.
Until recently the hash algorithm was hard coded to sha1.  Fix the
violation digest size included in the IMA measurement list.

This is just a cosmetic change which should not affect attestation.

Reported-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Fixes: 09091c44cb73 ("ima: use IMA default hash algorithm for integrity violations")
Tested-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "evm: Fix memleak in init_desc"</title>
<updated>2022-06-15T18:03:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Xiu Jianfeng</name>
<email>xiujianfeng@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-27T11:17:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=51dd64bb99e4478fc5280171acd8e1b529eadaf7'/>
<id>51dd64bb99e4478fc5280171acd8e1b529eadaf7</id>
<content type='text'>
This reverts commit ccf11dbaa07b328fa469415c362d33459c140a37.

Commit ccf11dbaa07b ("evm: Fix memleak in init_desc") said there is
memleak in init_desc. That may be incorrect, as we can see, tmp_tfm is
saved in one of the two global variables hmac_tfm or evm_tfm[hash_algo],
then if init_desc is called next time, there is no need to alloc tfm
again, so in the error path of kmalloc desc or crypto_shash_init(desc),
It is not a problem without freeing tmp_tfm.

And also that commit did not reset the global variable to NULL after
freeing tmp_tfm and this makes *tfm a dangling pointer which may cause a
UAF issue.

Reported-by: Guozihua (Scott) &lt;guozihua@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng &lt;xiujianfeng@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This reverts commit ccf11dbaa07b328fa469415c362d33459c140a37.

Commit ccf11dbaa07b ("evm: Fix memleak in init_desc") said there is
memleak in init_desc. That may be incorrect, as we can see, tmp_tfm is
saved in one of the two global variables hmac_tfm or evm_tfm[hash_algo],
then if init_desc is called next time, there is no need to alloc tfm
again, so in the error path of kmalloc desc or crypto_shash_init(desc),
It is not a problem without freeing tmp_tfm.

And also that commit did not reset the global variable to NULL after
freeing tmp_tfm and this makes *tfm a dangling pointer which may cause a
UAF issue.

Reported-by: Guozihua (Scott) &lt;guozihua@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng &lt;xiujianfeng@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'integrity-v5.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity</title>
<updated>2022-05-24T20:50:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-24T20:50:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=0350785b0a092c99c5ddd2ace0260dbe7b3f919f'/>
<id>0350785b0a092c99c5ddd2ace0260dbe7b3f919f</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull IMA updates from Mimi Zohar:
 "New is IMA support for including fs-verity file digests and signatures
  in the IMA measurement list as well as verifying the fs-verity file
  digest based signatures, both based on policy.

  In addition, are two bug fixes:

   - avoid reading UEFI variables, which cause a page fault, on Apple
     Macs with T2 chips.

   - remove the original "ima" template Kconfig option to address a boot
     command line ordering issue.

  The rest is a mixture of code/documentation cleanup"

* tag 'integrity-v5.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
  integrity: Fix sparse warnings in keyring_handler
  evm: Clean up some variables
  evm: Return INTEGRITY_PASS for enum integrity_status value '0'
  efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
  fsverity: update the documentation
  ima: support fs-verity file digest based version 3 signatures
  ima: permit fsverity's file digests in the IMA measurement list
  ima: define a new template field named 'd-ngv2' and templates
  fs-verity: define a function to return the integrity protected file digest
  ima: use IMA default hash algorithm for integrity violations
  ima: fix 'd-ng' comments and documentation
  ima: remove the IMA_TEMPLATE Kconfig option
  ima: remove redundant initialization of pointer 'file'.
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull IMA updates from Mimi Zohar:
 "New is IMA support for including fs-verity file digests and signatures
  in the IMA measurement list as well as verifying the fs-verity file
  digest based signatures, both based on policy.

  In addition, are two bug fixes:

   - avoid reading UEFI variables, which cause a page fault, on Apple
     Macs with T2 chips.

   - remove the original "ima" template Kconfig option to address a boot
     command line ordering issue.

  The rest is a mixture of code/documentation cleanup"

* tag 'integrity-v5.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
  integrity: Fix sparse warnings in keyring_handler
  evm: Clean up some variables
  evm: Return INTEGRITY_PASS for enum integrity_status value '0'
  efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
  fsverity: update the documentation
  ima: support fs-verity file digest based version 3 signatures
  ima: permit fsverity's file digests in the IMA measurement list
  ima: define a new template field named 'd-ngv2' and templates
  fs-verity: define a function to return the integrity protected file digest
  ima: use IMA default hash algorithm for integrity violations
  ima: fix 'd-ng' comments and documentation
  ima: remove the IMA_TEMPLATE Kconfig option
  ima: remove redundant initialization of pointer 'file'.
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>certs: Factor out the blacklist hash creation</title>
<updated>2022-05-23T15:47:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mickaël Salaün</name>
<email>mic@linux.microsoft.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-07-12T17:03:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=141e523914f72575915dd334fce3cef4fb0f1e91'/>
<id>141e523914f72575915dd334fce3cef4fb0f1e91</id>
<content type='text'>
Factor out the blacklist hash creation with the get_raw_hash() helper.
This also centralize the "tbs" and "bin" prefixes and make them private,
which help to manage them consistently.

Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw2@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Eric Snowberg &lt;eric.snowberg@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210712170313.884724-5-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Factor out the blacklist hash creation with the get_raw_hash() helper.
This also centralize the "tbs" and "bin" prefixes and make them private,
which help to manage them consistently.

Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw2@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Eric Snowberg &lt;eric.snowberg@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210712170313.884724-5-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>integrity: Fix sparse warnings in keyring_handler</title>
<updated>2022-05-16T21:06:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stefan Berger</name>
<email>stefanb@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-04-21T17:52:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=048ae41bb0806cde340f4e5d5030398037ab0be8'/>
<id>048ae41bb0806cde340f4e5d5030398037ab0be8</id>
<content type='text'>
Fix the following sparse warnings:

  CHECK   security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c:76:16: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c:91:16: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c:106:16: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer

Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Fix the following sparse warnings:

  CHECK   security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c:76:16: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c:91:16: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c:106:16: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer

Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Clean up some variables</title>
<updated>2022-05-16T12:14:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stefan Berger</name>
<email>stefanb@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-13T17:41:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=4c41186ff394680cbde32a6a29e539f1e6036a47'/>
<id>4c41186ff394680cbde32a6a29e539f1e6036a47</id>
<content type='text'>
Make hmac_tfm static since it's not used anywhere else besides the file
it is in.

Remove declaration of hash_tfm since it doesn't exist.

Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Make hmac_tfm static since it's not used anywhere else besides the file
it is in.

Remove declaration of hash_tfm since it doesn't exist.

Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
