Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:

  SELinux/LSM:
   - overlayfs support, necessary for container filesystems

  LSM:
   - finally remove the kernel_module_from_file hook

  Smack:
   - treat signal delivery as an 'append' operation

  TPM:
   - lots of bugfixes & updates

  Audit:
   - new audit data type: LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (47 commits)
  Revert "tpm/tpm_crb: implement tpm crb idle state"
  Revert "tmp/tpm_crb: fix Intel PTT hw bug during idle state"
  Revert "tpm/tpm_crb: open code the crb_init into acpi_add"
  Revert "tmp/tpm_crb: implement runtime pm for tpm_crb"
  lsm,audit,selinux: Introduce a new audit data type LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE
  tmp/tpm_crb: implement runtime pm for tpm_crb
  tpm/tpm_crb: open code the crb_init into acpi_add
  tmp/tpm_crb: fix Intel PTT hw bug during idle state
  tpm/tpm_crb: implement tpm crb idle state
  tpm: add check for minimum buffer size in tpm_transmit()
  tpm: constify TPM 1.x header structures
  tpm/tpm_crb: fix the over 80 characters checkpatch warring
  tpm/tpm_crb: drop useless cpu_to_le32 when writing to registers
  tpm/tpm_crb: cache cmd_size register value.
  tmp/tpm_crb: drop include to platform_device
  tpm/tpm_tis: remove unused itpm variable
  tpm_crb: fix incorrect values of cmdReady and goIdle bits
  tpm_crb: refine the naming of constants
  tpm_crb: remove wmb()'s
  tpm_crb: fix crb_req_canceled behavior
  ...

26 files changed, 436 insertions, 253 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/st33zp24/st33zp24.c b/drivers/char/tpm/st33zp24/st33zp24.c
index c2ee30451e41..6f060c76217b 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/st33zp24/st33zp24.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/st33zp24/st33zp24.c
@@ -589,8 +589,6 @@ int st33zp24_probe(void *phy_id, const struct st33zp24_phy_ops *ops,
 		chip->flags |= TPM_CHIP_FLAG_IRQ;
 
 		disable_irq_nosync(tpm_dev->irq);
-
-		tpm_gen_interrupt(chip);
 	}
 
 	return tpm_chip_register(chip);
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c
index f5d452151c6b..912ad30be585 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static ssize_t tpm_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 		return -EPIPE;
 	}
 	out_size = tpm_transmit(priv->chip, priv->data_buffer,
-				sizeof(priv->data_buffer));
+				sizeof(priv->data_buffer), 0);
 
 	tpm_put_ops(priv->chip);
 	if (out_size < 0) {
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
index 1abe2d7a2610..8de61876f633 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
@@ -330,13 +330,16 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_calc_ordinal_duration);
 /*
  * Internal kernel interface to transmit TPM commands
  */
-ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const char *buf,
-		     size_t bufsiz)
+ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz,
+		     unsigned int flags)
 {
 	ssize_t rc;
 	u32 count, ordinal;
 	unsigned long stop;
 
+	if (bufsiz < TPM_HEADER_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	if (bufsiz > TPM_BUFSIZE)
 		bufsiz = TPM_BUFSIZE;
 
@@ -350,7 +353,8 @@ ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const char *buf,
 		return -E2BIG;
 	}
 
-	mutex_lock(&chip->tpm_mutex);
+	if (!(flags & TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED))
+		mutex_lock(&chip->tpm_mutex);
 
 	rc = chip->ops->send(chip, (u8 *) buf, count);
 	if (rc < 0) {
@@ -393,20 +397,21 @@ out_recv:
 		dev_err(&chip->dev,
 			"tpm_transmit: tpm_recv: error %zd\n", rc);
 out:
-	mutex_unlock(&chip->tpm_mutex);
+	if (!(flags & TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED))
+		mutex_unlock(&chip->tpm_mutex);
 	return rc;
 }
 
 #define TPM_DIGEST_SIZE 20
 #define TPM_RET_CODE_IDX 6
 
-ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, void *cmd,
-			 int len, const char *desc)
+ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, const void *cmd,
+			 int len, unsigned int flags, const char *desc)
 {
-	struct tpm_output_header *header;
+	const struct tpm_output_header *header;
 	int err;
 
-	len = tpm_transmit(chip, (u8 *) cmd, len);
+	len = tpm_transmit(chip, (const u8 *)cmd, len, flags);
 	if (len <  0)
 		return len;
 	else if (len < TPM_HEADER_SIZE)
@@ -453,26 +458,13 @@ ssize_t tpm_getcap(struct tpm_chip *chip, __be32 subcap_id, cap_t *cap,
 		tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4);
 		tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = subcap_id;
 	}
-	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, desc);
+	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, 0,
+			      desc);
 	if (!rc)
 		*cap = tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap;
 	return rc;
 }
-
-void tpm_gen_interrupt(struct tpm_chip *chip)
-{
-	struct	tpm_cmd_t tpm_cmd;
-	ssize_t rc;
-
-	tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getcap_header;
-	tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_PROP;
-	tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4);
-	tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT;
-
-	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE,
-			      "attempting to determine the timeouts");
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_gen_interrupt);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_getcap);
 
 #define TPM_ORD_STARTUP cpu_to_be32(153)
 #define TPM_ST_CLEAR cpu_to_be16(1)
@@ -490,7 +482,7 @@ static int tpm_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip, __be16 startup_type)
 	start_cmd.header.in = tpm_startup_header;
 
 	start_cmd.params.startup_in.startup_type = startup_type;
-	return tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &start_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE,
+	return tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &start_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, 0,
 				"attempting to start the TPM");
 }
 
@@ -521,7 +513,8 @@ int tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 	tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_PROP;
 	tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4);
 	tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT;
-	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, NULL);
+	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, 0,
+			      NULL);
 
 	if (rc == TPM_ERR_INVALID_POSTINIT) {
 		/* The TPM is not started, we are the first to talk to it.
@@ -535,7 +528,7 @@ int tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 		tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4);
 		tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT;
 		rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE,
-				  NULL);
+				      0, NULL);
 	}
 	if (rc) {
 		dev_err(&chip->dev,
@@ -596,7 +589,7 @@ duration:
 	tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4);
 	tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_DURATION;
 
-	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE,
+	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, 0,
 			      "attempting to determine the durations");
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
@@ -633,7 +626,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_get_timeouts);
 #define TPM_ORD_CONTINUE_SELFTEST 83
 #define CONTINUE_SELFTEST_RESULT_SIZE 10
 
-static struct tpm_input_header continue_selftest_header = {
+static const struct tpm_input_header continue_selftest_header = {
 	.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
 	.length = cpu_to_be32(10),
 	.ordinal = cpu_to_be32(TPM_ORD_CONTINUE_SELFTEST),
@@ -652,14 +645,14 @@ static int tpm_continue_selftest(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 	struct tpm_cmd_t cmd;
 
 	cmd.header.in = continue_selftest_header;
-	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, CONTINUE_SELFTEST_RESULT_SIZE,
+	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, CONTINUE_SELFTEST_RESULT_SIZE, 0,
 			      "continue selftest");
 	return rc;
 }
 
