<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-toradex.git/security, branch v5.12-rc5</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel for Apalis and Colibri modules</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'integrity-v5.12-fix' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity</title>
<updated>2021-03-25T23:46:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-25T23:46:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=db24726bfefa68c606947a86132591568a06bfb4'/>
<id>db24726bfefa68c606947a86132591568a06bfb4</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull integrity fix from Mimi Zohar:
 "Just one patch to address a NULL ptr dereferencing when there is a
  mismatch between the user enabled LSMs and IMA/EVM"

* tag 'integrity-v5.12-fix' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
  integrity: double check iint_cache was initialized
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull integrity fix from Mimi Zohar:
 "Just one patch to address a NULL ptr dereferencing when there is a
  mismatch between the user enabled LSMs and IMA/EVM"

* tag 'integrity-v5.12-fix' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
  integrity: double check iint_cache was initialized
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>integrity: double check iint_cache was initialized</title>
<updated>2021-03-22T18:54:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-19T15:17:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=92063f3ca73aab794bd5408d3361fd5b5ea33079'/>
<id>92063f3ca73aab794bd5408d3361fd5b5ea33079</id>
<content type='text'>
The kernel may be built with multiple LSMs, but only a subset may be
enabled on the boot command line by specifying "lsm=".  Not including
"integrity" on the ordered LSM list may result in a NULL deref.

As reported by Dmitry Vyukov:
in qemu:
qemu-system-x86_64       -enable-kvm     -machine q35,nvdimm -cpu
max,migratable=off -smp 4       -m 4G,slots=4,maxmem=16G        -hda
wheezy.img      -kernel arch/x86/boot/bzImage   -nographic -vga std
 -soundhw all     -usb -usbdevice tablet  -bt hci -bt device:keyboard
   -net user,host=10.0.2.10,hostfwd=tcp::10022-:22 -net
nic,model=virtio-net-pci   -object
memory-backend-file,id=pmem1,share=off,mem-path=/dev/zero,size=64M
  -device nvdimm,id=nvdimm1,memdev=pmem1  -append "console=ttyS0
root=/dev/sda earlyprintk=serial rodata=n oops=panic panic_on_warn=1
panic=86400 lsm=smack numa=fake=2 nopcid dummy_hcd.num=8"   -pidfile
vm_pid -m 2G -cpu host

But it crashes on NULL deref in integrity_inode_get during boot:

Run /sbin/init as init process
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000001c
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 3 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc2+ #97
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS
rel-1.13.0-44-g88ab0c15525c-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:kmem_cache_alloc+0x2b/0x370 mm/slub.c:2920
Code: 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 41 89 f4 55 48 89 fd 53 48 83 ec 10 44 8b
3d d9 1f 90 0b 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 31 c0 &lt;8b&gt; 5f
1c 4cf
RSP: 0000:ffffc9000032f9d8 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888017fc4f00 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff888040220000 RSI: 0000000000000c40 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff888019263627
R10: ffffffff83937cd1 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000c40
R13: ffff888019263538 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000ffffff
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88802d180000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000000000001c CR3: 000000000b48e000 CR4: 0000000000750ee0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 integrity_inode_get+0x47/0x260 security/integrity/iint.c:105
 process_measurement+0x33d/0x17e0 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:237
 ima_bprm_check+0xde/0x210 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:474
 security_bprm_check+0x7d/0xa0 security/security.c:845
 search_binary_handler fs/exec.c:1708 [inline]
 exec_binprm fs/exec.c:1761 [inline]
 bprm_execve fs/exec.c:1830 [inline]
 bprm_execve+0x764/0x19a0 fs/exec.c:1792
 kernel_execve+0x370/0x460 fs/exec.c:1973
 try_to_run_init_process+0x14/0x4e init/main.c:1366
 kernel_init+0x11d/0x1b8 init/main.c:1477
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:294
Modules linked in:
CR2: 000000000000001c
---[ end trace 22d601a500de7d79 ]---

Since LSMs and IMA may be configured at build time, but not enabled at
run time, panic the system if "integrity" was not initialized before use.

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Fixes: 79f7865d844c ("LSM: Introduce "lsm=" for boottime LSM selection")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The kernel may be built with multiple LSMs, but only a subset may be
enabled on the boot command line by specifying "lsm=".  Not including
"integrity" on the ordered LSM list may result in a NULL deref.

As reported by Dmitry Vyukov:
in qemu:
qemu-system-x86_64       -enable-kvm     -machine q35,nvdimm -cpu
max,migratable=off -smp 4       -m 4G,slots=4,maxmem=16G        -hda
wheezy.img      -kernel arch/x86/boot/bzImage   -nographic -vga std
 -soundhw all     -usb -usbdevice tablet  -bt hci -bt device:keyboard
   -net user,host=10.0.2.10,hostfwd=tcp::10022-:22 -net
nic,model=virtio-net-pci   -object
memory-backend-file,id=pmem1,share=off,mem-path=/dev/zero,size=64M
  -device nvdimm,id=nvdimm1,memdev=pmem1  -append "console=ttyS0
root=/dev/sda earlyprintk=serial rodata=n oops=panic panic_on_warn=1
panic=86400 lsm=smack numa=fake=2 nopcid dummy_hcd.num=8"   -pidfile
vm_pid -m 2G -cpu host

But it crashes on NULL deref in integrity_inode_get during boot:

Run /sbin/init as init process
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000001c
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 3 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc2+ #97
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS
rel-1.13.0-44-g88ab0c15525c-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:kmem_cache_alloc+0x2b/0x370 mm/slub.c:2920
Code: 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 41 89 f4 55 48 89 fd 53 48 83 ec 10 44 8b
3d d9 1f 90 0b 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 31 c0 &lt;8b&gt; 5f
1c 4cf
RSP: 0000:ffffc9000032f9d8 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888017fc4f00 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff888040220000 RSI: 0000000000000c40 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff888019263627
R10: ffffffff83937cd1 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000c40
R13: ffff888019263538 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000ffffff
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88802d180000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000000000001c CR3: 000000000b48e000 CR4: 0000000000750ee0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 integrity_inode_get+0x47/0x260 security/integrity/iint.c:105
 process_measurement+0x33d/0x17e0 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:237
 ima_bprm_check+0xde/0x210 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:474
 security_bprm_check+0x7d/0xa0 security/security.c:845
 search_binary_handler fs/exec.c:1708 [inline]
 exec_binprm fs/exec.c:1761 [inline]
 bprm_execve fs/exec.c:1830 [inline]
 bprm_execve+0x764/0x19a0 fs/exec.c:1792
 kernel_execve+0x370/0x460 fs/exec.c:1973
 try_to_run_init_process+0x14/0x4e init/main.c:1366
 kernel_init+0x11d/0x1b8 init/main.c:1477
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:294
Modules linked in:
CR2: 000000000000001c
---[ end trace 22d601a500de7d79 ]---

Since LSMs and IMA may be configured at build time, but not enabled at
run time, panic the system if "integrity" was not initialized before use.

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Fixes: 79f7865d844c ("LSM: Introduce "lsm=" for boottime LSM selection")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20210322' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux</title>
<updated>2021-03-22T18:34:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-22T18:34:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=84196390620ac0e5070ae36af84c137c6216a7dc'/>
<id>84196390620ac0e5070ae36af84c137c6216a7dc</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull selinux fixes from Paul Moore:
 "Three SELinux patches:

   - Fix a problem where a local variable is used outside its associated
     function. Thankfully this can only be triggered by reloading the
     SELinux policy, which is a restricted operation for other obvious
     reasons.

   - Fix some incorrect, and inconsistent, audit and printk messages
     when loading the SELinux policy.

  All three patches are relatively minor and have been through our
  testing with no failures"

* tag 'selinux-pr-20210322' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
  selinuxfs: unify policy load error reporting
  selinux: fix variable scope issue in live sidtab conversion
  selinux: don't log MAC_POLICY_LOAD record on failed policy load
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull selinux fixes from Paul Moore:
 "Three SELinux patches:

   - Fix a problem where a local variable is used outside its associated
     function. Thankfully this can only be triggered by reloading the
     SELinux policy, which is a restricted operation for other obvious
     reasons.

   - Fix some incorrect, and inconsistent, audit and printk messages
     when loading the SELinux policy.

  All three patches are relatively minor and have been through our
  testing with no failures"

* tag 'selinux-pr-20210322' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
  selinuxfs: unify policy load error reporting
  selinux: fix variable scope issue in live sidtab conversion
  selinux: don't log MAC_POLICY_LOAD record on failed policy load
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinuxfs: unify policy load error reporting</title>
<updated>2021-03-19T03:26:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ondrej Mosnacek</name>
<email>omosnace@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-18T21:53:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=ee5de60a08b7d8d255722662da461ea159c15538'/>
<id>ee5de60a08b7d8d255722662da461ea159c15538</id>
<content type='text'>
Let's drop the pr_err()s from sel_make_policy_nodes() and just add one
pr_warn_ratelimited() call to the sel_make_policy_nodes() error path in
sel_write_load().

Changing from error to warning makes sense, since after 02a52c5c8c3b
("selinux: move policy commit after updating selinuxfs"), this error
path no longer leads to a broken selinuxfs tree (it's just kept in the
original state and policy load is aborted).

I also added _ratelimited to be consistent with the other prtin in the
same function (it's probably not necessary, but can't really hurt...
there are likely more important error messages to be printed when
filesystem entry creation starts erroring out).

Suggested-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Let's drop the pr_err()s from sel_make_policy_nodes() and just add one
pr_warn_ratelimited() call to the sel_make_policy_nodes() error path in
sel_write_load().

Changing from error to warning makes sense, since after 02a52c5c8c3b
("selinux: move policy commit after updating selinuxfs"), this error
path no longer leads to a broken selinuxfs tree (it's just kept in the
original state and policy load is aborted).

