linux-toradex.git/security/smack, branch v3.14.3

Merge git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/audit

2014-01-24T02:08:10+00:00

Pull audit update from Eric Paris:
 "Again we stayed pretty well contained inside the audit system.
  Venturing out was fixing a couple of function prototypes which were
  inconsistent (didn't hurt anything, but we used the same value as an
  int, uint, u32, and I think even a long in a couple of places).

  We also made a couple of minor changes to when a couple of LSMs called
  the audit system.  We hoped to add aarch64 audit support this go
  round, but it wasn't ready.

  I'm disappearing on vacation on Thursday.  I should have internet
  access, but it'll be spotty.  If anything goes wrong please be sure to
  cc rgb@redhat.com.  He'll make fixing things his top priority"

* git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/audit: (50 commits)
  audit: whitespace fix in kernel-parameters.txt
  audit: fix location of __net_initdata for audit_net_ops
  audit: remove pr_info for every network namespace
  audit: Modify a set of system calls in audit class definitions
  audit: Convert int limit uses to u32
  audit: Use more current logging style
  audit: Use hex_byte_pack_upper
  audit: correct a type mismatch in audit_syscall_exit()
  audit: reorder AUDIT_TTY_SET arguments
  audit: rework AUDIT_TTY_SET to only grab spin_lock once
  audit: remove needless switch in AUDIT_SET
  audit: use define's for audit version
  audit: documentation of audit= kernel parameter
  audit: wait_for_auditd rework for readability
  audit: update MAINTAINERS
  audit: log task info on feature change
  audit: fix incorrect set of audit_sock
  audit: print error message when fail to create audit socket
  audit: fix dangling keywords in audit_log_set_loginuid() output
  audit: log on errors from filter user rules
  ...

smack: call WARN_ONCE() instead of calling audit_log_start()

2014-01-14T03:32:06+00:00

Remove the call to audit_log() (which call audit_log_start()) and deal with
the errors in the caller, logging only once if the condition is met.  Calling
audit_log_start() in this location makes buffer allocation and locking more
complicated in the calling tree (audit_filter_user()).

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs 
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris

Smack: File receive audit correction

2013-12-31T21:35:27+00:00

Eric Paris politely points out:

    Inside smack_file_receive() it seems like you are initting the audit
    field with LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK.  And then use
    smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path().

    Seems like LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH would make more sense.  (and depending
    on how it's used fix a crash...)

He is correct. This puts things in order.

Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler

Smack: Rationalize mount restrictions

2013-12-31T21:35:16+00:00

The mount restrictions imposed by Smack rely heavily on the
use of the filesystem "floor", which is the label that all
processes writing to the filesystem must have access to. It
turns out that while the "floor" notion is sound, it has yet
to be fully implemented and has never been used.

The sb_mount and sb_umount hooks only make sense if the
filesystem floor is used actively, and it isn't. They can
be reintroduced if a rational restriction comes up. Until
then, they get removed.

The sb_kern_mount hook is required for the option processing.
It is too permissive in the case of unprivileged mounts,
effectively bypassing the CAP_MAC_ADMIN restrictions if
any of the smack options are specified. Unprivileged mounts
are no longer allowed to set Smack filesystem options.
Additionally, the root and default values are set to the
label of the caller, in keeping with the policy that objects
get the label of their creator.

Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler

Smack: change rule cap check

2013-12-23T23:57:43+00:00

smk_write_change_rule() is calling capable rather than
the more correct smack_privileged(). This allows for setting
rules in violation of the onlycap facility. This is the
simple repair.

Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler

Smack: Make the syslog control configurable

2013-12-23T23:50:55+00:00

The syslog control requires that the calling proccess
have the floor ("_") Smack label. Tizen does not run any
processes except for kernel helpers with the floor label.
This changes allows the admin to configure a specific
label for syslog. The default value is the star ("*")
label, effectively removing the restriction. The value
can be set using smackfs/syslog for anyone who wants
a more restrictive behavior.

Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler

Smack: Prevent the * and @ labels from being used in SMACK64EXEC

2013-12-19T21:05:24+00:00

Smack prohibits processes from using the star ("*") and web ("@") labels
because we don't want files with those labels getting created implicitly.
All setting of those labels should be done explicitly. The trouble is that
there is no check for these labels in the processing of SMACK64EXEC. That
is repaired.

Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler

smack: fix: allow either entry be missing on access/access2 check (v2)

2013-12-11T18:48:55+00:00

This is a regression caused by f7112e6c. When either subject or
object is not found the answer for access should be no. This
patch fixes the situation. '0' is written back instead of failing
with -EINVAL.

v2: cosmetic style fixes

Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen

Smack: Ptrace access check mode

2013-10-28T17:23:36+00:00

When the ptrace security hooks were split the addition of
a mode parameter was not taken advantage of in the Smack
ptrace access check. This changes the access check from
always looking for read and write access to using the
passed mode. This will make use of /proc much happier.

Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler

Smack: Implement lock security mode

2013-10-18T16:39:33+00:00

Linux file locking does not follow the same rules
as other mechanisms. Even though it is a write operation
a process can set a read lock on files which it has open
only for read access. Two programs with read access to
a file can use read locks to communicate.

This is not acceptable in a Mandatory Access Control
environment. Smack treats setting a read lock as the
write operation that it is. Unfortunately, many programs
assume that setting a read lock is a read operation.
These programs are unhappy in the Smack environment.

This patch introduces a new access mode (lock) to address
this problem. A process with lock access to a file can
set a read lock. A process with write access to a file can
set a read lock or a write lock. This prevents a situation
where processes are granted write access just so they can
set read locks.

Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler