Merge tag 'v4.4.121' into toradex_vf_4.4-nextColibri-VF_LXDE-Image_2.8b2.97-20180331

This is the 4.4.121 stable release

1 files changed, 292 insertions, 4 deletions

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index bd17db15a2c1..2bbc74f8a4a8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -9,6 +9,11 @@
  */
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/utsname.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+#include <asm/cmdline.h>
 #include <asm/bugs.h>
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 #include <asm/processor-flags.h>
@@ -16,15 +21,25 @@
 #include <asm/msr.h>
 #include <asm/paravirt.h>
 #include <asm/alternative.h>
+#include <asm/pgtable.h>
+#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
+#include <asm/intel-family.h>
+
+static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
 
 void __init check_bugs(void)
 {
 	identify_boot_cpu();
-#ifndef CONFIG_SMP
-	pr_info("CPU: ");
-	print_cpu_info(&boot_cpu_data);
-#endif
 
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP)) {
+		pr_info("CPU: ");
+		print_cpu_info(&boot_cpu_data);
+	}
+
+	/* Select the proper spectre mitigation before patching alternatives */
+	spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
 	/*
 	 * Check whether we are able to run this kernel safely on SMP.
 	 *
@@ -40,4 +55,277 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 	alternative_instructions();
 
 	fpu__init_check_bugs();
+#else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
+	alternative_instructions();
+
+	/*
+	 * Make sure the first 2MB area is not mapped by huge pages
+	 * There are typically fixed size MTRRs in there and overlapping
+	 * MTRRs into large pages causes slow downs.
+	 *
+	 * Right now we don't do that with gbpages because there seems
+	 * very little benefit for that case.
+	 */
+	if (!direct_gbpages)
+		set_memory_4k((unsigned long)__va(0), 1);
+#endif
+}
+
+/* The kernel command line selection */
+enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd {
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE,
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO,
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE,
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE,
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC,
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD,
+};
+
+static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] = {
+	[SPECTRE_V2_NONE]			= "Vulnerable",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL]		= "Vulnerable: Minimal generic ASM retpoline",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD]	= "Vulnerable: Minimal AMD ASM retpoline",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC]		= "Mitigation: Full generic retpoline",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD]		= "Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline",
+};
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Spectre V2 : " fmt
+
+static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
+
+
+#ifdef RETPOLINE
+static bool spectre_v2_bad_module;
+
+bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline)
+{
+	if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE || has_retpoline)
+		return true;
+
+	pr_err("System may be vulnerable to spectre v2\n");
+	spectre_v2_bad_module = true;
+	return false;
+}
+
+static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void)
+{
+	return spectre_v2_bad_module ? " - vulnerable module loaded" : "";
+}
+#else
+static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) { return ""; }
+#endif
+
+static void __init spec2_print_if_insecure(const char *reason)
+{
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
+		pr_info("%s selected on command line.\n", reason);
+}
+
+static void __init spec2_print_if_secure(const char *reason)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
+		pr_info("%s selected on command line.\n", reason);
+}
+
+static inline bool retp_compiler(void)
+{
+	return __is_defined(RETPOLINE);
+}
+
+static inline bool match_option(const char *arg, int arglen, const char *opt)
+{
+	int len = strlen(opt);
+
+	return len == arglen && !strncmp(arg, opt, len);
+}
+
+static const struct {
+	const char *option;
+	enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd;
+	bool secure;
+} mitigation_options[] = {
+	{ "off",               SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE,              false },
+	{ "on",                SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE,             true },
+	{ "retpoline",         SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE,         false },
+	{ "retpoline,amd",     SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD,     false },
+	{ "retpoline,generic", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, false },
+	{ "auto",              SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO,              false },
+};
+
+static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
+{
+	char arg[20];
+	int ret, i;
+	enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+
+	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2"))
+		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
+	else {
+		ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg,
+					  sizeof(arg));
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options); i++) {
+			if (!match_option(arg, ret, mitigation_options[i].option))
+				continue;
+			cmd = mitigation_options[i].cmd;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options)) {
+			pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg);
+			return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE ||
+	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD ||
+	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC) &&
+	    !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) {
+		pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+		       mitigation_options[i].option);
+		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+	}
+
+	if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD &&
+	    boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
+		pr_err("retpoline,amd selected but CPU is not AMD. Switching to AUTO select\n");
+		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+	}
+
+	if (mitigation_options[i].secure)
+		spec2_print_if_secure(mitigation_options[i].option);
+	else
+		spec2_print_if_insecure(mitigation_options[i].option);
+
+	return cmd;
 }
+
+/* Check for Skylake-like CPUs (for RSB handling) */
+static bool __init is_skylake_era(void)
+{
+	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
+	    boot_cpu_data.x86 == 6) {
+		switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) {
+		case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE:
+		case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP:
+		case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X:
+		case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE:
+		case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP:
+			return true;
+		}
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+	enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
+	enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the CPU is not affected and the command line mode is NONE or AUTO
+	 * then nothing to do.
+	 */
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2) &&
+	    (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE || cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO))
+		return;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE:
+		return;
+
+	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO:
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
+			goto retpoline_auto;
+		break;
+	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD:
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
+			goto retpoline_amd;
+		break;
+	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC:
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
+			goto retpoline_generic;
+		break;
+	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE:
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
+			goto retpoline_auto;
+		break;
+	}
+	pr_err("kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
+	return;
+
+retpoline_auto:
+	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
+	retpoline_amd:
+		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) {
+			pr_err("LFENCE not serializing. Switching to generic retpoline\n");
+			goto retpoline_generic;
+		}
+		mode = retp_compiler() ? SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD :
+					 SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD;
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD);
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
+	} else {
+	retpoline_generic:
+		mode = retp_compiler() ? SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC :
+					 SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL;
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
+	}
+
+	spectre_v2_enabled = mode;
+	pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
+
+	/*
+	 * If neither SMEP or KPTI are available, there is a risk of
+	 * hitting userspace addresses in the RSB after a context switch
+	 * from a shallow call stack to a deeper one. To prevent this fill
+	 * the entire RSB, even when using IBRS.
+	 *
+	 * Skylake era CPUs have a separate issue with *underflow* of the
+	 * RSB, when they will predict 'ret' targets from the generic BTB.
+	 * The proper mitigation for this is IBRS. If IBRS is not supported
+	 * or deactivated in favour of retpolines the RSB fill on context
+	 * switch is required.
+	 */
+	if ((!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_KAISER) &&
+	     !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMEP)) || is_skylake_era()) {
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
+		pr_info("Filling RSB on context switch\n");
+	}
+}
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
+ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev,
+			  struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
+		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_KAISER))
+		return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: PTI\n");
+	return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev,
+			    struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1))
+		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+	return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
+			    struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
+		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+
+	return sprintf(buf, "%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
+		       spectre_v2_module_string());
+}
+#endif