<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/security/selinux/include, branch master</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20261015' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux</title>
<updated>2026-10-21T05:42:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-10-21T05:42:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=331eadd85f14bac85663c14c99228f6dedf64d87'/>
<id>331eadd85f14bac85663c14c99228f6dedf64d87</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:

 - Continue to improve the load time validation of SELinux policies

   While SELinux policy loading remains a privileged operation, we
   continue the recent trend of hardening the policy parsing and
   validation code in the kernel to ensure that invalid, or poorly
   formatted policies are rejected at load time.

 - Correctly incorporate "neveraudit" into the xperms code

   This change aligns the xperms neveraudit handling with the
   conventional permission handling code, exiting early from the SELinux
   auditing code when neveraudit is enabled for the domain.

 - Mark the selinuxfs "status" and "policy" files immutable

   These are read-only kernel/userspace interfaces that could
   successfully be opened at the VFS layer through the use of
   CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE. With this pull request we are marking these two
   files as immutable so that the requests to open these file with write
   permissions now fail at the VFS layer. This also allows us to drop
   some of our mmap() checks around write permissions as the VFS will
   now also handle this for us.

   The existing SELinux permissions checks remain untouched.

 - Convert the selinuxfs inode numbers to u64

   Bring selinuxfs current with other filesystems in using u64 for inode
   numbering as opposed to the architecture dependent unsigned long.

 - Constify a number of the SELinux AVC function parameters

 - Remove a SELinux MLS function that was no longer used

* tag 'selinux-pr-20261015' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
  selinux: validate permissive and neveraudit map types at load
  selinux: validate user MLS range and default level at load
  selinux: bounds-check role and user membership bitmaps at load
  selinux: check neveraudit in avc_xperms_audit_required()
  selinux: bounds-check filename transition source types at load
  selinux: reject duplicate symbol values during policy load
  selinux: reject a policy that both rejects and allows unknown classes
  selinux: constify avc function parameters
  selinux: avoid 64-bit division of inode numbers
  selinux: mark status and policy inodes as immutable, drop status mmap write checks
  selinux: remove unused mls_setup_user_range()
  selinux: convert selinuxfs inode numbers from unsigned long to u64
  selinux: tighten policydb_context_isvalid() checks
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:

 - Continue to improve the load time validation of SELinux policies

   While SELinux policy loading remains a privileged operation, we
   continue the recent trend of hardening the policy parsing and
   validation code in the kernel to ensure that invalid, or poorly
   formatted policies are rejected at load time.

 - Correctly incorporate "neveraudit" into the xperms code

   This change aligns the xperms neveraudit handling with the
   conventional permission handling code, exiting early from the SELinux
   auditing code when neveraudit is enabled for the domain.

 - Mark the selinuxfs "status" and "policy" files immutable

   These are read-only kernel/userspace interfaces that could
   successfully be opened at the VFS layer through the use of
   CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE. With this pull request we are marking these two
   files as immutable so that the requests to open these file with write
   permissions now fail at the VFS layer. This also allows us to drop
   some of our mmap() checks around write permissions as the VFS will
   now also handle this for us.

   The existing SELinux permissions checks remain untouched.

 - Convert the selinuxfs inode numbers to u64

   Bring selinuxfs current with other filesystems in using u64 for inode
   numbering as opposed to the architecture dependent unsigned long.

 - Constify a number of the SELinux AVC function parameters

 - Remove a SELinux MLS function that was no longer used

* tag 'selinux-pr-20261015' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
  selinux: validate permissive and neveraudit map types at load
  selinux: validate user MLS range and default level at load
  selinux: bounds-check role and user membership bitmaps at load
  selinux: check neveraudit in avc_xperms_audit_required()
  selinux: bounds-check filename transition source types at load
  selinux: reject duplicate symbol values during policy load
  selinux: reject a policy that both rejects and allows unknown classes
  selinux: constify avc function parameters
  selinux: avoid 64-bit division of inode numbers
  selinux: mark status and policy inodes as immutable, drop status mmap write checks
  selinux: remove unused mls_setup_user_range()
  selinux: convert selinuxfs inode numbers from unsigned long to u64
  selinux: tighten policydb_context_isvalid() checks
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: constify avc function parameters</title>
<updated>2026-09-24T21:04:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Göttsche</name>
<email>cgzones@googlemail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-09-17T14:13:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e6b4f0bac981dcb5c1fd682be0d7a8d69892f5e1'/>
<id>e6b4f0bac981dcb5c1fd682be0d7a8d69892f5e1</id>
<content type='text'>
Constify read-only decision structs to ease reasoning where decisions
are actually modified, and where only processed.

Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche &lt;cgzones@googlemail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
[PM: fixed line length issues]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Constify read-only decision structs to ease reasoning where decisions
are actually modified, and where only processed.

Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche &lt;cgzones@googlemail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
[PM: fixed line length issues]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: recheck intermediate backing files on mprotect()</title>
<updated>2026-09-16T03:30:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Karl Mehltretter</name>
<email>kmehltretter@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-29T21:32:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=78fc54b934bfb2c18aad8154c7302067146946f9'/>
<id>78fc54b934bfb2c18aad8154c7302067146946f9</id>
<content type='text'>
mprotect() can be used to bypass the SELinux checks that mmap() performs
against the intermediate layers of a stacked filesystem.

mmap() checks every backing layer as the request descends through the
stack.  mprotect() only has the lowest backing file in vma-&gt;vm_file, so it
rechecks the top-level user and the lowest mounter, but skips the mounters
of every layer in between.  With two nested overlayfs mounts and a policy
denying mounter_t -&gt; middle_file_t:file { execute }, a direct
mmap(PROT_EXEC) is denied:

  avc:  denied  { execute } for  pid=71 comm="nested_exec"
    path="/payload" dev="overlay" ino=9
    scontext=user_u:base_r:mounter_t
    tcontext=user_u:object_r:middle_file_t tclass=file permissive=0

while mmap(PROT_NONE) followed by mprotect(PROT_EXEC) succeeds.

Preserve each intermediate path, mounter SID and file-description SID in
the backing-file security blob, copying the saved entries when another
backing layer is opened.  Allocate the array only for nested backing files,
and release it and the path references in the backing_file_free hook.

During mprotect(), recheck fd { use } and the requested inode permissions
for every saved mounter, and include the intermediate layers in the execmod
checks.  Policy for nested stacking may then need to grant intermediate
mounters what a direct mmap() already requires, and execmod on intermediate
labels for binaries using text relocations.

Tested on arm64 QEMU with a small BusyBox initramfs and a purpose-built
SELinux policy, on a mainline tree containing
commit f2381b546e7e ("fs: fix user path of nested backing files").

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 82544d36b172 ("selinux: fix overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checks")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Karl Mehltretter &lt;kmehltretter@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
mprotect() can be used to bypass the SELinux checks that mmap() performs
against the intermediate layers of a stacked filesystem.

mmap() checks every backing layer as the request descends through the
stack.  mprotect() only has the lowest backing file in vma-&gt;vm_file, so it
rechecks the top-level user and the lowest mounter, but skips the mounters
of every layer in between.  With two nested overlayfs mounts and a policy
denying mounter_t -&gt; middle_file_t:file { execute }, a direct
mmap(PROT_EXEC) is denied:

  avc:  denied  { execute } for  pid=71 comm="nested_exec"
    path="/payload" dev="overlay" ino=9
    scontext=user_u:base_r:mounter_t
    tcontext=user_u:object_r:middle_file_t tclass=file permissive=0

while mmap(PROT_NONE) followed by mprotect(PROT_EXEC) succeeds.

Preserve each intermediate path, mounter SID and file-description SID in
the backing-file security blob, copying the saved entries when another
backing layer is opened.  Allocate the array only for nested backing files,
and release it and the path references in the backing_file_free hook.

During mprotect(), recheck fd { use } and the requested inode permissions
for every saved mounter, and include the intermediate layers in the execmod
checks.  Policy for nested stacking may then need to grant intermediate
mounters what a direct mmap() already requires, and execmod on intermediate
labels for binaries using text relocations.

Tested on arm64 QEMU with a small BusyBox initramfs and a purpose-built
SELinux policy, on a mainline tree containing
commit f2381b546e7e ("fs: fix user path of nested backing files").

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 82544d36b172 ("selinux: fix overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checks")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Karl Mehltretter &lt;kmehltretter@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: preserve user SID across nested backing files</title>
<updated>2026-09-16T03:30:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Karl Mehltretter</name>
<email>kmehltretter@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-29T21:32:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=8c0c602202b9a4909b00bc3354e3c0355bc69e65'/>
<id>8c0c602202b9a4909b00bc3354e3c0355bc69e65</id>
<content type='text'>
SELinux saves the user file SID in a backing-file security blob so it
remains available after mmap() replaces vma-&gt;vm_file with a backing file.

For nested backing files (overlayfs over overlayfs, or FUSE passthrough
backed by overlayfs), user_file may itself be a backing file.  Its
fsec-&gt;sid is the SID of the mounter that opened it, rather than the user
that opened the top-level file.  mprotect() then checks fd { use } against
the mounter SID.  This can incorrectly deny access without a domain
transition, or check the wrong target SID after one.

Copy the saved user SID when user_file is a backing file.  Keep using the
regular file SID for the first backing layer.

With two nested overlayfs mounts and SELinux enforcing,
mprotect(PROT_READ) returns EACCES with an fd { use } denial against the
mounter SID.  With this change, mprotect() succeeds.

Tested on arm64 QEMU with a small BusyBox initramfs and a purpose-built
SELinux policy.  The original test was also repeated with Fedora Cloud
Base 44 userspace and gave the same result.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 82544d36b172 ("selinux: fix overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checks")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Karl Mehltretter &lt;kmehltretter@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
SELinux saves the user file SID in a backing-file security blob so it
remains available after mmap() replaces vma-&gt;vm_file with a backing file.

For nested backing files (overlayfs over overlayfs, or FUSE passthrough
backed by overlayfs), user_file may itself be a backing file.  Its
fsec-&gt;sid is the SID of the mounter that opened it, rather than the user
that opened the top-level file.  mprotect() then checks fd { use } against
the mounter SID.  This can incorrectly deny access without a domain
transition, or check the wrong target SID after one.

Copy the saved user SID when user_file is a backing file.  Keep using the
regular file SID for the first backing layer.

With two nested overlayfs mounts and SELinux enforcing,
mprotect(PROT_READ) returns EACCES with an fd { use } denial against the
mounter SID.  With this change, mprotect() succeeds.

Tested on arm64 QEMU with a small BusyBox initramfs and a purpose-built
SELinux policy.  The original test was also repeated with Fedora Cloud
Base 44 userspace and gave the same result.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 82544d36b172 ("selinux: fix overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checks")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Karl Mehltretter &lt;kmehltretter@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: compute the IMA configuration settings string length once at boot</title>
<updated>2026-07-16T01:42:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ian Bridges</name>
<email>icb@fastmail.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-14T04:09:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c0b6a5b89d1aa31574ea68bfb1fed1dee46e5ec6'/>
<id>c0b6a5b89d1aa31574ea68bfb1fed1dee46e5ec6</id>
<content type='text'>
selinux_ima_collect_state() builds a string of the current SELinux
configuration settings. The string lists each setting as a name and
one digit. The length of the string therefore never changes, but is
still recomputed on every call.

Add selinux_ima_config_len_init() to compute the length once during
selinux_init(). Update selinux_ima_collect_state() to use the stored
length.

Suggested-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/df755e0282dab3b932d19aceab71b7d7@paul-moore.com
Signed-off-by: Ian Bridges &lt;icb@fastmail.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
selinux_ima_collect_state() builds a string of the current SELinux
configuration settings. The string lists each setting as a name and
one digit. The length of the string therefore never changes, but is
still recomputed on every call.

Add selinux_ima_config_len_init() to compute the length once during
selinux_init(). Update selinux_ima_collect_state() to use the stored
length.

Suggested-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/df755e0282dab3b932d19aceab71b7d7@paul-moore.com
Signed-off-by: Ian Bridges &lt;icb@fastmail.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20260615' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux</title>
<updated>2026-06-17T11:41:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-17T11:41:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=231e9d447ea97033ae8b8dff7b910e6269d7c5af'/>
<id>231e9d447ea97033ae8b8dff7b910e6269d7c5af</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
 "A number of SELinux patches, almost all of which are either minor
  fixes or hardening patches:

   - Additional verifications when loading new SELinux policy

     Multiple patches by Christian Göttsche to add additional
     validations to the code responsible for loading and parsing SELinux
     policy as it is loaded into the kernel.

   - Avoid nontransitive comparisons comparisons in our sorting code

     Done to prevent unexpected sorting results due to overflow. Qualys
     documented a similar issue with glibc

	https://www.qualys.com/2024/01/30/qsort.txt

   - Consistently use u16 for SELinux security classes

   - Move from page allocations to kmalloc() based allocations

     Unfortunately one of these patches had to be reverted, but you
     should see a fixed version during the next merge window.

   - Move from kmalloc_objs() to kzalloc_objs() in the policy load code

   - Reorder sel_kill_sb() slightly to match other pseudo filesystems

   - Simplify things with QSTR() instead of QSTR_INIT()

   - Minor comment typo fixes"

* tag 'selinux-pr-20260615' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
  selinux: revert use of __getname() in selinux_genfs_get_sid()
  selinux: comment spelling fix in ibpkey.c
  selinux: comment typo fix in selinuxfs.c
  selinux: hooks: use __getname() to allocate path buffer
  selinux: use k[mz]alloc() to allocate temporary buffers
  selinux: check for simple types
  selinux: more strict bounds check
  selinux: beef up isvalid checks
  selinux: reorder policydb_index()
  selinux: check type attr map overflows
  selinux: check length fields in policies
  selinux: more strict policy parsing
  selinux: use u16 for security classes
  selinux: avoid nontransitive comparison
  selinux: switch two allocations to use kzalloc_objs()
  selinux: fix sel_kill_sb()
  selinux: use QSTR() instead of QSTR_INIT() in init_sel_fs
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
 "A number of SELinux patches, almost all of which are either minor
  fixes or hardening patches:

   - Additional verifications when loading new SELinux policy

     Multiple patches by Christian Göttsche to add additional
     validations to the code responsible for loading and parsing SELinux
     policy as it is loaded into the kernel.

   - Avoid nontransitive comparisons comparisons in our sorting code

     Done to prevent unexpected sorting results due to overflow. Qualys
     documented a similar issue with glibc

	https://www.qualys.com/2024/01/30/qsort.txt

   - Consistently use u16 for SELinux security classes

   - Move from page allocations to kmalloc() based allocations

     Unfortunately one of these patches had to be reverted, but you
     should see a fixed version during the next merge window.

   - Move from kmalloc_objs() to kzalloc_objs() in the policy load code

   - Reorder sel_kill_sb() slightly to match other pseudo filesystems

   - Simplify things with QSTR() instead of QSTR_INIT()

   - Minor comment typo fixes"

* tag 'selinux-pr-20260615' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
  selinux: revert use of __getname() in selinux_genfs_get_sid()
  selinux: comment spelling fix in ibpkey.c
  selinux: comment typo fix in selinuxfs.c
  selinux: hooks: use __getname() to allocate path buffer
  selinux: use k[mz]alloc() to allocate temporary buffers
  selinux: check for simple types
  selinux: more strict bounds check
  selinux: beef up isvalid checks
  selinux: reorder policydb_index()
  selinux: check type attr map overflows
  selinux: check length fields in policies
  selinux: more strict policy parsing
  selinux: use u16 for security classes
  selinux: avoid nontransitive comparison
  selinux: switch two allocations to use kzalloc_objs()
  selinux: fix sel_kill_sb()
  selinux: use QSTR() instead of QSTR_INIT() in init_sel_fs
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: more strict policy parsing</title>
<updated>2026-05-06T23:43:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Göttsche</name>
<email>cgzones@googlemail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-05-11T17:30:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=18fa21f10d008a0fc22565109c7d38f304295912'/>
<id>18fa21f10d008a0fc22565109c7d38f304295912</id>
<content type='text'>
Be more strict during parsing of policies and reject invalid values.

Add some error messages in the case of policy parse failures, to
enhance debugging, either on a malformed policy or a too strict check.

Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche &lt;cgzones@googlemail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
[PM: fixed checkpatch.pl warnings, style problems]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Be more strict during parsing of policies and reject invalid values.

Add some error messages in the case of policy parse failures, to
enhance debugging, either on a malformed policy or a too strict check.

Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche &lt;cgzones@googlemail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
[PM: fixed checkpatch.pl warnings, style problems]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: prune /sys/fs/selinux/user</title>
<updated>2026-05-05T19:27:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Smalley</name>
<email>stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-05T12:49:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ad1ac3d740cc6b858a99ab9c45c8c0574be7d1d3'/>
<id>ad1ac3d740cc6b858a99ab9c45c8c0574be7d1d3</id>
<content type='text'>
Remove the previously deprecated /sys/fs/selinux/user interface aside
from a residual stub for userspace compatibility.

Commit d7b6918e22c7 ("selinux: Deprecate /sys/fs/selinux/user") started
the deprecation process for /sys/fs/selinux/user:

    The selinuxfs "user" node allows userspace to request a list
    of security contexts that can be reached for a given SELinux
    user from a given starting context. This was used by libselinux
    when various login-style programs requested contexts for
    users, but libselinux stopped using it in 2020.
    Kernel support will be removed no sooner than Dec 2025.

A pr_warn() message has been in place since Linux v6.13, and a 5
second sleep was introduced since Linux v6.17 to help make it more
noticeable.

We are now past the stated deadline of Dec 2025, so remove the
underlying functionality and replace it with a stub that returns a
'0\0' buffer to avoid breaking userspace. This also avoids a local DoS
from logspam and an uninterruptible sleep delay.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Remove the previously deprecated /sys/fs/selinux/user interface aside
from a residual stub for userspace compatibility.

Commit d7b6918e22c7 ("selinux: Deprecate /sys/fs/selinux/user") started
the deprecation process for /sys/fs/selinux/user:

    The selinuxfs "user" node allows userspace to request a list
    of security contexts that can be reached for a given SELinux
    user from a given starting context. This was used by libselinux
    when various login-style programs requested contexts for
    users, but libselinux stopped using it in 2020.
    Kernel support will be removed no sooner than Dec 2025.

A pr_warn() message has been in place since Linux v6.13, and a 5
second sleep was introduced since Linux v6.17 to help make it more
noticeable.

We are now past the stated deadline of Dec 2025, so remove the
underlying functionality and replace it with a stub that returns a
'0\0' buffer to avoid breaking userspace. This also avoids a local DoS
from logspam and an uninterruptible sleep delay.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: fix avdcache auditing</title>
<updated>2026-04-28T22:13:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Smalley</name>
<email>stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-10T19:29:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=f92d542577db878acfd21cc18dab23d03023b217'/>
<id>f92d542577db878acfd21cc18dab23d03023b217</id>
<content type='text'>
The per-task avdcache was incorrectly saving and reusing the
audited vector computed by avc_audit_required() rather than
recomputing based on the currently requested permissions and
distinguishing the denied versus allowed cases. As a result,
some permission checks were not being audited, e.g.
directory write checks after a previously cached directory
search check.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: dde3a5d0f4dce ("selinux: move avdcache to per-task security struct")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
[PM: line wrap tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The per-task avdcache was incorrectly saving and reusing the
audited vector computed by avc_audit_required() rather than
recomputing based on the currently requested permissions and
distinguishing the denied versus allowed cases. As a result,
some permission checks were not being audited, e.g.
directory write checks after a previously cached directory
search check.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: dde3a5d0f4dce ("selinux: move avdcache to per-task security struct")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
[PM: line wrap tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: fix overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checks</title>
<updated>2026-04-03T20:53:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Moore</name>
<email>paul@paul-moore.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-01-01T22:19:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=82544d36b1729153c8aeb179e84750f0c085d3b1'/>
<id>82544d36b1729153c8aeb179e84750f0c085d3b1</id>
<content type='text'>
The existing SELinux security model for overlayfs is to allow access if
the current task is able to access the top level file (the "user" file)
and the mounter's credentials are sufficient to access the lower
level file (the "backing" file).  Unfortunately, the current code does
not properly enforce these access controls for both mmap() and mprotect()
operations on overlayfs filesystems.

This patch makes use of the newly created security_mmap_backing_file()
LSM hook to provide the missing backing file enforcement for mmap()
operations, and leverages the backing file API and new LSM blob to
provide the necessary information to properly enforce the mprotect()
access controls.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The existing SELinux security model for overlayfs is to allow access if
the current task is able to access the top level file (the "user" file)
and the mounter's credentials are sufficient to access the lower
level file (the "backing" file).  Unfortunately, the current code does
not properly enforce these access controls for both mmap() and mprotect()
operations on overlayfs filesystems.

This patch makes use of the newly created security_mmap_backing_file()
LSM hook to provide the missing backing file enforcement for mmap()
operations, and leverages the backing file API and new LSM blob to
provide the necessary information to properly enforce the mprotect()
access controls.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
