<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/security, branch v3.0.3</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>AppArmor: Fix masking of capabilities in complain mode</title>
<updated>2011-08-05T04:58:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-06-25T15:57:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=06b943855b6dbcc8cb3cdca954c19711ce7b76b6'/>
<id>06b943855b6dbcc8cb3cdca954c19711ce7b76b6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 25e75dff519bcce2cb35023105e7df51d7b9e691 upstream.

AppArmor is masking the capabilities returned by capget against the
capabilities mask in the profile.  This is wrong, in complain mode the
profile has effectively all capabilities, as the profile restrictions are
not being enforced, merely tested against to determine if an access is
known by the profile.

This can result in the wrong behavior of security conscience applications
like sshd which examine their capability set, and change their behavior
accordingly.  In this case because of the masked capability set being
returned sshd fails due to DAC checks, even when the profile is in complain
mode.

Kernels affected: 2.6.36 - 3.0.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 25e75dff519bcce2cb35023105e7df51d7b9e691 upstream.

AppArmor is masking the capabilities returned by capget against the
capabilities mask in the profile.  This is wrong, in complain mode the
profile has effectively all capabilities, as the profile restrictions are
not being enforced, merely tested against to determine if an access is
known by the profile.

This can result in the wrong behavior of security conscience applications
like sshd which examine their capability set, and change their behavior
accordingly.  In this case because of the masked capability set being
returned sshd fails due to DAC checks, even when the profile is in complain
mode.

Kernels affected: 2.6.36 - 3.0.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>AppArmor: Fix reference to rcu protected pointer outside of rcu_read_lock</title>
<updated>2011-08-05T04:58:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-06-28T14:06:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=0635a74b4ab037ed0c6d628d9cc737b949a15731'/>
<id>0635a74b4ab037ed0c6d628d9cc737b949a15731</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 04fdc099f9c80c7775dbac388fc97e156d4d47e7 upstream.

The pointer returned from tracehook_tracer_task() is only valid inside
the rcu_read_lock.  However the tracer pointer obtained is being passed
to aa_may_ptrace outside of the rcu_read_lock critical section.

Mover the aa_may_ptrace test into the rcu_read_lock critical section, to
fix this.

Kernels affected: 2.6.36 - 3.0

Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 04fdc099f9c80c7775dbac388fc97e156d4d47e7 upstream.

The pointer returned from tracehook_tracer_task() is only valid inside
the rcu_read_lock.  However the tracer pointer obtained is being passed
to aa_may_ptrace outside of the rcu_read_lock critical section.

Mover the aa_may_ptrace test into the rcu_read_lock critical section, to
fix this.

Kernels affected: 2.6.36 - 3.0

Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: Fix error handling in construct_key_and_link()</title>
<updated>2011-06-22T01:31:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-06-21T13:32:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=b1d7dd80aadb9042e83f9778b484a2f92e0b04d4'/>
<id>b1d7dd80aadb9042e83f9778b484a2f92e0b04d4</id>
<content type='text'>
Fix error handling in construct_key_and_link().

If construct_alloc_key() returns an error, it shouldn't pass out through
the normal path as the key_serial() called by the kleave() statement
will oops when it gets an error code in the pointer:

  BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffffffffff84
  IP: [&lt;ffffffff8120b401&gt;] request_key_and_link+0x4d7/0x52f
  ..
  Call Trace:
   [&lt;ffffffff8120b52c&gt;] request_key+0x41/0x75
   [&lt;ffffffffa00ed6e8&gt;] cifs_get_spnego_key+0x206/0x226 [cifs]
   [&lt;ffffffffa00eb0c9&gt;] CIFS_SessSetup+0x511/0x1234 [cifs]
   [&lt;ffffffffa00d9799&gt;] cifs_setup_session+0x90/0x1ae [cifs]
   [&lt;ffffffffa00d9c02&gt;] cifs_get_smb_ses+0x34b/0x40f [cifs]
   [&lt;ffffffffa00d9e05&gt;] cifs_mount+0x13f/0x504 [cifs]
   [&lt;ffffffffa00caabb&gt;] cifs_do_mount+0xc4/0x672 [cifs]
   [&lt;ffffffff8113ae8c&gt;] mount_fs+0x69/0x155
   [&lt;ffffffff8114ff0e&gt;] vfs_kern_mount+0x63/0xa0
   [&lt;ffffffff81150be2&gt;] do_kern_mount+0x4d/0xdf
   [&lt;ffffffff81152278&gt;] do_mount+0x63c/0x69f
   [&lt;ffffffff8115255c&gt;] sys_mount+0x88/0xc2
   [&lt;ffffffff814fbdc2&gt;] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Fix error handling in construct_key_and_link().

