diff options
author | Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> | 2012-12-08 19:43:22 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2012-12-09 18:59:37 -0500 |
commit | 405c005949e47b6e91359159c24753519ded0c67 (patch) | |
tree | 0bc2ce5536a6c72a668319559099b2b3fad1debe | |
parent | 1c95df85ca49640576de2f0a850925957b547b84 (diff) |
inet_diag: validate byte code to prevent oops in inet_diag_bc_run()
Add logic to validate INET_DIAG_BC_S_COND and INET_DIAG_BC_D_COND
operations.
Previously we did not validate the inet_diag_hostcond, address family,
address length, and prefix length. So a malicious user could make the
kernel read beyond the end of the bytecode array by claiming to have a
whole inet_diag_hostcond when the bytecode was not long enough to
contain a whole inet_diag_hostcond of the given address family. Or
they could make the kernel read up to about 27 bytes beyond the end of
a connection address by passing a prefix length that exceeded the
length of addresses of the given family.
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/inet_diag.c | 48 |
1 files changed, 45 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_diag.c b/net/ipv4/inet_diag.c index 16cfa42cfd99..529747d07a2a 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/inet_diag.c +++ b/net/ipv4/inet_diag.c @@ -513,6 +513,44 @@ static int valid_cc(const void *bc, int len, int cc) return 0; } +/* Validate an inet_diag_hostcond. */ +static bool valid_hostcond(const struct inet_diag_bc_op *op, int len, + int *min_len) +{ + int addr_len; + struct inet_diag_hostcond *cond; + + /* Check hostcond space. */ + *min_len += sizeof(struct inet_diag_hostcond); + if (len < *min_len) + return false; + cond = (struct inet_diag_hostcond *)(op + 1); + + /* Check address family and address length. */ + switch (cond->family) { + case AF_UNSPEC: + addr_len = 0; + break; + case AF_INET: + addr_len = sizeof(struct in_addr); + break; + case AF_INET6: + addr_len = sizeof(struct in6_addr); + break; + default: + return false; + } + *min_len += addr_len; + if (len < *min_len) + return false; + + /* Check prefix length (in bits) vs address length (in bytes). */ + if (cond->prefix_len > 8 * addr_len) + return false; + + return true; +} + static int inet_diag_bc_audit(const void *bytecode, int bytecode_len) { const void *bc = bytecode; @@ -520,18 +558,22 @@ static int inet_diag_bc_audit(const void *bytecode, int bytecode_len) while (len > 0) { const struct inet_diag_bc_op *op = bc; + int min_len = sizeof(struct inet_diag_bc_op); //printk("BC: %d %d %d {%d} / %d\n", op->code, op->yes, op->no, op[1].no, len); switch (op->code) { - case INET_DIAG_BC_AUTO: case INET_DIAG_BC_S_COND: case INET_DIAG_BC_D_COND: + if (!valid_hostcond(bc, len, &min_len)) + return -EINVAL; + /* fall through */ + case INET_DIAG_BC_AUTO: case INET_DIAG_BC_S_GE: case INET_DIAG_BC_S_LE: case INET_DIAG_BC_D_GE: case INET_DIAG_BC_D_LE: case INET_DIAG_BC_JMP: - if (op->no < 4 || op->no > len + 4 || op->no & 3) + if (op->no < min_len || op->no > len + 4 || op->no & 3) return -EINVAL; if (op->no < len && !valid_cc(bytecode, bytecode_len, len - op->no)) @@ -542,7 +584,7 @@ static int inet_diag_bc_audit(const void *bytecode, int bytecode_len) default: return -EINVAL; } - if (op->yes < 4 || op->yes > len + 4 || op->yes & 3) + if (op->yes < min_len || op->yes > len + 4 || op->yes & 3) return -EINVAL; bc += op->yes; len -= op->yes; |