diff options
| author | Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> | 2013-02-23 01:13:47 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2013-02-27 09:21:24 -0800 |
| commit | 314561f4fe77ffad1b560a10cdfb3b6fdc731a74 (patch) | |
| tree | 718c474303e1a97dcaeac4337de15a4ec78dd31e | |
| parent | ca2656dccef64c437d6717468bffd3762b11816e (diff) | |
sock_diag: Fix out-of-bounds access to sock_diag_handlers[]
[ Upstream commit 6e601a53566d84e1ffd25e7b6fe0b6894ffd79c0 ]
Userland can send a netlink message requesting SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY
with a family greater or equal then AF_MAX -- the array size of
sock_diag_handlers[]. The current code does not test for this
condition therefore is vulnerable to an out-of-bound access opening
doors for a privilege escalation.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| -rw-r--r-- | net/core/sock_diag.c | 3 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/core/sock_diag.c b/net/core/sock_diag.c index 602cd637182e..750f44f3aa31 100644 --- a/net/core/sock_diag.c +++ b/net/core/sock_diag.c @@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ static int __sock_diag_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*req)) return -EINVAL; + if (req->sdiag_family >= AF_MAX) + return -EINVAL; + hndl = sock_diag_lock_handler(req->sdiag_family); if (hndl == NULL) err = -ENOENT; |