linux-toradex.git/security, branch v2.6.27.12

System call wrappers part 28

2009-01-18T18:35:39+00:00

commit 938bb9f5e840eddbf54e4f62f6c5ba9b3ae12c9d upstream.

Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

System call wrappers part 27

2009-01-18T18:35:39+00:00

commit 1e7bfb2134dfec37ce04fb3a4ca89299e892d10c upstream.

Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

devices cgroup: allow mkfifo

2009-01-18T18:35:26+00:00

commit 0b82ac37b889ec881b645860da3775118effb3ca upstream.

The devcgroup_inode_permission() hook in the devices whitelist cgroup has
always bypassed access checks on fifos.  But the mknod hook did not.  The
devices whitelist is only about block and char devices, and fifos can't
even be added to the whitelist, so fifos can't be created at all except by
tasks which have 'a' in their whitelist (meaning they have access to all
devices).

Fix the behavior by bypassing access checks to mkfifo.

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn 
Cc: Li Zefan 
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov 
Cc: Paul Menage 
Cc: Lai Jiangshan 
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro 
Cc: James Morris 
Reported-by: Daniel Lezcano 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

KEYS: Make request key instantiate the per-user keyrings

2008-11-13T17:56:04+00:00

commit 1f8f5cf6e4f038552a3e47b66085452c08556d71 upstream

Make request_key() instantiate the per-user keyrings so that it doesn't oops
if it needs to get hold of the user session keyring because there isn't a
session keyring in place.

Signed-off-by: David Howells 
Tested-by: Steve French 
Tested-by: Rutger Nijlunsing 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

file caps: always start with clear bprm->caps_*

2008-11-07T03:05:55+00:00

commit 3318a386e4ca68c76e0294363d29bdc46fcad670 upstream

While Linux doesn't honor setuid on scripts.  However, it mistakenly
behaves differently for file capabilities.

This patch fixes that behavior by making sure that get_file_caps()
begins with empty bprm->caps_*.  That way when a script is loaded,
its bprm->caps_* may be filled when binfmt_misc calls prepare_binprm(),
but they will be cleared again when binfmt_elf calls prepare_binprm()
next to read the interpreter's file capabilities.

Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn 
Acked-by: David Howells 
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

selinux: Fix an uninitialized variable BUG/panic in selinux_secattr_to_sid()

2008-10-03T22:25:18+00:00

At some point during the 2.6.27 development cycle two new fields were added
to the SELinux context structure, a string pointer and a length field.  The
code in selinux_secattr_to_sid() was not modified and as a result these two
fields were left uninitialized which could result in erratic behavior,
including kernel panics, when NetLabel is used.  This patch fixes the
problem by fully initializing the context in selinux_secattr_to_sid() before
use and reducing the level of direct context manipulation done to help
prevent future problems.

Please apply this to the 2.6.27-rcX release stream.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore 
Signed-off-by: James Morris

SELinux: memory leak in security_context_to_sid_core

2008-09-03T22:35:13+00:00

Fix a bug and a philosophical decision about who handles errors.

security_context_to_sid_core() was leaking a context in the common case.
This was causing problems on fedora systems which recently have started
making extensive use of this function.

In discussion it was decided that if string_to_context_struct() had an
error it was its own responsibility to clean up any mess it created
along the way.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris 
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley 
Signed-off-by: James Morris

devcgroup: fix race against rmdir()

2008-09-03T02:21:38+00:00

During the use of a dev_cgroup, we should guarantee the corresponding
cgroup won't be deleted (i.e.  via rmdir).  This can be done through
css_get(&dev_cgroup->css), but here we can just get and use the dev_cgroup
under rcu_read_lock.

And also remove checking NULL dev_cgroup, it won't be NULL since a task
always belongs to a cgroup.

Signed-off-by: Li Zefan 
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn 
Cc: Paul Menage 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

security: Fix setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable()

2008-08-14T12:59:43+00:00

Fix the setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable() as it could corrupt the flags
the target process if that is not the current process and it is trying to
change its own flags in a different way at the same time.

__capable() is using neither atomic ops nor locking to protect t->flags.  This
patch removes __capable() and introduces has_capability() that doesn't set
PF_SUPERPRIV on the process being queried.

This patch further splits security_ptrace() in two:

 (1) security_ptrace_may_access().  This passes judgement on whether one
     process may access another only (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH for ptrace() and
     PTRACE_MODE_READ for /proc), and takes a pointer to the child process.
     current is the parent.

 (2) security_ptrace_traceme().  This passes judgement on PTRACE_TRACEME only,
     and takes only a pointer to the parent process.  current is the child.

     In Smack and commoncap, this uses has_capability() to determine whether
     the parent will be permitted to use PTRACE_ATTACH if normal checks fail.
     This does not set PF_SUPERPRIV.

Two of the instances of __capable() actually only act on current, and so have
been changed to calls to capable().

Of the places that were using __capable():

 (1) The OOM killer calls __capable() thrice when weighing the killability of a
     process.  All of these now use has_capability().

 (2) cap_ptrace() and smack_ptrace() were using __capable() to check to see
     whether the parent was allowed to trace any process.  As mentioned above,
     these have been split.  For PTRACE_ATTACH and /proc, capable() is now
     used, and for PTRACE_TRACEME, has_capability() is used.

 (3) cap_safe_nice() only ever saw current, so now uses capable().

 (4) smack_setprocattr() rejected accesses to tasks other than current just
     after calling __capable(), so the order of these two tests have been
     switched and capable() is used instead.

 (5) In smack_file_send_sigiotask(), we need to allow privileged processes to
     receive SIGIO on files they're manipulating.

 (6) In smack_task_wait(), we let a process wait for a privileged process,
     whether or not the process doing the waiting is privileged.

I've tested this with the LTP SELinux and syscalls testscripts.

Signed-off-by: David Howells 
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn 
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler 
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan 
Acked-by: Al Viro 
Signed-off-by: James Morris

SELinux: /proc/mounts should show what it can

2008-07-29T22:31:28+00:00

Given a hosed SELinux config in which a system never loads policy or
disables SELinux we currently just return -EINVAL for anyone trying to
read /proc/mounts.  This is a configuration problem but we can certainly
be more graceful.  This patch just ignores -EINVAL when displaying LSM
options and causes /proc/mounts display everything else it can.  If
policy isn't loaded the obviously there are no options, so we aren't
really loosing any information here.

This is safe as the only other return of EINVAL comes from
security_sid_to_context_core() in the case of an invalid sid.  Even if a
FS was mounted with a now invalidated context that sid should have been
remapped to unlabeled and so we won't hit the EINVAL and will work like
we should.  (yes, I tested to make sure it worked like I thought)

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris 
Tested-by: Marc Dionne 
Signed-off-by: James Morris