diff options
author | Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> | 2016-05-09 15:48:51 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2016-05-09 17:57:12 -0700 |
commit | 0161028b7c8aebef64194d3d73e43bc3b53b5c66 (patch) | |
tree | 6e7ffbfc92345548730fb7b33f8168760f99fa28 /Documentation/sysctl | |
parent | 5c56b563b4486281bff80658194f0d1da6feba67 (diff) |
perf/core: Change the default paranoia level to 2
Allowing unprivileged kernel profiling lets any user dump follow kernel
control flow and dump kernel registers. This most likely allows trivial
kASLR bypassing, and it may allow other mischief as well. (Off the top
of my head, the PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR output during /dev/urandom reads
could be quite interesting.)
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/sysctl')
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt index 57653a44b128..fcddfd5ded99 100644 --- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt +++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt @@ -645,7 +645,7 @@ allowed to execute. perf_event_paranoid: Controls use of the performance events system by unprivileged -users (without CAP_SYS_ADMIN). The default value is 1. +users (without CAP_SYS_ADMIN). The default value is 2. -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users >=0: Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_IOC_LOCK |