Merge branch 'audit.b37' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current

* 'audit.b37' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current:
  [PATCH] AUDIT_FD_PAIR
  [PATCH] audit config lockdown
  [PATCH] minor update to rule add/delete messages (ver 2)

6 files changed, 257 insertions, 76 deletions

diff --git a/fs/pipe.c b/fs/pipe.c
index 68090e84f589..ebafde7d6aba 100644
--- a/fs/pipe.c
+++ b/fs/pipe.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/uio.h>
 #include <linux/highmem.h>
 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
@@ -985,6 +986,10 @@ int do_pipe(int *fd)
 		goto err_fdr;
 	fdw = error;
 
+	error = audit_fd_pair(fdr, fdw);
+	if (error < 0)
+		goto err_fdw;
+
 	fd_install(fdr, fr);
 	fd_install(fdw, fw);
 	fd[0] = fdr;
@@ -992,6 +997,8 @@ int do_pipe(int *fd)
 
 	return 0;
 
+ err_fdw:
+	put_unused_fd(fdw);
  err_fdr:
 	put_unused_fd(fdr);
  err_read_pipe:
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 0e07db6cc0d0..229fa012c893 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@
 #define AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY		1314	/* POSIX MQ notify record type */
 #define AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR	1315	/* POSIX MQ get/set attribute record type */
 #define AUDIT_KERNEL_OTHER	1316	/* For use by 3rd party modules */
+#define AUDIT_FD_PAIR		1317    /* audit record for pipe/socketpair */
 
 #define AUDIT_AVC		1400	/* SE Linux avc denial or grant */
 #define AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR	1401	/* Internal SE Linux Errors */
@@ -387,6 +388,7 @@ extern int __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode
 extern int audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
 extern int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args);
 extern int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *addr);
+extern int __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2);
 extern int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt);
 extern int audit_set_macxattr(const char *name);
 extern int __audit_mq_open(int oflag, mode_t mode, struct mq_attr __user *u_attr);
@@ -401,6 +403,12 @@ static inline int audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
 		return __audit_ipc_obj(ipcp);
 	return 0;
 }
+static inline int audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
+{
+	if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
+		return __audit_fd_pair(fd1, fd2);
+	return 0;
+}
 static inline int audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
 {
 	if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
@@ -459,6 +467,7 @@ extern int audit_n_rules;
 #define audit_ipc_set_perm(q,u,g,m) ({ 0; })
 #define audit_bprm(p) ({ 0; })
 #define audit_socketcall(n,a) ({ 0; })
+#define audit_fd_pair(n,a) ({ 0; })
 #define audit_sockaddr(len, addr) ({ 0; })
 #define audit_avc_path(dentry, mnt) ({ 0; })
 #define audit_set_macxattr(n) do { ; } while (0)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index d9b690ac684b..76c9a11b72d6 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
  * Gateway between the kernel (e.g., selinux) and the user-space audit daemon.
  * System-call specific features have moved to auditsc.c
  *
- * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
+ * Copyright 2003-2007 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
  * All Rights Reserved.
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
@@ -65,7 +65,9 @@
  * (Initialization happens after skb_init is called.) */
 static int	audit_initialized;
 
-/* No syscall auditing will take place unless audit_enabled != 0. */
+/* 0 - no auditing
+ * 1 - auditing enabled
+ * 2 - auditing enabled and configuration is locked/unchangeable. */
 int		audit_enabled;
 
 /* Default state when kernel boots without any parameters. */
@@ -239,102 +241,150 @@ void audit_log_lost(const char *message)
 
 static int audit_set_rate_limit(int limit, uid_t loginuid, u32 sid)
 {
-	int old	= audit_rate_limit;
+	int res, rc = 0, old = audit_rate_limit;
+
+	/* check if we are locked */
+	if (audit_enabled == 2)
+		res = 0;
+	else
+		res = 1;
 
 	if (sid) {
 		char *ctx = NULL;
 		u32 len;
-		int rc;
-		if ((rc = selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)))
-			return rc;
-		else
+		if ((rc = selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)) == 0) {
 			audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
-				"audit_rate_limit=%d old=%d by auid=%u subj=%s",
-				limit, old, loginuid, ctx);
-		kfree(ctx);
-	} else
-		audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
-			"audit_rate_limit=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
-			limit, old, loginuid);
-	audit_rate_limit = limit;
-	return 0;
+				"audit_rate_limit=%d old=%d by auid=%u"
+				" subj=%s res=%d",
+				limit, old, loginuid, ctx, res);
+			kfree(ctx);
+		} else
+			res = 0; /* Something weird, deny request */
+	}
+	audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+		"audit_rate_limit=%d old=%d by auid=%u res=%d",
+		limit, old, loginuid, res);
+
+	/* If we are allowed, make the change */
+	if (res == 1)
+		audit_rate_limit = limit;
+	/* Not allowed, update reason */
+	else if (rc == 0)
+		rc = -EPERM;
+	return rc;
 }
 
 static int audit_set_backlog_limit(int limit, uid_t loginuid, u32 sid)
 {
-	int old	= audit_backlog_limit;
+	int res, rc = 0, old = audit_backlog_limit;
+
+	/* check if we are locked */
+	if (audit_enabled == 2)
+		res = 0;
+	else
+		res = 1;
 
 	if (sid) {
 		char *ctx = NULL;
 		u32 len;
-		int rc;
-		if ((rc = selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)))
-			return rc;
-		else
+		if ((rc = selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)) == 0) {
 			audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
-			    "audit_backlog_limit=%d old=%d by auid=%u subj=%s",
-				limit, old, loginuid, ctx);
-		kfree(ctx);
-	} else
-		audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
-			"audit_backlog_limit=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
-			limit, old, loginuid);
-	audit_backlog_limit = limit;
-	return 0;
+				"audit_backlog_limit=%d old=%d by auid=%u"
+				" subj=%s res=%d",
+				limit, old, loginuid, ctx, res);
+			kfree(ctx);
+		} else
+			res = 0; /* Something weird, deny request */
+	}
+	audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+		"audit_backlog_limit=%d old=%d by auid=%u res=%d",
+		limit, old, loginuid, res);
+
+	/* If we are allowed, make the change */
+	if (res == 1)
+		audit_backlog_limit = limit;
+	/* Not allowed, update reason */
+	else if (rc == 0)
+		rc = -EPERM;
+	return rc;
 }
 
 static int audit_set_enabled(int state, uid_t loginuid, u32 sid)
 {
-	int old = audit_enabled;
+	int res, rc = 0, old = audit_enabled;
 
-	if (state != 0 && state != 1)
+	if (state < 0 || state > 2)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	/* check if we are locked */
+	if (audit_enabled == 2)
+		res = 0;
+	else
+		res = 1;
+
 	if (sid) {
 		char *ctx = NULL;
 		u32 len;
-		int rc;
-		if ((rc = selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)))
-			return rc;
-		else
+		if ((rc = selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)) == 0) {
 			audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
-				"audit_enabled=%d old=%d by auid=%u subj=%s",
-				state, old, loginuid, ctx);
-		kfree(ctx);
-	} else
-		audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
-			"audit_enabled=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
-			state, old, loginuid);
-	audit_enabled = state;
-	return 0;
+				"audit_enabled=%d old=%d by auid=%u"
+				" subj=%s res=%d",
+				state, old, loginuid, ctx, res);
+			kfree(ctx);
+		} else
+			res = 0; /* Something weird, deny request */
+	}
+	audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+		"audit_enabled=%d old=%d by auid=%u res=%d",
+		state, old, loginuid, res);
+
+	/* If we are allowed, make the change */
+	if (res == 1)
+		audit_enabled = state;
+	/* Not allowed, update reason */
+	else if (rc == 0)
+		rc = -EPERM;
+	return rc;
 }
 
 static int audit_set_failure(int state, uid_t loginuid, u32 sid)
 {
-	int old = audit_failure;
+	int res, rc = 0, old = audit_failure;
 
 	if (state != AUDIT_FAIL_SILENT
 	    && state != AUDIT_FAIL_PRINTK
 	    && state != AUDIT_FAIL_PANIC)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	/* check if we are locked */
+	if (audit_enabled == 2)
+		res = 0;
+	else
+		res = 1;
+
 	if (sid) {
 		char *ctx = NULL;
 		u32 len;
-		int rc;
-		if ((rc = selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)))
-			return rc;
-		else
+		if ((rc = selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)) == 0) {
 			audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
-				"audit_failure=%d old=%d by auid=%u subj=%s",
-				state, old, loginuid, ctx);
-		kfree(ctx);
-	} else
-		audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
-			"audit_failure=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
-			state, old, loginuid);
-	audit_failure = state;
-	return 0;
+				"audit_failure=%d old=%d by auid=%u"
+				" subj=%s res=%d",
+				state, old, loginuid, ctx, res);
+			kfree(ctx);
+		} else
+			res = 0; /* Something weird, deny request */
+	}
+	audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+		"audit_failure=%d old=%d by auid=%u res=%d",
+		state, old, loginuid, res);
+
+	/* If we are allowed, make the change */
+	if (res == 1)
+		audit_failure = state;
+	/* Not allowed, update reason */
+	else if (rc == 0)
+		rc = -EPERM;
+	return rc;
 }
 
 static int kauditd_thread(void *dummy)
@@ -599,6 +649,30 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 	case AUDIT_DEL:
 		if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(struct audit_rule))
 			return -EINVAL;
+		if (audit_enabled == 2) {
+			ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL,
+					AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
+			if (ab) {
+				audit_log_format(ab,
+						 "pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u",
+						 pid, uid, loginuid);
+				if (sid) {
+					if (selinux_sid_to_string(
+							sid, &ctx, &len)) {
+						audit_log_format(ab,
+							" ssid=%u", sid);
+						/* Maybe call audit_panic? */
+					} else
+						audit_log_format(ab,
+							" subj=%s", ctx);
+					kfree(ctx);
+				}
+				audit_log_format(ab, " audit_enabled=%d res=0",
+					audit_enabled);
+				audit_log_end(ab);
+			}
+			return -EPERM;
+		}
 		/* fallthrough */
 	case AUDIT_LIST:
 		err = audit_receive_filter(nlh->nlmsg_type, NETLINK_CB(skb).pid,
@@ -609,6 +683,30 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 	case AUDIT_DEL_RULE:
 		if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(struct audit_rule_data))
 			return -EINVAL;
+		if (audit_enabled == 2) {
+			ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL,
+					AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
+			if (ab) {
+				audit_log_format(ab,
+						 "pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u",
+						 pid, uid, loginuid);
+				if (sid) {
+					if (selinux_sid_to_string(
+							sid, &ctx, &len)) {
+						audit_log_format(ab,
+							" ssid=%u", sid);
+						/* Maybe call audit_panic? */
+					} else
+						audit_log_format(ab,
+							" subj=%s", ctx);
+					kfree(ctx);
+				}
+				audit_log_format(ab, " audit_enabled=%d res=0",
+					audit_enabled);
+				audit_log_end(ab);
+			}
+			return -EPERM;
+		}
 		/* fallthrough */
 	case AUDIT_LIST_RULES:
 		err = audit_receive_filter(nlh->nlmsg_type, NETLINK_CB(skb).pid,
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 87865f8b4ce3..3749193aed8c 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -937,9 +937,10 @@ static void audit_update_watch(struct audit_parent *parent,
 		}
 
 		ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
-		audit_log_format(ab, "audit updated rules specifying path=");
+		audit_log_format(ab, "op=updated rules specifying path=");
 		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, owatch->path);
 		audit_log_format(ab, " with dev=%u ino=%lu\n", dev, ino);
+		audit_log_format(ab, " list=%d res=1", r->listnr);
 		audit_log_end(ab);
 
 		audit_remove_watch(owatch);
@@ -969,14 +970,14 @@ static void audit_remove_parent_watches(struct audit_parent *parent)
 			e = container_of(r, struct audit_entry, rule);
 
 			ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
-			audit_log_format(ab, "audit implicitly removed rule path=");
+			audit_log_format(ab, "op=remove rule path=");
 			audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, w->path);
 			if (r->filterkey) {
 				audit_log_format(ab, " key=");
 				audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, r->filterkey);
 			} else
 				audit_log_format(ab, " key=(null)");
-			audit_log_format(ab, " list=%d", r->listnr);
+			audit_log_format(ab, " list=%d res=1", r->listnr);
 			audit_log_end(ab);
 
 			list_del(&r->rlist);
@@ -1410,7 +1411,7 @@ static void audit_log_rule_change(uid_t loginuid, u32 sid, char *action,
 			audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
 		kfree(ctx);
 	}
-	audit_log_format(ab, " %s rule key=", action);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s rule key=", action);
 	if (rule->filterkey)
 		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, rule->filterkey);
 	else
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 298897559ca4..359955800dd2 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -170,6 +170,11 @@ struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr {
 	char			a[0];
 };
 
+struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair {
+	struct	audit_aux_data d;
+	int	fd[2];
+};
+
 struct audit_aux_data_path {
 	struct audit_aux_data	d;
 	struct dentry		*dentry;
@@ -961,6 +966,11 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts
 			audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", axi->dentry, axi->mnt);
 			break; }
 
+		case AUDIT_FD_PAIR: {
+			struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair *axs = (void *)aux;
+			audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d", axs->fd[0], axs->fd[1]);
+			break; }
+
 		}
 		audit_log_end(ab);
 	}
@@ -1815,6 +1825,36 @@ int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
 }
 
 /**
+ * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
+ * @fd1: the first file descriptor
+ * @fd2: the second file descriptor
+ *
+ * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
+ */
+int __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
+{
+	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+	struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair *ax;
+
+	if (likely(!context)) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ax) {
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	ax->fd[0] = fd1;
+	ax->fd[1] = fd2;
+
+	ax->d.type = AUDIT_FD_PAIR;
+	ax->d.next = context->aux;
+	context->aux = (void *)ax;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
  * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
  * @len: data length in user space
  * @a: data address in kernel space
diff --git a/net/socket.c b/net/socket.c
index 0778c5442411..9566e57ac7f5 100644
--- a/net/socket.c
+++ b/net/socket.c
@@ -1194,6 +1194,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_socketpair(int family, int type, int protocol,
 {
 	struct socket *sock1, *sock2;
 	int fd1, fd2, err;
+	struct file *newfile1, *newfile2;
 
 	/*
 	 * Obtain the first socket and check if the underlying protocol
@@ -1212,18 +1213,37 @@ asmlinkage long sys_socketpair(int family, int type, int protocol,
 	if (err < 0)
 		goto out_release_both;
 
-	fd1 = fd2 = -1;
+	fd1 = sock_alloc_fd(&newfile1);
+	if (unlikely(fd1 < 0))
+		goto out_release_both;
 
-	err = sock_map_fd(sock1);
-	if (err < 0)
+	fd2 = sock_alloc_fd(&newfile2);
+	if (unlikely(fd2 < 0)) {
+		put_filp(newfile1);
+		put_unused_fd(fd1);
 		goto out_release_both;
-	fd1 = err;
+	}
 
-	err = sock_map_fd(sock2);
-	if (err < 0)
-		goto out_close_1;
-	fd2 = err;
+	err = sock_attach_fd(sock1, newfile1);
+	if (unlikely(err < 0)) {
+		goto out_fd2;
+	}
+
+	err = sock_attach_fd(sock2, newfile2);
+	if (unlikely(err < 0)) {
+		fput(newfile1);
+		goto out_fd1;
+	}
+
+	err = audit_fd_pair(fd1, fd2);
+	if (err < 0) {
+		fput(newfile1);
+		fput(newfile2);
+		goto out_fd;
+	}
 
+	fd_install(fd1, newfile1);
+	fd_install(fd2, newfile2);
 	/* fd1 and fd2 may be already another descriptors.
 	 * Not kernel problem.
 	 */
@@ -1238,17 +1258,23 @@ asmlinkage long sys_socketpair(int family, int type, int protocol,
 	sys_close(fd1);
 	return err;
 
-out_close_1:
-	sock_release(sock2);
-	sys_close(fd1);
-	return err;
-
 out_release_both:
 	sock_release(sock2);
 out_release_1:
 	sock_release(sock1);
 out:
 	return err;
+
+out_fd2:
+	put_filp(newfile1);
+	sock_release(sock1);
+out_fd1:
+	put_filp(newfile2);
+	sock_release(sock2);
+out_fd:
+	put_unused_fd(fd1);
+	put_unused_fd(fd2);
+	goto out;
 }
 
 /*