linux-toradex.git/security/loadpin, branch v5.1-rc4

LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM

2019-01-08T21:18:43+00:00

This converts LoadPin from being a direct "minor" LSM into an ordered LSM.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler

LoadPin: Rename boot param "enabled" to "enforce"

2018-10-18T22:29:44+00:00

LoadPin's "enabled" setting is really about enforcement, not whether
or not the LSM is using LSM hooks. Instead, split this out so that LSM
enabling can be logically distinct from whether enforcement is happening
(for example, the pinning happens when the LSM is enabled, but the pin
is only checked when "enforce" is set). This allows LoadPin to continue
to operate sanely in test environments once LSM enable/disable is
centrally handled (i.e. we want LoadPin to be enabled separately from
its enforcement).

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler 
Reviewed-by: John Johansen

LoadPin: Report friendly block device name

2018-10-18T22:29:44+00:00

Instead of only reporting major/minor, include the actual block device
name, at least as seen by the kernel.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook

module: replace the existing LSM hook in init_module

2018-07-16T19:31:57+00:00

Both the init_module and finit_module syscalls call either directly
or indirectly the security_kernel_read_file LSM hook.  This patch
replaces the direct call in init_module with a call to the new
security_kernel_load_data hook and makes the corresponding changes
in SELinux, LoadPin, and IMA.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar 
Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep 
Cc: Casey Schaufler 
Cc: Kees Cook 
Acked-by: Jessica Yu 
Acked-by: Paul Moore 
Acked-by: Kees Cook 
Signed-off-by: James Morris

get rid of pointless includes of fs_struct.h

2018-02-22T19:28:50+00:00

Signed-off-by: Al Viro

security: mark LSM hooks as __ro_after_init

2017-03-06T00:00:15+00:00

Mark all of the registration hooks as __ro_after_init (via the
__lsm_ro_after_init macro).

Signed-off-by: James Morris 
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley 
Acked-by: Kees Cook

LSM: Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm

2017-01-19T02:18:29+00:00

I am still tired of having to find indirect ways to determine
what security modules are active on a system. I have added
/sys/kernel/security/lsm, which contains a comma separated
list of the active security modules. No more groping around
in /proc/filesystems or other clever hacks.

Unchanged from previous versions except for being updated
to the latest security next branch.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler 
Acked-by: John Johansen 
Acked-by: Paul Moore 
Acked-by: Kees Cook 
Signed-off-by: James Morris

LSM: LoadPin: provide enablement CONFIG

2016-05-17T10:10:30+00:00

Instead of being enabled by default when SECURITY_LOADPIN is selected,
provide an additional (default off) config to determine the boot time
behavior. As before, the "loadpin.enabled=0/1" kernel parameter remains
available.

Suggested-by: James Morris 
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Signed-off-by: James Morris

LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions

2016-04-21T00:47:27+00:00

This LSM enforces that kernel-loaded files (modules, firmware, etc)
must all come from the same filesystem, with the expectation that
such a filesystem is backed by a read-only device such as dm-verity
or CDROM. This allows systems that have a verified and/or unchangeable
filesystem to enforce module and firmware loading restrictions without
needing to sign the files individually.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn 
Signed-off-by: James Morris