diff options
author | Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> | 2014-05-12 09:28:11 -0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2014-06-26 15:15:38 -0400 |
commit | ca7919db0c6dd616f2d1102f40fe7aacfd730121 (patch) | |
tree | 84b37e7fc704bad01ab958ef7604d7ef760ecde6 | |
parent | 124067ae6606c2e9433a912b3c57fcc78b484362 (diff) |
ima: audit log files opened with O_DIRECT flag
commit f9b2a735bdddf836214b5dca74f6ca7712e5a08c upstream.
Files are measured or appraised based on the IMA policy. When a
file, in policy, is opened with the O_DIRECT flag, a deadlock
occurs.
The first attempt at resolving this lockdep temporarily removed the
O_DIRECT flag and restored it, after calculating the hash. The
second attempt introduced the O_DIRECT_HAVELOCK flag. Based on this
flag, do_blockdev_direct_IO() would skip taking the i_mutex a second
time. The third attempt, by Dmitry Kasatkin, resolves the i_mutex
locking issue, by re-introducing the IMA mutex, but uncovered
another problem. Reading a file with O_DIRECT flag set, writes
directly to userspace pages. A second patch allocates a user-space
like memory. This works for all IMA hooks, except ima_file_free(),
which is called on __fput() to recalculate the file hash.
Until this last issue is addressed, do not 'collect' the
measurement for measuring, appraising, or auditing files opened
with the O_DIRECT flag set. Based on policy, permit or deny file
access. This patch defines a new IMA policy rule option named
'permit_directio'. Policy rules could be defined, based on LSM
or other criteria, to permit specific applications to open files
with the O_DIRECT flag set.
Changelog v1:
- permit or deny file access based IMA policy rules
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/integrity.h | 1 |
5 files changed, 20 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy index f1c5cc9d17a8..4c3efe434806 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ Description: [fowner]] lsm: [[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=] [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]] - option: [[appraise_type=]] + option: [[appraise_type=]] [permit_directio] base: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK] mask:= [MAY_READ] [MAY_WRITE] [MAY_APPEND] [MAY_EXEC] diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index c38bbce8c6a6..025824af08e0 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -199,6 +199,7 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value, int *xattr_len) { + const char *audit_cause = "failed"; struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); const char *filename = file->f_dentry->d_name.name; int result = 0; @@ -213,6 +214,12 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, if (!(iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)) { u64 i_version = file_inode(file)->i_version; + if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) { + audit_cause = "failed(directio)"; + result = -EACCES; + goto out; + } + /* use default hash algorithm */ hash.hdr.algo = ima_hash_algo; @@ -233,9 +240,10 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, result = -ENOMEM; } } +out: if (result) integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, - filename, "collect_data", "failed", + filename, "collect_data", audit_cause, result, 0); return result; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 149ee1119f87..76d8aad146a8 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -217,8 +217,11 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename, xattr_ptr = &xattr_value; rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, xattr_ptr, &xattr_len); - if (rc != 0) + if (rc != 0) { + if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) + rc = (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO) ? 0 : -EACCES; goto out_digsig; + } pathname = !filename ? ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf) : filename; if (!pathname) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index a9c3d3cd1990..085c4964be99 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ enum { Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type, Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type, Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid, Opt_fowner, - Opt_appraise_type, Opt_fsuuid + Opt_appraise_type, Opt_fsuuid, Opt_permit_directio }; static match_table_t policy_tokens = { @@ -373,6 +373,7 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = { {Opt_uid, "uid=%s"}, {Opt_fowner, "fowner=%s"}, {Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"}, + {Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"}, {Opt_err, NULL} }; @@ -621,6 +622,9 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) else result = -EINVAL; break; + case Opt_permit_directio: + entry->flags |= IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO; + break; case Opt_err: ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p); result = -EINVAL; diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index 2fb5e53e927f..33c0a70f6b15 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ #define IMA_ACTION_FLAGS 0xff000000 #define IMA_DIGSIG 0x01000000 #define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED 0x02000000 +#define IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO 0x04000000 #define IMA_DO_MASK (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \ IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) |