linux-toradex.git/security, branch v2.6.21.6

[PATCH] sanitize security_getprocattr() API

2007-03-14T22:27:48+00:00

have it return the buffer it had allocated

Acked-by: Stephen Smalley 
Acked-by: James Morris 
Signed-off-by: Al Viro 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

Always initialize scontext and scontext_len

2007-02-26T19:43:15+00:00

Always initialize *scontext and *scontext_len in security_sid_to_context.

(via http://lkml.org/lkml/2007/2/23/135)

Signed-off-by:  Stephen Smalley 
Signed-off-by: James Morris

Reassign printk levels in selinux kernel code

2007-02-26T19:43:07+00:00

Below is a patch which demotes many printk lines to KERN_DEBUG from
KERN_INFO.  It should help stop the spamming of logs with messages in
which users are not interested nor is there any action that users should
take.  It also promotes some KERN_INFO to KERN_ERR such as when there
are improper attempts to register/unregister security modules.

A similar patch was discussed a while back on list:
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?t=116656343500003&r=1&w=2
This patch addresses almost all of the issues raised.  I believe the
only advice not taken was in the demoting of messages related to
undefined permissions and classes.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris 
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley 

 security/selinux/hooks.c       |   20 ++++++++++----------
 security/selinux/ss/avtab.c    |    2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c |    6 +++---
 security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c   |    2 +-
 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: James Morris

[PATCH] selinux: enhance selinux to always ignore private inodes

2007-02-14T16:10:00+00:00

Hmmm...turns out to not be quite enough, as the /proc/sys inodes aren't truly
private to the fs, so we can run into them in a variety of security hooks
beyond just the inode hooks, such as security_file_permission (when reading
and writing them via the vfs helpers), security_sb_mount (when mounting other
filesystems on directories in proc like binfmt_misc), and deeper within the
security module itself (as in flush_unauthorized_files upon inheritance across
execve).  So I think we have to add an IS_PRIVATE() guard within SELinux, as
below.  Note however that the use of the private flag here could be confusing,
as these inodes are _not_ private to the fs, are exposed to userspace, and
security modules must implement the sysctl hook to get any access control over
them.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman 
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

[PATCH] sysctl: fix the selinux_sysctl_get_sid

2007-02-14T16:10:00+00:00

I goofed and when reenabling the fine grained selinux labels for
sysctls and forgot to add the "/sys" prefix before consulting
the policy database.  When computing the same path using
proc_dir_entries we got the "/sys" for free as it was part
of the tree, but it isn't true for clt_table trees.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman 
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

[PATCH] sysctl: remove the proc_dir_entry member for the sysctl tables

2007-02-14T16:10:00+00:00

It isn't needed anymore, all of the users are gone, and all of the ctl_table
initializers have been converted to use explicit names of the fields they are
initializing.

[akpm@osdl.org: NTFS fix]
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman 
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley 
Cc: James Morris 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

[PATCH] remove many unneeded #includes of sched.h

2007-02-14T16:09:54+00:00

After Al Viro (finally) succeeded in removing the sched.h #include in module.h
recently, it makes sense again to remove other superfluous sched.h includes.
There are quite a lot of files which include it but don't actually need
anything defined in there.  Presumably these includes were once needed for
macros that used to live in sched.h, but moved to other header files in the
course of cleaning it up.

To ease the pain, this time I did not fiddle with any header files and only
removed #includes from .c-files, which tend to cause less trouble.

Compile tested against 2.6.20-rc2 and 2.6.20-rc2-mm2 (with offsets) on alpha,
arm, i386, ia64, mips, powerpc, and x86_64 with allnoconfig, defconfig,
allmodconfig, and allyesconfig as well as a few randconfigs on x86_64 and all
configs in arch/arm/configs on arm.  I also checked that no new warnings were
introduced by the patch (actually, some warnings are removed that were emitted
by unnecessarily included header files).

Signed-off-by: Tim Schmielau 
Acked-by: Russell King 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

[PATCH] mark struct file_operations const 9

2007-02-12T17:48:46+00:00

Many struct file_operations in the kernel can be "const".  Marking them const
moves these to the .rodata section, which avoids false sharing with potential
dirty data.  In addition it'll catch accidental writes at compile time to
these shared resources.

Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

[PATCH] Replace regular code with appropriate calls to container_of()

2007-02-11T19:18:06+00:00

Replace a small number of expressions with a call to the "container_of()"
macro.

Signed-off-by: Robert P. J. Day 
Acked-by: Paul Mackerras 
Cc: "David S. Miller" 
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky 
Cc: Stephen Smalley 
Cc: James Morris 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

[PATCH] Transform kmem_cache_alloc()+memset(0) -> kmem_cache_zalloc().

2007-02-11T18:51:27+00:00

Replace appropriate pairs of "kmem_cache_alloc()" + "memset(0)" with the
corresponding "kmem_cache_zalloc()" call.

Signed-off-by: Robert P. J. Day 
Cc: "Luck, Tony" 
Cc: Andi Kleen 
Cc: Roland McGrath 
Cc: James Bottomley 
Cc: Greg KH 
Acked-by: Joel Becker 
Cc: Steven Whitehouse 
Cc: Jan Kara 
Cc: Michael Halcrow 
Cc: "David S. Miller" 
Cc: Stephen Smalley 
Cc: James Morris 
Cc: Chris Wright 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds