diff options
| author | Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> | 2018-04-11 13:27:52 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2018-04-24 09:34:16 +0200 |
| commit | 4dfb3442bb7e1fb80515df4a199ca5a7a8edf900 (patch) | |
| tree | 5f506f0bd86918f14291bce8d6b17ee9401c0d7a | |
| parent | 2e2389a07923a888d6e22337391b08092f213416 (diff) | |
random: fix crng_ready() test
commit 43838a23a05fbd13e47d750d3dfd77001536dd33 upstream.
The crng_init variable has three states:
0: The CRNG is not initialized at all
1: The CRNG has a small amount of entropy, hopefully good enough for
early-boot, non-cryptographical use cases
2: The CRNG is fully initialized and we are sure it is safe for
cryptographic use cases.
The crng_ready() function should only return true once we are in the
last state. This addresses CVE-2018-1108.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Fixes: e192be9d9a30 ("random: replace non-blocking pool...")
Cc: stable@kernel.org # 4.8+
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/random.c | 10 |
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index cf1b91e33a28..4f82fe0789e4 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ struct crng_state primary_crng = { * its value (from 0->1->2). */ static int crng_init = 0; -#define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 0)) +#define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1)) static int crng_init_cnt = 0; #define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2*CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE) static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, @@ -800,7 +800,7 @@ static int crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len) if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags)) return 0; - if (crng_ready()) { + if (crng_init != 0) { spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); return 0; } @@ -872,7 +872,7 @@ static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, { unsigned long v, flags; - if (crng_init > 1 && + if (crng_ready() && time_after(jiffies, crng->init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL)) crng_reseed(crng, crng == &primary_crng ? &input_pool : NULL); spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags); @@ -1153,7 +1153,7 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags) fast_mix(fast_pool); add_interrupt_bench(cycles); - if (!crng_ready()) { + if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) { if ((fast_pool->count >= 64) && crng_fast_load((char *) fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool))) { @@ -2148,7 +2148,7 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count, { struct entropy_store *poolp = &input_pool; - if (!crng_ready()) { + if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) { crng_fast_load(buffer, count); return; } |