summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorEric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>2011-09-19 05:52:27 +0000
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>2011-09-28 13:29:50 -0400
commit16e5726269611b71c930054ffe9b858c1cea88eb (patch)
tree50d25ec97d639b418964bad2f45774d657468c74
parenta9e9fd7182332d0cf5f3e601df3e71dd431b70d7 (diff)
af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default
Since commit 7361c36c5224 (af_unix: Allow credentials to work across user and pid namespaces) af_unix performance dropped a lot. This is because we now take a reference on pid and cred in each write(), and release them in read(), usually done from another process, eventually from another cpu. This triggers false sharing. # Events: 154K cycles # # Overhead Command Shared Object Symbol # ........ ....... .................. ......................... # 10.40% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] put_pid 8.60% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] unix_stream_recvmsg 7.87% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] unix_stream_sendmsg 6.11% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] do_raw_spin_lock 4.95% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] unix_scm_to_skb 4.87% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] pid_nr_ns 4.34% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] cred_to_ucred 2.39% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] unix_destruct_scm 2.24% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] sub_preempt_count 1.75% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] fget_light 1.51% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] __mutex_lock_interruptible_slowpath 1.42% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] sock_alloc_send_pskb This patch includes SCM_CREDENTIALS information in a af_unix message/skb only if requested by the sender, [man 7 unix for details how to include ancillary data using sendmsg() system call] Note: This might break buggy applications that expected SCM_CREDENTIAL from an unaware write() system call, and receiver not using SO_PASSCRED socket option. If SOCK_PASSCRED is set on source or destination socket, we still include credentials for mere write() syscalls. Performance boost in hackbench : more than 50% gain on a 16 thread machine (2 quad-core cpus, 2 threads per core) hackbench 20 thread 2000 4.228 sec instead of 9.102 sec Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Acked-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
-rw-r--r--include/net/scm.h5
-rw-r--r--net/core/scm.c10
-rw-r--r--net/netlink/af_netlink.c5
-rw-r--r--net/unix/af_unix.c24
4 files changed, 33 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 745460fa2f02..d456f4c71a32 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ static __inline__ void scm_set_cred(struct scm_cookie *scm,
struct pid *pid, const struct cred *cred)
{
scm->pid = get_pid(pid);
- scm->cred = get_cred(cred);
+ scm->cred = cred ? get_cred(cred) : NULL;
cred_to_ucred(pid, cred, &scm->creds);
}
@@ -73,8 +73,7 @@ static __inline__ void scm_destroy(struct scm_cookie *scm)
static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
struct scm_cookie *scm)
{
- scm_set_cred(scm, task_tgid(current), current_cred());
- scm->fp = NULL;
+ memset(scm, 0, sizeof(*scm));
unix_get_peersec_dgram(sock, scm);
if (msg->msg_controllen <= 0)
return 0;
diff --git a/net/core/scm.c b/net/core/scm.c
index 811b53fb330e..ff52ad0a5150 100644
--- a/net/core/scm.c
+++ b/net/core/scm.c
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ int __scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *p)
if (err)
goto error;
- if (pid_vnr(p->pid) != p->creds.pid) {
+ if (!p->pid || pid_vnr(p->pid) != p->creds.pid) {
struct pid *pid;
err = -ESRCH;
pid = find_get_pid(p->creds.pid);
@@ -183,8 +183,9 @@ int __scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *p)
p->pid = pid;
}
- if ((p->cred->euid != p->creds.uid) ||
- (p->cred->egid != p->creds.gid)) {
+ if (!p->cred ||
+ (p->cred->euid != p->creds.uid) ||
+ (p->cred->egid != p->creds.gid)) {
struct cred *cred;
err = -ENOMEM;
cred = prepare_creds();
@@ -193,7 +194,8 @@ int __scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *p)
cred->uid = cred->euid = p->creds.uid;
cred->gid = cred->egid = p->creds.gid;
- put_cred(p->cred);
+ if (p->cred)
+ put_cred(p->cred);
p->cred = cred;
}
break;
diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
index 4330db99fabf..1201b6d4183d 100644
--- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
@@ -1324,10 +1324,9 @@ static int netlink_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
if (msg->msg_flags&MSG_OOB)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- if (NULL == siocb->scm) {
+ if (NULL == siocb->scm)
siocb->scm = &scm;
- memset(&scm, 0, sizeof(scm));
- }
+
err = scm_send(sock, msg, siocb->scm);
if (err < 0)
return err;
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index ec68e1c05b85..466fbcc5cf77 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -1381,8 +1381,10 @@ static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
static int unix_scm_to_skb(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb, bool send_fds)
{
int err = 0;
+
UNIXCB(skb).pid = get_pid(scm->pid);
- UNIXCB(skb).cred = get_cred(scm->cred);
+ if (scm->cred)
+ UNIXCB(skb).cred = get_cred(scm->cred);
UNIXCB(skb).fp = NULL;
if (scm->fp && send_fds)
err = unix_attach_fds(scm, skb);
@@ -1392,6 +1394,24 @@ static int unix_scm_to_skb(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb, bool sen
}
/*
+ * Some apps rely on write() giving SCM_CREDENTIALS
+ * We include credentials if source or destination socket
+ * asserted SOCK_PASSCRED.
+ */
+static void maybe_add_creds(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct socket *sock,
+ const struct sock *other)
+{
+ if (UNIXCB(skb).cred)
+ return;
+ if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags) ||
+ !other->sk_socket ||
+ test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &other->sk_socket->flags)) {
+ UNIXCB(skb).pid = get_pid(task_tgid(current));
+ UNIXCB(skb).cred = get_current_cred();
+ }
+}
+
+/*
* Send AF_UNIX data.
*/
@@ -1538,6 +1558,7 @@ restart:
if (sock_flag(other, SOCK_RCVTSTAMP))
__net_timestamp(skb);
+ maybe_add_creds(skb, sock, other);
skb_queue_tail(&other->sk_receive_queue, skb);
if (max_level > unix_sk(other)->recursion_level)
unix_sk(other)->recursion_level = max_level;
@@ -1652,6 +1673,7 @@ static int unix_stream_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
(other->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN))
goto pipe_err_free;
+ maybe_add_creds(skb, sock, other);
skb_queue_tail(&other->sk_receive_queue, skb);
if (max_level > unix_sk(other)->recursion_level)
unix_sk(other)->recursion_level = max_level;