 #define TPM_ORDINAL_PCRREAD cpu_to_be32(21)
 #define READ_PCR_RESULT_SIZE 30
-static struct tpm_input_header pcrread_header = {
+static const struct tpm_input_header pcrread_header = {
 	.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
 	.length = cpu_to_be32(14),
 	.ordinal = TPM_ORDINAL_PCRREAD
@@ -672,7 +665,7 @@ int tpm_pcr_read_dev(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf)
 
 	cmd.header.in = pcrread_header;
 	cmd.params.pcrread_in.pcr_idx = cpu_to_be32(pcr_idx);
-	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, READ_PCR_RESULT_SIZE,
+	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, READ_PCR_RESULT_SIZE, 0,
 			      "attempting to read a pcr value");
 
 	if (rc == 0)
@@ -745,7 +738,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pcr_read);
  */
 #define TPM_ORD_PCR_EXTEND cpu_to_be32(20)
 #define EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_SIZE 34
-static struct tpm_input_header pcrextend_header = {
+static const struct tpm_input_header pcrextend_header = {
 	.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
 	.length = cpu_to_be32(34),
 	.ordinal = TPM_ORD_PCR_EXTEND
@@ -770,7 +763,7 @@ int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash)
 	cmd.header.in = pcrextend_header;
 	cmd.params.pcrextend_in.pcr_idx = cpu_to_be32(pcr_idx);
 	memcpy(cmd.params.pcrextend_in.hash, hash, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
-	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_SIZE,
+	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_SIZE, 0,
 			      "attempting extend a PCR value");
 
 	tpm_put_ops(chip);
@@ -792,7 +785,7 @@ int tpm_do_selftest(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 	unsigned int loops;
 	unsigned int delay_msec = 100;
 	unsigned long duration;
-	struct tpm_cmd_t cmd;
+	u8 dummy[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
 
 	duration = tpm_calc_ordinal_duration(chip, TPM_ORD_CONTINUE_SELFTEST);
 
@@ -807,9 +800,8 @@ int tpm_do_selftest(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 
 	do {
 		/* Attempt to read a PCR value */
-		cmd.header.in = pcrread_header;
-		cmd.params.pcrread_in.pcr_idx = cpu_to_be32(0);
-		rc = tpm_transmit(chip, (u8 *) &cmd, READ_PCR_RESULT_SIZE);
+		rc = tpm_pcr_read_dev(chip, 0, dummy);
+
 		/* Some buggy TPMs will not respond to tpm_tis_ready() for
 		 * around 300ms while the self test is ongoing, keep trying
 		 * until the self test duration expires. */
@@ -824,7 +816,6 @@ int tpm_do_selftest(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 		if (rc < TPM_HEADER_SIZE)
 			return -EFAULT;
 
-		rc = be32_to_cpu(cmd.header.out.return_code);
 		if (rc == TPM_ERR_DISABLED || rc == TPM_ERR_DEACTIVATED) {
 			dev_info(&chip->dev,
 				 "TPM is disabled/deactivated (0x%X)\n", rc);
@@ -879,7 +870,7 @@ int tpm_send(u32 chip_num, void *cmd, size_t buflen)
 	if (chip == NULL)
 		return -ENODEV;
 
-	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, cmd, buflen, "attempting tpm_cmd");
+	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, cmd, buflen, 0, "attempting tpm_cmd");
 
 	tpm_put_ops(chip);
 	return rc;
@@ -949,7 +940,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(wait_for_tpm_stat);
 #define TPM_ORD_SAVESTATE cpu_to_be32(152)
 #define SAVESTATE_RESULT_SIZE 10
 
-static struct tpm_input_header savestate_header = {
+static const struct tpm_input_header savestate_header = {
 	.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
 	.length = cpu_to_be32(10),
 	.ordinal = TPM_ORD_SAVESTATE
@@ -981,14 +972,15 @@ int tpm_pm_suspend(struct device *dev)
 		cmd.params.pcrextend_in.pcr_idx = cpu_to_be32(tpm_suspend_pcr);
 		memcpy(cmd.params.pcrextend_in.hash, dummy_hash,
 		       TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
-		rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_SIZE,
+		rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_SIZE, 0,
 				      "extending dummy pcr before suspend");
 	}
 
 	/* now do the actual savestate */
 	for (try = 0; try < TPM_RETRY; try++) {
 		cmd.header.in = savestate_header;
-		rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, SAVESTATE_RESULT_SIZE, NULL);
+		rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, SAVESTATE_RESULT_SIZE, 0,
+				      NULL);
 
 		/*
 		 * If the TPM indicates that it is too busy to respond to
@@ -1032,7 +1024,7 @@ int tpm_pm_resume(struct device *dev)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pm_resume);
 
 #define TPM_GETRANDOM_RESULT_SIZE	18
-static struct tpm_input_header tpm_getrandom_header = {
+static const struct tpm_input_header tpm_getrandom_header = {
 	.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
 	.length = cpu_to_be32(14),
 	.ordinal = TPM_ORD_GET_RANDOM
@@ -1072,8 +1064,8 @@ int tpm_get_random(u32 chip_num, u8 *out, size_t max)
 		tpm_cmd.params.getrandom_in.num_bytes = cpu_to_be32(num_bytes);
 
 		err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd,
-				   TPM_GETRANDOM_RESULT_SIZE + num_bytes,
-				   "attempting get random");
+				       TPM_GETRANDOM_RESULT_SIZE + num_bytes,
+				       0, "attempting get random");
 		if (err)
 			break;
 
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c
index b46cf70c8b16..a76ab4af9fb2 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
 
 #define READ_PUBEK_RESULT_SIZE 314
 #define TPM_ORD_READPUBEK cpu_to_be32(124)
-static struct tpm_input_header tpm_readpubek_header = {
+static const struct tpm_input_header tpm_readpubek_header = {
 	.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
 	.length = cpu_to_be32(30),
 	.ordinal = TPM_ORD_READPUBEK
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ static ssize_t pubek_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct tpm_chip *chip = to_tpm_chip(dev);
 
 	tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_readpubek_header;
-	err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, READ_PUBEK_RESULT_SIZE,
+	err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, READ_PUBEK_RESULT_SIZE, 0,
 			       "attempting to read the PUBEK");
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
index 3e32d5bd2dc6..4d183c97f6a6 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
@@ -476,32 +476,35 @@ extern dev_t tpm_devt;
 extern const struct file_operations tpm_fops;
 extern struct idr dev_nums_idr;
 
+enum tpm_transmit_flags {
+	TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED	= BIT(0),
+};
+
+ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz,
+		     unsigned int flags);
+ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, const void *cmd, int len,
+			 unsigned int flags, const char *desc);
 ssize_t tpm_getcap(struct tpm_chip *chip, __be32 subcap_id, cap_t *cap,
 		   const char *desc);
-ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const char *buf,
-		     size_t bufsiz);
-ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, void *cmd, int len,
-			 const char *desc);
-extern int tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *);
-extern void tpm_gen_interrupt(struct tpm_chip *);
+int tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *);
 int tpm1_auto_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip);
-extern int tpm_do_selftest(struct tpm_chip *);
-extern unsigned long tpm_calc_ordinal_duration(struct tpm_chip *, u32);
-extern int tpm_pm_suspend(struct device *);
-extern int tpm_pm_resume(struct device *);
-extern int wait_for_tpm_stat(struct tpm_chip *, u8, unsigned long,
-			     wait_queue_head_t *, bool);
+int tpm_do_selftest(struct tpm_chip *chip);
+unsigned long tpm_calc_ordinal_duration(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 ordinal);
+int tpm_pm_suspend(struct device *dev);
+int tpm_pm_resume(struct device *dev);
+int wait_for_tpm_stat(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 mask, unsigned long timeout,
+		      wait_queue_head_t *queue, bool check_cancel);
 
 struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_find_get(int chip_num);
 __must_check int tpm_try_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip);
 void tpm_put_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip);
 
-extern struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_alloc(struct device *dev,
-				       const struct tpm_class_ops *ops);
-extern struct tpm_chip *tpmm_chip_alloc(struct device *pdev,
-				       const struct tpm_class_ops *ops);
-extern int tpm_chip_register(struct tpm_chip *chip);
-extern void tpm_chip_unregister(struct tpm_chip *chip);
+struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_alloc(struct device *dev,
+				const struct tpm_class_ops *ops);
+struct tpm_chip *tpmm_chip_alloc(struct device *pdev,
+				 const struct tpm_class_ops *ops);
+int tpm_chip_register(struct tpm_chip *chip);
+void tpm_chip_unregister(struct tpm_chip *chip);
 
 void tpm_sysfs_add_device(struct tpm_chip *chip);
 
@@ -528,8 +531,7 @@ ssize_t tpm2_get_tpm_pt(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 property_id,
 			u32 *value, const char *desc);
 
 int tpm2_auto_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip);
-extern void tpm2_shutdown(struct tpm_chip *chip, u16 shutdown_type);
-extern unsigned long tpm2_calc_ordinal_duration(struct tpm_chip *, u32);
-extern int tpm2_gen_interrupt(struct tpm_chip *chip);
-extern int tpm2_probe(struct tpm_chip *chip);
+void tpm2_shutdown(struct tpm_chip *chip, u16 shutdown_type);
+unsigned long tpm2_calc_ordinal_duration(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 ordinal);
+int tpm2_probe(struct tpm_chip *chip);
 #endif
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
index 0c75c3f1689f..7df55d58c939 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ int tpm2_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf)
 	       sizeof(cmd.params.pcrread_in.pcr_select));
 	cmd.params.pcrread_in.pcr_select[pcr_idx >> 3] = 1 << (pcr_idx & 0x7);
 
-	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd),
+	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0,
 			      "attempting to read a pcr value");
 	if (rc == 0) {
 		buf = cmd.params.pcrread_out.digest;
@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash)
 	cmd.params.pcrextend_in.hash_alg = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ALG_SHA1);
 	memcpy(cmd.params.pcrextend_in.digest, hash, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
 
-	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd),
+	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0,
 			      "attempting extend a PCR value");
 
 	return rc;
@@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *out, size_t max)
 		cmd.header.in = tpm2_getrandom_header;
 		cmd.params.getrandom_in.size = cpu_to_be16(num_bytes);
 
-		err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd),
+		err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0,
 				       "attempting get random");
 		if (err)
 			break;
@@ -434,12 +434,12 @@ static void tpm2_buf_append_auth(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 session_handle,
 }
 
 /**
- * tpm2_seal_trusted() - seal a trusted key
- * @chip_num: A specific chip number for the request or TPM_ANY_NUM
- * @options: authentication values and other options
+ * tpm2_seal_trusted() - seal the payload of a trusted key
+ * @chip_num: TPM chip to use
  * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
+ * @options: authentication values and other options
  *
- * Returns < 0 on error and 0 on success.
+ * Return: < 0 on error and 0 on success.
  */
 int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 		      struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
@@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, "sealing data");
+	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, 0, "sealing data");
 	if (rc)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -538,10 +538,18 @@ out:
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static int tpm2_load(struct tpm_chip *chip,
-		     struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
-		     struct trusted_key_options *options,
-		     u32 *blob_handle)
+/**
+ * tpm2_load_cmd() - execute a TPM2_Load command
+ * @chip_num: TPM chip to use
+ * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
+ * @options: authentication values and other options
+ *
+ * Return: same as with tpm_transmit_cmd
+ */
+static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
+			 struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
+			 struct trusted_key_options *options,
+			 u32 *blob_handle, unsigned int flags)
 {
 	struct tpm_buf buf;
 	unsigned int private_len;
@@ -576,7 +584,7 @@ static int tpm2_load(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, "loading blob");
+	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, flags, "loading blob");
 	if (!rc)
 		*blob_handle = be32_to_cpup(
 			(__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]);
@@ -590,7 +598,16 @@ out:
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static void tpm2_flush_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle)
+/**
+ * tpm2_flush_context_cmd() - execute a TPM2_FlushContext command
+ * @chip_num: TPM chip to use
+ * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
+ * @options: authentication values and other options
+ *
+ * Return: same as with tpm_transmit_cmd
+ */
+static void tpm2_flush_context_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle,
+				   unsigned int flags)
 {
 	struct tpm_buf buf;
 	int rc;
@@ -604,7 +621,8 @@ static void tpm2_flush_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle)
 
 	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, handle);
 
-	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, "flushing context");
+	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, flags,
+			      "flushing context");
 	if (rc)
 		dev_warn(&chip->dev, "0x%08x was not flushed, rc=%d\n", handle,
 			 rc);
@@ -612,10 +630,18 @@ static void tpm2_flush_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle)
 	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
 }
 
-static int tpm2_unseal(struct tpm_chip *chip,
-		       struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
-		       struct trusted_key_options *options,
-		       u32 blob_handle)
+/**
+ * tpm2_unseal_cmd() - execute a TPM2_Unload command
+ * @chip_num: TPM chip to use
+ * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
+ * @options: authentication values and other options
+ *
+ * Return: same as with tpm_transmit_cmd
+ */
+static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
+			   struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
+			   struct trusted_key_options *options,
+			   u32 blob_handle, unsigned int flags)
 {
 	struct tpm_buf buf;
 	u16 data_len;
@@ -635,7 +661,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 			     options->blobauth /* hmac */,
 			     TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
 
-	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, "unsealing");
+	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, flags, "unsealing");
 	if (rc > 0)
 		rc = -EPERM;
 
@@ -654,12 +680,12 @@ static int tpm2_unseal(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 }
 
 /**
- * tpm_unseal_trusted() - unseal a trusted key
- * @chip_num: A specific chip number for the request or TPM_ANY_NUM
- * @options: authentication values and other options
+ * tpm_unseal_trusted() - unseal the payload of a trusted key
+ * @chip_num: TPM chip to use
  * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
+ * @options: authentication values and other options
  *
- * Returns < 0 on error and 0 on success.
+ * Return: < 0 on error and 0 on success.
  */
 int tpm2_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 			struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
@@ -668,14 +694,17 @@ int tpm2_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 	u32 blob_handle;
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = tpm2_load(chip, payload, options, &blob_handle);
+	mutex_lock(&chip->tpm_mutex);
+	rc = tpm2_load_cmd(chip, payload, options, &blob_handle,
+			   TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED);
 	if (rc)
-		return rc;
-
-	rc = tpm2_unseal(chip, payload, options, blob_handle);
-
-	tpm2_flush_context(chip, blob_handle);
+		goto out;
 
+	rc = tpm2_unseal_cmd(chip, payload, options, blob_handle,
+			     TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED);
+	tpm2_flush_context_cmd(chip, blob_handle, TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED);
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&chip->tpm_mutex);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -701,12 +730,13 @@ ssize_t tpm2_get_tpm_pt(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 property_id,  u32 *value,
 	cmd.params.get_tpm_pt_in.property_id = cpu_to_be32(property_id);
 	cmd.params.get_tpm_pt_in.property_cnt = cpu_to_be32(1);
 
-	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), desc);
+	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0, desc);
 	if (!rc)
 		*value = be32_to_cpu(cmd.params.get_tpm_pt_out.value);
 
 	return rc;
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm2_get_tpm_pt);
 
 #define TPM2_STARTUP_IN_SIZE \
 	(sizeof(struct tpm_input_header) + \
@@ -735,7 +765,7 @@ static int tpm2_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip, u16 startup_type)
 	cmd.header.in = tpm2_startup_header;
 
 	cmd.params.startup_in.startup_type = cpu_to_be16(startup_type);
-	return tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd),
+	return tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0,
 				"attempting to start the TPM");
 }
 
@@ -763,7 +793,7 @@ void tpm2_shutdown(struct tpm_chip *chip, u16 shutdown_type)
 	cmd.header.in = tpm2_shutdown_header;
 	cmd.params.startup_in.startup_type = cpu_to_be16(shutdown_type);
 
-	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), "stopping the TPM");
+	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0, "stopping the TPM");
 
 	/* In places where shutdown command is sent there's no much we can do
 	 * except print the error code on a system failure.
@@ -828,7 +858,7 @@ static int tpm2_start_selftest(struct tpm_chip *chip, bool full)
 	cmd.header.in = tpm2_selftest_header;
 	cmd.params.selftest_in.full_test = full;
 
-	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, TPM2_SELF_TEST_IN_SIZE,
+	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, TPM2_SELF_TEST_IN_SIZE, 0,
 			      "continue selftest");
 
 	/* At least some prototype chips seem to give RC_TESTING error
@@ -880,7 +910,7 @@ static int tpm2_do_selftest(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 		cmd.params.pcrread_in.pcr_select[1] = 0x00;
 		cmd.params.pcrread_in.pcr_select[2] = 0x00;
 
-		rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, (u8 *) &cmd, sizeof(cmd), NULL);
+		rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0, NULL);
 		if (rc < 0)
 			break;
 
@@ -895,23 +925,6 @@ static int tpm2_do_selftest(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 }
 
 /**
- * tpm2_gen_interrupt() - generate an interrupt
- * @chip: TPM chip to use
- *
- * 0 is returned when the operation is successful. If a negative number is
- * returned it remarks a POSIX error code. If a positive number is returned
- * it remarks a TPM error.
- */
-int tpm2_gen_interrupt(struct tpm_chip *chip)
-{
-	u32 dummy;
-
-	return tpm2_get_tpm_pt(chip, 0x100, &dummy,
-			       "attempting to generate an interrupt");
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm2_gen_interrupt);
-
-/**
  * tpm2_probe() - probe TPM 2.0
  * @chip: TPM chip to use
  *
@@ -928,11 +941,9 @@ int tpm2_probe(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 	cmd.params.get_tpm_pt_in.property_id = cpu_to_be32(0x100);
 	cmd.params.get_tpm_pt_in.property_cnt = cpu_to_be32(1);
 
-	rc = tpm_transmit(chip, (const char *) &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
+	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd),  0, NULL);
 	if (rc <  0)
 		return rc;
-	else if (rc < TPM_HEADER_SIZE)
-		return -EFAULT;
 
 	if (be16_to_cpu(cmd.header.out.tag) == TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS)
 		chip->flags |= TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2;
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c
index 018c382554ba..a7c870af916c 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@
 #include <linux/highmem.h>
 #include <linux/rculist.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/platform_device.h>
 #include "tpm.h"
 
 #define ACPI_SIG_TPM2 "TPM2"
@@ -34,14 +33,14 @@ enum crb_defaults {
 	CRB_ACPI_START_INDEX = 1,
 };
 
-enum crb_ca_request {
-	CRB_CA_REQ_GO_IDLE	= BIT(0),
-	CRB_CA_REQ_CMD_READY	= BIT(1),
+enum crb_ctrl_req {
+	CRB_CTRL_REQ_CMD_READY	= BIT(0),
+	CRB_CTRL_REQ_GO_IDLE	= BIT(1),
 };
 
-enum crb_ca_status {
-	CRB_CA_STS_ERROR	= BIT(0),
-	CRB_CA_STS_TPM_IDLE	= BIT(1),
+enum crb_ctrl_sts {
+	CRB_CTRL_STS_ERROR	= BIT(0),
+	CRB_CTRL_STS_TPM_IDLE	= BIT(1),
 };
 
 enum crb_start {
@@ -67,7 +66,7 @@ struct crb_control_area {
 } __packed;
 
 enum crb_status {
-	CRB_STS_COMPLETE	= BIT(0),
+	CRB_DRV_STS_COMPLETE	= BIT(0),
 };
 
 enum crb_flags {
@@ -81,6 +80,7 @@ struct crb_priv {
 	struct crb_control_area __iomem *cca;
 	u8 __iomem *cmd;
 	u8 __iomem *rsp;
+	u32 cmd_size;
 };
 
 static SIMPLE_DEV_PM_OPS(crb_pm, tpm_pm_suspend, tpm_pm_resume);
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ static u8 crb_status(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 
 	if ((ioread32(&priv->cca->start) & CRB_START_INVOKE) !=
 	    CRB_START_INVOKE)
-		sts |= CRB_STS_COMPLETE;
+		sts |= CRB_DRV_STS_COMPLETE;
 
 	return sts;
 }
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ static int crb_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t count)
 	if (count < 6)
 		return -EIO;
 