I also added _ratelimited to be consistent with the other prtin in the
same function (it's probably not necessary, but can't really hurt...
there are likely more important error messages to be printed when
filesystem entry creation starts erroring out).

Suggested-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: fix variable scope issue in live sidtab conversion</title>
<updated>2021-03-19T03:23:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ondrej Mosnacek</name>
<email>omosnace@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-18T21:53:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=6406887a12ee5dcdaffff1a8508d91113d545559'/>
<id>6406887a12ee5dcdaffff1a8508d91113d545559</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit 02a52c5c8c3b ("selinux: move policy commit after updating
selinuxfs") moved the selinux_policy_commit() call out of
security_load_policy() into sel_write_load(), which caused a subtle yet
rather serious bug.

The problem is that security_load_policy() passes a reference to the
convert_params local variable to sidtab_convert(), which stores it in
the sidtab, where it may be accessed until the policy is swapped over
and RCU synchronized. Before 02a52c5c8c3b, selinux_policy_commit() was
called directly from security_load_policy(), so the convert_params
pointer remained valid all the way until the old sidtab was destroyed,
but now that's no longer the case and calls to sidtab_context_to_sid()
on the old sidtab after security_load_policy() returns may cause invalid
memory accesses.

This can be easily triggered using the stress test from commit
ee1a84fdfeed ("selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve
performance"):
```
function rand_cat() {
	echo $(( $RANDOM % 1024 ))
}

function do_work() {
	while true; do
		echo -n "system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0:c$(rand_cat),c$(rand_cat)" \
			&gt;/sys/fs/selinux/context 2&gt;/dev/null || true
	done
}

do_work &gt;/dev/null &amp;
do_work &gt;/dev/null &amp;
do_work &gt;/dev/null &amp;

while load_policy; do echo -n .; sleep 0.1; done

kill %1
kill %2
kill %3
```

Fix this by allocating the temporary sidtab convert structures
dynamically and passing them among the
selinux_policy_{load,cancel,commit} functions.

Fixes: 02a52c5c8c3b ("selinux: move policy commit after updating selinuxfs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;
[PM: merge fuzz in security.h and services.c]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Commit 02a52c5c8c3b ("selinux: move policy commit after updating
selinuxfs") moved the selinux_policy_commit() call out of
security_load_policy() into sel_write_load(), which caused a subtle yet
rather serious bug.

The problem is that security_load_policy() passes a reference to the
convert_params local variable to sidtab_convert(), which stores it in
the sidtab, where it may be accessed until the policy is swapped over
and RCU synchronized. Before 02a52c5c8c3b, selinux_policy_commit() was
called directly from security_load_policy(), so the convert_params
pointer remained valid all the way until the old sidtab was destroyed,
but now that's no longer the case and calls to sidtab_context_to_sid()
on the old sidtab after security_load_policy() returns may cause invalid
memory accesses.

This can be easily triggered using the stress test from commit
ee1a84fdfeed ("selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve
performance"):
```
function rand_cat() {
	echo $(( $RANDOM % 1024 ))
}

function do_work() {
	while true; do
		echo -n "system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0:c$(rand_cat),c$(rand_cat)" \
			&gt;/sys/fs/selinux/context 2&gt;/dev/null || true
	done
}

do_work &gt;/dev/null &amp;
do_work &gt;/dev/null &amp;
do_work &gt;/dev/null &amp;

while load_policy; do echo -n .; sleep 0.1; done

kill %1
kill %2
kill %3
```

Fix this by allocating the temporary sidtab convert structures
dynamically and passing them among the
selinux_policy_{load,cancel,commit} functions.

Fixes: 02a52c5c8c3b ("selinux: move policy commit after updating selinuxfs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;
[PM: merge fuzz in security.h and services.c]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: don't log MAC_POLICY_LOAD record on failed policy load</title>
<updated>2021-03-19T03:13:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ondrej Mosnacek</name>
<email>omosnace@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-18T21:53:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=519dad3bcd809dc1523bf80ab0310ddb3bf00ade'/>
<id>519dad3bcd809dc1523bf80ab0310ddb3bf00ade</id>
<content type='text'>
If sel_make_policy_nodes() fails, we should jump to 'out', not 'out1',
as the latter would incorrectly log an MAC_POLICY_LOAD audit record,
even though the policy hasn't actually been reloaded. The 'out1' jump
label now becomes unused and can be removed.

Fixes: 02a52c5c8c3b ("selinux: move policy commit after updating selinuxfs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
If sel_make_policy_nodes() fails, we should jump to 'out', not 'out1',
as the latter would incorrectly log an MAC_POLICY_LOAD audit record,
even though the policy hasn't actually been reloaded. The 'out1' jump
label now becomes unused and can be removed.

