linux-toradex.git/security/selinux/netlabel.c, branch v7.2-rc5 Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20240911' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm 2024-09-16T16:19:47+00:00 Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org 2024-09-16T16:19:47+00:00 a430d95c5efa2b545d26a094eb5f624e36732af0 Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore: - Move the LSM framework to static calls This transitions the vast majority of the LSM callbacks into static calls. Those callbacks which haven't been converted were left as-is due to the general ugliness of the changes required to support the static call conversion; we can revisit those callbacks at a future date. - Add the Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) LSM This adds a new LSM, Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE). There is plenty of documentation about IPE in this patches, so I'll refrain from going into too much detail here, but the basic motivation behind IPE is to provide a mechanism such that administrators can restrict execution to only those binaries which come from integrity protected storage, e.g. a dm-verity protected filesystem. You will notice that IPE requires additional LSM hooks in the initramfs, dm-verity, and fs-verity code, with the associated patches carrying ACK/review tags from the associated maintainers. We couldn't find an obvious maintainer for the initramfs code, but the IPE patchset has been widely posted over several years. Both Deven Bowers and Fan Wu have contributed to IPE's development over the past several years, with Fan Wu agreeing to serve as the IPE maintainer moving forward. Once IPE is accepted into your tree, I'll start working with Fan to ensure he has the necessary accounts, keys, etc. so that he can start submitting IPE pull requests to you directly during the next merge window. - Move the lifecycle management of the LSM blobs to the LSM framework Management of the LSM blobs (the LSM state buffers attached to various kernel structs, typically via a void pointer named "security" or similar) has been mixed, some blobs were allocated/managed by individual LSMs, others were managed by the LSM framework itself. Starting with this pull we move management of all the LSM blobs, minus the XFRM blob, into the framework itself, improving consistency across LSMs, and reducing the amount of duplicated code across LSMs. Due to some additional work required to migrate the XFRM blob, it has been left as a todo item for a later date; from a practical standpoint this omission should have little impact as only SELinux provides a XFRM LSM implementation. - Fix problems with the LSM's handling of F_SETOWN The LSM hook for the fcntl(F_SETOWN) operation had a couple of problems: it was racy with itself, and it was disconnected from the associated DAC related logic in such a way that the LSM state could be updated in cases where the DAC state would not. We fix both of these problems by moving the security_file_set_fowner() hook into the same section of code where the DAC attributes are updated. Not only does this resolve the DAC/LSM synchronization issue, but as that code block is protected by a lock, it also resolve the race condition. - Fix potential problems with the security_inode_free() LSM hook Due to use of RCU to protect inodes and the placement of the LSM hook associated with freeing the inode, there is a bit of a challenge when it comes to managing any LSM state associated with an inode. The VFS folks are not open to relocating the LSM hook so we have to get creative when it comes to releasing an inode's LSM state. Traditionally we have used a single LSM callback within the hook that is triggered when the inode is "marked for death", but not actually released due to RCU. Unfortunately, this causes problems for LSMs which want to take an action when the inode's associated LSM state is actually released; so we add an additional LSM callback, inode_free_security_rcu(), that is called when the inode's LSM state is released in the RCU free callback. - Refactor two LSM hooks to better fit the LSM return value patterns The vast majority of the LSM hooks follow the "return 0 on success, negative values on failure" pattern, however, there are a small handful that have unique return value behaviors which has caused confusion in the past and makes it difficult for the BPF verifier to properly vet BPF LSM programs. This includes patches to convert two of these"special" LSM hooks to the common 0/-ERRNO pattern. - Various cleanups and improvements A handful of patches to remove redundant code, better leverage the IS_ERR_OR_NULL() helper, add missing "static" markings, and do some minor style fixups. * tag 'lsm-pr-20240911' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: (40 commits) security: Update file_set_fowner documentation fs: Fix file_set_fowner LSM hook inconsistencies lsm: Use IS_ERR_OR_NULL() helper function lsm: remove LSM_COUNT and LSM_CONFIG_COUNT ipe: Remove duplicated include in ipe.c lsm: replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls lsm: count the LSMs enabled at compile time kernel: Add helper macros for loop unrolling init/main.c: Initialize early LSMs after arch code, static keys and calls. MAINTAINERS: add IPE entry with Fan Wu as maintainer documentation: add IPE documentation ipe: kunit test for parser scripts: add boot policy generation program ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs lsm: add security_inode_setintegrity() hook ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider dm-verity: expose root hash digest and signature data to LSMs block,lsm: add LSM blob and new LSM hooks for block devices ipe: add permissive toggle ... 
Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore:

 - Move the LSM framework to static calls

   This transitions the vast majority of the LSM callbacks into static
   calls. Those callbacks which haven't been converted were left as-is
   due to the general ugliness of the changes required to support the
   static call conversion; we can revisit those callbacks at a future
   date.

 - Add the Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) LSM

   This adds a new LSM, Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE). There is
   plenty of documentation about IPE in this patches, so I'll refrain
   from going into too much detail here, but the basic motivation behind
   IPE is to provide a mechanism such that administrators can restrict
   execution to only those binaries which come from integrity protected
   storage, e.g. a dm-verity protected filesystem. You will notice that
   IPE requires additional LSM hooks in the initramfs, dm-verity, and
   fs-verity code, with the associated patches carrying ACK/review tags
   from the associated maintainers. We couldn't find an obvious
   maintainer for the initramfs code, but the IPE patchset has been
   widely posted over several years.

   Both Deven Bowers and Fan Wu have contributed to IPE's development
   over the past several years, with Fan Wu agreeing to serve as the IPE
   maintainer moving forward. Once IPE is accepted into your tree, I'll
   start working with Fan to ensure he has the necessary accounts, keys,
   etc. so that he can start submitting IPE pull requests to you
   directly during the next merge window.

 - Move the lifecycle management of the LSM blobs to the LSM framework

   Management of the LSM blobs (the LSM state buffers attached to
   various kernel structs, typically via a void pointer named "security"
   or similar) has been mixed, some blobs were allocated/managed by
   individual LSMs, others were managed by the LSM framework itself.

   Starting with this pull we move management of all the LSM blobs,
   minus the XFRM blob, into the framework itself, improving consistency
   across LSMs, and reducing the amount of duplicated code across LSMs.
   Due to some additional work required to migrate the XFRM blob, it has
   been left as a todo item for a later date; from a practical
   standpoint this omission should have little impact as only SELinux
   provides a XFRM LSM implementation.

 - Fix problems with the LSM's handling of F_SETOWN

   The LSM hook for the fcntl(F_SETOWN) operation had a couple of
   problems: it was racy with itself, and it was disconnected from the
   associated DAC related logic in such a way that the LSM state could
   be updated in cases where the DAC state would not. We fix both of
   these problems by moving the security_file_set_fowner() hook into the
   same section of code where the DAC attributes are updated. Not only
   does this resolve the DAC/LSM synchronization issue, but as that code
   block is protected by a lock, it also resolve the race condition.

 - Fix potential problems with the security_inode_free() LSM hook

   Due to use of RCU to protect inodes and the placement of the LSM hook
   associated with freeing the inode, there is a bit of a challenge when
   it comes to managing any LSM state associated with an inode. The VFS
   folks are not open to relocating the LSM hook so we have to get
   creative when it comes to releasing an inode's LSM state.
   Traditionally we have used a single LSM callback within the hook that
   is triggered when the inode is "marked for death", but not actually
   released due to RCU.

   Unfortunately, this causes problems for LSMs which want to take an
   action when the inode's associated LSM state is actually released; so
   we add an additional LSM callback, inode_free_security_rcu(), that is
   called when the inode's LSM state is released in the RCU free
   callback.

 - Refactor two LSM hooks to better fit the LSM return value patterns

   The vast majority of the LSM hooks follow the "return 0 on success,
   negative values on failure" pattern, however, there are a small
   handful that have unique return value behaviors which has caused
   confusion in the past and makes it difficult for the BPF verifier to
   properly vet BPF LSM programs. This includes patches to
   convert two of these"special" LSM hooks to the common 0/-ERRNO pattern.

 - Various cleanups and improvements

   A handful of patches to remove redundant code, better leverage the
   IS_ERR_OR_NULL() helper, add missing "static" markings, and do some
   minor style fixups.

* tag 'lsm-pr-20240911' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: (40 commits)
  security: Update file_set_fowner documentation
  fs: Fix file_set_fowner LSM hook inconsistencies
  lsm: Use IS_ERR_OR_NULL() helper function
  lsm: remove LSM_COUNT and LSM_CONFIG_COUNT
  ipe: Remove duplicated include in ipe.c
  lsm: replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls
  lsm: count the LSMs enabled at compile time
  kernel: Add helper macros for loop unrolling
  init/main.c: Initialize early LSMs after arch code, static keys and calls.
  MAINTAINERS: add IPE entry with Fan Wu as maintainer
  documentation: add IPE documentation
  ipe: kunit test for parser
  scripts: add boot policy generation program
  ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider
  fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs
  lsm: add security_inode_setintegrity() hook
  ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider
  dm-verity: expose root hash digest and signature data to LSMs
  block,lsm: add LSM blob and new LSM hooks for block devices
  ipe: add permissive toggle
  ...
selinux: mark both IPv4 and IPv6 accepted connection sockets as labeled 2024-08-28T15:48:07+00:00 Guido Trentalancia guido@trentalancia.com 2024-08-28T09:35:19+00:00 a3422eb4facdebb685b9b4688feb60430450e3c9 The current partial labeling was introduced in 389fb800ac8b ("netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux") due to the fact that IPv6 labeling was not supported yet at the time. Signed-off-by: Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.com> [PM: properly format the referenced commit ID, adjust subject] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> 
The current partial labeling was introduced in 389fb800ac8b ("netlabel:
Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux") due to the fact
that IPv6 labeling was not supported yet at the time.

Signed-off-by: Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.com>
[PM: properly format the referenced commit ID, adjust subject]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
lsm: infrastructure management of the sock security 2024-07-29T20:54:50+00:00 Casey Schaufler casey@schaufler-ca.com 2024-07-10T21:32:25+00:00 2aff9d20d50ac45dd13a013ef5231f4fb8912356 Move management of the sock->sk_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: subject tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> 
Move management of the sock->sk_security blob out
of the individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.

Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
selinux: refactor code to return ERR_PTR in selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr 2024-07-29T20:34:08+00:00 Gaosheng Cui cuigaosheng1@huawei.com 2024-07-12T01:45:34+00:00 fc328c869c4128fc1f975b8cfe92e9ec320d477f Refactor the code in selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr to return ERR_PTR when an error occurs. Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> 
Refactor the code in selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr to return ERR_PTR
when an error occurs.

Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
netlabel: fix RCU annotation for IPv4 options on socket creation 2024-05-13T21:58:12+00:00 Davide Caratti dcaratti@redhat.com 2024-05-10T17:19:12+00:00 8ec9897ec2e93a412b9e3119e3137583a85969e0 Xiumei reports the following splat when netlabel and TCP socket are used: ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 6.9.0-rc2+ #637 Not tainted ----------------------------- net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c:1880 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 1 lock held by ncat/23333: #0: ffffffff906030c0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: netlbl_sock_setattr+0x25/0x1b0 stack backtrace: CPU: 11 PID: 23333 Comm: ncat Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2+ #637 Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-6027R-72RF/X9DRH-7TF/7F/iTF/iF, BIOS 3.0 07/26/2013 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xa9/0xc0 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x117/0x190 cipso_v4_sock_setattr+0x1ab/0x1b0 netlbl_sock_setattr+0x13e/0x1b0 selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create+0x3f/0x80 selinux_socket_post_create+0x1a0/0x460 security_socket_post_create+0x42/0x60 __sock_create+0x342/0x3a0 __sys_socket_create.part.22+0x42/0x70 __sys_socket+0x37/0xb0 __x64_sys_socket+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x96/0x180 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x68d/0xa30 ? exc_page_fault+0x171/0x280 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x71/0x79 RIP: 0033:0x7fbc0ca3fc1b Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 05 f2 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa b8 29 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d d5 f1 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fff18635208 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000029 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00007fbc0ca3fc1b RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000002 RBP: 000055d24f80f8a0 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000020000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055d24f80f8a0 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000055d24f80fb88 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> The current implementation of cipso_v4_sock_setattr() replaces IP options under the assumption that the caller holds the socket lock; however, such assumption is not true, nor needed, in selinux_socket_post_create() hook. Let all callers of cipso_v4_sock_setattr() specify the "socket lock held" condition, except selinux_socket_post_create() _ where such condition can safely be set as true even without holding the socket lock. Fixes: f6d8bd051c39 ("inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt") Reported-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/f4260d000a3a55b9e8b6a3b4e3fffc7da9f82d41.1715359817.git.dcaratti@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> 
Xiumei reports the following splat when netlabel and TCP socket are used:

 =============================
 WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
 6.9.0-rc2+ #637 Not tainted
 -----------------------------
 net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c:1880 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage!

 other info that might help us debug this:

 rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
 1 lock held by ncat/23333:
  #0: ffffffff906030c0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: netlbl_sock_setattr+0x25/0x1b0

 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 11 PID: 23333 Comm: ncat Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2+ #637
 Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-6027R-72RF/X9DRH-7TF/7F/iTF/iF, BIOS 3.0  07/26/2013
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0xa9/0xc0
  lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x117/0x190
  cipso_v4_sock_setattr+0x1ab/0x1b0
  netlbl_sock_setattr+0x13e/0x1b0
  selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create+0x3f/0x80
  selinux_socket_post_create+0x1a0/0x460
  security_socket_post_create+0x42/0x60
  __sock_create+0x342/0x3a0
  __sys_socket_create.part.22+0x42/0x70
  __sys_socket+0x37/0xb0
  __x64_sys_socket+0x16/0x20
  do_syscall_64+0x96/0x180
  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x68d/0xa30
  ? exc_page_fault+0x171/0x280
  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x71/0x79
 RIP: 0033:0x7fbc0ca3fc1b
 Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 05 f2 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa b8 29 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d d5 f1 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
 RSP: 002b:00007fff18635208 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000029
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00007fbc0ca3fc1b
 RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000002
 RBP: 000055d24f80f8a0 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000001

R10: 0000000000020000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055d24f80f8a0
 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000055d24f80fb88 R15: 0000000000000000
  </TASK>

The current implementation of cipso_v4_sock_setattr() replaces IP options
under the assumption that the caller holds the socket lock; however, such
assumption is not true, nor needed, in selinux_socket_post_create() hook.

Let all callers of cipso_v4_sock_setattr() specify the "socket lock held"
condition, except selinux_socket_post_create() _ where such condition can
safely be set as true even without holding the socket lock.

Fixes: f6d8bd051c39 ("inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt")
Reported-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/f4260d000a3a55b9e8b6a3b4e3fffc7da9f82d41.1715359817.git.dcaratti@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
selinux: prevent KMSAN warning in selinux_inet_conn_request() 2023-08-15T22:23:22+00:00 Andrew Kanner andrew.kanner@gmail.com 2023-08-15T20:59:17+00:00 1df83cbf23a27174aee6ea5e52462f03f7e48a10 KMSAN reports the following issue: [ 81.822503] ===================================================== [ 81.823222] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in selinux_inet_conn_request+0x2c8/0x4b0 [ 81.823891] selinux_inet_conn_request+0x2c8/0x4b0 [ 81.824385] security_inet_conn_request+0xc0/0x160 [ 81.824886] tcp_v4_route_req+0x30e/0x490 [ 81.825343] tcp_conn_request+0xdc8/0x3400 [ 81.825813] tcp_v4_conn_request+0x134/0x190 [ 81.826292] tcp_rcv_state_process+0x1f4/0x3b40 [ 81.826797] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x9ca/0xc30 [ 81.827236] tcp_v4_rcv+0x3bf5/0x4180 [ 81.827670] ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x822/0x1230 [ 81.828174] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x259/0x370 [ 81.828667] ip_local_deliver+0x1c0/0x450 [ 81.829105] ip_sublist_rcv+0xdc1/0xf50 [ 81.829534] ip_list_rcv+0x72e/0x790 [ 81.829941] __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x10d5/0x1180 [ 81.830499] netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0xc41/0x1190 [ 81.831064] napi_complete_done+0x2c4/0x8b0 [ 81.831532] e1000_clean+0x12bf/0x4d90 [ 81.831983] __napi_poll+0xa6/0x760 [ 81.832391] net_rx_action+0x84c/0x1550 [ 81.832831] __do_softirq+0x272/0xa6c [ 81.833239] __irq_exit_rcu+0xb7/0x1a0 [ 81.833654] irq_exit_rcu+0x17/0x40 [ 81.834044] common_interrupt+0x8d/0xa0 [ 81.834494] asm_common_interrupt+0x2b/0x40 [ 81.834949] default_idle+0x17/0x20 [ 81.835356] arch_cpu_idle+0xd/0x20 [ 81.835766] default_idle_call+0x43/0x70 [ 81.836210] do_idle+0x258/0x800 [ 81.836581] cpu_startup_entry+0x26/0x30 [ 81.837002] __pfx_ap_starting+0x0/0x10 [ 81.837444] secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0x17a/0x17b [ 81.837979] [ 81.838166] Local variable nlbl_type.i created at: [ 81.838596] selinux_inet_conn_request+0xe3/0x4b0 [ 81.839078] security_inet_conn_request+0xc0/0x160 KMSAN warning is reproducible with: * netlabel_mgmt_protocount is 0 (e.g. netlbl_enabled() returns 0) * CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM may be set or not * CONFIG_KMSAN=y * `ssh USER@HOSTNAME /bin/date` selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid() will call selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(), then fall to selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid() which will not initialize nlbl_type, but it will be passed to: err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid); and checked by KMSAN, although it will not be used inside security_net_peersid_resolve() (at least now), since this function will check either (xfrm_sid == SECSID_NULL) or (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL) first and return before using uninitialized nlbl_type. Signed-off-by: Andrew Kanner <andrew.kanner@gmail.com> [PM: subject line tweak, removed 'fixes' tag as code is not broken] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> 
KMSAN reports the following issue:
[   81.822503] =====================================================
[   81.823222] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in selinux_inet_conn_request+0x2c8/0x4b0
[   81.823891]  selinux_inet_conn_request+0x2c8/0x4b0
[   81.824385]  security_inet_conn_request+0xc0/0x160
[   81.824886]  tcp_v4_route_req+0x30e/0x490
[   81.825343]  tcp_conn_request+0xdc8/0x3400
[   81.825813]  tcp_v4_conn_request+0x134/0x190
[   81.826292]  tcp_rcv_state_process+0x1f4/0x3b40
[   81.826797]  tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x9ca/0xc30
[   81.827236]  tcp_v4_rcv+0x3bf5/0x4180
[   81.827670]  ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x822/0x1230
[   81.828174]  ip_local_deliver_finish+0x259/0x370
[   81.828667]  ip_local_deliver+0x1c0/0x450
[   81.829105]  ip_sublist_rcv+0xdc1/0xf50
[   81.829534]  ip_list_rcv+0x72e/0x790
[   81.829941]  __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x10d5/0x1180
[   81.830499]  netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0xc41/0x1190
[   81.831064]  napi_complete_done+0x2c4/0x8b0
[   81.831532]  e1000_clean+0x12bf/0x4d90
[   81.831983]  __napi_poll+0xa6/0x760
[   81.832391]  net_rx_action+0x84c/0x1550
[   81.832831]  __do_softirq+0x272/0xa6c
[   81.833239]  __irq_exit_rcu+0xb7/0x1a0
[   81.833654]  irq_exit_rcu+0x17/0x40
[   81.834044]  common_interrupt+0x8d/0xa0
[   81.834494]  asm_common_interrupt+0x2b/0x40
[   81.834949]  default_idle+0x17/0x20
[   81.835356]  arch_cpu_idle+0xd/0x20
[   81.835766]  default_idle_call+0x43/0x70
[   81.836210]  do_idle+0x258/0x800
[   81.836581]  cpu_startup_entry+0x26/0x30
[   81.837002]  __pfx_ap_starting+0x0/0x10
[   81.837444]  secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0x17a/0x17b
[   81.837979]
[   81.838166] Local variable nlbl_type.i created at:
[   81.838596]  selinux_inet_conn_request+0xe3/0x4b0
[   81.839078]  security_inet_conn_request+0xc0/0x160

KMSAN warning is reproducible with:
* netlabel_mgmt_protocount is 0 (e.g. netlbl_enabled() returns 0)
* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM may be set or not
* CONFIG_KMSAN=y
* `ssh USER@HOSTNAME /bin/date`

selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid() will call selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(), then fall
to selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid() which will not initialize nlbl_type,
but it will be passed to:

    err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid,
                                       nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);

and checked by KMSAN, although it will not be used inside
security_net_peersid_resolve() (at least now), since this function
will check either (xfrm_sid == SECSID_NULL) or (nlbl_sid ==
SECSID_NULL) first and return before using uninitialized nlbl_type.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Kanner <andrew.kanner@gmail.com>
[PM: subject line tweak, removed 'fixes' tag as code is not broken]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
selinux: Implement mptcp_add_subflow hook 2023-05-18T17:11:10+00:00 Paolo Abeni pabeni@redhat.com 2023-04-20T17:17:14+00:00 85c3222dddc6697dc7513623983a2ba748ba710e Newly added subflows should inherit the LSM label from the associated MPTCP socket regardless of the current context. This patch implements the above copying sid and class from the MPTCP socket context, deleting the existing subflow label, if any, and then re-creating the correct one. The new helper reuses the selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free() function, and the latter can end-up being called multiple times with the same argument; we additionally need to make it idempotent. Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Acked-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> 
Newly added subflows should inherit the LSM label from the associated
MPTCP socket regardless of the current context.

This patch implements the above copying sid and class from the MPTCP
socket context, deleting the existing subflow label, if any, and then
re-creating the correct one.

The new helper reuses the selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free() function,
and the latter can end-up being called multiple times with the same
argument; we additionally need to make it idempotent.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
selinux: stop passing selinux_state pointers and their offspring 2023-03-14T19:22:45+00:00 Stephen Smalley stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com 2023-03-09T18:30:37+00:00 e67b79850fcc4eb5816d69d34fd82aeda350aca7 Linus observed that the pervasive passing of selinux_state pointers introduced by me in commit aa8e712cee93 ("selinux: wrap global selinux state") adds overhead and complexity without providing any benefit. The original idea was to pave the way for SELinux namespaces but those have not yet been implemented and there isn't currently a concrete plan to do so. Remove the passing of the selinux_state pointers, reverting to direct use of the single global selinux_state, and likewise remove passing of child pointers like the selinux_avc. The selinux_policy pointer remains as it is needed for atomic switching of policies. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202303101057.mZ3Gv5fK-lkp@intel.com/ Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> 
Linus observed that the pervasive passing of selinux_state pointers
introduced by me in commit aa8e712cee93 ("selinux: wrap global selinux
state") adds overhead and complexity without providing any
benefit. The original idea was to pave the way for SELinux namespaces
but those have not yet been implemented and there isn't currently
a concrete plan to do so. Remove the passing of the selinux_state
pointers, reverting to direct use of the single global selinux_state,
and likewise remove passing of child pointers like the selinux_avc.
The selinux_policy pointer remains as it is needed for atomic switching
of policies.

Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202303101057.mZ3Gv5fK-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
security: pass asoc to sctp_assoc_request and sctp_sk_clone 2021-11-03T11:09:20+00:00 Xin Long lucien.xin@gmail.com 2021-11-02T12:02:47+00:00 c081d53f97a1a90a38e4296dd3d6fda5e38dca2c This patch is to move secid and peer_secid from endpoint to association, and pass asoc to sctp_assoc_request and sctp_sk_clone instead of ep. As ep is the local endpoint and asoc represents a connection, and in SCTP one sk/ep could have multiple asoc/connection, saving secid/peer_secid for new asoc will overwrite the old asoc's. Note that since asoc can be passed as NULL, security_sctp_assoc_request() is moved to the place right after the new_asoc is created in sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() and sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init(). v1->v2: - fix the description of selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(), as Jakub noticed. - fix the annotation in selinux_sctp_assoc_request(), as Richard Noticed. Fixes: 72e89f50084c ("security: Add support for SCTP security hooks") Reported-by: Prashanth Prahlad <pprahlad@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> Tested-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> 
This patch is to move secid and peer_secid from endpoint to association,
and pass asoc to sctp_assoc_request and sctp_sk_clone instead of ep. As
ep is the local endpoint and asoc represents a connection, and in SCTP
one sk/ep could have multiple asoc/connection, saving secid/peer_secid
for new asoc will overwrite the old asoc's.

Note that since asoc can be passed as NULL, security_sctp_assoc_request()
is moved to the place right after the new_asoc is created in
sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() and sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init().

v1->v2:
  - fix the description of selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(), as Jakub noticed.
  - fix the annotation in selinux_sctp_assoc_request(), as Richard Noticed.

Fixes: 72e89f50084c ("security: Add support for SCTP security hooks")
Reported-by: Prashanth Prahlad <pprahlad@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Tested-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
selinux: fix all of the W=1 build warnings 2021-10-13T20:31:51+00:00 Paul Moore paul@paul-moore.com 2020-11-19T02:15:08+00:00 e9fd7292935906c09824a10bc27b48fd3992c366 There were a number of places in the code where the function definition did not match the associated comment block as well at least one file where the appropriate header files were not included (missing function declaration/prototype); this patch fixes all of these issue such that building the SELinux code with "W=1" is now warning free. % make W=1 security/selinux/ Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> 
There were a number of places in the code where the function
definition did not match the associated comment block as well
at least one file where the appropriate header files were not
included (missing function declaration/prototype); this patch
fixes all of these issue such that building the SELinux code
with "W=1" is now warning free.

 % make W=1 security/selinux/

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>