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authorCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>2016-01-07 16:07:20 +0000
committerWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>2016-01-25 11:09:06 +0000
commitac15bd63bbb24238f763ec5b24ee175ec301e8cd (patch)
tree225abc2b3094fd8cdcced09d53f9f76fd5d335d2 /arch/arm64/mm
parentf436b2ac90a095746beb6729b8ee8ed87c9eaede (diff)
arm64: Honour !PTE_WRITE in set_pte_at() for kernel mappings
Currently, set_pte_at() only checks the software PTE_WRITE bit for user mappings when it sets or clears the hardware PTE_RDONLY accordingly. The kernel ptes are written directly without any modification, relying solely on the protection bits in macros like PAGE_KERNEL. However, modifying kernel pte attributes via pte_wrprotect() would be ignored by set_pte_at(). Since pte_wrprotect() does not set PTE_RDONLY (it only clears PTE_WRITE), the new permission is not taken into account. This patch changes set_pte_at() to adjust the read-only permission for kernel ptes as well. As a side effect, existing PROT_* definitions used for kernel ioremap*() need to include PTE_DIRTY | PTE_WRITE. (additionally, white space fix for PTE_KERNEL_ROX) Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reported-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm64/mm')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions