<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/security/selinux/include, branch v3.2.74</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>SELinux: Fix possible NULL pointer dereference in selinux_inode_permission()</title>
<updated>2014-02-15T19:20:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steven Rostedt</name>
<email>rostedt@goodmis.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-01-10T02:46:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=2ab27c173dcb3a2ea2e957f06231307c464ba334'/>
<id>2ab27c173dcb3a2ea2e957f06231307c464ba334</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3dc91d4338d698ce77832985f9cb183d8eeaf6be upstream.

While running stress tests on adding and deleting ftrace instances I hit
this bug:

  BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020
  IP: selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
  PGD 63681067 PUD 7ddbe067 PMD 0
  Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT
  CPU: 0 PID: 5634 Comm: ftrace-test-mki Not tainted 3.13.0-rc4-test-00033-gd2a6dde-dirty #20
  Hardware name:                  /DG965MQ, BIOS MQ96510J.86A.0372.2006.0605.1717 06/05/2006
  task: ffff880078375800 ti: ffff88007ddb0000 task.ti: ffff88007ddb0000
  RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff812d8bc5&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffff812d8bc5&gt;] selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
  RSP: 0018:ffff88007ddb1c48  EFLAGS: 00010246
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000800000 RCX: ffff88006dd43840
  RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000081 RDI: ffff88006ee46000
  RBP: ffff88007ddb1c88 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88007ddb1c54
  R10: 6e6576652f6f6f66 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: 0000000000000000
  R13: 0000000000000081 R14: ffff88006ee46000 R15: 0000000000000000
  FS:  00007f217b5b6700(0000) GS:ffffffff81e21000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033^M
  CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 000000006a0fe000 CR4: 00000000000007f0
  Call Trace:
    security_inode_permission+0x1c/0x30
    __inode_permission+0x41/0xa0
    inode_permission+0x18/0x50
    link_path_walk+0x66/0x920
    path_openat+0xa6/0x6c0
    do_filp_open+0x43/0xa0
    do_sys_open+0x146/0x240
    SyS_open+0x1e/0x20
    system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
  Code: 84 a1 00 00 00 81 e3 00 20 00 00 89 d8 83 c8 02 40 f6 c6 04 0f 45 d8 40 f6 c6 08 74 71 80 cf 02 49 8b 46 38 4c 8d 4d cc 45 31 c0 &lt;0f&gt; b7 50 20 8b 70 1c 48 8b 41 70 89 d9 8b 78 04 e8 36 cf ff ff
  RIP  selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
  CR2: 0000000000000020

Investigating, I found that the inode-&gt;i_security was NULL, and the
dereference of it caused the oops.

in selinux_inode_permission():

	isec = inode-&gt;i_security;

	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec-&gt;sid, isec-&gt;sclass, perms, 0, &amp;avd);

Note, the crash came from stressing the deletion and reading of debugfs
files.  I was not able to recreate this via normal files.  But I'm not
sure they are safe.  It may just be that the race window is much harder
to hit.

What seems to have happened (and what I have traced), is the file is
being opened at the same time the file or directory is being deleted.
As the dentry and inode locks are not held during the path walk, nor is
the inodes ref counts being incremented, there is nothing saving these
structures from being discarded except for an rcu_read_lock().

The rcu_read_lock() protects against freeing of the inode, but it does
not protect freeing of the inode_security_struct.  Now if the freeing of
the i_security happens with a call_rcu(), and the i_security field of
the inode is not changed (it gets freed as the inode gets freed) then
there will be no issue here.  (Linus Torvalds suggested not setting the
field to NULL such that we do not need to check if it is NULL in the
permission check).

Note, this is a hack, but it fixes the problem at hand.  A real fix is
to restructure the destroy_inode() to call all the destructor handlers
from the RCU callback.  But that is a major job to do, and requires a
lot of work.  For now, we just band-aid this bug with this fix (it
works), and work on a more maintainable solution in the future.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140109101932.0508dec7@gandalf.local.home
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140109182756.17abaaa8@gandalf.local.home

Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3dc91d4338d698ce77832985f9cb183d8eeaf6be upstream.

