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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2008-04-21 16:01:40 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2008-04-21 16:01:40 -0700
commit19b5b517a8b81a448be9b2bdaf18a761a7b9799e (patch)
treeb1e83e331769d44f98e564c984acf3841261c2a8
parentbda0c0afa7a694bb1459fd023515aca681e4d79a (diff)
parent95fff33b8e306a4331024bbd31c0999d5bf48fcf (diff)
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6: SELinux: one little, two little, three little whitespaces, the avc.c saga. SELinux: cleanup on isle selinuxfs.c changing whitespace for fun and profit: policydb.c SELinux: whitespace and formating fixes for hooks.c SELinux: clean up printks SELinux: sidtab.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups SELinux: services.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups SELinux: mls.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups SELinux: hashtab.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups SELinux: ebitmap.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups SELinux: conditional.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups SELinux: avtab.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups SELinux: xfrm.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups SELinux: nlmsgtab.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups SELinux: netnode.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups SELinux: netlink.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups SELinux: netlabel.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups SELinux: netif.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups
Diffstat
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/avc.c58
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c512
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/netif.c19
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/netlabel.c2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/netlink.c20
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/netnode.c2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c5
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/selinuxfs.c127
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/avtab.c48
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/conditional.c73
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c5
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c4
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/mls.c27
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/policydb.c148
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c178
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c6
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/xfrm.c9
17 files changed, 609 insertions, 634 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index a4fc6e6d038a..1d69f6649bff 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -2,16 +2,16 @@
* Implementation of the kernel access vector cache (AVC).
*
* Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
- * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
*
* Update: KaiGai, Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
- * Replaced the avc_lock spinlock by RCU.
+ * Replaced the avc_lock spinlock by RCU.
*
* Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
- * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
*/
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/stddef.h>
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ static const char *class_to_string[] = {
#undef S_
};
-#define TB_(s) static const char * s [] = {
+#define TB_(s) static const char *s[] = {
#define TE_(s) };
#define S_(s) s,
#include "common_perm_to_string.h"
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ const struct selinux_class_perm selinux_class_perm = {
#define AVC_CACHE_RECLAIM 16
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
-#define avc_cache_stats_incr(field) \
+#define avc_cache_stats_incr(field) \
do { \
per_cpu(avc_cache_stats, get_cpu()).field++; \
put_cpu(); \
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ struct avc_entry {
struct avc_node {
struct avc_entry ae;
struct list_head list;
- struct rcu_head rhead;
+ struct rcu_head rhead;
};
struct avc_cache {
@@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ struct avc_cache {
struct avc_callback_node {
int (*callback) (u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
- u16 tclass, u32 perms,
- u32 *out_retained);
+ u16 tclass, u32 perms,
+ u32 *out_retained);
u32 events;
u32 ssid;
u32 tsid;
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ static void avc_dump_query(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tcla
char *scontext;
u32 scontext_len;
- rc = security_sid_to_context(ssid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
+ rc = security_sid_to_context(ssid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
if (rc)
audit_log_format(ab, "ssid=%d", ssid);
else {
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ static inline int avc_reclaim_node(void)
int hvalue, try, ecx;
unsigned long flags;
- for (try = 0, ecx = 0; try < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; try++ ) {
+ for (try = 0, ecx = 0; try < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; try++) {
hvalue = atomic_inc_return(&avc_cache.lru_hint) & (AVC_CACHE_SLOTS - 1);
if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flags))
@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ static int avc_latest_notif_update(int seqno, int is_insert)
spin_lock_irqsave(&notif_lock, flag);
if (is_insert) {
if (seqno < avc_cache.latest_notif) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "avc: seqno %d < latest_notif %d\n",
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: avc: seqno %d < latest_notif %d\n",
seqno, avc_cache.latest_notif);
ret = -EAGAIN;
}
@@ -475,7 +475,7 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct avc_en
if (pos->ae.ssid == ssid &&
pos->ae.tsid == tsid &&
pos->ae.tclass == tclass) {
- avc_node_replace(node, pos);
+ avc_node_replace(node, pos);
goto found;
}
}
@@ -526,8 +526,8 @@ static inline void avc_print_ipv4_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab, __be32 addr,
* before calling the auditing code.
*/
void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
- u16 tclass, u32 requested,
- struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct avc_audit_data *a)
+ u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+ struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct avc_audit_data *a)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
struct inode *inode = NULL;
@@ -541,7 +541,7 @@ void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
return;
} else if (result) {
audited = denied = requested;
- } else {
+ } else {
audited = requested;
if (!(audited & avd->auditallow))
return;
@@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
if (!ab)
return; /* audit_panic has been called */
audit_log_format(ab, "avc: %s ", denied ? "denied" : "granted");
- avc_dump_av(ab, tclass,audited);
+ avc_dump_av(ab, tclass, audited);
audit_log_format(ab, " for ");
if (a && a->tsk)
tsk = a->tsk;
@@ -647,7 +647,7 @@ void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
break;
}
}
-
+
switch (a->u.net.family) {
case AF_INET:
avc_print_ipv4_addr(ab, a->u.net.v4info.saddr,
@@ -702,10 +702,10 @@ void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
* -%ENOMEM if insufficient memory exists to add the callback.
*/
int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
- u16 tclass, u32 perms,
- u32 *out_retained),
- u32 events, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
- u16 tclass, u32 perms)
+ u16 tclass, u32 perms,
+ u32 *out_retained),
+ u32 events, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+ u16 tclass, u32 perms)
{
struct avc_callback_node *c;
int rc = 0;
@@ -759,10 +759,10 @@ static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
spin_lock_irqsave(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flag);
- list_for_each_entry(pos, &avc_cache.slots[hvalue], list){
- if ( ssid==pos->ae.ssid &&
- tsid==pos->ae.tsid &&
- tclass==pos->ae.tclass ){
+ list_for_each_entry(pos, &avc_cache.slots[hvalue], list) {
+ if (ssid == pos->ae.ssid &&
+ tsid == pos->ae.tsid &&
+ tclass == pos->ae.tclass){
orig = pos;
break;
}
@@ -829,7 +829,7 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
for (c = avc_callbacks; c; c = c->next) {
if (c->events & AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
tmprc = c->callback(AVC_CALLBACK_RESET,
- 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
/* save the first error encountered for the return
value and continue processing the callbacks */
if (!rc)
@@ -878,11 +878,11 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested);
if (!node) {
rcu_read_unlock();
- rc = security_compute_av(ssid,tsid,tclass,requested,&entry.avd);
+ rc = security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &entry.avd);
if (rc)
goto out;
rcu_read_lock();
- node = avc_insert(ssid,tsid,tclass,&entry);
+ node = avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, &entry);
}
p_ae = node ? &node->ae : &entry;
@@ -924,7 +924,7 @@ out:
* another -errno upon other errors.
*/
int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
- u32 requested, struct avc_audit_data *auditdata)
+ u32 requested, struct avc_audit_data *auditdata)
{
struct av_decision avd;
int rc;
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index f9927f02bc3d..1bf2543ea942 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4,22 +4,22 @@
* This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
*
* Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
- * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
- * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
- * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
+ * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
+ * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
*
* Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
* Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
- * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
* Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
- * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
+ * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
* Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
- * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
+ * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
- * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
*/
#include <linux/init.h>
@@ -99,11 +99,11 @@ extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
-int selinux_enforcing = 0;
+int selinux_enforcing;
static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
{
- selinux_enforcing = simple_strtol(str,NULL,0);
+ selinux_enforcing = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
return 1;
}
__setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
@@ -123,13 +123,13 @@ int selinux_enabled = 1;
#endif
/* Original (dummy) security module. */
-static struct security_operations *original_ops = NULL;
+static struct security_operations *original_ops;
/* Minimal support for a secondary security module,
just to allow the use of the dummy or capability modules.
The owlsm module can alternatively be used as a secondary
module as long as CONFIG_OWLSM_FD is not enabled. */
-static struct security_operations *secondary_ops = NULL;
+static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
/* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
before the policy was loaded. */
@@ -575,8 +575,8 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
goto out;
}
rc = -EINVAL;
- printk(KERN_WARNING "Unable to set superblock options before "
- "the security server is initialized\n");
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
+ "before the security server is initialized\n");
goto out;
}
@@ -1054,7 +1054,7 @@ static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
int buflen, rc;
char *buffer, *path, *end;
- buffer = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buffer)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -1135,7 +1135,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
}
if (!dentry) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: no dentry for dev=%s "
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: no dentry for dev=%s "
"ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
inode->i_ino);
goto out_unlock;
@@ -1173,7 +1173,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
dput(dentry);
if (rc < 0) {
if (rc != -ENODATA) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: getxattr returned "
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
"%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
-rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
kfree(context);
@@ -1187,7 +1187,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
sbsec->def_sid,
GFP_NOFS);
if (rc) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: context_to_sid(%s) "
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
"returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
__func__, context, -rc,
inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
@@ -1305,7 +1305,7 @@ static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
tsec = tsk->security;
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,CAP);
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
ad.tsk = tsk;
ad.u.cap = cap;
@@ -1348,7 +1348,7 @@ static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
- if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (inode)))
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
return 0;
tsec = tsk->security;
@@ -1373,7 +1373,7 @@ static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
{
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
@@ -1470,9 +1470,9 @@ static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
}
-#define MAY_LINK 0
-#define MAY_UNLINK 1
-#define MAY_RMDIR 2
+#define MAY_LINK 0
+#define MAY_UNLINK 1
+#define MAY_RMDIR 2
/* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
@@ -1510,7 +1510,8 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
av = DIR__RMDIR;
break;
default:
- printk(KERN_WARNING "may_link: unrecognized kind %d\n", kind);
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
+ __func__, kind);
return 0;
}
@@ -1640,8 +1641,8 @@ static inline u32 open_file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
av |= DIR__OPEN;
else
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside open_file_to_av "
- "with unknown mode:%x\n", mode);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
+ "unknown mode:%x\n", __func__, mode);
}
return av;
}
@@ -1675,7 +1676,7 @@ static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
{
int rc;
- rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent,child);
+ rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent, child);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -1683,7 +1684,7 @@ static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
}
static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
- kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+ kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
int error;
@@ -1695,7 +1696,7 @@ static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
}
static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
- kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+ kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
int error;
@@ -1707,7 +1708,7 @@ static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effect
}
static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
- kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+ kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
@@ -1720,7 +1721,7 @@ static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
if (rc)
return rc;
- return task_has_capability(tsk,cap);
+ return task_has_capability(tsk, cap);
}
static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
@@ -1729,7 +1730,7 @@ static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
char *buffer, *path, *end;
rc = -ENOMEM;
- buffer = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buffer)
goto out;
@@ -1787,7 +1788,7 @@ static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
/* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
* a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
- if(op == 001) {
+ if (op == 001) {
error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
} else {
@@ -1799,7 +1800,7 @@ static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
if (av)
error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
- }
+ }
return error;
}
@@ -1812,25 +1813,23 @@ static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
return 0;
switch (cmds) {
- case Q_SYNC:
- case Q_QUOTAON:
- case Q_QUOTAOFF:
- case Q_SETINFO:
- case Q_SETQUOTA:
- rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
- sb,
- FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
- break;
- case Q_GETFMT:
- case Q_GETINFO:
- case Q_GETQUOTA:
- rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
- sb,
- FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
- break;
- default:
- rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
- break;
+ case Q_SYNC:
+ case Q_QUOTAON:
+ case Q_QUOTAOFF:
+ case Q_SETINFO:
+ case Q_SETQUOTA:
+ rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD,
+ NULL);
+ break;
+ case Q_GETFMT:
+ case Q_GETINFO:
+ case Q_GETQUOTA:
+ rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET,
+ NULL);
+ break;
+ default:
+ rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
+ break;
}
return rc;
}
@@ -1849,23 +1848,23 @@ static int selinux_syslog(int type)
return rc;
switch (type) {
- case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
- case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
- rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
- break;
- case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
- case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
- case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
- rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
- break;
- case 0: /* Close log */
- case 1: /* Open log */
- case 2: /* Read from log */
- case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
- case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
- default:
- rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
- break;
+ case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
+ case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
+ rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
+ break;
+ case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
+ case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
+ case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
+ rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
+ break;
+ case 0: /* Close log */
+ case 1: /* Open log */
+ case 2: /* Read from log */
+ case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
+ case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
+ default:
+ rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
+ break;
}
return rc;
}
@@ -1971,7 +1970,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
} else {
/* Check for a default transition on this program. */
rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
- SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
+ SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
@@ -1982,7 +1981,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
newsid = tsec->sid;
- if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
+ if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
if (rc)
@@ -2010,13 +2009,13 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
return 0;
}
-static int selinux_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+static int selinux_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
}
-static int selinux_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
int atsecure = 0;
@@ -2043,7 +2042,7 @@ extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
/* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
-static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files)
+static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct *files)
{
struct avc_audit_data ad;
struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
@@ -2078,7 +2077,7 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files)
/* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
for (;;) {
@@ -2094,7 +2093,7 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files)
if (!set)
continue;
spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
- for ( ; set ; i++,set >>= 1) {
+ for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
if (set & 1) {
file = fget(i);
if (!file)
@@ -2251,7 +2250,7 @@ static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
- rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max,initrlim->rlim_cur);
+ rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
}
if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
/*
@@ -2306,16 +2305,15 @@ static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
*to += len;
}
-static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
- int len)
+static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
+ int len)
{
int current_size = 0;
if (!*first) {
**to = '|';
*to += 1;
- }
- else
+ } else
*first = 0;
while (current_size < len) {
@@ -2379,7 +2377,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
if (rc)
return rc;
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
}
@@ -2388,16 +2386,16 @@ static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct avc_audit_data ad;
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
return superblock_has_perm(current, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
}
-static int selinux_mount(char * dev_name,
- struct nameidata *nd,
- char * type,
- unsigned long flags,
- void * data)
+static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
+ struct nameidata *nd,
+ char *type,
+ unsigned long flags,
+ void *data)
{
int rc;
@@ -2407,10 +2405,10 @@ static int selinux_mount(char * dev_name,
if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
return superblock_has_perm(current, nd->path.mnt->mnt_sb,
- FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
+ FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
else
return dentry_has_perm(current, nd->path.mnt, nd->path.dentry,
- FILE__MOUNTON);
+ FILE__MOUNTON);
}
static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
@@ -2421,8 +2419,8 @@ static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
if (rc)
return rc;
- return superblock_has_perm(current,mnt->mnt_sb,
- FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT,NULL);
+ return superblock_has_perm(current, mnt->mnt_sb,
+ FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
}
/* inode security operations */
@@ -2508,7 +2506,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, stru
{
int rc;
- rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry,dir,new_dentry);
+ rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
if (rc)
return rc;
return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
@@ -2551,7 +2549,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mod
}
static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
- struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
+ struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
{
return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
}
@@ -2565,7 +2563,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *na
{
int rc;
- rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry,nameidata);
+ rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nameidata);
if (rc)
return rc;
return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
@@ -2651,7 +2649,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value
if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
return -EPERM;
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
@@ -2669,7 +2667,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value
return rc;
rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
- isec->sclass);
+ isec->sclass);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -2681,7 +2679,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value
}
static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
- void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+ void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
@@ -2704,17 +2702,17 @@ static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
return;
}
-static int selinux_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
+static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
{
return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
}
-static int selinux_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry)
+static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
{
return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
}
-static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
+static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
{
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
@@ -2755,7 +2753,7 @@ out_nofree:
}
static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
- const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+ const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
u32 newsid;
@@ -2767,7 +2765,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
if (!value || !size)
return -EACCES;
- rc = security_context_to_sid((void*)value, size, &newsid);
+ rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -2858,42 +2856,41 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
int error = 0;
switch (cmd) {
- case FIONREAD:
- /* fall through */
- case FIBMAP:
- /* fall through */
- case FIGETBSZ:
- /* fall through */
- case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS:
- /* fall through */
- case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION:
- error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__GETATTR);
- break;
-
- case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS:
- /* fall through */
- case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION:
- error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__SETATTR);
- break;
+ case FIONREAD:
+ /* fall through */
+ case FIBMAP:
+ /* fall through */
+ case FIGETBSZ:
+ /* fall through */
+ case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS:
+ /* fall through */
+ case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION:
+ error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__GETATTR);
+ break;
- /* sys_ioctl() checks */
- case FIONBIO:
- /* fall through */
- case FIOASYNC:
- error = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
- break;
+ case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS:
+ /* fall through */
+ case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION:
+ error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__SETATTR);
+ break;
- case KDSKBENT:
- case KDSKBSENT:
- error = task_has_capability(current,CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG);
- break;
+ /* sys_ioctl() checks */
+ case FIONBIO:
+ /* fall through */
+ case FIOASYNC:
+ error = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
+ break;
- /* default case assumes that the command will go
- * to the file's ioctl() function.
- */
- default:
- error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__IOCTL);
+ case KDSKBENT:
+ case KDSKBSENT:
+ error = task_has_capability(current, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG);
+ break;
+ /* default case assumes that the command will go
+ * to the file's ioctl() function.
