diff options
| author | Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com> | 2008-09-03 01:02:19 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> | 2008-09-08 04:44:25 -0700 |
| commit | 53144b419e176e51157f6b9fc651ab9e733cb000 (patch) | |
| tree | 3bd9d54a8aad8ec89716ccbf8679870b441e43e1 | |
| parent | 97348238e1f470b200d4b810becaaa4147c6db51 (diff) | |
sctp: correct bounds check in sctp_setsockopt_auth_key
[ Upstream commit 328fc47ea0bcc27d9afa69c3ad6e52431cadd76c ]
The bonds check to prevent buffer overlflow was not exactly
right. It still allowed overflow of up to 8 bytes which is
sizeof(struct sctp_authkey).
Since optlen is already checked against the size of that struct,
we are guaranteed not to cause interger overflow either.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sctp/socket.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c index e62aafc320c2..68681fee61a6 100644 --- a/net/sctp/socket.c +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c @@ -3054,7 +3054,7 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_auth_key(struct sock *sk, goto out; } - if (authkey->sca_keylength > optlen) { + if (authkey->sca_keylength > optlen - sizeof(struct sctp_authkey)) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out; } |