While running stress tests on adding and deleting ftrace instances I hit
this bug:

  BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020
  IP: selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
  PGD 63681067 PUD 7ddbe067 PMD 0
  Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT
  CPU: 0 PID: 5634 Comm: ftrace-test-mki Not tainted 3.13.0-rc4-test-00033-gd2a6dde-dirty #20
  Hardware name:                  /DG965MQ, BIOS MQ96510J.86A.0372.2006.0605.1717 06/05/2006
  task: ffff880078375800 ti: ffff88007ddb0000 task.ti: ffff88007ddb0000
  RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff812d8bc5&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffff812d8bc5&gt;] selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
  RSP: 0018:ffff88007ddb1c48  EFLAGS: 00010246
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000800000 RCX: ffff88006dd43840
  RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000081 RDI: ffff88006ee46000
  RBP: ffff88007ddb1c88 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88007ddb1c54
  R10: 6e6576652f6f6f66 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: 0000000000000000
  R13: 0000000000000081 R14: ffff88006ee46000 R15: 0000000000000000
  FS:  00007f217b5b6700(0000) GS:ffffffff81e21000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033^M
  CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 000000006a0fe000 CR4: 00000000000007f0
  Call Trace:
    security_inode_permission+0x1c/0x30
    __inode_permission+0x41/0xa0
    inode_permission+0x18/0x50
    link_path_walk+0x66/0x920
    path_openat+0xa6/0x6c0
    do_filp_open+0x43/0xa0
    do_sys_open+0x146/0x240
    SyS_open+0x1e/0x20
    system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
  Code: 84 a1 00 00 00 81 e3 00 20 00 00 89 d8 83 c8 02 40 f6 c6 04 0f 45 d8 40 f6 c6 08 74 71 80 cf 02 49 8b 46 38 4c 8d 4d cc 45 31 c0 &lt;0f&gt; b7 50 20 8b 70 1c 48 8b 41 70 89 d9 8b 78 04 e8 36 cf ff ff
  RIP  selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
  CR2: 0000000000000020

Investigating, I found that the inode-&gt;i_security was NULL, and the
dereference of it caused the oops.

in selinux_inode_permission():

	isec = inode-&gt;i_security;

	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec-&gt;sid, isec-&gt;sclass, perms, 0, &amp;avd);

Note, the crash came from stressing the deletion and reading of debugfs
files.  I was not able to recreate this via normal files.  But I'm not
sure they are safe.  It may just be that the race window is much harder
to hit.

What seems to have happened (and what I have traced), is the file is
being opened at the same time the file or directory is being deleted.
As the dentry and inode locks are not held during the path walk, nor is
the inodes ref counts being incremented, there is nothing saving these
structures from being discarded except for an rcu_read_lock().

The rcu_read_lock() protects against freeing of the inode, but it does
not protect freeing of the inode_security_struct.  Now if the freeing of
the i_security happens with a call_rcu(), and the i_security field of
the inode is not changed (it gets freed as the inode gets freed) then
there will be no issue here.  (Linus Torvalds suggested not setting the
field to NULL such that we do not need to check if it is NULL in the
permission check).

Note, this is a hack, but it fixes the problem at hand.  A real fix is
to restructure the destroy_inode() to call all the destructor handlers
from the RCU callback.  But that is a major job to do, and requires a
lot of work.  For now, we just band-aid this bug with this fix (it
works), and work on a more maintainable solution in the future.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140109101932.0508dec7@gandalf.local.home
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140109182756.17abaaa8@gandalf.local.home

Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: sparse fix: fix several warnings in the security server code</title>
<updated>2011-09-09T23:56:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>James Morris</name>
<email>jmorris@namei.org</email>
</author>
<published>2011-08-30T02:52:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=7b98a5857c3fa86cb0a7e5f893643491a8b5b425'/>
<id>7b98a5857c3fa86cb0a7e5f893643491a8b5b425</id>
<content type='text'>
Fix several sparse warnings in the SELinux security server code.

Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Fix several sparse warnings in the SELinux security server code.

Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: sparse fix: fix warnings in netlink code</title>
<updated>2011-09-09T23:56:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>James Morris</name>
<email>jmorris@namei.org</email>
</author>
<published>2011-08-30T02:09:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=6a3fbe81179c85eb53054a0f4c8423ffec0276a7'/>
<id>6a3fbe81179c85eb53054a0f4c8423ffec0276a7</id>
<content type='text'>
Fix sparse warnings in SELinux Netlink code.

Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Fix sparse warnings in SELinux Netlink code.

Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: sparse fix: eliminate warnings for selinuxfs</title>
<updated>2011-09-09T23:56:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>James Morris</name>
<email>jmorris@namei.org</email>
</author>
<published>2011-08-30T00:50:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ad3fa08c4ff84ed87649d72e8497735c85561a3d'/>
<id>ad3fa08c4ff84ed87649d72e8497735c85561a3d</id>
<content type='text'>
Fixes several sparse warnings for selinuxfs.c

Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Fixes several sparse warnings for selinuxfs.c

Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: sparse fix: declare selinux_disable() in security.h</title>
<updated>2011-09-09T23:56:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>James Morris</name>
<email>jmorris@namei.org</email>
</author>
<published>2011-08-17T01:17:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=58982b74832917405a483a22beede729e3175376'/>
<id>58982b74832917405a483a22beede729e3175376</id>
<content type='text'>
Sparse fix: declare selinux_disable() in security.h

Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Sparse fix: declare selinux_disable() in security.h

Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: sparse fix: move selinux_complete_init</title>
<updated>2011-09-09T23:56:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>James Morris</name>
<email>jmorris@namei.org</email>
</author>
<published>2011-08-17T01:13:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=cc59a582d6081b296e481b8bc9676b5c2faad818'/>
<id>cc59a582d6081b296e481b8bc9676b5c2faad818</id>
<content type='text'>
Sparse fix: move selinux_complete_init

Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Sparse fix: move selinux_complete_init

Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>doc: Update the email address for Paul Moore in various source files</title>
<updated>2011-08-02T00:58:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Moore</name>
<email>paul.moore@hp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-08-01T11:10:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=82c21bfab41a77bc01affe21bea9727d776774a7'/>
<id>82c21bfab41a77bc01affe21bea9727d776774a7</id>
<content type='text'>
My @hp.com will no longer be valid starting August 5, 2011 so an update is
necessary.  My new email address is employer independent so we don't have
to worry about doing this again any time soon.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul.moore@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
My @hp.com will no longer be valid starting August 5, 2011 so an update is
necessary.  My new email address is employer independent so we don't have
to worry about doing this again any time soon.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul.moore@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'master' of git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/selinux into for-linus</title>
<updated>2011-05-24T13:20:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>James Morris</name>
<email>jmorris@namei.org</email>
</author>
<published>2011-05-24T13:20:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=b7b57551bbda1390959207f79f2038aa7adb72ae'/>
<id>b7b57551bbda1390959207f79f2038aa7adb72ae</id>
<content type='text'>
Conflicts:
	lib/flex_array.c
	security/selinux/avc.c
	security/selinux/hooks.c
	security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
	security/smack/smack_lsm.c

Manually resolve conflicts.

Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Conflicts:
	lib/flex_array.c
	security/selinux/avc.c
	security/selinux/hooks.c
	security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
	security/smack/smack_lsm.c

Manually resolve conflicts.

Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: avoid unnecessary avc cache stat hit count</title>
<updated>2011-05-20T04:22:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2011-05-20T04:22:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=257313b2a87795e07a0bdf58d0fffbdba8b31051'/>
<id>257313b2a87795e07a0bdf58d0fffbdba8b31051</id>
<content type='text'>
There is no point in counting hits - we can calculate it from the number
of lookups and misses.

This makes the avc statistics a bit smaller, and makes the code
generation better too.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
There is no point in counting hits - we can calculate it from the number
of lookups and misses.

This makes the avc statistics a bit smaller, and makes the code
generation better too.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>SELINUX: Make selinux cache VFS RCU walks safe</title>
<updated>2011-04-26T01:16:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Paris</name>
<email>eparis@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-04-25T20:26:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=9ade0cf440a1e5800dc68eef2e77b8d9d83a6dff'/>
<id>9ade0cf440a1e5800dc68eef2e77b8d9d83a6dff</id>
<content type='text'>
Now that the security modules can decide whether they support the
dcache RCU walk or not it's possible to make selinux a bit more
RCU friendly.  The SELinux AVC and security server access decision
code is RCU safe.  A specific piece of the LSM audit code may not
be RCU safe.

This patch makes the VFS RCU walk retry if it would hit the non RCU
safe chunk of code.  It will normally just work under RCU.  This is
done simply by passing the VFS RCU state as a flag down into the
avc_audit() code and returning ECHILD there if it would have an issue.

Based-on-patch-by: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Now that the security modules can decide whether they support the
dcache RCU walk or not it's possible to make selinux a bit more
RCU friendly.  The SELinux AVC and security server access decision
code is RCU safe.  A specific piece of the LSM audit code may not
be RCU safe.

This patch makes the VFS RCU walk retry if it would hit the non RCU
safe chunk of code.  It will normally just work under RCU.  This is
done simply by passing the VFS RCU state as a flag down into the
avc_audit() code and returning ECHILD there if it would have an issue.

Based-on-patch-by: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
