linux-toradex.git/security/selinux/include/objsec.h, branch v2.6.24.4

SELinux: Improve read/write performance

2007-10-16T22:59:31+00:00

It reduces the selinux overhead on read/write by only revalidating
permissions in selinux_file_permission if the task or inode labels have
changed or the policy has changed since the open-time check.  A new LSM
hook, security_dentry_open, is added to capture the necessary state at open
time to allow this optimization.

(see http://marc.info/?l=selinux&m=118972995207740&w=2)

Signed-off-by: Yuichi Nakamura
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley 
Signed-off-by: James Morris

NetLabel: SELinux cleanups

2006-12-03T05:24:13+00:00

This patch does a lot of cleanup in the SELinux NetLabel support code.  A
summary of the changes include:

* Use RCU locking for the NetLabel state variable in the skk_security_struct
  instead of using the inode_security_struct mutex.
* Remove unnecessary parameters in selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create().
* Rename selinux_netlbl_sk_clone_security() to
  selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone() to better fit the other NetLabel
  sk_security functions.
* Improvements to selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() to help reduce the cost of
  the common case.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore 
Signed-off-by: James Morris

[PATCH] SELinux: convert sbsec semaphore to a mutex

2006-09-26T15:48:53+00:00

This patch converts the semaphore in the superblock security struct to a
mutex.  No locking changes or other code changes are done.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris 
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley 
Acked-by: James Morris 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

[PATCH] SELinux: change isec semaphore to a mutex

2006-09-26T15:48:53+00:00

This patch converts the remaining isec->sem into a mutex.  Very similar
locking is provided as before only in the faster smaller mutex rather than a
semaphore.  An out_unlock path is introduced rather than the conditional
unlocking found in the original code.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris 
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley 
Acked-by: James Morris 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

[NetLabel]: SELinux support

2006-09-22T21:53:36+00:00

Add NetLabel support to the SELinux LSM and modify the
socket_post_create() LSM hook to return an error code.  The most
significant part of this patch is the addition of NetLabel hooks into
the following SELinux LSM hooks:

 * selinux_file_permission()
 * selinux_socket_sendmsg()
 * selinux_socket_post_create()
 * selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb()
 * selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream()
 * selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram()
 * selinux_sock_graft()
 * selinux_inet_conn_request()

The basic reasoning behind this patch is that outgoing packets are
"NetLabel'd" by labeling their socket and the NetLabel security
attributes are checked via the additional hook in
selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb().  NetLabel itself is only a labeling
mechanism, similar to filesystem extended attributes, it is up to the
SELinux enforcement mechanism to perform the actual access checks.

In addition to the changes outlined above this patch also includes
some changes to the extended bitmap (ebitmap) and multi-level security
(mls) code to import and export SELinux TE/MLS attributes into and out
of NetLabel.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

[MLSXFRM]: Add security sid to sock

2006-09-22T21:53:22+00:00

This adds security for IP sockets at the sock level. Security at the
sock level is needed to enforce the SELinux security policy for
security associations even when a sock is orphaned (such as in the TCP
LAST_ACK state).

This will also be used to enforce SELinux controls over data arriving
at or leaving a child socket while it's still waiting to be accepted.

Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

[PATCH] SELinux: decouple fscontext/context mount options

2006-07-10T20:24:13+00:00

Remove the conflict between fscontext and context mount options.  If
context= is specified without fscontext it will operate just as before, if
both are specified we will use mount point labeling and all inodes will get
the label specified by context=.  The superblock will be labeled with the
label of fscontext=, thus affecting operations which check the superblock
security context, such as associate permissions.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris 
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley 
Signed-off-by: James Morris 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

[PATCH] SELinux: Add sockcreate node to procattr API

2006-06-26T16:58:26+00:00

Below is a patch to add a new /proc/self/attr/sockcreate A process may write a
context into this interface and all subsequent sockets created will be labeled
with that context.  This is the same idea as the fscreate interface where a
process can specify the label of a file about to be created.  At this time one
envisioned user of this will be xinetd.  It will be able to better label
sockets for the actual services.  At this time all sockets take the label of
the creating process, so all xinitd sockets would just be labeled the same.

I tested this by creating a tcp sender and listener.  The sender was able to
write to this new proc file and then create sockets with the specified label.
I am able to be sure the new label was used since the avc denial messages
kicked out by the kernel included both the new security permission
setsockcreate and all the socket denials were for the new label, not the label
of the running process.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris 
Signed-off-by: James Morris 
Cc: Chris Wright 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

[PATCH] keys: add a way to store the appropriate context for newly-created keys

2006-06-26T16:58:18+00:00

Add a /proc//attr/keycreate entry that stores the appropriate context for
newly-created keys.  Modify the selinux_key_alloc hook to make use of the new
entry.  Update the flask headers to include a new "setkeycreate" permission
for processes.  Update the flask headers to include a new "create" permission
for keys.  Use the create permission to restrict which SIDs each task can
assign to newly-created keys.  Add a new parameter to the security hook
"security_key_alloc" to indicate whether it is being invoked by the kernel, or
from userspace.  If it is being invoked by the kernel, the security hook
should never fail.  Update the documentation to reflect these changes.

Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay 
Signed-off-by: James Morris 
Signed-off-by: David Howells 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

[PATCH] selinux: add hooks for key subsystem

2006-06-22T22:05:55+00:00

Introduce SELinux hooks to support the access key retention subsystem
within the kernel.  Incorporate new flask headers from a modified version
of the SELinux reference policy, with support for the new security class
representing retained keys.  Extend the "key_alloc" security hook with a
task parameter representing the intended ownership context for the key
being allocated.  Attach security information to root's default keyrings
within the SELinux initialization routine.

Has passed David's testsuite.

Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay 
Signed-off-by: David Howells 
Signed-off-by: James Morris 
Acked-by: Chris Wright 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds