diff options
| author | Phil Turnbull <phil.turnbull@oracle.com> | 2016-02-02 13:36:45 -0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2017-04-30 05:49:28 +0200 |
| commit | 9540baadb61ba5ed08832bb2a4cbfd876db37ff4 (patch) | |
| tree | 1743fcc12f06beafcc945dc3c80b6440ee803ed4 | |
| parent | 0d9dac5d7cc31df50757f26bcbdfbcf47277a1b2 (diff) | |
netfilter: nfnetlink: correctly validate length of batch messages
commit c58d6c93680f28ac58984af61d0a7ebf4319c241 upstream.
If nlh->nlmsg_len is zero then an infinite loop is triggered because
'skb_pull(skb, msglen);' pulls zero bytes.
The calculation in nlmsg_len() underflows if 'nlh->nlmsg_len <
NLMSG_HDRLEN' which bypasses the length validation and will later
trigger an out-of-bound read.
If the length validation does fail then the malformed batch message is
copied back to userspace. However, we cannot do this because the
nlh->nlmsg_len can be invalid. This leads to an out-of-bounds read in
netlink_ack:
[ 41.455421] ==================================================================
[ 41.456431] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in memcpy+0x1d/0x40 at addr ffff880119e79340
[ 41.456431] Read of size 4294967280 by task a.out/987
[ 41.456431] =============================================================================
[ 41.456431] BUG kmalloc-512 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
[ 41.456431] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
...
[ 41.456431] Bytes b4 ffff880119e79310: 00 00 00 00 d5 03 00 00 b0 fb fe ff 00 00 00 00 ................
[ 41.456431] Object ffff880119e79320: 20 00 00 00 10 00 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ...............
[ 41.456431] Object ffff880119e79330: 14 00 0a 00 01 03 fc 40 45 56 11 22 33 10 00 05 .......@EV."3...
[ 41.456431] Object ffff880119e79340: f0 ff ff ff 88 99 aa bb 00 14 00 0a 00 06 fe fb ................
^^ start of batch nlmsg with
nlmsg_len=4294967280
...
[ 41.456431] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 41.456431] ffff880119e79400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 41.456431] ffff880119e79480: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 41.456431] >ffff880119e79500: 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 41.456431] ^
[ 41.456431] ffff880119e79580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 41.456431] ffff880119e79600: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 41.456431] ==================================================================
Fix this with better validation of nlh->nlmsg_len and by setting
NFNL_BATCH_FAILURE if any batch message fails length validation.
CAP_NET_ADMIN is required to trigger the bugs.
Fixes: 9ea2aa8b7dba ("netfilter: nfnetlink: validate nfnetlink header from batch")
Signed-off-by: Phil Turnbull <phil.turnbull@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| -rw-r--r-- | net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c | 10 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c index 77afe913d03d..9adedba78eea 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c @@ -326,10 +326,12 @@ replay: nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb); err = 0; - if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(struct nfgenmsg) || - skb->len < nlh->nlmsg_len) { - err = -EINVAL; - goto ack; + if (nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN || + skb->len < nlh->nlmsg_len || + nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(struct nfgenmsg)) { + nfnl_err_reset(&err_list); + status |= NFNL_BATCH_FAILURE; + goto done; } /* Only requests are handled by the kernel */ |