Remove some #inclusions of linux/pipe_fs_i.h that don't seem to be
necessary any more.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

Pull smack updates from Casey Schaufler:
 "Four patches for v5.4. Nothing is major.

  All but one are in response to mechanically detected potential issues.
  The remaining patch cleans up kernel-doc notations"

* tag 'smack-for-5.4-rc1' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next:
  smack: use GFP_NOFS while holding inode_smack::smk_lock
  security: smack: Fix possible null-pointer dereferences in smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb()
  smack: fix some kernel-doc notations
  Smack: Don't ignore other bprm->unsafe flags if LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE is set

inode_smack::smk_lock is taken during smack_d_instantiate(), which is
called during a filesystem transaction when creating a file on ext4.
Therefore to avoid a deadlock, all code that takes this lock must use
GFP_NOFS, to prevent memory reclaim from waiting for the filesystem
transaction to complete.

Reported-by: syzbot+0eefc1e06a77d327a056@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

In smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(), there is an if statement
on line 3920 to check whether skb is NULL:
    if (skb && skb->secmark != 0)

This check indicates skb can be NULL in some cases.

But on lines 3931 and 3932, skb is used:
    ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
    ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);

Thus, possible null-pointer dereferences may occur when skb is NULL.

To fix these possible bugs, an if statement is added to check skb.

These bugs are found by a static analysis tool STCheck written by us.

Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Fix/add kernel-doc notation and fix typos in security/smack/.

Signed-off-by: Liguang Zhang <zhangliguang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

There is a logic bug in the current smack_bprm_set_creds():
If LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE is set, but the ptrace state is deemed to be
acceptable (e.g. because the ptracer detached in the meantime), the other
->unsafe flags aren't checked. As far as I can tell, this means that
something like the following could work (but I haven't tested it):

 - task A: create task B with fork()
 - task B: set NO_NEW_PRIVS
 - task B: install a seccomp filter that makes open() return 0 under some
   conditions
 - task B: replace fd 0 with a malicious library
 - task A: attach to task B with PTRACE_ATTACH
 - task B: execve() a file with an SMACK64EXEC extended attribute
 - task A: while task B is still in the middle of execve(), exit (which
   destroys the ptrace relationship)

Make sure that if any flags other than LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE are set in
bprm->unsafe, we reject the execve().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5663884caab1 ("Smack: unify all ptrace accesses in the smack")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Pull vfs mount updates from Al Viro:
 "The first part of mount updates.

  Convert filesystems to use the new mount API"

* 'work.mount0' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (63 commits)
  mnt_init(): call shmem_init() unconditionally
  constify ksys_mount() string arguments
  don't bother with registering rootfs
  init_rootfs(): don't bother with init_ramfs_fs()
  vfs: Convert smackfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert selinuxfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert securityfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert apparmorfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert openpromfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert xenfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert gadgetfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert oprofilefs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert ibmasmfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert qib_fs/ipathfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert efivarfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert configfs to use the new mount API
  vfs: Convert binfmt_misc to use the new mount API
  convenience helper: get_tree_single()
  convenience helper get_tree_nodev()
  vfs: Kill sget_userns()
  ...

This reverts merge 0f75ef6a9cff49ff612f7ce0578bced9d0b38325 (and thus
effectively commits

   7a1ade847596 ("keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION")
   2e12256b9a76 ("keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL")

that the merge brought in).

It turns out that it breaks booting with an encrypted volume, and Eric
biggers reports that it also breaks the fscrypt tests [1] and loading of
in-kernel X.509 certificates [2].

The root cause of all the breakage is likely the same, but David Howells
is off email so rather than try to work it out it's getting reverted in
order to not impact the rest of the merge window.

 [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190710011559.GA7973@sol.localdomain/
 [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190710013225.GB7973@sol.localdomain/

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wjxoeMJfeBahnWH=9zShKp2bsVy527vo3_y8HfOdhwAAw@mail.gmail.com/
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Pull keyring ACL support from David Howells:
 "This changes the permissions model used by keys and keyrings to be
  based on an internal ACL by the following means:

   - Replace the permissions mask internally with an ACL that contains a
     list of ACEs, each with a specific subject with a permissions mask.
     Potted default ACLs are available for new keys and keyrings.

     ACE subjects can be macroised to indicate the UID and GID specified
     on the key (which remain). Future commits will be able to add
     additional subject types, such as specific UIDs or domain
     tags/namespaces.

     Also split a number of permissions to give finer control. Examples
     include splitting the revocation permit from the change-attributes
     permit, thereby allowing someone to be granted permission to revoke
     a key without allowing them to change the owner; also the ability
     to join a keyring is split from the ability to link to it, thereby
     stopping a process accessing a keyring by joining it and thus
     acquiring use of possessor permits.

   - Provide a keyctl to allow the granting or denial of one or more
     permits to a specific subject. Direct access to the ACL is not
     granted, and the ACL cannot be viewed"

* tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
  keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION
  keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL

Convert the smackfs filesystem to the new internal mount API as the old
one will be obsoleted and removed.  This allows greater flexibility in
communication of mount parameters between userspace, the VFS and the
filesystem.

See Documentation/filesystems/mount_api.txt for more information.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>