linux-toradex.git/security/selinux/include/security.h, branch v4.4.7

selinux: introduce security_context_str_to_sid

2015-10-21T21:44:25+00:00

There seems to be a little confusion as to whether the scontext_len
parameter of security_context_to_sid() includes the nul-byte or
not. Reading security_context_to_sid_core(), it seems that the
expectation is that it does not (both the string copying and the test
for scontext_len being zero hint at that).

Introduce the helper security_context_str_to_sid() to do the strlen()
call and fix all callers.

Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes 
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley 
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

selinux: extended permissions for ioctls

2015-07-13T17:31:58+00:00

Add extended permissions logic to selinux. Extended permissions
provides additional permissions in 256 bit increments. Extend the
generic ioctl permission check to use the extended permissions for
per-command filtering. Source/target/class sets including the ioctl
permission may additionally include a set of commands. Example:

allowxperm  : ioctl unpriv_app_socket_cmds
auditallowxperm  : ioctl priv_gpu_cmds

Where unpriv_app_socket_cmds and priv_gpu_cmds are macros
representing commonly granted sets of ioctl commands.

When ioctl commands are omitted only the permissions are checked.
This feature is intended to provide finer granularity for the ioctl
permission that may be too imprecise. For example, the same driver
may use ioctls to provide important and benign functionality such as
driver version or socket type as well as dangerous capabilities such
as debugging features, read/write/execute to physical memory or
access to sensitive data. Per-command filtering provides a mechanism
to reduce the attack surface of the kernel, and limit applications
to the subset of commands required.

The format of the policy binary has been modified to include ioctl
commands, and the policy version number has been incremented to
POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL=30 to account for the format
change.

The extended permissions logic is deliberately generic to allow
components to be reused e.g. netlink filters

Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep 
Acked-by: Nick Kralevich 
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

selinux: enable per-file labeling for debugfs files.

2015-06-04T20:22:17+00:00

Add support for per-file labeling of debugfs files so that
we can distinguish them in policy.  This is particularly
important in Android where certain debugfs files have to be writable
by apps and therefore the debugfs directory tree can be read and
searched by all.

Since debugfs is entirely kernel-generated, the directory tree is
immutable by userspace, and the inodes are pinned in memory, we can
simply use the same approach as with proc and label the inodes from
policy based on pathname from the root of the debugfs filesystem.
Generalize the existing labeling support used for proc and reuse it
for debugfs too.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley 
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

security: Used macros from compiler.h instead of attribute((...))

2014-06-18T20:59:34+00:00

To increase compiler portability there is  which
provides convenience macros for various gcc constructs.  Eg: __packed
for __attribute__((packed)).

This patch is part of a large task I've taken to clean the gcc
specific attributes and use the the macros instead.

Signed-off-by: Gideon Israel Dsouza 
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

selinux: add gfp argument to security_xfrm_policy_alloc and fix callers

2014-03-10T07:30:02+00:00

security_xfrm_policy_alloc can be called in atomic context so the
allocation should be done with GFP_ATOMIC. Add an argument to let the
callers choose the appropriate way. In order to do so a gfp argument
needs to be added to the method xfrm_policy_alloc_security in struct
security_operations and to the internal function
selinux_xfrm_alloc_user. After that switch to GFP_ATOMIC in the atomic
callers and leave GFP_KERNEL as before for the rest.
The path that needed the gfp argument addition is:
security_xfrm_policy_alloc -> security_ops.xfrm_policy_alloc_security ->
all users of xfrm_policy_alloc_security (e.g. selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc) ->
selinux_xfrm_alloc_user (here the allocation used to be GFP_KERNEL only)

Now adding a gfp argument to selinux_xfrm_alloc_user requires us to also
add it to security_context_to_sid which is used inside and prior to this
patch did only GFP_KERNEL allocation. So add gfp argument to
security_context_to_sid and adjust all of its callers as well.

CC: Paul Moore 
CC: Dave Jones 
CC: Steffen Klassert 
CC: Fan Du 
CC: David S. Miller 
CC: LSM list 
CC: SELinux list 

Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov 
Acked-by: Paul Moore 
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert

SELinux: Update policy version to support constraints info

2013-11-19T22:34:23+00:00

Update the policy version (POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES) to allow
holding of policy source info for constraints.

Signed-off-by: Richard Haines 
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley 
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

Merge git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/selinux

2013-09-18T17:52:20+00:00

Conflicts:
	security/selinux/hooks.c

Pull Eric's existing SELinux tree as there are a number of patches in
there that are not yet upstream.  There was some minor fixup needed to
resolve a conflict in security/selinux/hooks.c:selinux_set_mnt_opts()
between the labeled NFS patches and Eric's security_fs_use()
simplification patch.

Revert "SELinux: do not handle seclabel as a special flag"

2013-08-28T18:45:21+00:00

This reverts commit 308ab70c465d97cf7e3168961dfd365535de21a6.

It breaks my FC6 test box.  /dev/pts is not mounted.  dmesg says

SELinux: mount invalid.  Same superblock, different security settings
for (dev devpts, type devpts)

Cc: Peter Hurley 
Cc: Greg KH 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris

Add SELinux policy capability for always checking packet and peer classes.

2013-07-25T17:03:38+00:00

Currently the packet class in SELinux is not checked if there are no
SECMARK rules in the security or mangle netfilter tables.  Some systems
prefer that packets are always checked, for example, to protect the system
should the netfilter rules fail to load or if the nefilter rules
were maliciously flushed.

Add the always_check_network policy capability which, when enabled, treats
SECMARK as enabled, even if there are no netfilter SECMARK rules and
treats peer labeling as enabled, even if there is no Netlabel or
labeled IPSEC configuration.

Includes definition of "redhat1" SELinux policy capability, which
exists in the SELinux userpace library, to keep ordering correct.

The SELinux userpace portion of this was merged last year, but this kernel
change fell on the floor.

Signed-off-by: Chris PeBenito 
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris

SELinux: pass a superblock to security_fs_use

2013-07-25T17:03:21+00:00

Rather than passing pointers to memory locations, strings, and other
stuff just give up on the separation and give security_fs_use the
superblock.  It just makes the code easier to read (even if not easier to
reuse on some other OS)

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris