<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/security, branch v2.6.26-rc2</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] split linux/file.h</title>
<updated>2008-05-01T17:08:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2008-04-24T11:44:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=9f3acc3140444a900ab280de942291959f0f615d'/>
<id>9f3acc3140444a900ab280de942291959f0f615d</id>
<content type='text'>
Initial splitoff of the low-level stuff; taken to fdtable.h

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Initial splitoff of the low-level stuff; taken to fdtable.h

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>signals: cleanup security_task_kill() usage/implementation</title>
<updated>2008-04-30T15:29:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleg Nesterov</name>
<email>oleg@tv-sign.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2008-04-30T07:52:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=3b5e9e53c6f31b5a5a0f5c43707503c62bdefa46'/>
<id>3b5e9e53c6f31b5a5a0f5c43707503c62bdefa46</id>
<content type='text'>
Every implementation of -&gt;task_kill() does nothing when the signal comes from
the kernel.  This is correct, but means that check_kill_permission() should
call security_task_kill() only for SI_FROMUSER() case, and we can remove the
same check from -&gt;task_kill() implementations.

(sadly, check_kill_permission() is the last user of signal-&gt;session/__session
 but we can't s/task_session_nr/task_session/ here).

NOTE: Eric W.  Biederman pointed out cap_task_kill() should die, and I think
he is very right.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@tv-sign.ru&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Serge Hallyn &lt;serue@us.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Roland McGrath &lt;roland@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Cc: David Quigley &lt;dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Cc: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Harald Welte &lt;laforge@gnumonks.org&gt;
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@openvz.org&gt;
Cc: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Every implementation of -&gt;task_kill() does nothing when the signal comes from
the kernel.  This is correct, but means that check_kill_permission() should
call security_task_kill() only for SI_FROMUSER() case, and we can remove the
same check from -&gt;task_kill() implementations.

(sadly, check_kill_permission() is the last user of signal-&gt;session/__session
 but we can't s/task_session_nr/task_session/ here).

NOTE: Eric W.  Biederman pointed out cap_task_kill() should die, and I think
he is very right.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@tv-sign.ru&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Serge Hallyn &lt;serue@us.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Roland McGrath &lt;roland@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Cc: David Quigley &lt;dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Cc: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Harald Welte &lt;laforge@gnumonks.org&gt;
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov &lt;xemul@openvz.org&gt;
Cc: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Smack: Integrate Smack with Audit</title>
<updated>2008-04-29T22:34:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ahmed S. Darwish</name>
<email>darwish.07@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-04-29T22:34:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=d20bdda6d45a4035e48ca7ae467a0d955c1ffc60'/>
<id>d20bdda6d45a4035e48ca7ae467a0d955c1ffc60</id>
<content type='text'>
Setup the new Audit hooks for Smack. SELinux Audit rule fields are recycled
to avoid `auditd' userspace modifications. Currently only equality testing
is supported on labels acting as a subject (AUDIT_SUBJ_USER) or as an object
(AUDIT_OBJ_USER).

Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish &lt;darwish.07@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Setup the new Audit hooks for Smack. SELinux Audit rule fields are recycled
to avoid `auditd' userspace modifications. Currently only equality testing
is supported on labels acting as a subject (AUDIT_SUBJ_USER) or as an object
(AUDIT_OBJ_USER).

Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish &lt;darwish.07@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Security: Make secctx_to_secid() take const secdata</title>
<updated>2008-04-29T22:23:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-04-29T19:52:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=e52c1764f18a62776a0f2bc6752fb76b6e345827'/>
<id>e52c1764f18a62776a0f2bc6752fb76b6e345827</id>
<content type='text'>
Make secctx_to_secid() take constant secdata.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Make secctx_to_secid() take constant secdata.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'audit.b50' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current</title>
<updated>2008-04-29T18:41:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2008-04-29T18:41:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=9781db7b345b5dfe93787aaaf310c861db7c1ede'/>
<id>9781db7b345b5dfe93787aaaf310c861db7c1ede</id>
<content type='text'>
* 'audit.b50' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current:
  [PATCH] new predicate - AUDIT_FILETYPE
  [patch 2/2] Use find_task_by_vpid in audit code
  [patch 1/2] audit: let userspace fully control TTY input auditing
  [PATCH 2/2] audit: fix sparse shadowed variable warnings
  [PATCH 1/2] audit: move extern declarations to audit.h
  Audit: MAINTAINERS update
  Audit: increase the maximum length of the key field
  Audit: standardize string audit interfaces
  Audit: stop deadlock from signals under load
  Audit: save audit_backlog_limit audit messages in case auditd comes back
  Audit: collect sessionid in netlink messages
  Audit: end printk with newline
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
* 'audit.b50' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current:
  [PATCH] new predicate - AUDIT_FILETYPE
  [patch 2/2] Use find_task_by_vpid in audit code
  [patch 1/2] audit: let userspace fully control TTY input auditing
  [PATCH 2/2] audit: fix sparse shadowed variable warnings
  [PATCH 1/2] audit: move extern declarations to audit.h
  Audit: MAINTAINERS update
  Audit: increase the maximum length of the key field
  Audit: standardize string audit interfaces
  Audit: stop deadlock from signals under load
  Audit: save audit_backlog_limit audit messages in case auditd comes back
  Audit: collect sessionid in netlink messages
  Audit: end printk with newline
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>keys: explicitly include required slab.h header file.</title>
<updated>2008-04-29T15:06:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Robert P. J. Day</name>
<email>rpjday@crashcourse.ca</email>
</author>
<published>2008-04-29T08:01:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=fdb89bce6c9ccb17dae13ec43a25d2fdd405233f'/>
<id>fdb89bce6c9ccb17dae13ec43a25d2fdd405233f</id>
<content type='text'>
Since these two source files invoke kmalloc(), they should explicitly
include &lt;linux/slab.h&gt;.

Signed-off-by: Robert P. J. Day &lt;rpjday@crashcourse.ca&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Since these two source files invoke kmalloc(), they should explicitly
include &lt;linux/slab.h&gt;.

Signed-off-by: Robert P. J. Day &lt;rpjday@crashcourse.ca&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>keys: make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sys</title>
<updated>2008-04-29T15:06:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-04-29T08:01:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=0b77f5bfb45c13e1e5142374f9d6ca75292252a4'/>
<id>0b77f5bfb45c13e1e5142374f9d6ca75292252a4</id>
<content type='text'>
Make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sys files:

 (*) /proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxkeys
     /proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxbytes

     Maximum number of keys that root may have and the maximum total number of
     bytes of data that root may have stored in those keys.

 (*) /proc/sys/kernel/keys/maxkeys
     /proc/sys/kernel/keys/maxbytes

     Maximum number of keys that each non-root user may have and the maximum
     total number of bytes of data that each of those users may have stored in
     their keys.

Also increase the quotas as a number of people have been complaining that it's
not big enough.  I'm not sure that it's big enough now either, but on the
other hand, it can now be set in /etc/sysctl.conf.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;kwc@citi.umich.edu&gt;
Cc: &lt;arunsr@cse.iitk.ac.in&gt;
Cc: &lt;dwalsh@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sys files:

 (*) /proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxkeys
     /proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxbytes

     Maximum number of keys that root may have and the maximum total number of
     bytes of data that root may have stored in those keys.

 (*) /proc/sys/kernel/keys/maxkeys
     /proc/sys/kernel/keys/maxbytes

     Maximum number of keys that each non-root user may have and the maximum
     total number of bytes of data that each of those users may have stored in
     their keys.

Also increase the quotas as a number of people have been complaining that it's
not big enough.  I'm not sure that it's big enough now either, but on the
other hand, it can now be set in /etc/sysctl.conf.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;kwc@citi.umich.edu&gt;
Cc: &lt;arunsr@cse.iitk.ac.in&gt;
Cc: &lt;dwalsh@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed</title>
<updated>2008-04-29T15:06:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-04-29T08:01:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=69664cf16af4f31cd54d77948a4baf9c7e0ca7b9'/>
<id>69664cf16af4f31cd54d77948a4baf9c7e0ca7b9</id>
<content type='text'>
Don't generate the per-UID user and user session keyrings unless they're
explicitly accessed.  This solves a problem during a login process whereby
set*uid() is called before the SELinux PAM module, resulting in the per-UID
keyrings having the wrong security labels.

This also cures the problem of multiple per-UID keyrings sometimes appearing
due to PAM modules (including pam_keyinit) setuiding and causing user_structs
to come into and go out of existence whilst the session keyring pins the user
keyring.  This is achieved by first searching for extant per-UID keyrings
before inventing new ones.

The serial bound argument is also dropped from find_keyring_by_name() as it's
not currently made use of (setting it to 0 disables the feature).

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;kwc@citi.umich.edu&gt;
Cc: &lt;arunsr@cse.iitk.ac.in&gt;
Cc: &lt;dwalsh@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Don't generate the per-UID user and user session keyrings unless they're
explicitly accessed.  This solves a problem during a login process whereby
set*uid() is called before the SELinux PAM module, resulting in the per-UID
keyrings having the wrong security labels.

This also cures the problem of multiple per-UID keyrings sometimes appearing
due to PAM modules (including pam_keyinit) setuiding and causing user_structs
to come into and go out of existence whilst the session keyring pins the user
keyring.  This is achieved by first searching for extant per-UID keyrings
before inventing new ones.

The serial bound argument is also dropped from find_keyring_by_name() as it's
not currently made use of (setting it to 0 disables the feature).

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;kwc@citi.umich.edu&gt;
Cc: &lt;arunsr@cse.iitk.ac.in&gt;
Cc: &lt;dwalsh@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>keys: allow clients to set key perms in key_create_or_update()</title>
<updated>2008-04-29T15:06:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Arun Raghavan</name>
<email>arunsr@cse.iitk.ac.in</email>
</author>
<published>2008-04-29T08:01:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=6b79ccb5144f9ffb4d4596c23e7570238dd12abc'/>
<id>6b79ccb5144f9ffb4d4596c23e7570238dd12abc</id>
<content type='text'>
The key_create_or_update() function provided by the keyring code has a default
set of permissions that are always applied to the key when created.  This
might not be desirable to all clients.

Here's a patch that adds a "perm" parameter to the function to address this,
which can be set to KEY_PERM_UNDEF to revert to the current behaviour.

Signed-off-by: Arun Raghavan &lt;arunsr@cse.iitk.ac.in&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Satyam Sharma &lt;ssatyam@cse.iitk.ac.in&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The key_create_or_update() function provided by the keyring code has a default
set of permissions that are always applied to the key when created.  This
might not be desirable to all clients.

Here's a patch that adds a "perm" parameter to the function to address this,
which can be set to KEY_PERM_UNDEF to revert to the current behaviour.

Signed-off-by: Arun Raghavan &lt;arunsr@cse.iitk.ac.in&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Satyam Sharma &lt;ssatyam@cse.iitk.ac.in&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>keys: switch to proc_create()</title>
<updated>2008-04-29T15:06:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexey Dobriyan</name>
<email>adobriyan@sw.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2008-04-29T08:01:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=da91d2ef9fe4fd84cc0a8a729201d38e40ac9f2e'/>
<id>da91d2ef9fe4fd84cc0a8a729201d38e40ac9f2e</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@sw.ru&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan &lt;adobriyan@sw.ru&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