If construct_alloc_key() returns an error, it shouldn't pass out through
the normal path as the key_serial() called by the kleave() statement
will oops when it gets an error code in the pointer:

  BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffffffffff84
  IP: [&lt;ffffffff8120b401&gt;] request_key_and_link+0x4d7/0x52f
  ..
  Call Trace:
   [&lt;ffffffff8120b52c&gt;] request_key+0x41/0x75
   [&lt;ffffffffa00ed6e8&gt;] cifs_get_spnego_key+0x206/0x226 [cifs]
   [&lt;ffffffffa00eb0c9&gt;] CIFS_SessSetup+0x511/0x1234 [cifs]
   [&lt;ffffffffa00d9799&gt;] cifs_setup_session+0x90/0x1ae [cifs]
   [&lt;ffffffffa00d9c02&gt;] cifs_get_smb_ses+0x34b/0x40f [cifs]
   [&lt;ffffffffa00d9e05&gt;] cifs_mount+0x13f/0x504 [cifs]
   [&lt;ffffffffa00caabb&gt;] cifs_do_mount+0xc4/0x672 [cifs]
   [&lt;ffffffff8113ae8c&gt;] mount_fs+0x69/0x155
   [&lt;ffffffff8114ff0e&gt;] vfs_kern_mount+0x63/0xa0
   [&lt;ffffffff81150be2&gt;] do_kern_mount+0x4d/0xdf
   [&lt;ffffffff81152278&gt;] do_mount+0x63c/0x69f
   [&lt;ffffffff8115255c&gt;] sys_mount+0x88/0xc2
   [&lt;ffffffff814fbdc2&gt;] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6</title>
<updated>2011-06-21T03:09:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2011-06-21T03:09:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=36698206504fca9198b8563f1fc2c9e38e063e11'/>
<id>36698206504fca9198b8563f1fc2c9e38e063e11</id>
<content type='text'>
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6:
  devcgroup_inode_permission: take "is it a device node" checks to inlined wrapper
  fix comment in generic_permission()
  kill obsolete comment for follow_down()
  proc_sys_permission() is OK in RCU mode
  reiserfs_permission() doesn't need to bail out in RCU mode
  proc_fd_permission() is doesn't need to bail out in RCU mode
  nilfs2_permission() doesn't need to bail out in RCU mode
  logfs doesn't need -&gt;permission() at all
  coda_ioctl_permission() is safe in RCU mode
  cifs_permission() doesn't need to bail out in RCU mode
  bad_inode_permission() is safe from RCU mode
  ubifs: dereferencing an ERR_PTR in ubifs_mount()
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6:
  devcgroup_inode_permission: take "is it a device node" checks to inlined wrapper
  fix comment in generic_permission()
  kill obsolete comment for follow_down()
  proc_sys_permission() is OK in RCU mode
  reiserfs_permission() doesn't need to bail out in RCU mode
  proc_fd_permission() is doesn't need to bail out in RCU mode
  nilfs2_permission() doesn't need to bail out in RCU mode
  logfs doesn't need -&gt;permission() at all
  coda_ioctl_permission() is safe in RCU mode
  cifs_permission() doesn't need to bail out in RCU mode
  bad_inode_permission() is safe from RCU mode
  ubifs: dereferencing an ERR_PTR in ubifs_mount()
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>devcgroup_inode_permission: take "is it a device node" checks to inlined wrapper</title>
<updated>2011-06-20T14:46:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2011-06-19T17:01:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=482e0cd3dbaa70f2a2bead4b5f2c0d203ef654ba'/>
<id>482e0cd3dbaa70f2a2bead4b5f2c0d203ef654ba</id>
<content type='text'>
inode_permission() calls devcgroup_inode_permission() and almost all such
calls are _not_ for device nodes; let's at least keep the common path
straight...

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
inode_permission() calls devcgroup_inode_permission() and almost all such
calls are _not_ for device nodes; let's at least keep the common path
straight...

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS/DNS: Fix ____call_usermodehelper() to not lose the session keyring</title>
<updated>2011-06-17T16:40:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-06-17T10:25:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=879669961b11e7f40b518784863a259f735a72bf'/>
<id>879669961b11e7f40b518784863a259f735a72bf</id>
<content type='text'>
____call_usermodehelper() now erases any credentials set by the
subprocess_inf::init() function.  The problem is that commit
17f60a7da150 ("capabilites: allow the application of capability limits
to usermode helpers") creates and commits new credentials with
prepare_kernel_cred() after the call to the init() function.  This wipes
all keyrings after umh_keys_init() is called.

The best way to deal with this is to put the init() call just prior to
the commit_creds() call, and pass the cred pointer to init().  That
means that umh_keys_init() and suchlike can modify the credentials
_before_ they are published and potentially in use by the rest of the
system.

This prevents request_key() from working as it is prevented from passing
the session keyring it set up with the authorisation token to
/sbin/request-key, and so the latter can't assume the authority to
instantiate the key.  This causes the in-kernel DNS resolver to fail
with ENOKEY unconditionally.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
____call_usermodehelper() now erases any credentials set by the
subprocess_inf::init() function.  The problem is that commit
17f60a7da150 ("capabilites: allow the application of capability limits
to usermode helpers") creates and commits new credentials with
prepare_kernel_cred() after the call to the init() function.  This wipes
all keyrings after umh_keys_init() is called.

The best way to deal with this is to put the init() call just prior to
the commit_creds() call, and pass the cred pointer to init().  That
means that umh_keys_init() and suchlike can modify the credentials
_before_ they are published and potentially in use by the rest of the
system.

This prevents request_key() from working as it is prevented from passing
the session keyring it set up with the authorisation token to
/sbin/request-key, and so the latter can't assume the authority to
instantiate the key.  This causes the in-kernel DNS resolver to fail
with ENOKEY unconditionally.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/selinux into for-linus</title>
<updated>2011-06-14T23:41:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>James Morris</name>
<email>jmorris@namei.org</email>
</author>
<published>2011-06-14T23:41:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=82b88bb24e28dd4fb4bec30e75412f41326130f0'/>
<id>82b88bb24e28dd4fb4bec30e75412f41326130f0</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>SELinux: skip file_name_trans_write() when policy downgraded.</title>
<updated>2011-06-14T16:58:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roy.Li</name>
<email>rongqing.li@windriver.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-05-20T02:38:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ded509880f6a0213b09f8ae7bef84acb16eaccbf'/>
<id>ded509880f6a0213b09f8ae7bef84acb16eaccbf</id>
<content type='text'>
When policy version is less than POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS,
skip file_name_trans_write().

Signed-off-by: Roy.Li &lt;rongqing.li@windriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When policy version is less than POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS,
skip file_name_trans_write().

Signed-off-by: Roy.Li &lt;rongqing.li@windriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>TOMOYO: Fix oops in tomoyo_mount_acl().</title>
<updated>2011-06-14T05:18:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tetsuo Handa</name>
<email>penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2011-06-13T04:49:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=4e78c724d47e2342aa8fde61f6b8536f662f795f'/>
<id>4e78c724d47e2342aa8fde61f6b8536f662f795f</id>
<content type='text'>
In tomoyo_mount_acl() since 2.6.36, kern_path() was called without checking
dev_name != NULL. As a result, an unprivileged user can trigger oops by issuing
mount(NULL, "/", "ext3", 0, NULL) request.
Fix this by checking dev_name != NULL before calling kern_path(dev_name).

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
In tomoyo_mount_acl() since 2.6.36, kern_path() was called without checking
dev_name != NULL. As a result, an unprivileged user can trigger oops by issuing
mount(NULL, "/", "ext3", 0, NULL) request.
Fix this by checking dev_name != NULL before calling kern_path(dev_name).

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>AppArmor: Fix sleep in invalid context from task_setrlimit</title>
<updated>2011-06-09T01:46:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-06-08T22:07:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=1780f2d3839a0d3eb85ee014a708f9e2c8f8ba0e'/>
<id>1780f2d3839a0d3eb85ee014a708f9e2c8f8ba0e</id>
<content type='text'>
Affected kernels 2.6.36 - 3.0

AppArmor may do a GFP_KERNEL memory allocation with task_lock(tsk-&gt;group_leader);
held when called from security_task_setrlimit.  This will only occur when the
task's current policy has been replaced, and the task's creds have not been
updated before entering the LSM security_task_setrlimit() hook.

BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/slub.c:847
 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 1583, name: cupsd
 2 locks held by cupsd/1583:
  #0:  (tasklist_lock){.+.+.+}, at: [&lt;ffffffff8104dafa&gt;] do_prlimit+0x61/0x189
  #1:  (&amp;(&amp;p-&gt;alloc_lock)-&gt;rlock){+.+.+.}, at: [&lt;ffffffff8104db2d&gt;]
do_prlimit+0x94/0x189
 Pid: 1583, comm: cupsd Not tainted 3.0.0-rc2-git1 #7
 Call Trace:
  [&lt;ffffffff8102ebf2&gt;] __might_sleep+0x10d/0x112
  [&lt;ffffffff810e6f46&gt;] slab_pre_alloc_hook.isra.49+0x2d/0x33
  [&lt;ffffffff810e7bc4&gt;] kmem_cache_alloc+0x22/0x132
  [&lt;ffffffff8105b6e6&gt;] prepare_creds+0x35/0xe4
  [&lt;ffffffff811c0675&gt;] aa_replace_current_profile+0x35/0xb2
  [&lt;ffffffff811c4d2d&gt;] aa_current_profile+0x45/0x4c
  [&lt;ffffffff811c4d4d&gt;] apparmor_task_setrlimit+0x19/0x3a
  [&lt;ffffffff811beaa5&gt;] security_task_setrlimit+0x11/0x13
  [&lt;ffffffff8104db6b&gt;] do_prlimit+0xd2/0x189
  [&lt;ffffffff8104dea9&gt;] sys_setrlimit+0x3b/0x48
  [&lt;ffffffff814062bb&gt;] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Reported-by: Miles Lane &lt;miles.lane@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Affected kernels 2.6.36 - 3.0

AppArmor may do a GFP_KERNEL memory allocation with task_lock(tsk-&gt;group_leader);
held when called from security_task_setrlimit.  This will only occur when the
task's current policy has been replaced, and the task's creds have not been
updated before entering the LSM security_task_setrlimit() hook.

BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/slub.c:847
 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 1583, name: cupsd
 2 locks held by cupsd/1583:
  #0:  (tasklist_lock){.+.+.+}, at: [&lt;ffffffff8104dafa&gt;] do_prlimit+0x61/0x189
  #1:  (&amp;(&amp;p-&gt;alloc_lock)-&gt;rlock){+.+.+.}, at: [&lt;ffffffff8104db2d&gt;]
do_prlimit+0x94/0x189
 Pid: 1583, comm: cupsd Not tainted 3.0.0-rc2-git1 #7
 Call Trace:
  [&lt;ffffffff8102ebf2&gt;] __might_sleep+0x10d/0x112
  [&lt;ffffffff810e6f46&gt;] slab_pre_alloc_hook.isra.49+0x2d/0x33
  [&lt;ffffffff810e7bc4&gt;] kmem_cache_alloc+0x22/0x132
  [&lt;ffffffff8105b6e6&gt;] prepare_creds+0x35/0xe4
  [&lt;ffffffff811c0675&gt;] aa_replace_current_profile+0x35/0xb2
  [&lt;ffffffff811c4d2d&gt;] aa_current_profile+0x45/0x4c
  [&lt;ffffffff811c4d4d&gt;] apparmor_task_setrlimit+0x19/0x3a
  [&lt;ffffffff811beaa5&gt;] security_task_setrlimit+0x11/0x13
  [&lt;ffffffff8104db6b&gt;] do_prlimit+0xd2/0x189
  [&lt;ffffffff8104dea9&gt;] sys_setrlimit+0x3b/0x48
  [&lt;ffffffff814062bb&gt;] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Reported-by: Miles Lane &lt;miles.lane@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</pre>
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</entry>
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