-	if (ioread32(&priv->cca->sts) & CRB_CA_STS_ERROR)
+	if (ioread32(&priv->cca->sts) & CRB_CTRL_STS_ERROR)
 		return -EIO;
 
 	memcpy_fromio(buf, priv->rsp, 6);
@@ -142,11 +142,14 @@ static int crb_send(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t len)
 	struct crb_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(&chip->dev);
 	int rc = 0;
 
-	if (len > ioread32(&priv->cca->cmd_size)) {
-		dev_err(&chip->dev,
-			"invalid command count value %x %zx\n",
-			(unsigned int) len,
-			(size_t) ioread32(&priv->cca->cmd_size));
+	/* Zero the cancel register so that the next command will not get
+	 * canceled.
+	 */
+	iowrite32(0, &priv->cca->cancel);
+
+	if (len > priv->cmd_size) {
+		dev_err(&chip->dev, "invalid command count value %zd %d\n",
+			len, priv->cmd_size);
 		return -E2BIG;
 	}
 
@@ -156,7 +159,7 @@ static int crb_send(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t len)
 	wmb();
 
 	if (priv->flags & CRB_FL_CRB_START)
-		iowrite32(cpu_to_le32(CRB_START_INVOKE), &priv->cca->start);
+		iowrite32(CRB_START_INVOKE, &priv->cca->start);
 
 	if (priv->flags & CRB_FL_ACPI_START)
 		rc = crb_do_acpi_start(chip);
@@ -168,15 +171,10 @@ static void crb_cancel(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 {
 	struct crb_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(&chip->dev);
 
-	iowrite32(cpu_to_le32(CRB_CANCEL_INVOKE), &priv->cca->cancel);
-
-	/* Make sure that cmd is populated before issuing cancel. */
-	wmb();
+	iowrite32(CRB_CANCEL_INVOKE, &priv->cca->cancel);
 
 	if ((priv->flags & CRB_FL_ACPI_START) && crb_do_acpi_start(chip))
 		dev_err(&chip->dev, "ACPI Start failed\n");
-
-	iowrite32(0, &priv->cca->cancel);
 }
 
 static bool crb_req_canceled(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 status)
@@ -194,8 +192,8 @@ static const struct tpm_class_ops tpm_crb = {
 	.send = crb_send,
 	.cancel = crb_cancel,
 	.req_canceled = crb_req_canceled,
-	.req_complete_mask = CRB_STS_COMPLETE,
-	.req_complete_val = CRB_STS_COMPLETE,
+	.req_complete_mask = CRB_DRV_STS_COMPLETE,
+	.req_complete_val = CRB_DRV_STS_COMPLETE,
 };
 
 static int crb_init(struct acpi_device *device, struct crb_priv *priv)
@@ -265,8 +263,7 @@ static int crb_map_io(struct acpi_device *device, struct crb_priv *priv,
 	acpi_dev_free_resource_list(&resources);
 
 	if (resource_type(&io_res) != IORESOURCE_MEM) {
-		dev_err(dev,
-			FW_BUG "TPM2 ACPI table does not define a memory resource\n");
+		dev_err(dev, FW_BUG "TPM2 ACPI table does not define a memory resource\n");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
@@ -302,6 +299,7 @@ static int crb_map_io(struct acpi_device *device, struct crb_priv *priv,
 		dev_err(dev, FW_BUG "overlapping command and response buffer sizes are not identical");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
+	priv->cmd_size = cmd_size;
 
 	priv->rsp = priv->cmd;
 	return 0;
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c
index d66f51b3648e..e3bf31b37138 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c
@@ -440,7 +440,6 @@ static int probe_itpm(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 		0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf1
 	};
 	size_t len = sizeof(cmd_getticks);
-	bool itpm;
 	u16 vendor;
 
 	rc = tpm_tis_read16(priv, TPM_DID_VID(0), &vendor);
@@ -451,8 +450,6 @@ static int probe_itpm(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 	if (vendor != TPM_VID_INTEL)
 		return 0;
 
-	itpm = false;
-
 	rc = tpm_tis_send_data(chip, cmd_getticks, len);
 	if (rc == 0)
 		goto out;
@@ -460,8 +457,6 @@ static int probe_itpm(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 	tpm_tis_ready(chip);
 	release_locality(chip, priv->locality, 0);
 
-	itpm = true;
-
 	rc = tpm_tis_send_data(chip, cmd_getticks, len);
 	if (rc == 0) {
 		dev_info(&chip->dev, "Detected an iTPM.\n");
@@ -526,6 +521,18 @@ static irqreturn_t tis_int_handler(int dummy, void *dev_id)
 	return IRQ_HANDLED;
 }
 
+static int tpm_tis_gen_interrupt(struct tpm_chip *chip)
+{
+	const char *desc = "attempting to generate an interrupt";
+	u32 cap2;
+	cap_t cap;
+
+	if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)
+		return tpm2_get_tpm_pt(chip, 0x100, &cap2, desc);
+	else
+		return tpm_getcap(chip, TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT, &cap, desc);
+}
+
 /* Register the IRQ and issue a command that will cause an interrupt. If an
  * irq is seen then leave the chip setup for IRQ operation, otherwise reverse
  * everything and leave in polling mode. Returns 0 on success.
@@ -575,10 +582,9 @@ static int tpm_tis_probe_irq_single(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 intmask,
 	/* Generate an interrupt by having the core call through to
 	 * tpm_tis_send
 	 */
-	if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)
-		tpm2_gen_interrupt(chip);
-	else
-		tpm_gen_interrupt(chip);
+	rc = tpm_tis_gen_interrupt(chip);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		return rc;
 
 	/* tpm_tis_send will either confirm the interrupt is working or it
 	 * will call disable_irq which undoes all of the above.
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
index 43fdc2765aea..db37a0e02d32 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
@@ -105,6 +105,13 @@ retry:
 			goto retry;
 		}
 
+		error = security_inode_copy_up_xattr(name);
+		if (error < 0 && error != -EOPNOTSUPP)
+			break;
+		if (error == 1) {
+			error = 0;
+			continue; /* Discard */
+		}
 		error = vfs_setxattr(new, name, value, size, 0);
 		if (error)
 			break;
@@ -248,6 +255,8 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_locked(struct dentry *workdir, struct dentry *upperdir,
 	struct dentry *upper = NULL;
 	umode_t mode = stat->mode;
 	int err;
+	const struct cred *old_creds = NULL;
+	struct cred *new_creds = NULL;
 
 	newdentry = ovl_lookup_temp(workdir, dentry);
 	err = PTR_ERR(newdentry);
@@ -260,10 +269,23 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_locked(struct dentry *workdir, struct dentry *upperdir,
 	if (IS_ERR(upper))
 		goto out1;
 
+	err = security_inode_copy_up(dentry, &new_creds);
+	if (err < 0)
+		goto out2;
+
+	if (new_creds)
+		old_creds = override_creds(new_creds);
+
 	/* Can't properly set mode on creation because of the umask */
 	stat->mode &= S_IFMT;
 	err = ovl_create_real(wdir, newdentry, stat, link, NULL, true);
 	stat->mode = mode;
+
+	if (new_creds) {
+		revert_creds(old_creds);
+		put_cred(new_creds);
+	}
+
 	if (err)
 		goto out2;
 
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
index 1560fdc09a5f..b0ffa1d1677e 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
@@ -489,6 +489,15 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
 	if (override_cred) {
 		override_cred->fsuid = inode->i_uid;
 		override_cred->fsgid = inode->i_gid;
+		if (!hardlink) {
+			err = security_dentry_create_files_as(dentry,
+					stat->mode, &dentry->d_name, old_cred,
+					override_cred);
+			if (err) {
+				put_cred(override_cred);
+				goto out_revert_creds;
+			}
+		}
 		put_cred(override_creds(override_cred));
 		put_cred(override_cred);
 
@@ -499,6 +508,7 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
 			err = ovl_create_over_whiteout(dentry, inode, stat,
 							link, hardlink);
 	}
+out_revert_creds:
 	revert_creds(old_cred);
 	if (!err) {
 		struct inode *realinode = d_inode(ovl_dentry_upper(dentry));
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
index ffb9c9da4f39..e58e577117b6 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ struct common_audit_data {
 #define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE	9
 #define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY	10
 #define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP	11
+#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE	12
 	union 	{
 		struct path path;
 		struct dentry *dentry;
@@ -75,6 +76,7 @@ struct common_audit_data {
 #endif
 		char *kmod_name;
 		struct lsm_ioctlop_audit *op;
+		struct file *file;
 	} u;
 	/* this union contains LSM specific data */
 	union {
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 101bf19c0f41..558adfa5c8a8 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -151,6 +151,16 @@
  *	@name name of the last path component used to create file
  *	@ctx pointer to place the pointer to the resulting context in.
  *	@ctxlen point to place the length of the resulting context.
+ * @dentry_create_files_as:
+ *	Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available
+ *	and set that context in passed in creds so that new files are
+ *	created using that context. Context is calculated using the
+ *	passed in creds and not the creds of the caller.
+ *	@dentry dentry to use in calculating the context.
+ *	@mode mode used to determine resource type.
+ *	@name name of the last path component used to create file
+ *	@old creds which should be used for context calculation
+ *	@new creds to modify
  *
  *
  * Security hooks for inode operations.
@@ -401,6 +411,23 @@
  *	@inode contains a pointer to the inode.
  *	@secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved.
  *	In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
+ * @inode_copy_up:
+ *	A file is about to be copied up from lower layer to upper layer of
+ *	overlay filesystem. Security module can prepare a set of new creds
+ *	and modify as need be and return new creds. Caller will switch to
+ *	new creds temporarily to create new file and release newly allocated
+ *	creds.
+ *	@src indicates the union dentry of file that is being copied up.
+ *	@new pointer to pointer to return newly allocated creds.
+ *	Returns 0 on success or a negative error code on error.
+ * @inode_copy_up_xattr:
+ *	Filter the xattrs being copied up when a unioned file is copied
+ *	up from a lower layer to the union/overlay layer.
+ *	@name indicates the name of the xattr.
+ *	Returns 0 to accept the xattr, 1 to discard the xattr, -EOPNOTSUPP if
+ *	security module does not know about attribute or a negative error code
+ *	to abort the copy up. Note that the caller is responsible for reading
+ *	and writing the xattrs as this hook is merely a filter.
  *
  * Security hooks for file operations
  *
@@ -1358,6 +1385,10 @@ union security_list_options {
 	int (*dentry_init_security)(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
 					const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
 					u32 *ctxlen);
+	int (*dentry_create_files_as)(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
+					struct qstr *name,
+					const struct cred *old,
+					struct cred *new);
 
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
@@ -1425,6 +1456,8 @@ union security_list_options {
 	int (*inode_listsecurity)(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
 					size_t buffer_size);
 	void (*inode_getsecid)(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
+	int (*inode_copy_up)(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new);
+	int (*inode_copy_up_xattr)(const char *name);
 
 	int (*file_permission)(struct file *file, int mask);
 	int (*file_alloc_security)(struct file *file);
@@ -1455,7 +1488,6 @@ union security_list_options {
 	int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
 	int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
 	int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name);
-	int (*kernel_module_from_file)(struct file *file);
 	int (*kernel_read_file)(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);
 	int (*kernel_post_read_file)(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 				     enum kernel_read_file_id id);
@@ -1656,6 +1688,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
 	struct list_head sb_clone_mnt_opts;
 	struct list_head sb_parse_opts_str;
 	struct list_head dentry_init_security;
+	struct list_head dentry_create_files_as;
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
 	struct list_head path_unlink;
 	struct list_head path_mkdir;
@@ -1696,6 +1729,8 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
 	struct list_head inode_setsecurity;
 	struct list_head inode_listsecurity;
 	struct list_head inode_getsecid;
+	struct list_head inode_copy_up;
+	struct list_head inode_copy_up_xattr;
 	struct list_head file_permission;
 	struct list_head file_alloc_security;
 	struct list_head file_free_security;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 7831cd57bcf7..c2125e9093e8 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -242,6 +242,10 @@ int security_sb_parse_opts_str(char *options, struct security_mnt_opts *opts);
 int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
 					const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
 					u32 *ctxlen);
+int security_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
+					struct qstr *name,
+					const struct cred *old,
+					struct cred *new);
 
 int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode);
 void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode);
@@ -282,6 +286,8 @@ int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buf
 int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
 int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);
 void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
+int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new);
+int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name);
 int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask);
 int security_file_alloc(struct file *file);
 void security_file_free(struct file *file);
@@ -307,7 +313,6 @@ void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
 int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
 int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
 int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
-int security_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file);
 int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);
 int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 				   enum kernel_read_file_id id);
@@ -598,6 +603,14 @@ static inline int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry,
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
 
+static inline int security_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry,
+						  int mode, struct qstr *name,
+						  const struct cred *old,
+						  struct cred *new)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 
 static inline int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,
 						struct inode *dir,
@@ -758,6 +771,16 @@ static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
 	*secid = 0;
 }
 
+static inline int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
 static inline int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
 	return 0;
diff --git a/security/lsm_audit.c b/security/lsm_audit.c
index 45d927ab807d..37f04dadc8d6 100644
--- a/security/lsm_audit.c
+++ b/security/lsm_audit.c
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ int ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	}
 	return ret;
 }
-#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
 /**
  * ipv6_skb_to_auditdata : fill auditdata from skb
  * @skb : the skb
@@ -245,6 +245,19 @@ static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab,
 		}
 		break;
 	}
+	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE: {
+		struct inode *inode;
+
+		audit_log_d_path(ab, " path=", &a->u.file->f_path);
+
+		inode = file_inode(a->u.file);
+		if (inode) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " dev=");
+			audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, inode->i_sb->s_id);
+			audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%lu", inode->i_ino);
+		}
+		break;
+	}
 	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP: {
 		struct inode *inode;
 
@@ -257,7 +270,7 @@ static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab,
 			audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%lu", inode->i_ino);
 		}
 
-		audit_log_format(ab, " ioctlcmd=%hx", a->u.op->cmd);
+		audit_log_format(ab, " ioctlcmd=0x%hx", a->u.op->cmd);
 		break;
 	}
 	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY: {
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 4838e7fefa1f..f825304f04a7 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -364,6 +364,15 @@ int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_init_security);
 
+int security_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
+				    struct qstr *name,
+				    const struct cred *old, struct cred *new)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(dentry_create_files_as, 0, dentry, mode,
+				name, old, new);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_create_files_as);
+
 int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 				 const struct qstr *qstr,
 				 const initxattrs initxattrs, void *fs_data)
@@ -748,6 +757,18 @@ void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
 	call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid);
 }
 
+int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(inode_copy_up, 0, src, new);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up);
+
+int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(inode_copy_up_xattr, -EOPNOTSUPP, name);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up_xattr);
+
 int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
 	int ret;
@@ -1623,6 +1644,8 @@ struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads = {
 		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_parse_opts_str),
 	.dentry_init_security =
 		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.dentry_init_security),
+	.dentry_create_files_as =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.dentry_create_files_as),
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
 	.path_unlink =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_unlink),
 	.path_mkdir =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_mkdir),
@@ -1684,6 +1707,10 @@ struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads = {
 		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_listsecurity),
 	.inode_getsecid =
 		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_getsecid),
+	.inode_copy_up =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_copy_up),
+	.inode_copy_up_xattr =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_copy_up_xattr),
 	.file_permission =
 		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_permission),
 	.file_alloc_security =
diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig
index 8691e92f27e5..ea7e3efbe0f7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/Kconfig
+++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig
@@ -93,41 +93,3 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE
 	  via /selinux/checkreqprot if authorized by policy.
 
 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 0.
-
-config SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX
-	bool "NSA SELinux maximum supported policy format version"
-	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
-	default n
-	help
-	  This option enables the maximum policy format version supported
-	  by SELinux to be set to a particular value.  This value is reported
-	  to userspace via /selinux/policyvers and used at policy load time.
-	  It can be adjusted downward to support legacy userland (init) that
-	  does not correctly handle kernels that support newer policy versions.
-
-	  Examples:
-	  For the Fedora Core 3 or 4 Linux distributions, enable this option
-	  and set the value via the next option. For Fedora Core 5 and later,
-	  do not enable this option.
-
-	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
-
-config SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX_VALUE
-	int "NSA SELinux maximum supported policy format version value"
-	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX
-	range 15 23
-	default 19
-	help
-	  This option sets the value for the maximum policy format version
-	  supported by SELinux.
-
-	  Examples:
-	  For Fedora Core 3, use 18.
-	  For Fedora Core 4, use 19.
-
-	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, look for the
-	  policy format version supported by your policy toolchain, by
-	  running 'checkpolicy -V'. Or look at what policy you have
-	  installed under /etc/selinux/$SELINUXTYPE/policy, where
-	  SELINUXTYPE is defined in your /etc/selinux/config.
-
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 13185a6c266a..2205ea27aa0a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1761,8 +1761,8 @@ static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 {
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
 
-	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
-	ad.u.path = file->f_path;
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
+	ad.u.file = file;
 	return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
 }
 
@@ -1784,8 +1784,8 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 	u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
 	int rc;
 
-	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
-	ad.u.path = file->f_path;
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
+	ad.u.file = file;
 
 	if (sid != fsec->sid) {
 		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
@@ -1808,13 +1808,13 @@ out:
 /*
  * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned.
  */
-static int selinux_determine_inode_label(struct inode *dir,
-					 const struct qstr *name,
-					 u16 tclass,
-					 u32 *_new_isid)
+static int
+selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
+				 struct inode *dir,
+				 const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass,
+				 u32 *_new_isid)
 {
 	const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
-	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
 
 	if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
 	    (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
@@ -1857,8 +1857,8 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(dir, &dentry->d_name, tclass,
-					   &newsid);
+	rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(), dir,
+					   &dentry->d_name, tclass, &newsid);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -2365,8 +2365,8 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 			new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
 	}
 
-	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
-	ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path;
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
+	ad.u.file = bprm->file;
 
 	if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
 		rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
@@ -2838,7 +2838,8 @@ static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
 	u32 newsid;
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
+	rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(),
+					   d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
 					   inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
 					   &newsid);
 	if (rc)
@@ -2847,6 +2848,27 @@ static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
 	return security_sid_to_context(newsid, (char **)ctx, ctxlen);
 }
 
+static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
+					  struct qstr *name,
+					  const struct cred *old,
+					  struct cred *new)
+{
+	u32 newsid;
+	int rc;
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+
+	rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(old->security,
+					   d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
+					   inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
+					   &newsid);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	tsec = new->security;
+	tsec->create_sid = newsid;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 				       const struct qstr *qstr,
 				       const char **name,
@@ -2863,7 +2885,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 	sid = tsec->sid;
 	newsid = tsec->create_sid;
 
-	rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(
+	rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(),
 		dir, qstr,
 		inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
 		&newsid);
@@ -3293,6 +3315,41 @@ static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
 	*secid = isec->sid;
 }
 
+static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
+{
+	u32 sid;
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	struct cred *new_creds = *new;
+
+	if (new_creds == NULL) {
+		new_creds = prepare_creds();
+		if (!new_creds)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	tsec = new_creds->security;
+	/* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */
+	selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid);
+	tsec->create_sid = sid;
+	*new = new_creds;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
+{
+	/* The copy_up hook above sets the initial context on an inode, but we
+	 * don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower
+	 * xattrs up.  Instead, we have to filter out SELinux-related xattrs.
+	 */
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0)
+		return 1; /* Discard */
+	/*
+	 * Any other attribute apart from SELINUX is not claimed, supported
+	 * by selinux.
+	 */
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
 /* file security operations */
 
 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
@@ -3776,8 +3833,8 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
 
 	/* finit_module */
 
-	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
-	ad.u.path = file->f_path;
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
+	ad.u.file = file;
 
 	fsec = file->f_security;
 	if (sid != fsec->sid) {
@@ -3984,7 +4041,7 @@ out:
 	return ret;
 }
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
 
 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
@@ -4075,7 +4132,7 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
 				       &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
 		goto okay;
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
 	case PF_INET6:
 		ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
 		if (ret)
@@ -5029,7 +5086,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(void *priv,
 	return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET);
 }
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(void *priv,
 					 struct sk_buff *skb,
 					 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
@@ -5087,7 +5144,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(void *priv,
 	return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
 }
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_output(void *priv,
 					struct sk_buff *skb,
 					const struct nf_hook_state *state)
@@ -5273,7 +5330,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(void *priv,
 	return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET);
 }
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(void *priv,
 					   struct sk_buff *skb,
 					   const struct nf_hook_state *state)
@@ -6062,6 +6119,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_parse_opts_str, selinux_parse_opts_str),
 
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, selinux_dentry_create_files_as),
 
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security),
@@ -6088,6 +6146,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr),
 
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
@@ -6317,7 +6377,7 @@ static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
 		.hooknum =	NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
 		.priority =	NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
 	},
-#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
 	{
 		.hook =		selinux_ipv6_postroute,
 		.pf =		NFPROTO_IPV6,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 38feb55d531a..308a286c6cbe 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -39,11 +39,7 @@
 
 /* Range of policy versions we understand*/
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN   POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX
-#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX	CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX_VALUE
-#else
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX	POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL
-#endif
 
 /* Mask for just the mount related flags */
 #define SE_MNTMASK	0x0f
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
index 456e1a9bcfde..34afeadd9e73 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
@@ -242,6 +242,8 @@ int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
 		goto err;
 
 	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+	if (((len == 0) || (len == (u32)-1)))
+		goto err;
 
 	rc = -ENOMEM;
 	key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
index 894b6cdc11c5..7d10e5d418bb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
@@ -374,6 +374,9 @@ int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
 		goto ok;
 	}
 
+	if (e->highbit && !count)
+		goto bad;
+
 	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
 		rc = next_entry(&startbit, fp, sizeof(u32));
 		if (rc < 0) {
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 992a31530825..ace683838d80 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -541,21 +541,21 @@ static int policydb_index(struct policydb *p)
 
 	rc = -ENOMEM;
 	p->class_val_to_struct =
-		kmalloc(p->p_classes.nprim * sizeof(*(p->class_val_to_struct)),
+		kzalloc(p->p_classes.nprim * sizeof(*(p->class_val_to_struct)),
 			GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!p->class_val_to_struct)
 		goto out;
 
 	rc = -ENOMEM;
 	p->role_val_to_struct =
-		kmalloc(p->p_roles.nprim * sizeof(*(p->role_val_to_struct)),
+		kzalloc(p->p_roles.nprim * sizeof(*(p->role_val_to_struct)),
 			GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!p->role_val_to_struct)
 		goto out;
 
 	rc = -ENOMEM;
 	p->user_val_to_struct =
-		kmalloc(p->p_users.nprim * sizeof(*(p->user_val_to_struct)),
+		kzalloc(p->p_users.nprim * sizeof(*(p->user_val_to_struct)),
 			GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!p->user_val_to_struct)
 		goto out;
@@ -964,7 +964,7 @@ int policydb_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c)
 		 * Role must be authorized for the type.
 		 */
 		role = p->role_val_to_struct[c->role - 1];
-		if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&role->types, c->type - 1))
+		if (!role || !ebitmap_get_bit(&role->types, c->type - 1))
 			/* role may not be associated with type */
 			return 0;
 
@@ -1094,6 +1094,9 @@ static int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, void *fp, u32 len)
 	int rc;
 	char *str;
 
+	if ((len == 0) || (len == (u32)-1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags);
 	if (!str)
 		return -ENOMEM;
@@ -2414,6 +2417,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 		} else
 			tr->tclass = p->process_class;
 
+		rc = -EINVAL;
 		if (!policydb_role_isvalid(p, tr->role) ||
 		    !policydb_type_isvalid(p, tr->type) ||
 		    !policydb_class_isvalid(p, tr->tclass) ||
diff --git a/security/smack/Kconfig b/security/smack/Kconfig
index 271adae81796..923b120e0fa5 100644
--- a/security/smack/Kconfig
+++ b/security/smack/Kconfig
@@ -40,3 +40,15 @@ config SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
 	  This enables security marking of network packets using
 	  Smack labels.
 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY_SMACK_APPEND_SIGNALS
+	bool "Treat delivering signals as an append operation"
+	depends on SECURITY_SMACK
+	default n
+	help
+	  Sending a signal has been treated as a write operation to the
+	  receiving process. If this option is selected, the delivery
+	  will be an append operation instead. This makes it possible
+	  to differentiate between delivering a network packet and
+	  delivering a signal in the Smack rules.
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 26e58f1804b1..51fd30192c08 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -256,6 +256,16 @@ enum {
 #define MAY_LOCK	0x00002000	/* Locks should be writes, but ... */
 #define MAY_BRINGUP	0x00004000	/* Report use of this rule */
 
+/*
+ * The policy for delivering signals is configurable.
+ * It is usually "write", but can be "append".
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_APPEND_SIGNALS
+#define MAY_DELIVER	MAY_APPEND	/* Signal delivery requires append */
+#else
+#define MAY_DELIVER	MAY_WRITE	/* Signal delivery requires write */
+#endif
+
 #define SMACK_BRINGUP_ALLOW		1	/* Allow bringup mode */
 #define SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT	2	/* Allow unconfined label */
 #define SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT		3	/* Allow unconfined label */
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 87a9741b0d02..caec2256ab22 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1857,14 +1857,14 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
 
 	/* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */
 	skp = file->f_security;
-	rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
-	rc = smk_bu_note("sigiotask", skp, tkp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+	rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, NULL);
+	rc = smk_bu_note("sigiotask", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
 	if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
 		rc = 0;
 
 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tsk);
-	smack_log(skp->smk_known, tkp->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad);
+	smack_log(skp->smk_known, tkp->smk_known, MAY_DELIVER, rc, &ad);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -2265,8 +2265,8 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
 	 * can write the receiver.
 	 */
 	if (secid == 0) {
-		rc = smk_curacc(tkp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
-		rc = smk_bu_task(p, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+		rc = smk_curacc(tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_task(p, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
 		return rc;
 	}
 	/*
@@ -2275,8 +2275,8 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
 	 * we can't take privilege into account.
 	 */
 	skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
-	rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
-	rc = smk_bu_note("USB signal", skp, tkp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+	rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_note("USB signal", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
 	return rc;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
index aa6bf1b22ec5..205b785fb400 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
 #include <net/inet_sock.h>
 #include "smack.h"
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
 
 static unsigned int smack_ipv6_output(void *priv,
 					struct sk_buff *skb,
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ static struct nf_hook_ops smack_nf_ops[] = {
 		.hooknum =	NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
 		.priority =	NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
 	},
-#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
 	{
 		.hook =		smack_ipv6_output,
 		.pf =		NFPROTO_IPV6,
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index e249a66db533..6492fe96cae4 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -2523,14 +2523,9 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_revoke_subj(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	if (count == 0 || count > SMK_LONGLABEL)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	data = kzalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (data == NULL)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) {
-		rc = -EFAULT;
-		goto out_data;
-	}
+	data = memdup_user(buf, count);
+	if (IS_ERR(data))
+		return PTR_ERR(data);
 
 	cp = smk_parse_smack(data, count);
 	if (IS_ERR(cp)) {