linux-toradex.git/security/keys/Makefile, branch v3.10.78

KEYS: Reorganise keys Makefile

2012-05-11T09:56:56+00:00

Reorganise the keys directory Makefile to put all the core bits together and
the type-specific bits after.

Signed-off-by: David Howells 
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar

encrypted-keys: create encrypted-keys directory

2011-09-14T19:22:26+00:00

Move all files associated with encrypted keys to keys/encrypted-keys.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar

encrypted-keys: add ecryptfs format support

2011-06-27T13:11:17+00:00

The 'encrypted' key type defines its own payload format which contains a
symmetric key randomly generated that cannot be used directly to mount
an eCryptfs filesystem, because it expects an authentication token
structure.

This patch introduces the new format 'ecryptfs' that allows to store an
authentication token structure inside the encrypted key payload containing
a randomly generated symmetric key, as the same for the format 'default'.

More details about the usage of encrypted keys with the eCryptfs
filesystem can be found in the file 'Documentation/keys-ecryptfs.txt'.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu 
Acked-by: Gianluca Ramunno 
Acked-by: Tyler Hicks 
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar

encrypted-keys: rename encrypted_defined files to encrypted

2011-01-23T23:27:57+00:00

Rename encrypted_defined.c and encrypted_defined.h files to encrypted.c and
encrypted.h, respectively. Based on request from David Howells.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar 
Acked-by: David Howells 
Signed-off-by: James Morris

trusted-keys: rename trusted_defined files to trusted

2011-01-23T23:14:22+00:00

Rename trusted_defined.c and trusted_defined.h files to trusted.c and
trusted.h, respectively. Based on request from David Howells.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar 
Acked-by: David Howells 
Signed-off-by: James Morris

keys: add new key-type encrypted

2010-11-28T21:55:29+00:00

Define a new kernel key-type called 'encrypted'. Encrypted keys are kernel
generated random numbers, which are encrypted/decrypted with a 'trusted'
symmetric key. Encrypted keys are created/encrypted/decrypted in the kernel.
Userspace only ever sees/stores encrypted blobs.

Changelog:
- bug fix: replaced master-key rcu based locking with semaphore
  (reported by David Howells)
- Removed memset of crypto_shash_digest() digest output
- Replaced verification of 'key-type:key-desc' using strcspn(), with
  one based on string constants.
- Moved documentation to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
- Replace hash with shash (based on comments by David Howells)
- Make lengths/counts size_t where possible (based on comments by David Howells)
  Could not convert most lengths, as crypto expects 'unsigned int'
  (size_t: on 32 bit is defined as unsigned int, but on 64 bit is unsigned long)
- Add 'const' where possible (based on comments by David Howells)
- allocate derived_buf dynamically to support arbitrary length master key
  (fixed by Roberto Sassu)
- wait until late_initcall for crypto libraries to be registered
- cleanup security/Kconfig
- Add missing 'update' keyword (reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu)
- Free epayload on failure to create key (reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu)
- Increase the data size limit (requested by Roberto Sassu)
- Crypto return codes are always 0 on success and negative on failure,
  remove unnecessary tests.
- Replaced kzalloc() with kmalloc()

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar 
Signed-off-by: David Safford 
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu 
Signed-off-by: James Morris

keys: add new trusted key-type

2010-11-28T21:55:25+00:00

Define a new kernel key-type called 'trusted'.  Trusted keys are random
number symmetric keys, generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM.  The TPM
only unseals the keys, if the boot PCRs and other criteria match.
Userspace can only ever see encrypted blobs.

Based on suggestions by Jason Gunthorpe, several new options have been
added to support additional usages.

The new options are:
migratable=  designates that the key may/may not ever be updated
             (resealed under a new key, new pcrinfo or new auth.)

pcrlock=n    extends the designated PCR 'n' with a random value,
             so that a key sealed to that PCR may not be unsealed
             again until after a reboot.

keyhandle=   specifies the sealing/unsealing key handle.

keyauth=     specifies the sealing/unsealing key auth.

blobauth=    specifies the sealed data auth.

Implementation of a kernel reserved locality for trusted keys will be
investigated for a possible future extension.

Changelog:
- Updated and added examples to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
- Moved generic TPM constants to include/linux/tpm_command.h
  (David Howell's suggestion.)
- trusted_defined.c: replaced kzalloc with kmalloc, added pcrlock failure
  error handling, added const qualifiers where appropriate.
- moved to late_initcall
- updated from hash to shash (suggestion by David Howells)
- reduced worst stack usage (tpm_seal) from 530 to 312 bytes
- moved documentation to Documentation directory (suggestion by David Howells)
- all the other code cleanups suggested by David Howells
- Add pcrlock CAP_SYS_ADMIN dependency (based on comment by Jason Gunthorpe)
- New options: migratable, pcrlock, keyhandle, keyauth, blobauth (based on
  discussions with Jason Gunthorpe)
- Free payload on failure to create key(reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu)
- Updated Kconfig and other descriptions (based on Serge Hallyn's suggestion)
- Replaced kzalloc() with kmalloc() (reported by Serge Hallyn)

Signed-off-by: David Safford 
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar 
Signed-off-by: James Morris

KEYS: Add garbage collection for dead, revoked and expired keys. [try #6]

2009-09-02T11:29:11+00:00

Add garbage collection for dead, revoked and expired keys.  This involved
erasing all links to such keys from keyrings that point to them.  At that
point, the key will be deleted in the normal manner.

Keyrings from which garbage collection occurs are shrunk and their quota
consumption reduced as appropriate.

Dead keys (for which the key type has been removed) will be garbage collected
immediately.

Revoked and expired keys will hang around for a number of seconds, as set in
/proc/sys/kernel/keys/gc_delay before being automatically removed.  The default
is 5 minutes.

Signed-off-by: David Howells 
Signed-off-by: James Morris

keys: make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sys

2008-04-29T15:06:17+00:00

Make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sys files:

 (*) /proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxkeys
     /proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxbytes

     Maximum number of keys that root may have and the maximum total number of
     bytes of data that root may have stored in those keys.

 (*) /proc/sys/kernel/keys/maxkeys
     /proc/sys/kernel/keys/maxbytes

     Maximum number of keys that each non-root user may have and the maximum
     total number of bytes of data that each of those users may have stored in
     their keys.

Also increase the quotas as a number of people have been complaining that it's
not big enough.  I'm not sure that it's big enough now either, but on the
other hand, it can now be set in /etc/sysctl.conf.

Signed-off-by: David Howells 
Cc: 
Cc: 
Cc: 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

[PATCH] Keys: Split key permissions checking into a .c file

2005-10-08T21:53:31+00:00

The attached patch splits key permissions checking out of key-ui.h and
moves it into a .c file.  It's quite large and called quite a lot, and
it's about to get bigger with the addition of LSM support for keys...

key_any_permission() is also discarded as it's no longer used.

Signed-Off-By: David Howells 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds