diff options
| author | Matthias Hopf <mhopf@suse.de> | 2008-10-18 07:18:05 +1000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> | 2008-10-22 14:05:16 -0700 |
| commit | 54e4b4720e7eda31b4e3c72a09d0bcda9dd3482c (patch) | |
| tree | 638493cf11142b632f388880a1d055b44a99ccbd | |
| parent | 79f095640dd266b97d53e6f8d06208beb7b346fa (diff) | |
drm/i915: fix ioremap of a user address for non-root (CVE-2008-3831)
commit 4b40893918203ee1a1f6a114316c2a19c072e9bd upstream
Olaf Kirch noticed that the i915_set_status_page() function of the i915
kernel driver calls ioremap with an address offset that is supplied by
userspace via ioctl. The function zeroes the mapped memory via memset
and tells the hardware about the address. Turns out that access to that
ioctl is not restricted to root so users could probably exploit that to
do nasty things. We haven't tried to write actual exploit code though.
It only affects the Intel G33 series and newer.
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/drm/i915_dma.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/drm/i915_dma.c b/drivers/char/drm/i915_dma.c index a043bb12301a..ed2a83f9bced 100644 --- a/drivers/char/drm/i915_dma.c +++ b/drivers/char/drm/i915_dma.c @@ -836,7 +836,7 @@ struct drm_ioctl_desc i915_ioctls[] = { DRM_IOCTL_DEF(DRM_I915_SET_VBLANK_PIPE, i915_vblank_pipe_set, DRM_AUTH|DRM_MASTER|DRM_ROOT_ONLY ), DRM_IOCTL_DEF(DRM_I915_GET_VBLANK_PIPE, i915_vblank_pipe_get, DRM_AUTH ), DRM_IOCTL_DEF(DRM_I915_VBLANK_SWAP, i915_vblank_swap, DRM_AUTH), - DRM_IOCTL_DEF(DRM_I915_HWS_ADDR, i915_set_status_page, DRM_AUTH), + DRM_IOCTL_DEF(DRM_I915_HWS_ADDR, i915_set_status_page, DRM_AUTH|DRM_MASTER|DRM_ROOT_ONLY), }; int i915_max_ioctl = DRM_ARRAY_SIZE(i915_ioctls); |