Fixes: 02a52c5c8c3b ("selinux: move policy commit after updating selinuxfs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert 95ebabde382c ("capabilities: Don't allow writing ambiguous v3 file capabilities")</title>
<updated>2021-03-12T21:27:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-12T21:07:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=3b0c2d3eaa83da259d7726192cf55a137769012f'/>
<id>3b0c2d3eaa83da259d7726192cf55a137769012f</id>
<content type='text'>
It turns out that there are in fact userspace implementations that
care and this recent change caused a regression.

https://github.com/containers/buildah/issues/3071

As the motivation for the original change was future development,
and the impact is existing real world code just revert this change
and allow the ambiguity in v3 file caps.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 95ebabde382c ("capabilities: Don't allow writing ambiguous v3 file capabilities")
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
It turns out that there are in fact userspace implementations that
care and this recent change caused a regression.

https://github.com/containers/buildah/issues/3071

As the motivation for the original change was future development,
and the impact is existing real world code just revert this change
and allow the ambiguity in v3 file caps.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 95ebabde382c ("capabilities: Don't allow writing ambiguous v3 file capabilities")
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'keys-misc-20210126' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs</title>
<updated>2021-02-24T00:09:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-02-24T00:09:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=c03c21ba6f4e95e406a1a7b4c34ef334b977c194'/>
<id>c03c21ba6f4e95e406a1a7b4c34ef334b977c194</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull keyring updates from David Howells:
 "Here's a set of minor keyrings fixes/cleanups that I've collected from
  various people for the upcoming merge window.

  A couple of them might, in theory, be visible to userspace:

   - Make blacklist_vet_description() reject uppercase letters as they
     don't match the all-lowercase hex string generated for a blacklist
     search.

     This may want reconsideration in the future, but, currently, you
     can't add to the blacklist keyring from userspace and the only
     source of blacklist keys generates lowercase descriptions.

   - Fix blacklist_init() to use a new KEY_ALLOC_* flag to indicate that
     it wants KEY_FLAG_KEEP to be set rather than passing KEY_FLAG_KEEP
     into keyring_alloc() as KEY_FLAG_KEEP isn't a valid alloc flag.

     This isn't currently a problem as the blacklist keyring isn't
     currently writable by userspace.

  The rest of the patches are cleanups and I don't think they should
  have any visible effect"

* tag 'keys-misc-20210126' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
  watch_queue: rectify kernel-doc for init_watch()
  certs: Replace K{U,G}IDT_INIT() with GLOBAL_ROOT_{U,G}ID
  certs: Fix blacklist flag type confusion
  PKCS#7: Fix missing include
  certs: Fix blacklisted hexadecimal hash string check
  certs/blacklist: fix kernel doc interface issue
  crypto: public_key: Remove redundant header file from public_key.h
  keys: remove trailing semicolon in macro definition
  crypto: pkcs7: Use match_string() helper to simplify the code
  PKCS#7: drop function from kernel-doc pkcs7_validate_trust_one
  encrypted-keys: Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones
  crypto: asymmetric_keys: fix some comments in pkcs7_parser.h
  KEYS: remove redundant memset
  security: keys: delete repeated words in comments
  KEYS: asymmetric: Fix kerneldoc
  security/keys: use kvfree_sensitive()
  watch_queue: Drop references to /dev/watch_queue
  keys: Remove outdated __user annotations
  security: keys: Fix fall-through warnings for Clang
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull keyring updates from David Howells:
 "Here's a set of minor keyrings fixes/cleanups that I've collected from
  various people for the upcoming merge window.

  A couple of them might, in theory, be visible to userspace:

   - Make blacklist_vet_description() reject uppercase letters as they
     don't match the all-lowercase hex string generated for a blacklist
     search.

     This may want reconsideration in the future, but, currently, you
     can't add to the blacklist keyring from userspace and the only
     source of blacklist keys generates lowercase descriptions.

   - Fix blacklist_init() to use a new KEY_ALLOC_* flag to indicate that
     it wants KEY_FLAG_KEEP to be set rather than passing KEY_FLAG_KEEP
     into keyring_alloc() as KEY_FLAG_KEEP isn't a valid alloc flag.

     This isn't currently a problem as the blacklist keyring isn't
     currently writable by userspace.

  The rest of the patches are cleanups and I don't think they should
  have any visible effect"

* tag 'keys-misc-20210126' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
  watch_queue: rectify kernel-doc for init_watch()
  certs: Replace K{U,G}IDT_INIT() with GLOBAL_ROOT_{U,G}ID
  certs: Fix blacklist flag type confusion
  PKCS#7: Fix missing include
  certs: Fix blacklisted hexadecimal hash string check
  certs/blacklist: fix kernel doc interface issue
  crypto: public_key: Remove redundant header file from public_key.h
  keys: remove trailing semicolon in macro definition
  crypto: pkcs7: Use match_string() helper to simplify the code
  PKCS#7: drop function from kernel-doc pkcs7_validate_trust_one
  encrypted-keys: Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones
  crypto: asymmetric_keys: fix some comments in pkcs7_parser.h
  KEYS: remove redundant memset
  security: keys: delete repeated words in comments
  KEYS: asymmetric: Fix kerneldoc
  security/keys: use kvfree_sensitive()
  watch_queue: Drop references to /dev/watch_queue
  keys: Remove outdated __user annotations
  security: keys: Fix fall-through warnings for Clang
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux</title>
<updated>2021-02-23T21:39:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-02-23T21:39:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=7d6beb71da3cc033649d641e1e608713b8220290'/>
<id>7d6beb71da3cc033649d641e1e608713b8220290</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull idmapped mounts from Christian Brauner:
 "This introduces idmapped mounts which has been in the making for some
  time. Simply put, different mounts can expose the same file or
  directory with different ownership. This initial implementation comes
  with ports for fat, ext4 and with Christoph's port for xfs with more
  filesystems being actively worked on by independent people and
  maintainers.

  Idmapping mounts handle a wide range of long standing use-cases. Here
  are just a few:

   - Idmapped mounts make it possible to easily share files between
     multiple users or multiple machines especially in complex
     scenarios. For example, idmapped mounts will be used in the
     implementation of portable home directories in
     systemd-homed.service(8) where they allow users to move their home
     directory to an external storage device and use it on multiple
     computers where they are assigned different uids and gids. This
     effectively makes it possible to assign random uids and gids at
     login time.

   - It is possible to share files from the host with unprivileged
     containers without having to change ownership permanently through
     chown(2).

   - It is possible to idmap a container's rootfs and without having to
     mangle every file. For example, Chromebooks use it to share the
     user's Download folder with their unprivileged containers in their
     Linux subsystem.

   - It is possible to share files between containers with
     non-overlapping idmappings.

   - Filesystem that lack a proper concept of ownership such as fat can
     use idmapped mounts to implement discretionary access (DAC)
     permission checking.

   - They allow users to efficiently changing ownership on a per-mount
     basis without having to (recursively) chown(2) all files. In
     contrast to chown (2) changing ownership of large sets of files is
     instantenous with idmapped mounts. This is especially useful when
     ownership of a whole root filesystem of a virtual machine or
     container is changed. With idmapped mounts a single syscall
     mount_setattr syscall will be sufficient to change the ownership of
     all files.

   - Idmapped mounts always take the current ownership into account as
     idmappings specify what a given uid or gid is supposed to be mapped
     to. This contrasts with the chown(2) syscall which cannot by itself
     take the current ownership of the files it changes into account. It
     simply changes the ownership to the specified uid and gid. This is
     especially problematic when recursively chown(2)ing a large set of
     files which is commong with the aforementioned portable home
     directory and container and vm scenario.

   - Idmapped mounts allow to change ownership locally, restricting it
     to specific mounts, and temporarily as the ownership changes only
     apply as long as the mount exists.

  Several userspace projects have either already put up patches and
  pull-requests for this feature or will do so should you decide to pull
  this:

   - systemd: In a wide variety of scenarios but especially right away
     in their implementation of portable home directories.

         https://systemd.io/HOME_DIRECTORY/

   - container runtimes: containerd, runC, LXD:To share data between
     host and unprivileged containers, unprivileged and privileged
     containers, etc. The pull request for idmapped mounts support in
     containerd, the default Kubernetes runtime is already up for quite
     a while now: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/4734

   - The virtio-fs developers and several users have expressed interest
     in using this feature with virtual machines once virtio-fs is
     ported.

   - ChromeOS: Sharing host-directories with unprivileged containers.

  I've tightly synced with all those projects and all of those listed
  here have also expressed their need/desire for this feature on the
  mailing list. For more info on how people use this there's a bunch of
  talks about this too. Here's just two recent ones:

      https://www.cncf.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Rootless-Containers-in-Gitpod.pdf
      https://fosdem.org/2021/schedule/event/containers_idmap/

  This comes with an extensive xfstests suite covering both ext4 and
  xfs:

      https://git.kernel.org/brauner/xfstests-dev/h/idmapped_mounts

  It covers truncation, creation, opening, xattrs, vfscaps, setid
  execution, setgid inheritance and more both with idmapped and
  non-idmapped mounts. It already helped to discover an unrelated xfs
  setgid inheritance bug which has since been fixed in mainline. It will
  be sent for inclusion with the xfstests project should you decide to
  merge this.

  In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with
  user namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to
  map the ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount.
  By default all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace.
  The initial user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not
  idmapped. All operations behave as before and this is verified in the
  testsuite.

  Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace
  and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all
  the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of
  introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in
  the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users
  to setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account
  whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is
  currently marked with.

  The user namespace the mount will be marked with can be specified by
  passing a file descriptor refering to the user namespace as an
  argument to the new mount_setattr() syscall together with the new
  MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag. The system call follows the openat2() pattern
  of extensibility.

  The following conditions must be met in order to create an idmapped
  mount:

   - The caller must currently have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the
     user namespace the underlying filesystem has been mounted in.

   - The underlying filesystem must support idmapped mounts.

   - The mount must not already be idmapped. This also implies that the
     idmapping of a mount cannot be altered once it has been idmapped.

   - The mount must be a detached/anonymous mount, i.e. it must have
     been created by calling open_tree() with the OPEN_TREE_CLONE flag
     and it must not already have been visible in the filesystem.

  The last two points guarantee easier semantics for userspace and the
  kernel and make the implementation significantly simpler.

  By default vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace and no
  behavioral or performance changes are observed.

  The manpage with a detailed description can be found here:

      https://git.kernel.org/brauner/man-pages/c/1d7b902e2875a1ff342e036a9f866a995640aea8

  In order to support idmapped mounts, filesystems need to be changed
  and mark themselves with the FS_ALLOW_IDMAP flag in fs_flags. The
  patches to convert individual filesystem are not very large or
  complicated overall as can be seen from the included fat, ext4, and
  xfs ports. Patches for other filesystems are actively worked on and
  will be sent out separately. The xfstestsuite can be used to verify
  that port has been done correctly.

  The mount_setattr() syscall is motivated independent of the idmapped
  mounts patches and it's been around since July 2019. One of the most
  valuable features of the new mount api is the ability to perform
  mounts based on file descriptors only.

  Together with the lookup restrictions available in the openat2()
  RESOLVE_* flag namespace which we added in v5.6 this is the first time
  we are close to hardened and race-free (e.g. symlinks) mounting and
  path resolution.

  While userspace has started porting to the new mount api to mount
  proper filesystems and create new bind-mounts it is currently not
  possible to change mount options of an already existing bind mount in
  the new mount api since the mount_setattr() syscall is missing.

  With the addition of the mount_setattr() syscall we remove this last
  restriction and userspace can now fully port to the new mount api,
  covering every use-case the old mount api could. We also add the
  crucial ability to recursively change mount options for a whole mount
  tree, both removing and adding mount options at the same time. This
  syscall has been requested multiple times by various people and
  projects.

  There is a simple tool available at

      https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped

  that allows to create idmapped mounts so people can play with this
  patch series. I'll add support for the regular mount binary should you
  decide to pull this in the following weeks:

  Here's an example to a simple idmapped mount of another user's home
  directory:

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo ./mount --idmap both:1000:1001:1 /home/ubuntu/ /mnt

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/
	total 28
	drwxr-xr-x 2 ubuntu ubuntu 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
	drwxr-xr-x 4 root   root   4096 Oct 28 04:00 ..
	-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu  220 Feb 25  2020 .bash_logout
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3771 Feb 25  2020 .bashrc
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu  807 Feb 25  2020 .profile
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu    0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
	-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/
	total 28
	drwxr-xr-x  2 u1001 u1001 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
	drwxr-xr-x 29 root  root  4096 Oct 28 22:01 ..
	-rw-------  1 u1001 u1001 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001  220 Feb 25  2020 .bash_logout
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001 3771 Feb 25  2020 .bashrc
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001  807 Feb 25  2020 .profile
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001    0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
	-rw-------  1 u1001 u1001 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ touch /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ setfacl -m u:1001:rwx /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo setcap -n 1001 cap_net_raw+ep /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/my-file
	-rw-rwxr--+ 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 28 22:14 /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/my-file
	-rw-rwxr--+ 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 28 22:14 /home/ubuntu/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /mnt/my-file
	getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
	# file: mnt/my-file
	# owner: u1001
	# group: u1001
	user::rw-
	user:u1001:rwx
	group::rw-
	mask::rwx
	other::r--

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /home/ubuntu/my-file
	getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
	# file: home/ubuntu/my-file
	# owner: ubuntu
	# group: ubuntu
	user::rw-
	user:ubuntu:rwx
	group::rw-
	mask::rwx
	other::r--"

* tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux: (41 commits)
  xfs: remove the possibly unused mp variable in xfs_file_compat_ioctl
  xfs: support idmapped mounts
  ext4: support idmapped mounts
  fat: handle idmapped mounts
  tests: add mount_setattr() selftests
  fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP
  fs: add mount_setattr()
  fs: add attr_flags_to_mnt_flags helper
  fs: split out functions to hold writers
  namespace: only take read lock in do_reconfigure_mnt()
  mount: make {lock,unlock}_mount_hash() static
  namespace: take lock_mount_hash() directly when changing flags
  nfs: do not export idmapped mounts
  overlayfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
  ecryptfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
  ima: handle idmapped mounts
  apparmor: handle idmapped mounts
  fs: make helpers idmap mount aware
  exec: handle idmapped mounts
  would_dump: handle idmapped mounts
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull idmapped mounts from Christian Brauner:
 "This introduces idmapped mounts which has been in the making for some
  time. Simply put, different mounts can expose the same file or
  directory with different ownership. This initial implementation comes
  with ports for fat, ext4 and with Christoph's port for xfs with more
  filesystems being actively worked on by independent people and
  maintainers.

  Idmapping mounts handle a wide range of long standing use-cases. Here
  are just a few:

   - Idmapped mounts make it possible to easily share files between
     multiple users or multiple machines especially in complex
     scenarios. For example, idmapped mounts will be used in the
     implementation of portable home directories in
     systemd-homed.service(8) where they allow users to move their home
     directory to an external storage device and use it on multiple
     computers where they are assigned different uids and gids. This
     effectively makes it possible to assign random uids and gids at
     login time.

   - It is possible to share files from the host with unprivileged
     containers without having to change ownership permanently through
     chown(2).

   - It is possible to idmap a container's rootfs and without having to
     mangle every file. For example, Chromebooks use it to share the
     user's Download folder with their unprivileged containers in their
     Linux subsystem.

   - It is possible to share files between containers with
     non-overlapping idmappings.

   - Filesystem that lack a proper concept of ownership such as fat can
     use idmapped mounts to implement discretionary access (DAC)
     permission checking.

   - They allow users to efficiently changing ownership on a per-mount
     basis without having to (recursively) chown(2) all files. In
     contrast to chown (2) changing ownership of large sets of files is
     instantenous with idmapped mounts. This is especially useful when
     ownership of a whole root filesystem of a virtual machine or
     container is changed. With idmapped mounts a single syscall
     mount_setattr syscall will be sufficient to change the ownership of
     all files.

   - Idmapped mounts always take the current ownership into account as
     idmappings specify what a given uid or gid is supposed to be mapped
     to. This contrasts with the chown(2) syscall which cannot by itself
     take the current ownership of the files it changes into account. It
     simply changes the ownership to the specified uid and gid. This is
     especially problematic when recursively chown(2)ing a large set of
     files which is commong with the aforementioned portable home
     directory and container and vm scenario.

   - Idmapped mounts allow to change ownership locally, restricting it
     to specific mounts, and temporarily as the ownership changes only
     apply as long as the mount exists.

  Several userspace projects have either already put up patches and
  pull-requests for this feature or will do so should you decide to pull
  this:

   - systemd: In a wide variety of scenarios but especially right away
     in their implementation of portable home directories.

         https://systemd.io/HOME_DIRECTORY/

   - container runtimes: containerd, runC, LXD:To share data between
     host and unprivileged containers, unprivileged and privileged
     containers, etc. The pull request for idmapped mounts support in
     containerd, the default Kubernetes runtime is already up for quite
     a while now: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/4734

   - The virtio-fs developers and several users have expressed interest
     in using this feature with virtual machines once virtio-fs is
     ported.

   - ChromeOS: Sharing host-directories with unprivileged containers.

  I've tightly synced with all those projects and all of those listed
  here have also expressed their need/desire for this feature on the
  mailing list. For more info on how people use this there's a bunch of
  talks about this too. Here's just two recent ones:

      https://www.cncf.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Rootless-Containers-in-Gitpod.pdf
      https://fosdem.org/2021/schedule/event/containers_idmap/

  This comes with an extensive xfstests suite covering both ext4 and
  xfs:

      https://git.kernel.org/brauner/xfstests-dev/h/idmapped_mounts

  It covers truncation, creation, opening, xattrs, vfscaps, setid
  execution, setgid inheritance and more both with idmapped and
  non-idmapped mounts. It already helped to discover an unrelated xfs
  setgid inheritance bug which has since been fixed in mainline. It will
  be sent for inclusion with the xfstests project should you decide to
  merge this.

  In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with
  user namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to
  map the ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount.
  By default all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace.
  The initial user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not
  idmapped. All operations behave as before and this is verified in the
  testsuite.

  Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace
  and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all
  the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of
  introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in
  the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users
  to setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account
  whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is
  currently marked with.

  The user namespace the mount will be marked with can be specified by
  passing a file descriptor refering to the user namespace as an
  argument to the new mount_setattr() syscall together with the new
  MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag. The system call follows the openat2() pattern
  of extensibility.

  The following conditions must be met in order to create an idmapped
  mount:

   - The caller must currently have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the
     user namespace the underlying filesystem has been mounted in.

   - The underlying filesystem must support idmapped mounts.

   - The mount must not already be idmapped. This also implies that the
     idmapping of a mount cannot be altered once it has been idmapped.

   - The mount must be a detached/anonymous mount, i.e. it must have
     been created by calling open_tree() with the OPEN_TREE_CLONE flag
     and it must not already have been visible in the filesystem.

  The last two points guarantee easier semantics for userspace and the
  kernel and make the implementation significantly simpler.

  By default vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace and no
  behavioral or performance changes are observed.

  The manpage with a detailed description can be found here:

      https://git.kernel.org/brauner/man-pages/c/1d7b902e2875a1ff342e036a9f866a995640aea8

  In order to support idmapped mounts, filesystems need to be changed
  and mark themselves with the FS_ALLOW_IDMAP flag in fs_flags. The
  patches to convert individual filesystem are not very large or
  complicated overall as can be seen from the included fat, ext4, and
  xfs ports. Patches for other filesystems are actively worked on and
  will be sent out separately. The xfstestsuite can be used to verify
  that port has been done correctly.

  The mount_setattr() syscall is motivated independent of the idmapped
  mounts patches and it's been around since July 2019. One of the most
  valuable features of the new mount api is the ability to perform
  mounts based on file descriptors only.

  Together with the lookup restrictions available in the openat2()
  RESOLVE_* flag namespace which we added in v5.6 this is the first time
  we are close to hardened and race-free (e.g. symlinks) mounting and
  path resolution.

  While userspace has started porting to the new mount api to mount
  proper filesystems and create new bind-mounts it is currently not
  possible to change mount options of an already existing bind mount in
  the new mount api since the mount_setattr() syscall is missing.

  With the addition of the mount_setattr() syscall we remove this last
  restriction and userspace can now fully port to the new mount api,
  covering every use-case the old mount api could. We also add the
  crucial ability to recursively change mount options for a whole mount
  tree, both removing and adding mount options at the same time. This
  syscall has been requested multiple times by various people and
  projects.

  There is a simple tool available at

      https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped

  that allows to create idmapped mounts so people can play with this
  patch series. I'll add support for the regular mount binary should you
  decide to pull this in the following weeks:

  Here's an example to a simple idmapped mount of another user's home
  directory:

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo ./mount --idmap both:1000:1001:1 /home/ubuntu/ /mnt

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/
	total 28
	drwxr-xr-x 2 ubuntu ubuntu 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
	drwxr-xr-x 4 root   root   4096 Oct 28 04:00 ..
	-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu  220 Feb 25  2020 .bash_logout
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3771 Feb 25  2020 .bashrc
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu  807 Feb 25  2020 .profile
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu    0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
	-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/
	total 28
	drwxr-xr-x  2 u1001 u1001 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
	drwxr-xr-x 29 root  root  4096 Oct 28 22:01 ..
	-rw-------  1 u1001 u1001 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001  220 Feb 25  2020 .bash_logout
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001 3771 Feb 25  2020 .bashrc
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001  807 Feb 25  2020 .profile
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001    0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
	-rw-------  1 u1001 u1001 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ touch /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ setfacl -m u:1001:rwx /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo setcap -n 1001 cap_net_raw+ep /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/my-file
	-rw-rwxr--+ 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 28 22:14 /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/my-file
	-rw-rwxr--+ 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 28 22:14 /home/ubuntu/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /mnt/my-file
	getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
	# file: mnt/my-file
	# owner: u1001
	# group: u1001
	user::rw-
	user:u1001:rwx
	group::rw-
	mask::rwx
	other::r--

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /home/ubuntu/my-file
	getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
	# file: home/ubuntu/my-file
	# owner: ubuntu
	# group: ubuntu
	user::rw-
	user:ubuntu:rwx
	group::rw-
	mask::rwx
	other::r--"

* tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux: (41 commits)
  xfs: remove the possibly unused mp variable in xfs_file_compat_ioctl
  xfs: support idmapped mounts
  ext4: support idmapped mounts
  fat: handle idmapped mounts
  tests: add mount_setattr() selftests
  fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP
  fs: add mount_setattr()
  fs: add attr_flags_to_mnt_flags helper
  fs: split out functions to hold writers
  namespace: only take read lock in do_reconfigure_mnt()
  mount: make {lock,unlock}_mount_hash() static
  namespace: take lock_mount_hash() directly when changing flags
  nfs: do not export idmapped mounts
  overlayfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
  ecryptfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
  ima: handle idmapped mounts
  apparmor: handle idmapped mounts
  fs: make helpers idmap mount aware
  exec: handle idmapped mounts
  would_dump: handle idmapped mounts
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'userns-for-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace</title>
<updated>2021-02-23T01:13:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-02-23T01:13:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.toradex.cn/cgit/linux-toradex.git/commit/?id=7b0b78df9cca7344960decf3a16805e8378a43b7'/>
<id>7b0b78df9cca7344960decf3a16805e8378a43b7</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull user namespace update from Eric Biederman:
 "There are several pieces of active development, but only a single
  change made it through the gauntlet to be ready for v5.12. That change
  is tightening up the semantics of the v3 capabilities xattr. It is
  just short of being a bug-fix/security issue as no user space is known
  to even generate the problem case"

* 'userns-for-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
  capabilities: Don't allow writing ambiguous v3 file capabilities
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull user namespace update from Eric Biederman:
 "There are several pieces of active development, but only a single
  change made it through the gauntlet to be ready for v5.12. That change
  is tightening up the semantics of the v3 capabilities xattr. It is
  just short of being a bug-fix/security issue as no user space is known
  to even generate the problem case"

* 'userns-for-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
  capabilities: Don't allow writing ambiguous v3 file capabilities
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