+ */
+ default:
+ error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__IOCTL);
}
return error;
}
@@ -2934,7 +2931,7 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
{
int rc = 0;
- u32 sid = ((struct task_security_struct*)(current->security))->sid;
+ u32 sid = ((struct task_security_struct *)(current->security))->sid;
if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
@@ -3003,39 +3000,39 @@ static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
int err = 0;
switch (cmd) {
- case F_SETFL:
- if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
- err = -EINVAL;
- break;
- }
+ case F_SETFL:
+ if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
- if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
- err = file_has_perm(current, file,FILE__WRITE);
- break;
- }
- /* fall through */
- case F_SETOWN:
- case F_SETSIG:
- case F_GETFL:
- case F_GETOWN:
- case F_GETSIG:
- /* Just check FD__USE permission */
- err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
+ if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
+ err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__WRITE);
break;
- case F_GETLK:
- case F_SETLK:
- case F_SETLKW:
+ }
+ /* fall through */
+ case F_SETOWN:
+ case F_SETSIG:
+ case F_GETFL:
+ case F_GETOWN:
+ case F_GETSIG:
+ /* Just check FD__USE permission */
+ err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
+ break;
+ case F_GETLK:
+ case F_SETLK:
+ case F_SETLKW:
#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
- case F_GETLK64:
- case F_SETLK64:
- case F_SETLKW64:
+ case F_GETLK64:
+ case F_SETLK64:
+ case F_SETLKW64:
#endif
- if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
- err = -EINVAL;
- break;
- }
- err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
+ if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
break;
+ }
+ err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
+ break;
}
return err;
@@ -3056,13 +3053,13 @@ static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
{
- struct file *file;
+ struct file *file;
u32 perm;
struct task_security_struct *tsec;
struct file_security_struct *fsec;
/* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
- file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
+ file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
tsec = tsk->security;
fsec = file->f_security;
@@ -3164,7 +3161,7 @@ static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
{
- return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0,id1,id2,flags);
+ return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0, id1, id2, flags);
}
static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
@@ -3208,7 +3205,7 @@ static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
if (rc)
return rc;
- return task_has_perm(current,p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
+ return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
}
static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
@@ -3312,7 +3309,7 @@ static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
@@ -3357,11 +3354,11 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
*proto = ih->protocol;
switch (ih->protocol) {
- case IPPROTO_TCP: {
- struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
+ case IPPROTO_TCP: {
+ struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
- if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
- break;
+ if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
+ break;
offset += ihlen;
th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
@@ -3371,23 +3368,23 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
break;
- }
-
- case IPPROTO_UDP: {
- struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
-
- if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
- break;
-
+ }
+
+ case IPPROTO_UDP: {
+ struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
+
+ if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
+ break;
+
offset += ihlen;
- uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
+ uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
if (uh == NULL)
- break;
+ break;
- ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
- ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
- break;
- }
+ ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
+ ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
+ break;
+ }
case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
@@ -3403,11 +3400,11 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
break;
- }
+ }
- default:
- break;
- }
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
out:
return ret;
}
@@ -3442,7 +3439,7 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
switch (nexthdr) {
case IPPROTO_TCP: {
- struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
+ struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
if (th == NULL)
@@ -3475,7 +3472,7 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
break;
- }
+ }
/* includes fragments */
default:
@@ -3573,7 +3570,7 @@ static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
goto out;
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
@@ -3683,7 +3680,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
snum, &sid);
if (err)
goto out;
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
ad.u.net.family = family;
err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
@@ -3693,12 +3690,12 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
goto out;
}
}
-
- switch(isec->sclass) {
+
+ switch (isec->sclass) {
case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
break;
-
+
case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
break;
@@ -3711,12 +3708,12 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
break;
}
-
+
err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
if (err)
goto out;
-
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
+
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
ad.u.net.family = family;
@@ -3726,7 +3723,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
- isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
+ isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
if (err)
goto out;
}
@@ -3775,7 +3772,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
@@ -3813,7 +3810,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
}
static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
- int size)
+ int size)
{
int rc;
@@ -3840,7 +3837,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
}
-static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,int level,int optname)
+static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
{
int err;
@@ -3879,7 +3876,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
@@ -3891,7 +3888,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
/* connecting socket */
ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
-
+
/* server child socket */
ssec = newsk->sk_security;
ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
@@ -3911,7 +3908,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
@@ -3989,7 +3986,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
if (err)
return err;
-
+
err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -4140,7 +4137,7 @@ out_len:
err = -EFAULT;
kfree(scontext);
-out:
+out:
return err;
}
@@ -4201,7 +4198,7 @@ static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
}
}
-static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock* sk, struct socket *parent)
+static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
@@ -4278,13 +4275,13 @@ static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
-
+
if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
-
+
err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
if (err) {
if (err == -EINVAL) {
@@ -4410,7 +4407,7 @@ static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
return err;
err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
return err;
-
+
err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -4593,7 +4590,7 @@ static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
ad.u.cap = capability;
return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
- SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
+ SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
}
static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
@@ -4685,7 +4682,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
isec = msq->q_perm.security;
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
- ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
+ ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
@@ -4722,7 +4719,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
int err;
int perms;
- switch(cmd) {
+ switch (cmd) {
case IPC_INFO:
case MSG_INFO:
/* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
@@ -4806,7 +4803,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
msec = msg->security;
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
- ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
+ ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
@@ -4832,7 +4829,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
- ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
+ ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
SHM__CREATE, &ad);
@@ -4870,7 +4867,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
int perms;
int err;
- switch(cmd) {
+ switch (cmd) {
case IPC_INFO:
case SHM_INFO:
/* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
@@ -4931,7 +4928,7 @@ static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
- ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
+ ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
SEM__CREATE, &ad);
@@ -4969,7 +4966,7 @@ static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
int err;
u32 perms;
- switch(cmd) {
+ switch (cmd) {
case IPC_INFO:
case SEM_INFO:
/* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
@@ -5041,13 +5038,13 @@ static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
}
/* module stacking operations */
-static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
+static int selinux_register_security(const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
{
if (secondary_ops != original_ops) {
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: There is already a secondary security "
"module registered.\n", __func__);
return -EINVAL;
- }
+ }
secondary_ops = ops;
@@ -5058,7 +5055,7 @@ static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operatio
return 0;
}
-static void selinux_d_instantiate (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
+static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
{
if (inode)
inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
@@ -5186,11 +5183,11 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
}
while_each_thread(g, t);
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
- }
+ }
/* Check permissions for the transition. */
error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
- PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
+ PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
if (error)
return error;
@@ -5218,8 +5215,7 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
tsec->sid = sid;
task_unlock(p);
}
- }
- else
+ } else
return -EINVAL;
return size;
@@ -5309,7 +5305,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
.netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
- .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
+ .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
.bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
.bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security,
@@ -5322,13 +5318,13 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
.sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
.sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
- .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
+ .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
.sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
.sb_mount = selinux_mount,
.sb_umount = selinux_umount,
.sb_get_mnt_opts = selinux_get_mnt_opts,
.sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
- .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
+ .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
.sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
@@ -5353,9 +5349,9 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
.inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
.inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
- .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
- .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
- .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
+ .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
+ .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
+ .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
.inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
.inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv,
.inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
@@ -5372,7 +5368,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
.file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
- .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
+ .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
.task_create = selinux_task_create,
.task_alloc_security = selinux_task_alloc_security,
@@ -5382,7 +5378,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
.task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
.task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
- .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
+ .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
.task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
.task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
.task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
@@ -5396,7 +5392,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
.task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
.task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
- .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
+ .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
.ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
.ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
@@ -5417,24 +5413,24 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
.shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
- .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
- .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
+ .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
+ .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
.sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
.sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
.sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
.register_security = selinux_register_security,
- .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
+ .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
- .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
- .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
+ .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
+ .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
.secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
.secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
.release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
- .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
+ .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
.unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
.socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
@@ -5456,7 +5452,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
.sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
.sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
- .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
+ .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
.sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
.inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
.inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
@@ -5471,15 +5467,15 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
.xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
.xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
- .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
+ .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
.xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
- .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
- .key_free = selinux_key_free,
- .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
+ .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
+ .key_free = selinux_key_free,
+ .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
@@ -5519,15 +5515,14 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
original_ops = secondary_ops = security_ops;
if (!secondary_ops)
- panic ("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
- if (register_security (&selinux_ops))
+ panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
+ if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
- if (selinux_enforcing) {
+ if (selinux_enforcing)
printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
- } else {
+ else
printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
- }
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
/* Add security information to initial keyrings */
@@ -5552,8 +5547,8 @@ next_sb:
if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
- struct superblock_security_struct,
- list);
+ struct superblock_security_struct,
+ list);
struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
sb->s_count++;
spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
@@ -5672,10 +5667,11 @@ static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
+static int selinux_disabled;
+
int selinux_disable(void)
{
extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
- static int selinux_disabled = 0;
if (ss_initialized) {
/* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
diff --git a/security/selinux/netif.c b/security/selinux/netif.c
index 9c8a82aa8baf..c658b84c3196 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netif.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netif.c
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
*
* Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
* Copyright (C) 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
- * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
+ * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
@@ -31,8 +31,7 @@
#define SEL_NETIF_HASH_SIZE 64
#define SEL_NETIF_HASH_MAX 1024
-struct sel_netif
-{
+struct sel_netif {
struct list_head list;
struct netif_security_struct nsec;
struct rcu_head rcu_head;
@@ -92,10 +91,10 @@ static inline struct sel_netif *sel_netif_find(int ifindex)
static int sel_netif_insert(struct sel_netif *netif)
{
int idx;
-
+
if (sel_netif_total >= SEL_NETIF_HASH_MAX)
return -ENOSPC;
-
+
idx = sel_netif_hashfn(netif->nsec.ifindex);
list_add_rcu(&netif->list, &sel_netif_hash[idx]);
sel_netif_total++;
@@ -267,7 +266,7 @@ static void sel_netif_flush(void)
}
static int sel_netif_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
- u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained)
+ u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained)
{
if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
sel_netif_flush();
@@ -277,7 +276,7 @@ static int sel_netif_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
}
static int sel_netif_netdev_notifier_handler(struct notifier_block *this,
- unsigned long event, void *ptr)
+ unsigned long event, void *ptr)
{
struct net_device *dev = ptr;
@@ -297,7 +296,7 @@ static struct notifier_block sel_netif_netdev_notifier = {
static __init int sel_netif_init(void)
{
int i, err;
-
+
if (!selinux_enabled)
return 0;
@@ -305,9 +304,9 @@ static __init int sel_netif_init(void)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sel_netif_hash[i]);
register_netdevice_notifier(&sel_netif_netdev_notifier);
-
+
err = avc_add_callback(sel_netif_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET,
- SECSID_NULL, SECSID_NULL, SECCLASS_NULL, 0);
+ SECSID_NULL, SECSID_NULL, SECCLASS_NULL, 0);
if (err)
panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", err);
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index e8ee91ac12ef..89b418392f11 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void)
void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(struct sk_security_struct *ssec,
int family)
{
- if (family == PF_INET)
+ if (family == PF_INET)
ssec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQUIRE;
else
ssec->nlbl_state = NLBL_UNSET;
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlink.c b/security/selinux/netlink.c
index 6214a7a73149..1ae556446e65 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlink.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlink.c
@@ -24,16 +24,16 @@ static struct sock *selnl;
static int selnl_msglen(int msgtype)
{
int ret = 0;
-
+
switch (msgtype) {
case SELNL_MSG_SETENFORCE:
ret = sizeof(struct selnl_msg_setenforce);
break;
-
+
case SELNL_MSG_POLICYLOAD:
ret = sizeof(struct selnl_msg_policyload);
break;
-
+
default:
BUG();
}
@@ -45,15 +45,15 @@ static void selnl_add_payload(struct nlmsghdr *nlh, int len, int msgtype, void *
switch (msgtype) {
case SELNL_MSG_SETENFORCE: {
struct selnl_msg_setenforce *msg = NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
-
+
memset(msg, 0, len);
msg->val = *((int *)data);
break;
}
-
+
case SELNL_MSG_POLICYLOAD: {
struct selnl_msg_policyload *msg = NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
-
+
memset(msg, 0, len);
msg->seqno = *((u32 *)data);
break;
@@ -70,9 +70,9 @@ static void selnl_notify(int msgtype, void *data)
sk_buff_data_t tmp;
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
-
+
len = selnl_msglen(msgtype);
-
+
skb = alloc_skb(NLMSG_SPACE(len), GFP_USER);
if (!skb)
goto oom;
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ static void selnl_notify(int msgtype, void *data)
netlink_broadcast(selnl, skb, 0, SELNLGRP_AVC, GFP_USER);
out:
return;
-
+
nlmsg_failure:
kfree_skb(skb);
oom:
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ static int __init selnl_init(void)
SELNLGRP_MAX, NULL, NULL, THIS_MODULE);
if (selnl == NULL)
panic("SELinux: Cannot create netlink socket.");
- netlink_set_nonroot(NETLINK_SELINUX, NL_NONROOT_RECV);
+ netlink_set_nonroot(NETLINK_SELINUX, NL_NONROOT_RECV);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/netnode.c b/security/selinux/netnode.c
index f3c526f2cacb..2edc4c5e0c61 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netnode.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netnode.c
@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ static __init int sel_netnode_init(void)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sel_netnode_hash[iter]);
ret = avc_add_callback(sel_netnode_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET,
- SECSID_NULL, SECSID_NULL, SECCLASS_NULL, 0);
+ SECSID_NULL, SECSID_NULL, SECCLASS_NULL, 0);
if (ret != 0)
panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", ret);
diff --git a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
index eddc7b420109..ff59c0c4804b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
@@ -23,8 +23,7 @@
#include "flask.h"
#include "av_permissions.h"
-struct nlmsg_perm
-{
+struct nlmsg_perm {
u16 nlmsg_type;
u32 perm;
};
@@ -159,7 +158,7 @@ int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm)
if ((nlmsg_type >= AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG &&
nlmsg_type <= AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG) ||
(nlmsg_type >= AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2 &&
- nlmsg_type <= AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2)) {
+ nlmsg_type <= AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2)) {
*perm = NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_RELAY;
} else {
err = nlmsg_perm(nlmsg_type, perm, nlmsg_audit_perms,
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 7b681692be47..ac1ccc13a704 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -1,16 +1,16 @@
/* Updated: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
*
- * Added conditional policy language extensions
+ * Added conditional policy language extensions
*
* Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul.moore@hp.com>
*
- * Added support for the policy capability bitmap
+ * Added support for the policy capability bitmap
*
* Copyright (C) 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
* Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
* Copyright (C) 2004 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
*/
@@ -57,14 +57,14 @@ int selinux_compat_net = SELINUX_COMPAT_NET_VALUE;
static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
{
- selinux_checkreqprot = simple_strtoul(str,NULL,0) ? 1 : 0;
+ selinux_checkreqprot = simple_strtoul(str, NULL, 0) ? 1 : 0;
return 1;
}
__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
static int __init selinux_compat_net_setup(char *str)
{
- selinux_compat_net = simple_strtoul(str,NULL,0) ? 1 : 0;
+ selinux_compat_net = simple_strtoul(str, NULL, 0) ? 1 : 0;
return 1;
}
__setup("selinux_compat_net=", selinux_compat_net_setup);
@@ -73,17 +73,17 @@ __setup("selinux_compat_net=", selinux_compat_net_setup);
static DEFINE_MUTEX(sel_mutex);
/* global data for booleans */
-static struct dentry *bool_dir = NULL;
-static int bool_num = 0;
+static struct dentry *bool_dir;
+static int bool_num;
static char **bool_pending_names;
-static int *bool_pending_values = NULL;
+static int *bool_pending_values;
/* global data for classes */
-static struct dentry *class_dir = NULL;
+static struct dentry *class_dir;
static unsigned long last_class_ino;
/* global data for policy capabilities */
-static struct dentry *policycap_dir = NULL;
+static struct dentry *policycap_dir;
extern void selnl_notify_setenforce(int val);
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_enforce(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
-static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
+static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
/* No partial writes. */
return -EINVAL;
}
- page = (char*)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!page)
return -ENOMEM;
length = -EFAULT;
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_handle_unknown_ops = {
};
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
-static ssize_t sel_write_disable(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
+static ssize_t sel_write_disable(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_disable(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
/* No partial writes. */
return -EINVAL;
}
- page = (char*)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!page)
return -ENOMEM;
length = -EFAULT;
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_disable_ops = {
};
static ssize_t sel_read_policyvers(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
- size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
ssize_t length;
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_mls_ops = {
.read = sel_read_mls,
};
-static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
+static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
@@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_load_ops = {
.write = sel_write_load,
};
-static ssize_t sel_write_context(struct file * file, char *buf, size_t size)
+static ssize_t sel_write_context(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
{
char *canon;
u32 sid, len;
@@ -390,8 +390,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_context(struct file * file, char *buf, size_t size)
return length;
if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "%s: context size (%u) exceeds payload "
- "max\n", __func__, len);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: context size (%u) exceeds "
+ "payload max\n", __func__, len);
length = -ERANGE;
goto out;
}
@@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_checkreqprot(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
}
-static ssize_t sel_write_checkreqprot(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
+static ssize_t sel_write_checkreqprot(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
char *page;
@@ -430,7 +430,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_checkreqprot(struct file * file, const char __user * bu
/* No partial writes. */
return -EINVAL;
}
- page = (char*)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!page)
return -ENOMEM;
length = -EFAULT;
@@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_compat_net(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
}
-static ssize_t sel_write_compat_net(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
+static ssize_t sel_write_compat_net(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
char *page;
@@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_compat_net(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
/* No partial writes. */
return -EINVAL;
}
- page = (char*)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!page)
return -ENOMEM;
length = -EFAULT;
@@ -504,11 +504,11 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_compat_net_ops = {
/*
* Remaining nodes use transaction based IO methods like nfsd/nfsctl.c
*/
-static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file * file, char *buf, size_t size);
-static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file * file, char *buf, size_t size);
-static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(struct file * file, char *buf, size_t size);
-static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file * file, char *buf, size_t size);
-static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file * file, char *buf, size_t size);
+static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
+static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
+static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
+static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
+static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
static ssize_t (*write_op[])(struct file *, char *, size_t) = {
[SEL_ACCESS] = sel_write_access,
@@ -521,7 +521,7 @@ static ssize_t (*write_op[])(struct file *, char *, size_t) = {
static ssize_t selinux_transaction_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t size, loff_t *pos)
{
- ino_t ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
+ ino_t ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
char *data;
ssize_t rv;
@@ -532,8 +532,8 @@ static ssize_t selinux_transaction_write(struct file *file, const char __user *b
if (IS_ERR(data))
return PTR_ERR(data);
- rv = write_op[ino](file, data, size);
- if (rv>0) {
+ rv = write_op[ino](file, data, size);
+ if (rv > 0) {
simple_transaction_set(file, rv);
rv = size;
}
@@ -552,7 +552,7 @@ static const struct file_operations transaction_ops = {
* and the length returned. Otherwise return 0 or and -error.
*/
-static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file * file, char *buf, size_t size)
+static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
{
char *scon, *tcon;
u32 ssid, tsid;
@@ -601,7 +601,7 @@ out:
return length;
}
-static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file * file, char *buf, size_t size)
+static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
{
char *scon, *tcon;
u32 ssid, tsid, newsid;
@@ -643,8 +643,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file * file, char *buf, size_t size)
goto out2;
if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "%s: context size (%u) exceeds payload "
- "max\n", __func__, len);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: context size (%u) exceeds "
+ "payload max\n", __func__, len);
length = -ERANGE;
goto out3;
}
@@ -660,7 +660,7 @@ out:
return length;
}
-static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(struct file * file, char *buf, size_t size)
+static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
{
char *scon, *tcon;
u32 ssid, tsid, newsid;
@@ -717,7 +717,7 @@ out:
return length;
}
-static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file * file, char *buf, size_t size)
+static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
{
char *con, *user, *ptr;
u32 sid, *sids;
@@ -778,7 +778,7 @@ out:
return length;
}
-static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file * file, char *buf, size_t size)
+static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
{
char *scon, *tcon;
u32 ssid, tsid, newsid;
@@ -820,8 +820,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file * file, char *buf, size_t size)
goto out2;
if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "%s: context size (%u) exceeds payload "
- "max\n", __func__, len);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: context size (%u) exceeds "
+ "payload max\n", __func__, len);
length = -ERANGE;
goto out3;
}
@@ -872,7 +872,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_bool(struct file *filep, char __user *buf,
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
- if (!(page = (char*)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL))) {
+ page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!page) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
@@ -923,7 +924,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf,
length = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
- page = (char*)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!page) {
length = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
@@ -951,8 +952,8 @@ out:
}
static const struct file_operations sel_bool_ops = {
- .read = sel_read_bool,
- .write = sel_write_bool,
+ .read = sel_read_bool,
+ .write = sel_write_bool,
};
static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep,
@@ -977,7 +978,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep,
/* No partial writes. */
goto out;
}
- page = (char*)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!page) {
length = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
@@ -991,9 +992,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep,
if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1)
goto out;
- if (new_value && bool_pending_values) {
+ if (new_value && bool_pending_values)
security_set_bools(bool_num, bool_pending_values);
- }
length = count;
@@ -1005,7 +1005,7 @@ out:
}
static const struct file_operations sel_commit_bools_ops = {
- .write = sel_commit_bools_write,
+ .write = sel_commit_bools_write,
};
static void sel_remove_entries(struct dentry *de)
@@ -1055,7 +1055,8 @@ static int sel_make_bools(void)
sel_remove_entries(dir);
- if (!(page = (char*)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL)))
+ page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!page)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = security_get_bools(&num, &names, &values);
@@ -1082,8 +1083,9 @@ static int sel_make_bools(void)
ret = -ENAMETOOLONG;
goto err;
}
- isec = (struct inode_security_struct*)inode->i_security;
- if ((ret = security_genfs_sid("selinuxfs", page, SECCLASS_FILE, &sid)))
+ isec = (struct inode_security_struct *)inode->i_security;
+ ret = security_genfs_sid("selinuxfs", page, SECCLASS_FILE, &sid);
+ if (ret)
goto err;
isec->sid = sid;
isec->initialized = 1;
@@ -1111,7 +1113,7 @@ err:
#define NULL_FILE_NAME "null"
-struct dentry *selinux_null = NULL;
+struct dentry *selinux_null;
static ssize_t sel_read_avc_cache_threshold(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
@@ -1123,8 +1125,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_avc_cache_threshold(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
}
-static ssize_t sel_write_avc_cache_threshold(struct file * file,
- const char __user * buf,
+static ssize_t sel_write_avc_cache_threshold(struct file *file,
+ const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
@@ -1143,7 +1145,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_avc_cache_threshold(struct file * file,
goto out;
}
- page = (char*)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!page) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
@@ -1301,7 +1303,7 @@ out:
return ret;
}
-static ssize_t sel_read_initcon(struct file * file, char __user *buf,
+static ssize_t sel_read_initcon(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct inode *inode;
@@ -1375,7 +1377,7 @@ static inline u32 sel_ino_to_perm(unsigned long ino)
return (ino & SEL_INO_MASK) % (SEL_VEC_MAX + 1);
}
-static ssize_t sel_read_class(struct file * file, char __user *buf,
+static ssize_t sel_read_class(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
ssize_t rc, len;
@@ -1399,7 +1401,7 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_class_ops = {
.read = sel_read_class,
};
-static ssize_t sel_read_perm(struct file * file, char __user *buf,
+static ssize_t sel_read_perm(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
ssize_t rc, len;
@@ -1412,7 +1414,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_perm(struct file * file, char __user *buf,
goto out;
}
- len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE,"%d", sel_ino_to_perm(ino));
+ len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d", sel_ino_to_perm(ino));
rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, len);
free_page((unsigned long)page);
out:
@@ -1640,7 +1642,7 @@ out:
return ret;
}
-static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block * sb, void * data, int silent)
+static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
{
int ret;
struct dentry *dentry;
@@ -1696,7 +1698,7 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block * sb, void * data, int silent)
goto err;
}
inode->i_ino = ++sel_last_ino;
- isec = (struct inode_security_struct*)inode->i_security;
+ isec = (struct inode_security_struct *)inode->i_security;
isec->sid = SECINITSID_DEVNULL;
isec->sclass = SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
isec->initialized = 1;
@@ -1760,7 +1762,8 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block * sb, void * data, int silent)
out:
return ret;
err:
- printk(KERN_ERR "%s: failed while creating inodes\n", __func__);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: failed while creating inodes\n",
+ __func__);
goto out;
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
index 916e73a18bc5..9e6626362bfd 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -6,15 +6,15 @@
/* Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
*
- * Added conditional policy language extensions
+ * Added conditional policy language extensions
*
* Copyright (C) 2003 Tresys Technology, LLC
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
*
* Updated: Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
- * Tuned number of hash slots for avtab to reduce memory usage
+ * Tuned number of hash slots for avtab to reduce memory usage
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
@@ -33,10 +33,10 @@ static inline int avtab_hash(struct avtab_key *keyp, u16 mask)
static struct avtab_node*
avtab_insert_node(struct avtab *h, int hvalue,
- struct avtab_node * prev, struct avtab_node * cur,
+ struct avtab_node *prev, struct avtab_node *cur,
struct avtab_key *key, struct avtab_datum *datum)
{
- struct avtab_node * newnode;
+ struct avtab_node *newnode;
newnode = kmem_cache_zalloc(avtab_node_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (newnode == NULL)
return NULL;
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ static int avtab_insert(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key, struct avtab_dat
}
newnode = avtab_insert_node(h, hvalue, prev, cur, key, datum);
- if(!newnode)
+ if (!newnode)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ static int avtab_insert(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key, struct avtab_dat
* It also returns a pointer to the node inserted.
*/
struct avtab_node *
-avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab * h, struct avtab_key * key, struct avtab_datum * datum)
+avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key, struct avtab_datum *datum)
{
int hvalue;
struct avtab_node *prev, *cur, *newnode;
@@ -310,8 +310,8 @@ void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, char *tag)
}
}
- printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, longest "
- "chain length %d sum of chain length^2 %Lu\n",
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: %s: %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, "
+ "longest chain length %d sum of chain length^2 %Lu\n",
tag, h->nel, slots_used, h->nslot, max_chain_len,
chain2_len_sum);
}
@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ static uint16_t spec_order[] = {
};
int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
- int (*insertf)(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k,
+ int (*insertf)(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k,
struct avtab_datum *d, void *p),
void *p)
{
@@ -364,19 +364,19 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
key.source_type = (u16)val;
if (key.source_type != val) {
- printk("SELinux: avtab: truncated source type\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated source type\n");
return -1;
}
val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
key.target_type = (u16)val;
if (key.target_type != val) {
- printk("SELinux: avtab: truncated target type\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated target type\n");
return -1;
}
val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
key.target_class = (u16)val;
if (key.target_class != val) {
- printk("SELinux: avtab: truncated target class\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated target class\n");
return -1;
}
@@ -384,12 +384,12 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
enabled = (val & AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD) ? AVTAB_ENABLED : 0;
if (!(val & (AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_TYPE))) {
- printk("SELinux: avtab: null entry\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: null entry\n");
return -1;
}
if ((val & AVTAB_AV) &&
(val & AVTAB_TYPE)) {
- printk("SELinux: avtab: entry has both access vectors and types\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: entry has both access vectors and types\n");
return -1;
}
@@ -398,12 +398,13 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
key.specified = spec_order[i] | enabled;
datum.data = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
rc = insertf(a, &key, &datum, p);
- if (rc) return rc;
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
}
}
if (items != items2) {
- printk("SELinux: avtab: entry only had %d items, expected %d\n", items2, items);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: entry only had %d items, expected %d\n", items2, items);
return -1;
}
return 0;
@@ -411,7 +412,7 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
rc = next_entry(buf16, fp, sizeof(u16)*4);
if (rc < 0) {
- printk("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
return -1;
}
@@ -424,7 +425,7 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
if (!policydb_type_isvalid(pol, key.source_type) ||
!policydb_type_isvalid(pol, key.target_type) ||
!policydb_class_isvalid(pol, key.target_class)) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: avtab: invalid type or class\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: invalid type or class\n");
return -1;
}
@@ -434,20 +435,19 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
set++;
}
if (!set || set > 1) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING
- "SELinux: avtab: more than one specifier\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: more than one specifier\n");
return -1;
}
rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32));
if (rc < 0) {
- printk("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
return -1;
}
datum.data = le32_to_cpu(*buf32);
if ((key.specified & AVTAB_TYPE) &&
!policydb_type_isvalid(pol, datum.data)) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: avtab: invalid type\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: invalid type\n");
return -1;
}
return insertf(a, &key, &datum, p);
@@ -513,5 +513,5 @@ void avtab_cache_init(void)
void avtab_cache_destroy(void)
{
- kmem_cache_destroy (avtab_node_cachep);
+ kmem_cache_destroy(avtab_node_cachep);
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
index da0566c4f329..fb4efe4f4bc8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
/* Authors: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
- * Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com>
+ * Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com>
*
* Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
*/
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ static int cond_evaluate_expr(struct policydb *p, struct cond_expr *expr)
int evaluate_cond_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node)
{
int new_state;
- struct cond_av_list* cur;
+ struct cond_av_list *cur;
new_state = cond_evaluate_expr(p, node->expr);
if (new_state != node->cur_state) {
@@ -98,20 +98,18 @@ int evaluate_cond_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node)
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: expression result was undefined - disabling all rules.\n");
/* turn the rules on or off */
for (cur = node->true_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
- if (new_state <= 0) {
+ if (new_state <= 0)
cur->node->key.specified &= ~AVTAB_ENABLED;
- } else {
+ else
cur->node->key.specified |= AVTAB_ENABLED;
- }
}
for (cur = node->false_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
/* -1 or 1 */
- if (new_state) {
+ if (new_state)
cur->node->key.specified &= ~AVTAB_ENABLED;
- } else {
+ else
cur->node->key.specified |= AVTAB_ENABLED;
- }
}
}
return 0;
@@ -173,8 +171,8 @@ void cond_policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
int cond_init_bool_indexes(struct policydb *p)
{
kfree(p->bool_val_to_struct);
- p->bool_val_to_struct = (struct cond_bool_datum**)
- kmalloc(p->p_bools.nprim * sizeof(struct cond_bool_datum*), GFP_KERNEL);
+ p->bool_val_to_struct = (struct cond_bool_datum **)
+ kmalloc(p->p_bools.nprim * sizeof(struct cond_bool_datum *), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p->bool_val_to_struct)
return -1;
return 0;
@@ -199,7 +197,7 @@ int cond_index_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
return -EINVAL;
p->p_bool_val_to_name[booldatum->value - 1] = key;
- p->bool_val_to_struct[booldatum->value -1] = booldatum;
+ p->bool_val_to_struct[booldatum->value - 1] = booldatum;
return 0;
}
@@ -251,8 +249,7 @@ err:
return -1;
}
-struct cond_insertf_data
-{
+struct cond_insertf_data {
struct policydb *p;
struct cond_av_list *other;
struct cond_av_list *head;
@@ -275,7 +272,7 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k, struct avtab_datum
*/
if (k->specified & AVTAB_TYPE) {
if (avtab_search(&p->te_avtab, k)) {
- printk("SELinux: type rule already exists outside of a conditional.");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: type rule already exists outside of a conditional.\n");
goto err;
}
/*
@@ -290,7 +287,7 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k, struct avtab_datum
node_ptr = avtab_search_node(&p->te_cond_avtab, k);
if (node_ptr) {
if (avtab_search_node_next(node_ptr, k->specified)) {
- printk("SELinux: too many conflicting type rules.");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: too many conflicting type rules.\n");
goto err;
}
found = 0;
@@ -301,13 +298,13 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k, struct avtab_datum
}
}
if (!found) {
- printk("SELinux: conflicting type rules.\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: conflicting type rules.\n");
goto err;
}
}
} else {
if (avtab_search(&p->te_cond_avtab, k)) {
- printk("SELinux: conflicting type rules when adding type rule for true.\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: conflicting type rules when adding type rule for true.\n");
goto err;
}
}
@@ -315,7 +312,7 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k, struct avtab_datum
node_ptr = avtab_insert_nonunique(&p->te_cond_avtab, k, d);
if (!node_ptr) {
- printk("SELinux: could not insert rule.");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: could not insert rule.\n");
goto err;
}
@@ -352,9 +349,8 @@ static int cond_read_av_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp, struct cond_av_list *
return -1;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
- if (len == 0) {
+ if (len == 0)
return 0;
- }
data.p = p;
data.other = other;
@@ -375,12 +371,12 @@ static int cond_read_av_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp, struct cond_av_list *
static int expr_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct cond_expr *expr)
{
if (expr->expr_type <= 0 || expr->expr_type > COND_LAST) {
- printk("SELinux: conditional expressions uses unknown operator.\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: conditional expressions uses unknown operator.\n");
return 0;
}
if (expr->bool > p->p_bools.nprim) {
- printk("SELinux: conditional expressions uses unknown bool.\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: conditional expressions uses unknown bool.\n");
return 0;
}
return 1;
@@ -407,15 +403,14 @@ static int cond_read_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node, void *fp)
/* expr */
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
- for (i = 0; i < len; i++ ) {
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
if (rc < 0)
goto err;
expr = kzalloc(sizeof(struct cond_expr), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!expr) {
+ if (!expr)
goto err;
- }
expr->expr_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
expr->bool = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
@@ -425,11 +420,10 @@ static int cond_read_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node, void *fp)
goto err;
}
- if (i == 0) {
+ if (i == 0)
node->expr = expr;
- } else {
+ else
last->next = expr;
- }
last = expr;
}
@@ -468,11 +462,10 @@ int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
if (cond_read_node(p, node, fp) != 0)
goto err;
- if (i == 0) {
+ if (i == 0)
p->cond_list = node;
- } else {
+ else
last->next = node;
- }
last = node;
}
return 0;
@@ -489,24 +482,24 @@ void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key, struct av_decisi
{
struct avtab_node *node;
- if(!ctab || !key || !avd)
+ if (!ctab || !key || !avd)
return;
- for(node = avtab_search_node(ctab, key); node != NULL;
+ for (node = avtab_search_node(ctab, key); node != NULL;
node = avtab_search_node_next(node, key->specified)) {
- if ( (u16) (AVTAB_ALLOWED|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
- (node->key.specified & (AVTAB_ALLOWED|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
+ if ((u16)(AVTAB_ALLOWED|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
+ (node->key.specified & (AVTAB_ALLOWED|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
avd->allowed |= node->datum.data;
- if ( (u16) (AVTAB_AUDITDENY|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
- (node->key.specified & (AVTAB_AUDITDENY|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
+ if ((u16)(AVTAB_AUDITDENY|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
+ (node->key.specified & (AVTAB_AUDITDENY|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
/* Since a '0' in an auditdeny mask represents a
* permission we do NOT want to audit (dontaudit), we use
* the '&' operand to ensure that all '0's in the mask
* are retained (much unlike the allow and auditallow cases).
*/
avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.data;
- if ( (u16) (AVTAB_AUDITALLOW|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
- (node->key.specified & (AVTAB_AUDITALLOW|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
+ if ((u16)(AVTAB_AUDITALLOW|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
+ (node->key.specified & (AVTAB_AUDITALLOW|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
avd->auditallow |= node->datum.data;
}
return;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
index e499af474b35..ddc275490af8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
@@ -411,11 +411,10 @@ int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
}
/* round down */
tmp->startbit = startbit - (startbit % EBITMAP_SIZE);
- if (n) {
+ if (n)
n->next = tmp;
- } else {
+ else
e->node = tmp;
- }
n = tmp;
} else if (startbit <= n->startbit) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: ebitmap: start bit %d"
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
index 77b530c3bbce..2e7788e13213 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@
#include "hashtab.h"
struct hashtab *hashtab_create(u32 (*hash_value)(struct hashtab *h, const void *key),
- int (*keycmp)(struct hashtab *h, const void *key1, const void *key2),
- u32 size)
+ int (*keycmp)(struct hashtab *h, const void *key1, const void *key2),
+ u32 size)
{
struct hashtab *p;
u32 i;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
index feaf0a5b828f..8b1706b7b3cc 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
* Return the length in bytes for the MLS fields of the
* security context string representation of `context'.
*/
-int mls_compute_context_len(struct context * context)
+int mls_compute_context_len(struct context *context)
{
int i, l, len, head, prev;
char *nm;
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ int mls_compute_context_len(struct context * context)
* Update `*scontext' to point to the end of the MLS fields.
*/
void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context,
- char **scontext)
+ char **scontext)
{
char *scontextp, *nm;
int i, l, head, prev;
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context,
if (l == 0) {
if (mls_level_eq(&context->range.level[0],
- &context->range.level[1]))
+ &context->range.level[1]))
break;
else
*scontextp++ = '-';
@@ -305,20 +305,21 @@ int mls_context_to_sid(char oldc,
*p++ = 0;
/* Separate into range if exists */
- if ((rngptr = strchr(scontextp, '.')) != NULL) {
+ rngptr = strchr(scontextp, '.');
+ if (rngptr != NULL) {
/* Remove '.' */
*rngptr++ = 0;
}
catdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_cats.table,
- scontextp);
+ scontextp);
if (!catdatum) {
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&context->range.level[l].cat,
- catdatum->value - 1, 1);
+ catdatum->value - 1, 1);
if (rc)
goto out;
@@ -395,7 +396,7 @@ int mls_from_string(char *str, struct context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
rc = -ENOMEM;
} else {
rc = mls_context_to_sid(':', &tmpstr, context,
- NULL, SECSID_NULL);
+ NULL, SECSID_NULL);
kfree(freestr);
}
@@ -406,7 +407,7 @@ int mls_from_string(char *str, struct context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
* Copies the MLS range `range' into `context'.
*/
static inline int mls_range_set(struct context *context,
- struct mls_range *range)
+ struct mls_range *range)
{
int l, rc = 0;
@@ -423,7 +424,7 @@ static inline int mls_range_set(struct context *context,
}
int mls_setup_user_range(struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user,
- struct context *usercon)
+ struct context *usercon)
{
if (selinux_mls_enabled) {
struct mls_level *fromcon_sen = &(fromcon->range.level[0]);
@@ -449,11 +450,11 @@ int mls_setup_user_range(struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user,
that of the user's default clearance (but
only if the "fromcon" clearance dominates
the user's computed sensitivity level) */
- if (mls_level_dom(user_clr, fromcon_clr)) {
+ if (mls_level_dom(user_clr, fromcon_clr))
*usercon_clr = *fromcon_clr;
- } else if (mls_level_dom(fromcon_clr, user_clr)) {
+ else if (mls_level_dom(fromcon_clr, user_clr))
*usercon_clr = *user_clr;
- } else
+ else
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -525,7 +526,7 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext,
rtr->target_class == tclass) {
/* Set the range from the rule */
return mls_range_set(newcontext,
- &rtr->target_range);
+ &rtr->target_range);
}
}
/* Fallthrough */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 6bdb0ff6a927..84f8cc73c7db 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
*
* Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
*
- * Added conditional policy language extensions
+ * Added conditional policy language extensions
*
* Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul.moore@hp.com>
*
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
* Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
*/
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ static char *symtab_name[SYM_NUM] = {
};
#endif
-int selinux_mls_enabled = 0;
+int selinux_mls_enabled;
static unsigned int symtab_sizes[SYM_NUM] = {
2,
@@ -73,39 +73,39 @@ struct policydb_compat_info {
/* These need to be updated if SYM_NUM or OCON_NUM changes */
static struct policydb_compat_info policydb_compat[] = {
{
- .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE,
- .sym_num = SYM_NUM - 3,
- .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 1,
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM - 3,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 1,
},
{
- .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_BOOL,
- .sym_num = SYM_NUM - 2,
- .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 1,
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_BOOL,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM - 2,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 1,
},
{
- .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_IPV6,
- .sym_num = SYM_NUM - 2,
- .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_IPV6,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM - 2,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
},
{
- .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS,
- .sym_num = SYM_NUM - 2,
- .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM - 2,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
},
{
- .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS,
- .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
- .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
},
{
- .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB,
- .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
- .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
},
{
- .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS,
- .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
- .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
},
{
.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP,
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ static int roles_init(struct policydb *p)
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out_free_role;
}
- key = kmalloc(strlen(OBJECT_R)+1,GFP_KERNEL);
+ key = kmalloc(strlen(OBJECT_R)+1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!key) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out_free_role;
@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ static void symtab_hash_eval(struct symtab *s)
struct hashtab_info info;
hashtab_stat(h, &info);
- printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, "
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: %s: %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, "
"longest chain length %d\n", symtab_name[i], h->nel,
info.slots_used, h->size, info.max_chain_len);
}
@@ -424,7 +424,7 @@ static int policydb_index_others(struct policydb *p)
p->role_val_to_struct =
kmalloc(p->p_roles.nprim * sizeof(*(p->role_val_to_struct)),
- GFP_KERNEL);
+ GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p->role_val_to_struct) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ static int policydb_index_others(struct policydb *p)
p->user_val_to_struct =
kmalloc(p->p_users.nprim * sizeof(*(p->user_val_to_struct)),
- GFP_KERNEL);
+ GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p->user_val_to_struct) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
@@ -634,7 +634,7 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
while (c) {
ctmp = c;
c = c->next;
- ocontext_destroy(ctmp,i);
+ ocontext_destroy(ctmp, i);
}
p->ocontexts[i] = NULL;
}
@@ -647,7 +647,7 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
while (c) {
ctmp = c;
c = c->next;
- ocontext_destroy(ctmp,OCON_FSUSE);
+ ocontext_destroy(ctmp, OCON_FSUSE);
}
gtmp = g;
g = g->next;
@@ -664,14 +664,14 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
}
kfree(ltr);
- for (ra = p->role_allow; ra; ra = ra -> next) {
+ for (ra = p->role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next) {
cond_resched();
kfree(lra);
lra = ra;
}
kfree(lra);
- for (rt = p->range_tr; rt; rt = rt -> next) {
+ for (rt = p->range_tr; rt; rt = rt->next) {
cond_resched();
if (lrt) {
ebitmap_destroy(&lrt->target_range.level[0].cat);
@@ -924,7 +924,7 @@ static int perm_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
perdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
- key = kmalloc(len + 1,GFP_KERNEL);
+ key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!key) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto bad;
@@ -971,7 +971,7 @@ static int common_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
comdatum->permissions.nprim = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
- key = kmalloc(len + 1,GFP_KERNEL);
+ key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!key) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto bad;
@@ -998,7 +998,7 @@ bad:
}
static int read_cons_helper(struct constraint_node **nodep, int ncons,
- int allowxtarget, void *fp)
+ int allowxtarget, void *fp)
{
struct constraint_node *c, *lc;
struct constraint_expr *e, *le;
@@ -1012,11 +1012,10 @@ static int read_cons_helper(struct constraint_node **nodep, int ncons,
if (!c)
return -ENOMEM;
- if (lc) {
+ if (lc)
lc->next = c;
- } else {
+ else
*nodep = c;
- }
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, (sizeof(u32) * 2));
if (rc < 0)
@@ -1030,11 +1029,10 @@ static int read_cons_helper(struct constraint_node **nodep, int ncons,
if (!e)
return -ENOMEM;
- if (le) {
+ if (le)
le->next = e;
- } else {
+ else
c->expr = e;
- }
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, (sizeof(u32) * 3));
if (rc < 0)
@@ -1111,7 +1109,7 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
ncons = le32_to_cpu(buf[5]);
- key = kmalloc(len + 1,GFP_KERNEL);
+ key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!key) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto bad;
@@ -1122,7 +1120,7 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
key[len] = 0;
if (len2) {
- cladatum->comkey = kmalloc(len2 + 1,GFP_KERNEL);
+ cladatum->comkey = kmalloc(len2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cladatum->comkey) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto bad;
@@ -1195,7 +1193,7 @@ static int role_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
role->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
- key = kmalloc(len + 1,GFP_KERNEL);
+ key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!key) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto bad;
@@ -1215,7 +1213,7 @@ static int role_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
if (strcmp(key, OBJECT_R) == 0) {
if (role->value != OBJECT_R_VAL) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "Role %s has wrong value %d\n",
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: Role %s has wrong value %d\n",
OBJECT_R, role->value);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto bad;
@@ -1242,7 +1240,7 @@ static int type_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
__le32 buf[3];
u32 len;
- typdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*typdatum),GFP_KERNEL);
+ typdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*typdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!typdatum) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
return rc;
@@ -1256,7 +1254,7 @@ static int type_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
typdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
typdatum->primary = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
- key = kmalloc(len + 1,GFP_KERNEL);
+ key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!key) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto bad;
@@ -1328,7 +1326,7 @@ static int user_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
usrdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
- key = kmalloc(len + 1,GFP_KERNEL);
+ key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!key) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto bad;
@@ -1382,7 +1380,7 @@ static int sens_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
levdatum->isalias = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
- key = kmalloc(len + 1,GFP_ATOMIC);
+ key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!key) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto bad;
@@ -1434,7 +1432,7 @@ static int cat_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
catdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
catdatum->isalias = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
- key = kmalloc(len + 1,GFP_ATOMIC);
+ key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!key) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto bad;
@@ -1493,7 +1491,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
goto out;
/* Read the magic number and string length. */
- rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)* 2);
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
if (rc < 0)
goto bad;
@@ -1511,7 +1509,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
len, strlen(POLICYDB_STRING));
goto bad;
}
- policydb_str = kmalloc(len + 1,GFP_KERNEL);
+ policydb_str = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!policydb_str) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to allocate memory for policydb "
"string of length %d\n", len);
@@ -1544,29 +1542,30 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN ||
p->policyvers > POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: policydb version %d does not match "
- "my version range %d-%d\n",
- le32_to_cpu(buf[0]), POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN, POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX);
- goto bad;
+ "my version range %d-%d\n",
+ le32_to_cpu(buf[0]), POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN, POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX);
+ goto bad;
}
if ((le32_to_cpu(buf[1]) & POLICYDB_CONFIG_MLS)) {
if (ss_initialized && !selinux_mls_enabled) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "Cannot switch between non-MLS and MLS "
- "policies\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: Cannot switch between non-MLS"
+ " and MLS policies\n");
goto bad;
}
selinux_mls_enabled = 1;
config |= POLICYDB_CONFIG_MLS;
if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "security policydb version %d (MLS) "
- "not backwards compatible\n", p->policyvers);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: security policydb version %d "
+ "(MLS) not backwards compatible\n",
+ p->policyvers);
goto bad;
}
} else {
if (ss_initialized && selinux_mls_enabled) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "Cannot switch between MLS and non-MLS "
- "policies\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: Cannot switch between MLS and"
+ " non-MLS policies\n");
goto bad;
}
}
@@ -1633,11 +1632,10 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto bad;
}
- if (ltr) {
+ if (ltr)
ltr->next = tr;
- } else {
+ else
p->role_tr = tr;
- }
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*3);
if (rc < 0)
goto bad;
@@ -1664,11 +1662,10 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto bad;
}
- if (lra) {
+ if (lra)
lra->next = ra;
- } else {
+ else
p->role_allow = ra;
- }
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*2);
if (rc < 0)
goto bad;
@@ -1702,11 +1699,10 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto bad;
}
- if (l) {
+ if (l)
l->next = c;
- } else {
+ else
p->ocontexts[i] = c;
- }
l = c;
rc = -EINVAL;
switch (i) {
@@ -1725,7 +1721,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
if (rc < 0)
goto bad;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
- c->u.name = kmalloc(len + 1,GFP_KERNEL);
+ c->u.name = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!c->u.name) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto bad;
@@ -1753,7 +1749,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
goto bad;
break;
case OCON_NODE:
- rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)* 2);
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
if (rc < 0)
goto bad;
c->u.node.addr = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
@@ -1770,7 +1766,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
if (c->v.behavior > SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE)
goto bad;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
- c->u.name = kmalloc(len + 1,GFP_KERNEL);
+ c->u.name = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!c->u.name) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto bad;
@@ -1818,7 +1814,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
goto bad;
}
- newgenfs->fstype = kmalloc(len + 1,GFP_KERNEL);
+ newgenfs->fstype = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!newgenfs->fstype) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
kfree(newgenfs);
@@ -1864,7 +1860,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
goto bad;
}
- newc->u.name = kmalloc(len + 1,GFP_KERNEL);
+ newc->u.name = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!newc->u.name) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto bad_newc;
@@ -1968,7 +1964,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
out:
return rc;
bad_newc:
- ocontext_destroy(newc,OCON_FSUSE);
+ ocontext_destroy(newc, OCON_FSUSE);
bad:
if (!rc)
rc = -EINVAL;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index b341b8fd8c7c..2daaddbb301d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
* Implementation of the security services.
*
* Authors : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
- * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
*
* Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
*
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
*
* Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
*
- * Added conditional policy language extensions
+ * Added conditional policy language extensions
*
* Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul.moore@hp.com>
*
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
* Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004, 2006 Tresys Technology, LLC
* Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(load_mutex);
static struct sidtab sidtab;
struct policydb policydb;
-int ss_initialized = 0;
+int ss_initialized;
/*
* The largest sequence number that has been used when
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ int ss_initialized = 0;
* The sequence number only changes when a policy change
* occurs.
*/
-static u32 latest_granting = 0;
+static u32 latest_granting;
/* Forward declaration. */
static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext,
@@ -163,10 +163,10 @@ static int constraint_expr_eval(struct context *scontext,
val1 - 1);
continue;
case CEXPR_INCOMP:
- s[++sp] = ( !ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
- val2 - 1) &&
- !ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
- val1 - 1) );
+ s[++sp] = (!ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
+ val2 - 1) &&
+ !ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
+ val1 - 1));
continue;
default:
break;
@@ -409,13 +409,14 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
}
if (!ra)
avd->allowed = (avd->allowed) & ~(PROCESS__TRANSITION |
- PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION);
+ PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION);
}
return 0;
inval_class:
- printk(KERN_ERR "%s: unrecognized class %d\n", __func__, tclass);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %d\n", __func__,
+ tclass);
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -445,9 +446,9 @@ int security_permissive_sid(u32 sid)
}
static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct context *ocontext,
- struct context *ncontext,
- struct context *tcontext,
- u16 tclass)
+ struct context *ncontext,
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ u16 tclass)
{
char *o = NULL, *n = NULL, *t = NULL;
u32 olen, nlen, tlen;
@@ -459,9 +460,9 @@ static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct context *ocontext,
if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen) < 0)
goto out;
audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
- "security_validate_transition: denied for"
- " oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s taskcontext=%s tclass=%s",
- o, n, t, policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass-1]);
+ "security_validate_transition: denied for"
+ " oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s taskcontext=%s tclass=%s",
+ o, n, t, policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass-1]);
out:
kfree(o);
kfree(n);
@@ -473,7 +474,7 @@ out:
}
int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
- u16 tclass)
+ u16 tclass)
{
struct context *ocontext;
struct context *ncontext;
@@ -499,8 +500,8 @@ int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
tclass = SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
if (!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "security_validate_transition: "
- "unrecognized class %d\n", tclass);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %d\n",
+ __func__, tclass);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
@@ -508,24 +509,24 @@ int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
ocontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, oldsid);
if (!ocontext) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "security_validate_transition: "
- " unrecognized SID %d\n", oldsid);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, oldsid);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
ncontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, newsid);
if (!ncontext) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "security_validate_transition: "
- " unrecognized SID %d\n", newsid);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, newsid);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tasksid);
if (!tcontext) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "security_validate_transition: "
- " unrecognized SID %d\n", tasksid);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, tasksid);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
@@ -533,9 +534,9 @@ int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
constraint = tclass_datum->validatetrans;
while (constraint) {
if (!constraint_expr_eval(ocontext, ncontext, tcontext,
- constraint->expr)) {
+ constraint->expr)) {
rc = security_validtrans_handle_fail(ocontext, ncontext,
- tcontext, tclass);
+ tcontext, tclass);
goto out;
}
constraint = constraint->next;
@@ -581,15 +582,15 @@ int security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
if (!scontext) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "security_compute_av: unrecognized SID %d\n",
- ssid);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, ssid);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
if (!tcontext) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "security_compute_av: unrecognized SID %d\n",
- tsid);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, tsid);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
@@ -623,9 +624,8 @@ static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u3
/* Allocate space for the context; caller must free this space. */
scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!scontextp) {
+ if (!scontextp)
return -ENOMEM;
- }
*scontext = scontextp;
/*
@@ -636,8 +636,8 @@ static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u3
policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1],
policydb.p_type_val_to_name[context->type - 1]);
scontextp += strlen(policydb.p_user_val_to_name[context->user - 1]) +
- 1 + strlen(policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1]) +
- 1 + strlen(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[context->type - 1]);
+ 1 + strlen(policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1]) +
+ 1 + strlen(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[context->type - 1]);
mls_sid_to_context(context, &scontextp);
@@ -678,7 +678,7 @@ int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
char *scontextp;
*scontext_len = strlen(initial_sid_to_string[sid]) + 1;
- scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len,GFP_ATOMIC);
+ scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!scontextp) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
@@ -687,16 +687,16 @@ int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
*scontext = scontextp;
goto out;
}
- printk(KERN_ERR "security_sid_to_context: called before initial "
- "load_policy on unknown SID %d\n", sid);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: called before initial "
+ "load_policy on unknown SID %d\n", __func__, sid);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
POLICY_RDLOCK;
context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
if (!context) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "security_sid_to_context: unrecognized SID "
- "%d\n", sid);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, sid);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
@@ -926,15 +926,15 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
if (!scontext) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "security_compute_sid: unrecognized SID %d\n",
- ssid);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, ssid);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
if (!tcontext) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "security_compute_sid: unrecognized SID %d\n",
- tsid);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, tsid);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
@@ -974,7 +974,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
avdatum = avtab_search(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
/* If no permanent rule, also check for enabled conditional rules */
- if(!avdatum) {
+ if (!avdatum) {
node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey);
for (; node != NULL; node = avtab_search_node_next(node, specified)) {
if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) {
@@ -1288,26 +1288,23 @@ static int convert_context(u32 key,
/* Convert the user. */
usrdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_users.table,
- args->oldp->p_user_val_to_name[c->user - 1]);
- if (!usrdatum) {
+ args->oldp->p_user_val_to_name[c->user - 1]);
+ if (!usrdatum)
goto bad;
- }
c->user = usrdatum->value;
/* Convert the role. */
role = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_roles.table,
- args->oldp->p_role_val_to_name[c->role - 1]);
- if (!role) {
+ args->oldp->p_role_val_to_name[c->role - 1]);
+ if (!role)
goto bad;
- }
c->role = role->value;
/* Convert the type. */
typdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_types.table,
- args->oldp->p_type_val_to_name[c->type - 1]);
- if (!typdatum) {
+ args->oldp->p_type_val_to_name[c->type - 1]);
+ if (!typdatum)
goto bad;
- }
c->type = typdatum->value;
rc = mls_convert_context(args->oldp, args->newp, c);
@@ -1556,8 +1553,8 @@ static int match_ipv6_addrmask(u32 *input, u32 *addr, u32 *mask)
{
int i, fail = 0;
- for(i = 0; i < 4; i++)
- if(addr[i] != (input[i] & mask[i])) {
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+ if (addr[i] != (input[i] & mask[i])) {
fail = 1;
break;
}
@@ -1656,7 +1653,7 @@ out:
*/
int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
- char *username,
+ char *username,
u32 **sids,
u32 *nel)
{
@@ -1766,7 +1763,7 @@ out:
* transition SIDs or task SIDs.
*/
int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
- char *path,
+ char *path,
u16 sclass,
u32 *sid)
{
@@ -1881,7 +1878,7 @@ int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values)
goto out;
}
- *names = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(char*), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ *names = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!*names)
goto err;
@@ -1893,7 +1890,7 @@ int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values)
size_t name_len;
(*values)[i] = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state;
name_len = strlen(policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i]) + 1;
- (*names)[i] = kmalloc(sizeof(char) * name_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ (*names)[i] = kmalloc(sizeof(char) * name_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!(*names)[i])
goto err;
strncpy((*names)[i], policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i], name_len);
@@ -1938,11 +1935,10 @@ int security_set_bools(int len, int *values)
audit_get_loginuid(current),
audit_get_sessionid(current));
}
- if (values[i]) {
+ if (values[i])
policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 1;
- } else {
+ else
policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 0;
- }
}
for (cur = policydb.cond_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
@@ -2036,16 +2032,16 @@ int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
POLICY_RDLOCK;
context1 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
if (!context1) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "security_sid_mls_copy: unrecognized SID "
- "%d\n", sid);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, sid);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
context2 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, mls_sid);
if (!context2) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "security_sid_mls_copy: unrecognized SID "
- "%d\n", mls_sid);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, mls_sid);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
@@ -2136,17 +2132,15 @@ int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
nlbl_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, nlbl_sid);
if (!nlbl_ctx) {
- printk(KERN_ERR
- "security_sid_mls_cmp: unrecognized SID %d\n",
- nlbl_sid);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, nlbl_sid);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out_slowpath;
}
xfrm_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, xfrm_sid);
if (!xfrm_ctx) {
- printk(KERN_ERR
- "security_sid_mls_cmp: unrecognized SID %d\n",
- xfrm_sid);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, xfrm_sid);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out_slowpath;
}
@@ -2226,7 +2220,7 @@ int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms)
match = hashtab_search(policydb.p_classes.table, class);
if (!match) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "%s: unrecognized class %s\n",
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %s\n",
__func__, class);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
@@ -2435,7 +2429,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
if (!rule) {
audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
- "selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n");
+ "selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n");
return -ENOENT;
}
@@ -2443,7 +2437,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
if (rule->au_seqno < latest_granting) {
audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
- "selinux_audit_rule_match: stale rule\n");
+ "selinux_audit_rule_match: stale rule\n");
match = -ESTALE;
goto out;
}
@@ -2451,8 +2445,8 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
ctxt = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
if (!ctxt) {
audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
- "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
- sid);
+ "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ sid);
match = -ENOENT;
goto out;
}
@@ -2498,36 +2492,36 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
level = ((field == AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN ||
- field == AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW) ?
- &ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]);
+ field == AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW) ?
+ &ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]);
switch (op) {
case AUDIT_EQUAL:
match = mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
- level);
+ level);
break;
case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL:
match = !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
- level);
+ level);
break;
case AUDIT_LESS_THAN:
match = (mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
- level) &&
- !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
- level));
+ level) &&
+ !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+ level));
break;
case AUDIT_LESS_THAN_OR_EQUAL:
match = mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
- level);
+ level);
break;
case AUDIT_GREATER_THAN:
match = (mls_level_dom(level,
- &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]) &&
- !mls_level_eq(level,
- &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]));
+ &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]) &&
+ !mls_level_eq(level,
+ &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]));
break;
case AUDIT_GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL:
match = mls_level_dom(level,
- &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]);
+ &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]);
break;
}
}
@@ -2554,7 +2548,7 @@ static int __init aurule_init(void)
int err;
err = avc_add_callback(aurule_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET,
- SECSID_NULL, SECSID_NULL, SECCLASS_NULL, 0);
+ SECSID_NULL, SECSID_NULL, SECCLASS_NULL, 0);
if (err)
panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", err);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
index 53a54a77f1f8..4a516ff4bcde 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
@@ -156,12 +156,10 @@ void sidtab_map_remove_on_error(struct sidtab *s,
while (cur != NULL) {
ret = apply(cur->sid, &cur->context, args);
if (ret) {
- if (last) {
+ if (last)
last->next = cur->next;
- } else {
+ else
s->htable[i] = cur->next;
- }
-
temp = cur;
cur = cur->next;
context_destroy(&temp->context);
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index 3b8b994faad4..8f17f542a116 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -180,8 +180,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall)
if (!ckall)
break;
- }
- else if (*sid != ctx->ctx_sid)
+ } else if (*sid != ctx->ctx_sid)
return -EINVAL;
}
}
@@ -326,8 +325,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
*/
void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
{
- if (ctx)
- kfree(ctx);
+ kfree(ctx);
}
/*
@@ -372,8 +370,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uct
void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
{
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
- if (ctx)
- kfree(ctx);
+ kfree(ctx);
}
/*
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.0.4) at 2024-11-05 03:27:06 +0000